Must-read: Adair Turner: “Are Central Banks Really Out of Ammunition?”

Must-Read: Adair Turner: Are Central Banks Really Out of Ammunition?: “The global economy faces a chronic problem of deficient nominal demand…

…But the debate about which policies could boost demand remains inadequate, evasive, and confused. In Shanghai, the G-20 foreign ministers committed to use all available tools – structural, monetary, and fiscal – to boost growth rates and prevent deflation. But many of the key players are keener to point out what they can’t do than what they can….

Central banks frequently stress the limits of their powers, and bemoan lack of government progress toward ‘structural reform’…. But while some [SR measures] might increase potential growth over the long term, almost none can make any difference in growth or inflation rates over the next 1-3 years…. Vague references to ‘structural reform’ should ideally be banned, with everyone forced to specify which particular reforms they are talking about and the timetable for any benefits that are achieved…. Central bankers are right to stress the limits of what monetary policy alone can achieve…. Negative interest rates, and… yet more quantitative easing… can make little difference to real economic consumption and investment. Negative interest rates… [may have the] the actual and perverse consequence… [of] higher lending rates….

Nominal demand will rise only if governments deploy fiscal policy to reduce taxes or increase public expenditure – thereby, in Milton Friedman’s phrase, putting new demand directly ‘into the income stream.’ But the world is full of governments that feel unable to do this. Japan’s finance ministry is convinced that it must reduce its large fiscal deficit…. Eurozone rules mean that many member countries are committed to reducing their deficits. British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne is also determined to reduce, not increase, his country’s deficit. The standard official mantra has therefore become that countries that still have ‘fiscal space’ should use it. But there are no grounds for believing the most obvious candidates – such as Germany – will actually do anything….

These impasses have fueled growing fear that we are ‘out of ammunition’…. But if our problem is inadequate nominal demand, there is one policy that will always work. If governments run larger fiscal deficits and finance this not with interest-bearing debt but with central-bank money…. The option of so-called ‘helicopter money’ is therefore increasingly discussed. But the debate about it is riddled with confusions.

It is often claimed that monetizing fiscal deficits would commit central banks to keeping interest rates low forever, an approach that is bound to produce excessive inflation. It is simultaneously argued (sometimes even by the same people) that monetary financing would not stimulate demand because people will fear a future ‘inflation tax.’
Both assertions cannot be true; in reality, neither is. Very small money-financed deficits would produce only a minimal impact on nominal demand: very large ones would produce harmfully high inflation. Somewhere in the middle there is an optimal policy…. The one really important political issue is ignored: whether we can design rules and allocate institutional responsibilities to ensure that monetary financing is used only in an appropriately moderate and disciplined fashion, or whether the temptation to use it to excess will prove irresistible. If political irresponsibility is inevitable, we really are out of ammunition that we can use without blowing ourselves up. But if, as I believe, the discipline problem can be solved, we need to start formulating the right rules and distribution of responsibilities…

Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue”

Must-Read: Very nice. But why “Galilean”, Gavyn? I do note that in the end Gavyn’s “insider” argument boils down to “we must keep the hawks on the FOMC on board with policy”, which is a declaration that:

  1. The Obama administration has made truly serious mistakes in speed of action and in personnel in its Fed governor nominations;
  2. The Bernanke-Yellen Board of Governors has made truly serious mistakes in Fed Bank President selection; and
  3. The high priority given to keeping (nearly) the entire FOMC on board with the policy path should, perhaps, be revisited.

Also, “we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time” is simply incoherent: sunk costs do not matter for future actions.

The dialogue:

Gavyn Davies: Splits in the Keynesian Camp: a Galilean Dialogue: “As Paul Krugman pointed out a year ago…

…a sharp difference of views about US monetary policy has developed between two camps of Keynesians who normally agree about almost everything. What makes this interesting is that, in this division of opinion, the fault line often seems to be determined by the professional location of the economists concerned. Those outside the Federal Reserve (eg Lawrence Summers, Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong) tend to adopt a strongly dovish view, while those inside the central bank (eg Janet Yellen, Stanley Fischer, William Dudley, John Williams) have lately taken a more hawkish line about the need to ‘normalise’ the level of interest rates [1]. My colleague David Blake suggested that this blog should carry a Galilean ‘Dialogue’ between representatives of the two camps. Galileo is unavailable this week, but here goes”

Fed Insider: The US has now reached full employment and the labour market remains firm. The Phillips Curve still exists, so wage inflation is headed higher. Core inflation is not far below the Fed’s 2 per cent target. While the economy is therefore close to normal, interest rates are far below normal, so there should be a predisposition to tighten monetary conditions gradually from here. That would still leave monetary policy far more accommodative than normal for a long period of time.

Fed Outsider: I am not so sure about the Phillips Curve. It seems much flatter than it was in earlier decades. But in any case you do not seem to have noticed that the economy is slowing down. This is probably because of the increase in the dollar, which has tightened monetary conditions much more than the Fed intended. The Fed should not make this slowdown worse by raising domestic interest rates as well.

Insider: I concede that the economy has slowed, and I am worried about the tightening in financial conditions caused by the dollar. But I think that this will prove temporary. The dollar effect will not get much worse from here, and the economy has also been affected by inventory shedding and the drop in shale oil investment. As these effects subside, GDP growth will return to above 2 per cent. The pace of employment growth may slow, but remember that payrolls need to grow by under 100,000 per month to keep unemployment constant at the natural rate. Some slowdown is not only inevitable, it is desirable.

Outsider: I do not know how you can be so confident that growth will recover. All your forecasts for growth in recent years have proven far too optimistic. You should be worried that the economy is stuck in a secular stagnation trap. The equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the actual rate of interest. To emerge from secular stagnation, the Fed should be cutting interest rates, not raising them.

Insider: The case for secular stagnation is a bit extreme. Economies tend to return to equilibrium after shocks. The US has been held back by a series of major headwinds since 2009, but these are now abating. Fiscal policy is easing, the euro shock is healing and deleveraging is ending. As these headwinds abate, the equilibrium real rate of interest will return to its normal level around 1.5 per cent, so the nominal Fed funds rate should be 3.5 per cent. It is right to warn people now that this is likely to happen.

Outsider: The hawkish forward guidance shown in your ‘dot plot’ will slow demand growth further. It is unnecessary – in fact, outright damaging. I am pleased that you are rethinking the presentation of the dots. But, more important, the economic recovery is already long in the tooth. There is a 60 percent chance of a recession within 2 years. In a normal recession, the Fed has to cut interest rates by 4 percentage points. Because of the zero lower bound, it will not be able to do so in the next recession, so it needs to avoid a recession at all costs.

Insider: Oh dear. Recoveries do not die of old age, as Glenn Rudebusch at the San Francisco Fed has just conclusively proved. Expansions, like Peter Pan, do not grow old. Provided that we avoid a build up of inflation pressures, or excessive risk taking in markets, there is no reason to believe that this recovery will spontaneously run out of steam. It is much more likely to persist.

Outsider: Maybe, but have you ever considered the possibility that you might be wrong? The future path of the equilibrium interest rate is subject to huge uncertainty, as your own estimations demonstrate. If you kill this recovery, it will subsequently be impossible to use monetary policy to get out of recession. If, on the other hand, you allow inflation to rise, you can easily bring it back under control, simply by raising interest rates. So the risks are not symmetrical.

Insider: Well, we have already allowed for these asymmetrical risks by holding interest rates below those suggested by the Taylor Rule for a long time. And anyway I do not agree with you about inflation risks. If we allow inflation to become embedded in the system, we will then have to raise interest rates abruptly. That is the most likely way that this recovery can end in a severe recession.

Outsider: Inflation cannot rise permanently unless inflation expectations rise as well. In case you have not noticed, inflation expectations have been falling and are now out of line with your 2 per cent inflation target. This is dangerous because real (inflation adjusted) interest rates are actually rising when they should be falling.

Insider: I used to worry a lot about the inflation expectations built into the bond market, but I now think that these are affected by market imperfections that should be downplayed. Inflation expectations in the household and corporate sectors are still broadly in line with the Fed target. And, anyway, I am increasingly concerned that inflation could rise because productivity growth is now so low. With the economy at full employment, inflation pressures could be building, even with GDP growth still very subdued.

Outsider: I am also very worried about the slowdown in productivity growth. But I think this could be happening because you have allowed the actual GDP growth rate to be so low for so long. Because of hysteresis, you may be making things progressively worse. You may have permanently shifted the equilibrium of the economy in a bad direction.

Insider: I am not so sure about this hysteresis stuff. I would not rule it out entirely. But you cannot rely on the Fed to solve all of our economic problems. At the moment, the Fed’s main priority is to return monetary policy to normal, and I am determined to continue this process unless something really bad happens to the economy.

Outsider: In that case, something bad is quite likely to happen. It seems that it will take a disaster to shake your orthodoxy. Do you really want to be responsible for making a historic economic mistake?

Insider: It is easy for you on the outside to make dramatic points like that. If you had been entrusted with the responsibility of office, you would be more circumspect. Although we went to the same graduate school, we are now in different positions. The hawks on the FOMC need to be kept on board with the majority. And I do not want to inflame the Fed’s Republican critics in Congress by appearing soft on inflation. That means I sometimes have to make difficult compromises that you do not have to make.

Outsider: The hawks are giving too much weight to the health of the banks. You should be worrying more about Main Street, and less about Wall Street.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “What Have We Learned since 2008?”

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: What Have We Learned since 2008?: “Some annoying propositions…

…”Complex” econometrics never convinces anyone. “Complex” includes multiple regression. Natural experiments rule. But so do “surprising” ex-ante predictions that come true…. “In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences.” — Frank Graham…. Demand side: The liquidity trap as a baseline…. Predictions: * Little or no effect of even very large increases in monetary base. * No crowding out from deficits * Large fiscal multipliers. These were controversial predictions!….

Very little effect of monetary expansion. Certainly no inflation. Did QE do anything?… Feel the [debt] crowding out!… Things we didn’t expect: crucial role of liquidity…. Things we didn’t expect: negative rates…. But there is still presumably a lower bound set by storage costs for currency….

The supply side: what was the baseline? Probably the accelerationist Phillips curve…. But what’s missing is the acceleration, not the unemployment => inflation causation…. Strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (courtesy Olivier Blanchard)…. Things we didn’t expect: Very strong hysteresis (maybe)….

What is the post-2008 experience trying to tell us? * Liquidity-trap economics passes with flying colors. * Fiscal policy effectiveness confirmed. * Monetary iffy at best. * Neo-paleo-Keynesian aggregate supply in short run. * Long run seems to reinforce, not diminish, that case.

Must-read: Paul Krugman: “Living with Monetary Impotence”

Must-Read: [And no sooner do I write:]

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now…

But Paul Krugman goes full (1) as well:

Paul Krugman: Living with Monetary Impotence: “Check our low, low rates…

… Fiscal policy has been effective but procyclical…. Monetary policy has been countercyclical but ineffective…. Lender of last resort matters…. Otherwise, not so much…. Open market vs. open mouth operations…. String theory is hard to explain…. Surprise implication: stagnation is contagious.

Quantitative easing: Walking the walk without talking the talk?

The extremely sharp Joe Gagnon is approaching the edge of shrillness: He seeks to praise the Bank of Japan for what it has done, and yet stress and stress again that what it has done is far too little than it should and needs to do:

Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push… The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages…. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen…. The paradox of quantitative easing… is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later…. If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Those of us who are, like me, broadly in Joe Gagnon’s camp are now having to grapple with an unexpected intellectual shock. When 2010 came around and when the “Recovery Summers” and “V-Shaped Recoveries” that had been confidently predicted by others refused to arrive, we once again reached back to the 1930s. We remembered the reflationary policies of Neville Chamberlain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Takahashi Korekiyo, and Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht gave us considerable confidence that quantitative easing supported by promises that reflation was the goal of policy would be effective. They had been ineffective in the major catastrophe of the Great Depression. They should, we thought, also be effective in the less-major catastrophe that we started by calling the “Great Recession”, but should now have shifted to calling the “Lesser Depression”, and in all likelihood will soon be calling the “Longer Depression”.

Narayana Kocherlakota’s view, if I grasp it correctly, is that in the United States the Federal Reserve has walked the quantitative-easing walk but not talked the quantitative-easing talk. Increases in interest rates to start the normalization process have always been promised a couple of years in the future. Federal Reserve policymakers have avoided even casual flirtation with the ideas of seeking a reversal of any of the fall of nominal GDP or the price level vis-a-vis its pre-2008 trend. Federal Reserve policymakers have consistently adopted a rhetorical posture that tells observers that an overshoot of inflation above 2%/year on the PCE would be cause for action, while an undershoot is… well, as often as not, cause for wait-and-see because the situation will probably normalize to 2%/year on its own.

By contrast, Neville Chamberlain was very clear that it was the policy of H.M. Government to raise the price level in order to raise the nominal tax take in order to support the burden of amortizing Britain’s WWI debt. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not at all clear about what he was doing in total, but he was very clear that raising commodity prices so that American producers could earn more money was a key piece of it. Takahashi Korekiyo. And all had supportive rather than austere and oppositional fiscal authorities behind them.

But, we thought, monetary policy has really powerful tools expectations-management and asset-supply management tools at its disposal. They should be able to make not just a difference but a big difference. And yet…

There are three possible positions for us to take now:

  1. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is not or will rarely be sufficient to have any substantial effect—active fiscal expansionary support on a large scale is essential for good macroeconomic policy.
  2. In a liquidity trap, monetary policy can have substantial effects, but only if the central bank and government are willing to talk the talk by aggressive and consistent promises of inflation—backed up, if necessary, by régime change.
  3. We are barking up the wrong tree: there is something we have missed, and the models that we think are good first-order approximations to reality are not, in fact, so.

I still favor a mixture of (2) and (1), with (2) still having the heavier weight in it. Larry Summers is, I think, all the way at (1) now. But the failure of the Abenomics situation to have developed fully to Japan’s advantage as I had expected makes me wonder: under what circumstances should I being opening my mind to and placing positive probability on (3)?

(AP Photo/Koji Sasahara)

Must-read: Joe Gagnon: “The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction”

Must-Read: Joe Gagnon: The Bank of Japan Is Moving Too Slowly in the Right Direction: “Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s bold program…

…has made enormous progress, but it has fallen well short of its goal of 2 percent inflation within two years. Now is the time for a final big push…. On January 29, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) announced a complicated program to pay different rates of interest on tranches of deposits that banks hold with the BOJ…. Financial markets quickly reacted positively: Real bond yields fell, the yen fell, and stock prices rose. But much of these gains were erased in subsequent days, probably because markets came to believe the effects of the new policy would be small…. Ten-year inflation compensation is now only 0.5 percent, a clear message that markets expect the BOJ to fail to deliver 2 percent inflation….

A shift from 0.1 to -0.1 percent on a small fraction of BOJ deposits is a tiny move…. The BOJ should move to -0.75 percent on future increases in deposits, while paying 0 percent on the current stock of deposits. The BOJ’s program of asset purchases since 2013 moved the best measure of core inflation (consumer prices excluding energy and fresh food) from nearly -1 percent to more than 1 percent. This is about two-thirds of the way to its goal…. But the BOJ cannot afford to make only tiny adjustments to its policies at this time…. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could help by raising the salaries of public workers and taking other measures to increase wages recently recommended by Olivier Blanchard and Adam Posen in the Nikkei Asian Review. But the BOJ should not make inaction by the government an excuse for its own passivity…. The BOJ needs to make a convincingly bold move now… lowering its deposit rate to -0.75 percent… step up purchases of equities to 50 trillion yen….

The paradox of quantitative easing in the past seven years is that central banks that were slowest to engage in it at first (the BOJ and the European Central Bank) are being forced to do more of it later than those central banks that embraced it earlier (the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve). If the BOJ does not move boldly now, it will have to do even more later.

Must-read: Tim Duy: “FOMC Minutes and More”

Must-Read: But being “behind the cycle” is good, no? On a lee shore you need more sea room, lest the wind strengthen, no?

Tim Duy: FOMC Minutes and More: “The Fed may be turning toward my long-favored policy position…

…the best chance they have of lifting off from the zero bound is letting the economy run hot enough that inflation becomes a genuine concern. That means following the cycle, not trying to lead it. And I would argue that if the recession scare is just that, a scare, they are almost certainly going to fall behind the curve. The unemployment rate is below 5 percent and wage pressures are rising. The economy is already closing in on full-employment. If we don’t have a recession, then how much further along will the economy be by the time the Fed deems they are sufficiently confident in the economy that they can resume raising rates? And note the importance of clearly progress on inflation….

Bullard noted that the FOMC has repeatedly stated in official communication and public commentary that future monetary policy adjustments are data dependent. He then addressed the possibility that the financial markets may not believe this since the SEP may be unintentionally communicating a version of the 2004-2006 normalization cycle, which appeared to be mechanical…. You might forgive market participants for believing that the SEP infers some calendar-based guidance when Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer says things like:

WELL, WE WATCH WHAT THE MARKET THINKS, BUT WE CAN’T BE LED BY WHAT THE MARKET THINKS. WE’VE GOT TO MAKE OUR OWN ANALYSIS. WE MAKE OUR OWN ANALYSIS AND OUR ANALYSIS SAYS THAT THE MARKET IS UNDERESTIMATING WHERE WE ARE GOING TO BE. YOU KNOW, YOU CAN’T RULE OUT THAT THERE IS SOME PROBABILITY THEY ARE RIGHT BECAUSE THERE’S UNCERTAINTY. BUT WE THINK THAT THEY ARE TOO LOW. 

Saying the markets are wrong implies that the policy direction is fairly rigid. In any event, I am not confident there is yet much support for Bullard’s position…. Bullard has also gone full-dove. He remembered that he thought inflation expectations were supposed to be important, and the decline in 5-year, 5-year forward expectations has him spooked. And he thinks that the excess air has been released from financial markets, so his fears of asset bubbles has eased. Hence, the Fed can easily pause now….

Bottom Line: The Fed is on hold, stuck in risk management mode until the skies clear. If you are in the ‘recession’ camp, the path forward is obvious. The Fed cuts back to zero, drags its heals on more QE, and fumbles around as they try to figure out if negative rates are a good or bad thing. Not pretty. But if you are in the ‘no recession’ camp, it’s worth thinking about the implications of a Fed pause now on the pace of hikes later. Being on hold now raises the risk that by the time the Fed moves again, they will be behind the cycle.

Must-read: Tim Duy: “Fed Yet to Fully Embrace a New Policy Path”

Must-Read: Tim Duy: Fed Yet to Fully Embrace a New Policy Path: “The Fed will take a pause on rate hikes. An indefinite pause…

…The sooner they admit this, the better off we will all be. Indeed, the sooner they admit this, the sooner financial markets will calm and the sooner they would be able to resume hiking rates. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen had two high profile opportunities this week to make such an admission. Yet she failed to do so….

By the end of 2015, the economy was near full-employment…. A combination of factors would work in tandem to slow activity… higher dollar, higher inflation, higher wages, and higher short term interest rates (tighter monetary policy). How much monetary policy tightening is consistent with the new equilibrium depends on the evolution of the other prices. A reasonable baseline at the end of last year was that 100bp of tightening would be consistent with achieving full-employment. That was the Fed’s starting point as well….

A key factor in keeping the US economy on the rails is acknowledging that tightening financial conditions via the dollar obviates the need to tightening conditions via monetary policy…. But the Fed has yet to fully embrace this story. And that leaves them sounding relatively hawkish…. Yellen & Co. don’t need to emphasize the direction of rates. They just can’t stop themselves. Worse yet, they feel compelled to describe the level of future rates via the Summary of Economic Projections. A level entirely inconsistent with signals from bond markets, no less. They don’t really know what the terminal fed funds rate will be, so why keep pretending they do? The ‘dot plot’ does nothing more than project an overly-hawkish policy stance that leaves market participants persistently fearful a policy error is in the making. It is time to end the ‘dot plot.’ 

Must-read: Antonio Fatas: “A 2016 Recession Would Be Different”

Must-Read: “The years that the locust hath eaten, the cankerworm, and the caterpiller, and the palmerworm…” –Joel 2:25 (KJV). The task of fiscal and monetary policymakers as of the start of 2009 was (1) to arrest the slide, (2) to trigger a strong recovery, and (3) to set the world economy in a situation in which future policymakers would have the room to maneuver so that future substantial adverse macroeconomic shocks–and there would be future substantial adverse macroeconomic shocks–could be neutralized. They (probably) accomplished (1), they (certainly) failed at (2), and they continue to fail at even starting at (3)–and the fact that it is now seven years and they have not even started this task somehow fails to exercise them:

Antonio Fatas: A 2016 Recession Would Be Different: “1. The Yield curve would be very steep…

…2. The real federal funds rate (or the ECB real repo rate) would be extremely low…. 3. And nominal central bank interest rates would be stuck at zero…. So maybe this tells us that a recession is not about to happen. But if it is, the lack of space to implement traditional monetary policy tools should be a big concern for policy makers. If a recession ends up happening, helicopter money will likely become a policy option.

Must-read: Martin Sandbu: “Four Takes on the Fed Fumble”

Must-Read: That the Fed would be facing significant chances of recession and would be moving in the opposite policy direction than its peers over the winter was a serious risk of beginning a tightening cycle in December, and a risk that has now risen from a possibility to a probability.

What was the countervailing serious risk that starting the tightening cycle in December took off the table? I really do not see it…

Graph 5 Year 5 Year Forward Inflation Expectation Rate FRED St Louis Fed

Martin Sandbu: Four Takes on the Fed Fumble: “Remember September? Markets seemingly couldn’t wait for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates…

…Now, however, markets seemingly can’t wait for the Fed to definitively snip the fledgling tightening cycle in the bud. And a growing chatter wonders whether the Fed made a mistake…. Market pricing now implies nearly a two-thirds probability that Fed policymakers will get past next September without a single further rate rise. The change in market sentiment is easy enough to understand… financial turmoil in China… slide in global stock markets… sharp US growth slowdown…. There are (at least) four different ways one may assess the Fed’s actions. First, the plain ‘the Fed goofed up’ view… Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong and Larry Summers. Free Lunch readers will know that this column shares their view on this issue… Jed Graham….

A second, perhaps more interesting, take is that in hindsight the Fed shouldn’t have raised rates, but that it couldn’t have known this at the time…. A third take… the mistake was to create expectations that caused financial conditions to tighten long before December…. A fourth view… the Fed was right to hike but wrong in thinking it would then proceed to lift rates through this year…. But… the arguments for a rise were… for the beginning of a sustained if gradual process. If that is now derailed, it removes much of the rationale for the first increase.

It also leaves open the question of what to do next…. Should the Fed reverse course? That is the view of Narayana Kocherlakota…