Must-Read: The Puzzling Aversion to Expansionary Fiscal Policy: ‘Low interest rates are not really low’, or something…
:Tag: Macroeconomics
Must-Read: Antonio Fatás and Lawrence H. Summers: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations
Must-Read: The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations: “The global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of GDP in all advanced economies…
:…At the same time, and in response to rising government debt levels, many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates. We empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regarding fiscal policy multipliers. Our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy. The large size of the effects points in the direction of self-defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by DeLong and Summers (2012). Attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to GDP ratio through their long-term negative impact on output.
Must-Read: Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji: Animal Spirits and the Optimal Inflation Target
Must-Read: Animal Spirits and the Optimal Inflation Target: “Low inflation targets can cause economies to hit the zero lower bound during deflationary periods caused by even mild shocks…
:…In such circumstances, central banks lose their ability to stimulate the economy. This column assesses the risk of this happening using a model that endogenises self-perpetuating optimism and pessimism in the economy. Given agents’ intrinsic chronic pessimism during times of recession, central banks should raise their inflation targets to 3 or 4% to preserve their ability to stimulate the economy when needed.
Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: Three Antidotes to the Brexit Crisis
Must-Read: Correct, IMHO, from the very sharp Narayana Kocherlakota. Now perhaps his successor Neel Kashkari and the other Reserve Bank presidents not named Charlie Evans might give him some back up?
The one thing I do not like is Narayana’s “Granted, there is a risk that such steps will spook markets by signaling that the Fed is concerned about the state of the U.S. financial system.” That sentence seems to me to misread market psychology completely. As I see it–and as the people in markets I talk to say–right now markets are fairly completely spooked by their belief that the Federal Reserve is unconcerned, and takes that lack of concern as a sign of Federal Reserve detachment from reality. Narayana’s following sentences seems to me to be highly likely to be the right take: “I’d say the markets are already pretty spooked” and “By demonstrating that it is paying attention to these obvious signals, the Fed can help to bolster confidence in its economic management”.
Let me stress that, at least from where I sit, that confidence in Federal Reserve economic management is, right now, lacking.
The people I talk to in financial markets tend to say that they believe markets took Stan Fischer on January 5 to be something of a wake-up call with respect to Fed groupthink:
Liesman: When I looked at where the market is priced, the market is priced below where the Fed median forecast is. Quite a bit. Two rate hikes really, if you count them in quarter points. Does that concern you that the market needs to catch up with where the Fed is or is it a matter of you think the Fed needs to recalibrate to where the market is?
Fischer: Well, we watch what the market thinks, but we can’t be led by what the market thinks. We’ve got to make our own analysis. We make our own analysis and our analysis says that the market is underestimating where we are going to be. You know, you can’t rule out that there is some probability they are right because there’s uncertainty. But we think that they are too low.
For eight straight years now the Federal Reserve has been more optimistic than the markets. And for eight straight years now the markets have been closer to being correct. And yet the Federal Reserve still believes that it “can’t be led by what the market thinks” and has “got to make our own analysis”? Why?
Three Antidotes to the Brexit Crisis: “The Fed should ensure that banks have enough loss-absorbing equity capital…
:…not allow them to return equity to shareholders…. The measure should apply to all banks, so markets won’t read it as a signal about individual institutions’ relative strength. Second, there’s a risk that investors’ flight to safe assets could develop into a broader credit freeze. To mitigate this, the Fed should lower its short-term interest-rate target…. Finally, the Fed should consider reviving the Term Auction Facility, which allows banks to borrow funds from the central bank with less of the stigma…. Granted, there is a risk that such steps will spook markets by signaling that the Fed is concerned about the state of the U.S. financial system. That said, as an outsider who gets much of his information from Twitter, I’d say the markets are already pretty spooked. By demonstrating that it is paying attention to these obvious signals, the Fed can help to bolster confidence in its economic management. One important lesson of the last financial crisis is that the guarantors of stability must be proactive if they want to be effective. It’s time for the Fed to put that lesson into practice.
Must-Read: John Authers: Yield on 10-Yr U.S. Treasury…
Must-Read: That the Brexit vote would deliver a substantial leftward IS shock to the global economy was not very foreseeable. But that something could deliver such a shock was very foreseeable indeed.
Do not be reassured by the recovery of the stock market: P = D/(r-g). That the stock market has not gone up as a result of Brexit indicates that the lower interest rates expected in the long run (r) have been offset by the lower growth rate of profit due to additional expected economic weakness (g).
By now Yellen and Bernanke before her have had three full Reserve Bank president-appointment cycles–2006, 2011, and 2016–to get the non-Governor members of the FOMC on the page. It is no longer credible to claim that technocratic imperatives of ideal monetary policy have to bow to the requirements of maintaining committee consensus to promote banking-sector confidence with the Fed.
If financial markets were going to scream any louder that a régime shift to a less deflationary monetary policy régime is called for, how would they do that?
:This is a big deal: Yield on 10-year US Treasury bond closes at a record low of 1.367% amid global econ uncertainty https://t.co/A33Awb7yed
— John Authers (@johnauthers) July 5, 2016
Must-Read: Jamie Chisholm: Treasury Yields Hit Record Lows
Must-Read: May I please have a theory from the Federal Reserve–I am not asking for much: just a theory–as to why they continue to be confident that their models are a better guide to likely futures than financial markets, and as to why they continue to regard the lower tail of outcomes as something that can be handled if and when it happens rather than something they need to be desperately clawing away from as fast as they can?
Treasury Yields Hit Record Lows: “The 10-year Treasury yield is down 7 basis points to 1.39 per cent…
:…earlier touching 1.377 per cent, its most meagre offering on record. The 30-year Treasury yield also hit an all-time low of 2.14 per cent. Equivalent maturity German Bunds and UK gilts are down 3bp to minus 0.17 per cent and off 4bp to 0.80 per cent, respectively — also flirting with record lows. The Bank of England has already said it is likely to loosen policy further in coming months, and governor Mark Carney on Tuesday said banks could stop building up rainy-day funds in an attempt to support lending. Shares in real estate companies, life insurers and housebuilders are leading declines in London, following the Standard Life news. Miners are under pressure too, as the ‘risk off’ mood batters commodities, with base metals lower and Brent crude down 3.6 per cent to $48.31 a barrel.
Must-Read: Duncan Weldon: Five Thoughts on Brexit
Must-Read: Five Thoughts on Brexit:
:
- British politics now has a big dose of Syriza thinking. ‘Respect our democratic mandate’ doesn’t work when you’re dealing with 27 other democratically elected governments.
- I have no idea what the final settlement looks like. No one does.
- We won’t get any clarity in the next few months. The Tory leadership contest will at best give a small signal, but really it’s noise. The next PM will be selected by a membership of leave supporters and the candidates will pitch to that. All will offer a fantasy that the EU is unlikely to agree to.
- British politics is in flux. The next Tory leader faces having to make a tough choice: disappoint the membership and traditional Tory voters or lose the City. The broad coalition of social conservatives and economic liberals that form the party may not be able to survive this choice. Labour faces similar pressures. Handled badly, this go see a UKIP surge – not into power but into a much stronger position in Parliament.
- Finally – I think the UK’s actions will ultimately be good for EU unity. Others will be less inclined to follow our example if it is painful (and that’s without the additional problems of leaving Schengen or the euro). It isn’t hard to imagine the Eurozone doubling down now and building the kind of institutions that the zone needs to work.
Must-Read: Olivier Blanchard: Boasting a Bit…
Must-Read: Boasting a bit…:
:@ojblanchard1 Congratulations Prof.Blanchard – my call too! Let's hope we remain correct
(Richard Griffiths Sloan 86).— Richard Griffiths (@InvestStratWire) July 1, 2016
Must-Read: Ryan Avent: Everything Is Not OK
Must-Read: Everything Is Not OK: “Things might or might not be ok in the long run….
:…[But] in the short run, there is plenty to worry about…. Yields around the world were already extraordinarily low before the Brexit vote. In the days immediately after they plummeted. While equities have risen, bond yields have not. The yield on the 10-year US Treasury is 30 basis points below where it was on June 23rd. The real yield is close to zero. The 10-year gilt yield is below 1%. The yield on 10-year bonds in Germany, France and the Netherlands are basically zero. Falling yields on safe assets indicate some combination of falling expectations for growth, falling expectations for inflation and a rising risk premium….
The range of possibilities has widened, and the odds of quite a bad outcome have increased. Worryingly, central banks have very little room to respond…. Neither short- nor long-term rates can be pushed much lower. The best hope for effective monetary stimulus is asset purchases designed to weaken a country’s currency. But not everyone can depreciate simultaneously…. Quantitative easing everywhere could help if it boosted expectations for growth and inflation. But at the zero lower bound and with little hope of massive fiscal stimulus, central banks might well struggle to raise animal spirits. In a world of very low inflation and very low interest rates, people only have to cling a little more tightly to their money to tip economies into recession…
What I Saw and Did Not See About the Macroeconomic Situation Eight Years Ago: Hoisted from the Archives
Hoisted from the Archives from June 2008The Macroeconomic Situation, with added commentary:
(June 2008):Looking back, what did I get right or wrong back eight years ago when I was talking about the economy? I said:
- That the best way to think about things was that we were in a 19th-century financial crisis, and so we should look way back to understand things (RIGHT)
- That a recession had started (RIGHT), which would probably be only a short and shallow recession (WRONG!!!!)
- That the Federal Reserve understood (MAYBE) that it has screwed the pooch by failing to prudentially regulate shadow banks, especially in the housing sector (RIGHT), but that it would shortly fix things (MAYBE).
- That the Federal Reserve was still trying to raise interest rates (RIGHT).
- That the Federal Reserve should not be trying to raise interest rates (RIGHT), because the tight coupling between headline inflation today and core inflation tomorrow that it feared and expected had not been seen for 25 years (RIGHT).
- That central bank charters are always drawn up to make financial markets confident that they are tightly bound not to give in to pressure and validate inflation (RIGHT).
- That, nevertheless, when the rubber hit the road and financial crisis came there was ample historical precedent that central banks were not strictly bound by the terms of their charters–that they were guidelines and not rules (RIGHT).
- That the Federal Reserve understood these historical precedents (WRONG) and would, with little hesitation, take actions ultra vires to avoid a major financial and economic collapse (WRONG).
- That there was a long-standing tradition opposed to central banks’ taking action to stem financial crisis and depression–a Marx-Hayek-Mellon-Hoover axis, if yo will (RIGHT).
- That this axis thought that business cycle downturns were always generated by real-side imbalances that had to be faced via pain and liquidation–could not be papered over by financial prestidigitation (RIGHT).
- But that this axis was wrong: business cycle downturns, even those to a large degree generated by real-side imbalances, could be papered over by financial prestidigitation (RIGHT).
- That even though the Fed and the Treasury believed that interest rates should still go up a little bit, they were also engaged in unleashing a huge tsunami of financial liquidity upon the economy (RIGHT).
- That this liquidity tsunami was appropriate as an attempt to maintain full employment response to the collapse in construction and to the great increase in financial risk (RIGHT).
- That this liquidity tsunami would do the job, and the recession would be short and shallow (WRONG!!!!!!!!)
- That the runup in oil prices was not a speculative bubble that would be rapidly unwound (RIGHT).
- That the runup in oil prices was a headwind for real growth (RIGHT).
- That the dollar was headed for substantial depreciation (WRONG).
- That the housing price and housing construction shocks to the economy were still ongoing (RIGHT).
- That for those with a long time horizon equities were fairly valued, offering higher returns than other asset classes, if risky returns (RIGHT).
- That asset prices would fluctuate (RIGHT).
But I did not, even in June 2008, understand (a) how bad the derivatives books of the major money-center banks were, and (b) how weak the commitment of central banks to doing whatever was necessary to stabilize the growth path of nominal GDP was.