What to teach the undergraduates about business cycles

Let me promote this to “highlighted” status, and flag it: it is time I once again tried to think hard about just what the “macro” weeks of introductory economics are for:

Time to Start Teaching the Undergraduates About Business Cycles: How to begin? What is the vision I went them to take away and remember?

How about this:

For some reason–it can be any of a large number of reasons, this time it is the blowback from excessive leverage and irrational exuberance, but it can be for any of a large number of reasons–the people in the economy decide that they are spending too much on currently-produced goods and services. They decide that they want to spend less and so build up their holdings of financial assets. People cut back on their spending on currently-produced goods and services, planning to use the margin they will create between income and spending to build up their holdings of financial assets.

The problem is that one person’s spending is another person’s production, and that one person’s production is another person’s income. Businesses see demand for what they produce fall off. They see their inventories of unsold goods rise. Businesses thus lay workers off in order to avoid making even more stuff that they cannot sell: production falls.

And as production falls businesses stop paying the workers they have laid off: incomes fall.

People spend what they had planned on currently-produced goods and services. But they find that their incomes are less than they had thought they would be. Thus the margin they had hoped to create between their incomes and their spending does not exist. People find that they have not managed to carry out their plans to build up their holdings of financial assets. But they still want to. So people try to cut back on their spending on currently produce goods and services yet again to build up their holdings of financial assets. And the process repeats. Spending, production, and incomes fall again.

Why don’t spending and production and incomes and production fall to zero in this downward spiral?
Because at some point incomes drop so low that people give up on the idea of building up their stocks of financial assets.
They still would like to build up their stocks of financial assets–if their incomes were normal. But keeping their standard of living from falling too much becomes a higher priority.

The economy settles down at a spot where spending on currently-produced goods and services once again equals production and income. It finds itself at a short-run macroeconomic equilibrium where inventories are neither rising and causing businesses to fire more workers or falling and causing businesses to hire more workers. This equilibrium, however, has a lot of unemployment: a lot of unemployed workers looking for jobs, and few vacancies looking for workers.

How bad do things get as a result of this collective decision to try to build up stocks of financial assets?

For that we need to build an economic model. And we need to build different economic model then the production function base growth economic model we been dealing with over the past two weeks…

No: We can’t wave a magic demand wand now and get the recovery we threw away in 2009

The estimable Mike Konczal writes:

Mike Konczal: Dissecting the CEA Letter and Sanders’s Other Proposals: “I would have done Gerald Friedman’s paper backwards…

…He gives a giant headline number and then you have to work into the text and the footnotes to gather all the details. But a core assumption within the paper is that we are capable of getting back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand. We can get the recovery we should have gotten in 2009…

He is wrong.

We cannot get back to the 2007 trend GDP through demand alone.

For one thing, demand for investment spending has now been low for almost a decade. Since 2007, we have foregone relative to the then-trend:

  1. 16%-point-years of GDP of housing investment.
  2. 6%-point-years of GDP of equipment investment
  3. 5%-point-years of government purchases–of which roughly half have been investments.
  4. 4% of our labor force from their attachments to the labor market.
  5. A hard-to-quantify amount of development of business models and practices.
FRED Graph FRED St Louis Fed

These are principal causes of “hysteresis”. I do not believe that the output gap is the zero that the Federal Reserve currently thinks it is. But it is very unlikely to be anywhere near the 12% of GDP needed to support 4%/year real growth through demand along over the next two presidential terms.

We could bend the potential growth curve upward slowly and gradually through policies that boosted investment and boosted the rate of innovation. But it would be very difficult indeed to make up all the potential output-growth ground that we have failed to gain during the past decade of the years that the locust hath eaten

Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue”

Must-Read: Very nice. But why “Galilean”, Gavyn? I do note that in the end Gavyn’s “insider” argument boils down to “we must keep the hawks on the FOMC on board with policy”, which is a declaration that:

  1. The Obama administration has made truly serious mistakes in speed of action and in personnel in its Fed governor nominations;
  2. The Bernanke-Yellen Board of Governors has made truly serious mistakes in Fed Bank President selection; and
  3. The high priority given to keeping (nearly) the entire FOMC on board with the policy path should, perhaps, be revisited.

Also, “we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time” is simply incoherent: sunk costs do not matter for future actions.

The dialogue:

Gavyn Davies: Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue: “As Paul Krugman pointed out a year ago…

…a sharp difference of views about US monetary policy has developed between two camps of Keynesians who normally agree about almost everything. What makes this interesting is that, in this division of opinion, the fault line often seems to be determined by the professional location of the economists concerned. Those outside the Federal Reserve (eg Lawrence Summers, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong) tend to adopt a strongly dovish view, while those inside the central bank (eg Janet Yellen, Stanley Fischer, William Dudley, John Williams) have lately taken a more hawkish line about the need to ‘normalise’ the level of interest rates [1]. My colleague David Blake suggested that this blog should carry a Galilean ‘Dialogue’ between representatives of the two camps. Galileo is unavailable this week, but here goes”

Fed Insider: The US has now reached full employment and the labour market remains firm. The Phillips Curve still exists, so wage inflation is headed higher. Core inflation is not far below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. While the economy is therefore close to normal, interest rates are far below normal, so there should be a predisposition to tighten monetary conditions gradually from here. That would still leave monetary policy far more accommodative than normal for a long period of time.

Fed Outsider: I am not so sure about the Phillips Curve. It seems much flatter than it was in earlier decades. But in any case you do not seem to have noticed that the economy is slowing down. This is probably because of the increase in the dollar, which has tightened monetary conditions much more than the Fed intended. The Fed should not make this slowdown worse by raising domestic interest rates as well.

Insider: I concede that the economy has slowed, and I am worried about the tightening in financial conditions caused by the dollar. But I think that this will prove temporary. The dollar effect will not get much worse from here, and the economy has also been affected by inventory shedding and the drop in shale oil investment. As these effects subside, GDP growth will return to above 2 per cent. The pace of employment growth may slow, but remember that payrolls need to grow by under 100,000 per month to keep unemployment constant at the natural rate. Some slowdown is not only inevitable, it is desirable.

Outsider: I do not know how you can be so confident that growth will recover. All your forecasts for growth in recent years have proven far too optimistic. You should be worried that the economy is stuck in a secular stagnation trap. The equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the actual rate of interest. To emerge from secular stagnation, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising them.

Insider: The case for secular stagnation is a bit extreme. Economies tend to return to equilibrium after shocks. The US has been held back by a series of major headwinds since 2009, but these are now abating. Fiscal policy is easing, the euro shock is healing and deleveraging is ending. As these headwinds abate, the equilibrium real rate of interest will return to its normal level around 1.5 per cent, so the nominal Fed funds rate should be 3.5 per cent. It is right to warn people now that this is likely to happen.

Outsider: The hawkish forward guidance shown in your ‘dot plot’ will slow demand growth further. It is unnecessary – in fact, outright damaging. I am pleased that you are rethinking the presentation of the dots. But, more important, the economic recovery is already long in the tooth. There is a 60 percent chance of a recession within 2 years. In a normal recession, the Fed has to cut interest rates by 4 percentage points. Because of the zero lower bound, it will not be able to do so in the next recession, so it needs to avoid a recession at all costs.

Insider: Oh dear. Recoveries do not die of old age, as Glenn Rudebusch at the San Francisco Fed has just conclusively proved. Expansions, like Peter Pan, do not grow old. Provided that we avoid a build up of inflation pressures, or excessive risk taking in markets, there is no reason to believe that this recovery will spontaneously run out of steam. It is much more likely to persist.

Outsider: Maybe, but have you ever considered the possibility that you might be wrong? The future path of the equilibrium interest rate is subject to huge uncertainty, as your own estimations demonstrate. If you kill this recovery, it will subsequently be impossible to use monetary policy to get out of recession. If, on the other hand, you allow inflation to rise, you can easily bring it back under control, simply by raising interest rates. So the risks are not symmetrical.

Insider: Well, we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time. And anyway I do not agree with you about inflation risks. If we allow inflation to become embedded in the system, we will then have to raise interest rates abruptly. That is the most likely way that this recovery can end in a severe recession.

Outsider: Inflation cannot rise permanently unless inflation expectations rise as well. In case you have not noticed, inflation expectations have been falling and are now out of line with your 2 per cent inflation target. This is dangerous because real (inflation adjusted) interest rates are actually rising when they should be falling.

Insider: I used to worry a lot about the inflation expectations built into the bond market, but I now think that these are affected by market imperfections that should be downplayed. Inflation expectations in the household and corporate sectors are still broadly in line with the Fed target. And, anyway, I am increasingly concerned that inflation could rise because productivity growth is now so low. With the economy at full employment, inflation pressures could be building, even with GDP growth still very subdued.

Outsider: I am also very worried about the slowdown in productivity growth. But I think this could be happening because you have allowed the actual GDP growth rate to be so low for so long. Because of hysteresis, you may be making things progressively worse. You may have permanently shifted the equilibrium of the economy in a bad direction.

Insider: I am not so sure about this hysteresis stuff. I would not rule it out entirely. But you cannot rely on the Fed to solve all of our economic problems. At the moment, the Fed’s main priority is to return monetary policy to normal, and I am determined to continue this process unless something really bad happens to the economy.

Outsider: In that case, something bad is quite likely to happen. It seems that it will take a disaster to shake your orthodoxy. Do you really want to be responsible for making a historic economic mistake?

Insider: It is easy for you on the outside to make dramatic points like that. If you had been entrusted with the responsibility of office, you would be more circumspect. Although we went to the same graduate school, we are now in different positions. The hawks on the FOMC need to be kept on board with the majority. And I do not want to inflame the Fed’s Republican critics in Congress by appearing soft on inflation. That means I sometimes have to make difficult compromises that you do not have to make.

Outsider: The hawks are giving too much weight to the health of the banks. You should be worrying more about Main Street, and less about Wall Street.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “What Have We Learned since 2008?”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned since 2008?: “Some annoying propositions…

…”Complex” econometrics never convinces anyone. “Complex” includes multiple regression. Natural experiments rule. But so do “surprising” ex-ante predictions that come true…. “In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences.” — Frank Graham…. Demand side: The liquidity trap as a baseline…. Predictions: * Little or no effect of even very large increases in monetary base. * No crowding out from deficits * Large fiscal multipliers. These were controversial predictions!….

Very little effect of monetary expansion. Certainly no inflation. Did QE do anything?… Feel the [debt] crowding out!… Things we didn’t expect: crucial role of liquidity…. Things we didn’t expect: negative rates…. But there is still presumably a lower bound set by storage costs for currency….

The supply side: what was the baseline? Probably the accelerationist Phillips curve…. But what’s missing is the acceleration, not the unemployment => inflation causation…. Strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (courtesy Olivier Blanchard)…. Things we didn’t expect: Very strong hysteresis (maybe)….

What is the post-2008 experience trying to tell us? * Liquidity-trap economics passes with flying colors. * Fiscal policy effectiveness confirmed. * Monetary iffy at best. * Neo-paleo-Keynesian aggregate supply in short run. * Long run seems to reinforce, not diminish, that case.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Living with Monetary Impotence”

Must-Read: [And no sooner do I write:]

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now…

But Paul Krugman goes full (1) as well:

Paul Krugman: Living with Monetary Impotence: “Check our low, low rates…

… Fiscal policy has been effective but procyclical…. Monetary policy has been countercyclical but ineffective…. Lender of last resort matters…. Otherwise, not so much…. Open market vs. open mouth operations…. String theory is hard to explain…. Surprise implication: stagnation is contagious.

Quantitative easing: Walking the walk without talking the talk?

The extremely sharp Joe Gagnon is approaching the edge of shrillness: He seeks to praise the Bank of Japan for what it has done, and yet stress and stress again that what it has done is far too little than it should and needs to do:

Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push… The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages…. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen…. The paradox of quantitative easing… is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later…. If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Those of us who are, like me, broadly in Joe Gagnon’s camp are now having to grapple with an unexpected intellectual shock. When 2010 came around and when the “Recovery Summers” and “V-Shaped Recoveries” that had been confidently predicted by others refused to arrive, we once again reached back to the 1930s. We remembered the reflationary policies of Neville Chamberlain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Takahashi Korekiyo, and Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht gave us considerable confidence that quantitative easing supported by promises that reflation was the goal of policy would be effective. They had been ineffective in the major catastrophe of the Great Depression. They should, we thought, also be effective in the less-major catastrophe that we started by calling the “Great Recession”, but should now have shifted to calling the “Lesser Depression”, and in all likelihood will soon be calling the “Longer Depression”.

Narayana Kocherlakota’s view, if I grasp it correctly, is that in the United States the Federal Reserve has walked the quantitative-easing walk but not talked the quantitative-easing talk. Increases in interest rates to start the normalization process have always been promised a couple of years in the future. Federal Reserve policymakers have avoided even casual flirtation with the ideas of seeking a reversal of any of the fall of nominal GDP or the price level vis-a-vis its pre-2008 trend. Federal Reserve policymakers have consistently adopted a rhetorical posture that tells observers that an overshoot of inflation above 2%/year on the PCE would be cause for action, while an undershoot is… well, as often as not, cause for wait-and-see because the situation will probably normalize to 2%/year on its own.

By contrast, Neville Chamberlain was very clear that it was the policy of H.M. Government to raise the price level in order to raise the nominal tax take in order to support the burden of amortizing Britain’s WWI debt. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not at all clear about what he was doing in total, but he was very clear that raising commodity prices so that American producers could earn more money was a key piece of it. Takahashi Korekiyo. And all had supportive rather than austere and oppositional fiscal authorities behind them.

But, we thought, monetary policy has really powerful tools expectations-management and asset-supply management tools at its disposal. They should be able to make not just a difference but a big difference. And yet…

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now. But the failure of the Abenomics situation to have developed fully to Japan’s advantage as I had expected makes me wonder: under what circumstances should I being opening my mind to and placing positive probability on (3)?

(AP Photo/Koji Sasahara)

Must-read: Joe Gagnon: “The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction”

Must-Read: Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push…. On January 29, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced a complicated program to pay different rates of interest on tranches of deposits that banks hold with the BOJ…. Financial markets quickly reacted positively: Real bond yields fell, the yen fell, and stock prices rose. But much of these gains were erased in subsequent days, probably because markets came to believe the effects of the new policy would be small…. Ten-year inflation compensation is now only 0.5 percent, a clear message that markets expect the BOJ to fail to deliver 2 percent inflation….

A shift from 0.1 to -0.1 percent on a small fraction of BOJ deposits is a tiny move…. The BOJ should move to -0.75 percent on future increases in deposits, while paying 0 percent on the current stock of deposits. The BOJ’s program of asset purchases since 2013 moved the best measure of core inflation (consumer prices excluding energy and fresh food) from nearly -1 percent to more than 1 percent. This is about two-thirds of the way to its goal…. But the BOJ cannot afford to make only tiny adjustments to its policies at this time…. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages recently recommended by Olivier Blanchard and Adam Posen in the Nikkei Asian Review. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen….

The paradox of quantitative easing in the past seven years is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later than those central banks that embraced it earlier (the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve). If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Must-read: Narayana Kocherlakota: “What We’ve Learned About Unconventional Monetary Policy”

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota has been on quite a roll recently:

Narayana Kocherlakota: What We’ve Learned About Unconventional Monetary Policy: “Lesson 1: Even over relatively long periods of time…

…unconventional monetary policy tools don’t have extreme downside risks…. Lesson 2: Central banks are able to guide inflation close to its desired level using unconventional tools…. One could certainly ask: why was the FOMC consistently aiming for such a low inflation rate in this time frame, given that they expected such a high unemployment rate? (I have posed that question here.) But let’s leave that question aside. Throughout much of the 2008-10 period, many observers outside of the Fed expressed strong concerns about the risk of unduly high or unduly low inflation. Given that level of background uncertainty, I would say that the FOMC did a very good job at using unconventional tools to achieve what policymakers wanted in terms of inflation outcomes. Lesson 3: Hitting inflation objectives does not translate into hitting growth objectives…

Plus:

Narayana Kocherlakota: Interest Rate Increases Are Hard to Undo?: “Yellen made the following statement…

I do not expect that the FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee] is going to be soon in the situation where it is necessary to cut rates….

I argue that her statement suggests that the FOMC’s policy moves will be inappropriately insensitive to adverse information about the evolution of the economy…. There’s some set of economic conditions for which a range of a quarter to half a percent for the target range for the fed funds rate is appropriate. Under an appropriately data-sensitive approach… the FOMC should slightly lower the fed funds rate target range if it confronts a slightly worse set of economic conditions [than that]…. If a move of zero is highly likely, surely a downward move of a quarter percent point should be more than a little possible? But Chair Yellen’s statement suggests that this isn’t the way that the FOMC is thinking about the situation…. She seems to be saying that it will take a pretty bad turn of events for the FOMC to be willing to reverse its December move.  Such an approach means that the FOMC’s December has created a new higher floor….

The FOMC could be a lot more data-sensitive than I’ve described when it considers interest rate cuts. Failing that, the other response is to realize that any future rate increase will push upwards on the new soft floor.  That realization should make the FOMC very cautious about undertaking any future rate increase.

And:

Narayana Kocherlakota: Negative Rates: A Gigantic Fiscal Policy Failure: “Since October 2015, I’ve argued that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)…

…should reduce the target range for the fed funds rate below zero. Such a move would be appropriate for three reasons:

  • It would facilitate a more rapid return of inflation to target.
  • It would help reduce labor market slack more rapidly.
  • It would slow and hopefully reverse the ongoing and dangerous slide in inflation expectations. 

So, going negative is daring but appropriate monetary policy. But it is a sign of a terrible policy failure by fiscal policymakers.

The reason that the FOMC has to go negative is because the natural real rate of interest r* (defined to be the real interest rate consistent with the FOMC’s mandated inflation and employment goals) is so low.   The low natural real interest rate is a signal that households and businesses around the world desperately want to buy and hold debt issued by the US government. (Yes, there is already a lot of that debt out there – but its high price is a clear signal that still more should be issued.)  The US government should be issuing that debt that the public wants so desperately and using the proceeds to undertake investments of social value.

But maybe there are no such investments?  That’s a tough argument to sustain quantitatively.  The current market real interest rate – which I would argue is actually above the natural real rate r* – is about 1% out to thirty years.  This low natural real rate represents an incredible opportunity for the US. We can afford to do more to ensure that all of our cities have safe water for our children to drink.  We can afford to do more to ensure that our nuclear power plants won’t spring leaks.  We can afford to do more to ensure that our bridges won’t collapse under commuters.

These opportunities barely scratch the surface.  With a 30-year r* below 1%, our government can afford to make progress on a myriad of social problems.  It is choosing not to. 

If the government issued more debt and undertook these opportunities, it would push up r*.  That would make life easier for monetary policymakers, because they could achieve their mandated objectives with higher nominal interest rates. But, more importantly, the change in fiscal policy would make life a lot better for all of us. 

I don’t think that Chair Yellen will say the above in her Humphrey-Hawkins testimony tomorrow – but I also think that it would be great if she did.

Narayana Kocherlakota: Dovish Actions Require Dovish Talk (To Be Effective): “The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has bought a lot of assets and kept interest rates extraordinarily low…

…Yet all of this stimulus has accomplished surprisingly little (for example, inflation and inflation expectations remain below target and are expected to do so for years to come)…. Over the past seven years, the FOMC’s has consistently talked hawkish while acting dovish. This communications approach has weakened the effectiveness of policy choices, probably in a significant way…. In December 2008, the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate target range to 0 to a quarter percent. It did not raise the target range until December 2015, when the unemployment rate had fallen back down to 5%.   But – with the benefit of hindsight – a shocking amount of this eight years’ worth of unprecedented stimulus was wasted, because it was largely unanticipated by financial markets…

Must-read: David Glasner: “Competitive Devaluation Plus Monetary Expansion Does Create a Free Lunch”

Must-Read: The very sharp David Glasner says–correctly–that currency war is different from war-war. War war is a negative sum game. Currency war is a positive-sum game:

David Glasner: Competitive Devaluation Plus Monetary Expansion Does Create a Free Lunch: “Hawtrey explained why competitive devaluation in the 1930s was–and in my view still is–not a problem…

…Because the value of gold was not stable after Britain left the gold standard and depreciated its currency, the deflationary effect in other countries was mistakenly attributed to the British depreciation. But Hawtrey points out that this reasoning was backwards. The fall in prices in the rest of the world was caused by deflationary measures that were increasing the demand for gold and causing prices in terms of gold to continue to fall, as they had been since 1929. It was the fall in prices in terms of gold that was causing the pound to depreciate, not the other way around….

Depreciating your currency cushions the fall in nominal income and aggregate demand. If aggregate demand is kept stable, then the increased output, income, and employment associated with a falling exchange rate will spill over into a demand for the exports of other countries and an increase in the home demand for exportable home products. So it’s a win-win situation.

However, the Fed has permitted passive monetary tightening over the last eighteen months, and in December 2015 embarked on active monetary tightening…. Passive tightening has reduced US demand for imports and for US exportable products, so passive tightening has negative indirect effects on aggregate demand in the rest of the world…

Must-read: Dan Davies: Comment on “The Euro Area Crisis Five Years After the Original Sin”

Must-Read: Dan Davies: Comment on “The Euro Area Crisis Five Years After the Original Sin”: “The IMF took two decisions on Greece, not one…

…They decided that they could lend without a debt restructuring, and they decided to implement a completely unprecedented front-loaded fiscal consolidation program. The first of these was the subject of the ‘mea culpa’ exercise, but the second has never been revisited… they actually defended it in the lessons-learnt paper…. It seems clear to me that it is the second mistake, not the first, which deserves the name ‘austerity’, and it is blindingly obvious that the overwhelming majority of the economic damage was done by the front-loaded nature of the fiscal cuts. (The IMF occasionally tries to claim that the headline number of the debt/GDP ratio had a negative effect on business confidence, but this seems pretty desperate to me when you’re trying to explain what happened to Greek GDP and the alternative explanation is simply the cut in government spending).
But having noted that the decision to slash and burn the primary deficit might have been a bad idea, Orphanides then spends the rest of the paper talking about the minor mistake which made hardly any difference!…