Which Thinkers Will Define Our Future?: Live at Project Syndicate

Over at Project Syndicate: Which Thinkers Will Define Our Future?: BERKELEY – Several years ago, it occurred to me that social scientists today are all standing on the shoulders of giants like Niccolo Machiavelli, John Locke, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim.

One thing they all have in common is that their primary focus was on the social, political, and economic makeup of the Western European world between 1450 and 1900. Which is to say, they provide an intellectual toolkit for looking at, say, the Western world of 1840, but not necessarily the Western world of 2016. What will be taught in the social theory courses of, say, 2070? What canon – written today or still forthcoming – will those who end their careers in the 2070s wish that they had used when they started them in the late 2010s? Read MOAR at Project Syndicate

Time to Play Whack-a-Mole with the Expansionary-Austerity Confidence-Fairy Zombie Once Again!

Four readings on the expansionary austerity zombie:

Reading #1: Paul Krugman (2015):

Paul Krugman: Views Differ on Shape of Macroeconomics (2015): “The doctrine of expansionary austerity…

…the claim that slashing spending would actually boost demand and employment, because it would have such positive effects on confidence that this would outweigh the direct drag–was immensely popular among policymakers in 2010, as the great turn toward austerity began. But the statistical underpinnings of the doctrine fell apart under scrutiny: the methods Alberto Alesina used to identify changes in fiscal policy did not, it turned out, do a very good job, and more careful work found that historically austerity has in fact been contractionary after all. Moreover, the experience of austerity programs seemed to confirm what Keynesians new and old had warned from the beginning–that the negative effects of austerity are much larger under conditions where they cannot be offset by conventional monetary policy. So at this point research economists overwhelmingly believe that austerity is contractionary (and that stimulus is expansionary)…. For now at least expansionary austerity has virtually collapsed as a doctrine taken seriously by researchers. Nonetheless, Simon Wren-Lewis points us to Robert Peston of the BBC declaring

I am simply pointing out that there is a debate here (though Krugman, Wren-Lewis and Portes are utterly persuaded they’ve won this match–and take the somewhat patronising view that voters who think differently are ignorant sheep led astray by a malign or blinkered media).

Wow. Yes, I suppose that ‘there is a debate’ — there are debates about lots of things, from climate change to evolution to alien spaceships hidden in Area 51. But to suggest that this debate is at all symmetric is just wrong — and deeply misleading to one’s audience. As for the claim that it’s somehow patronizing to suggest that voters are ill-informed when (a) macroeconomics is a technical subject, and (b) the media have indeed misreported the state of the professional debate — well, this is sort of an economic version of the line that one must not suggest that the Iraq war was launched on false pretenses, because this would be disrespectful to the troops. If you’re being accused of misleading reporting, it’s hardly a defense to say that the public believed your misinformation — more like a self-indictment…

The question to which “expansionary austerity” was relevant was never: can one substantially reduce the budget deficit without risking substantial recession? The answer to that was always yes: if fiscal contraction is supported by monetary expansion a outrance the decline in government purchases from spending reductions and in consumption spending from tax increases can be offset and more than offset by higher exports and higher investment spending. That is and has been standard Keynesian doctrine since the 1950s, at least. (Cf. the Economic Report of the President chapter that Robert Solow drafted in the early 1960s.)

The novelty of Alesina’s claim was not that monetary offset can neutralize the short-run contractionary effect of fiscal austerity. It was, rather, that summoning the Confidence Fairy could and many times had neutralized the short-run contractionary effect of fiscal austerity.

The question to which “expansionary austerity” purported to give the answer was: At the zero lower bound, where attempts to stimulate the economy through expansionary monetary policy have greatly reduced traction and are fraught, is the connection between lower deficits and more optimistic business animal spirits strong enough that one can one substantially reduce the budget deficit without risking substantial recession?

And back in 2010 Alberto Alesina very strongly said that the answer to that was “yes”: Reading #2:

Alberto Alesina: Fiscal Adjustments: Lessons from Recent History

Many even sharp reductions of budget deficits have been accompanied and immediately followed by sustained growth rather than recessions even in the very short run. These are the adjustments which have occurred on the spending side and have been large, credible and decisive…. Governments which have initiated thorough and successful fiscal adjustment policies have not systematically suffered at the polls… especially… when the electorate has perceived the sense of urgency of a crisis or in some cases in the presence of an external commitment. On the contrary, fiscally-loose governments have suffered losses at the polls…. Thus relatively painless (economically and politically) fiscal adjustments might be possible; whether government will take the opportunity remains to be seen…

“Many” and “even sharp” have been “immediately followed” because adjustments that “have been large, credible and decisive” and “have occurred on the spending side” have summoned the Confidence Fairy. Thus governments should “take the opportunity” for the “relatively painless (economically and politically) fiscal adjustments” that “might be possible” via expansionary austerity.

This was pretty much completely wrong. Many of Alesina’s adjustments were not policy adjustments at all–but rather unplanned side-effects of booms driven by other factors. The rest appeared, to me at least, to be due to the kind of expansionary monetary policy offset that the Clinton administration had planned and carried out over 1993-6 and that was not possible at the zero lower bound.

Nevertheless, it appears that Alesina is sticking to his guns here: Reading #3:

Alberto Alesina (2016) Fiscal Policy and Austerity: “Well, I think Paul Krugman has rather extreme views…

…But more importantly, he talks about his views as if they were obviously true, and anybody who would disagree with him was obviously wrong. And he exaggerates. And that I really prefer not to go into a discussion about his quotes.

But I think that the idea that the work about austerity that I and others have done has been discredited is wrong. In fact, the IMF, in 2010 wrote a rather pointed criticism about my work…. [The IMF’s] second point is whether whether there are cases where spending cuts accompanied by other policies can be expansionary, and the confidence argument that he makes fun of is actually confidence, one of the many aspects; and we can elaborate on that. But I think that there are several episodes in which fiscal spending cuts have been accompanied not by a recession, but by an expansion. So, I think that those kind of statements by Krugman are trying to push a view which is respectable but they are not proven by the facts. Or at least they are not supported by research….

I do think that confidence is important, because we have empirical evidence suggesting that when there are spending cuts, the confidence of investors actually goes up, and the confidence of consumers goes down very little; while with tax increases, confidence of both consumers and business investors goes down quite a bit in many countries. So confidence has played a role. And then, there are many–as I said, austerity plans are a combination of many, many other policies. So, it matters what monetary policy does. It matters that sometimes, particularly in European countries, when there is a crisis and austerity is called for, then there is a productive opportunity to engage in other so-called “structural reform”–labor market reform and goods market reform, liberalization of various sectors, which help and that indeed has spurred growth. And of course monetary policy matters–we are saying in a situation which monetary policy is supportive and expansionary, that helps fiscal adjustment. So these are just the more important of many other factors which are left out from the basic Keynesian model…

My view: Alberto should simply not be saying this. If you want to claim that the Confidence Fairy channel–rather than the monetary offset channel–is important, you bring forward at least one regression or at least one case study in which a sharp, large, credible, and decisive policy of fiscal austerity has been rapidly followed by a substantial improvement in business confidence which then immediately drives sustained growth. If you don’t have that regression or that channel–if what you have is monetary-policy offset plus misspecification of your right hand-side variable–you do not have an economic argument.

Reading #4:

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933): First Inaugural Address: “our distress comes from no failure of substance. We are stricken by no plague of locusts…

…Compared with the perils which our forefathers conquered because they believed and were not afraid, we have still much to be thankful for. Nature still offers her bounty and human efforts have multiplied it. Plenty is at our doorstep, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply. Primarily this is because rulers of the exchange of mankind’s goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure, and have abdicated…. Stripped of the lure of profit by which to induce our people to follow their false leadership, they have resorted to exhortations, pleading tearfully for restored confidence. They know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers. They have no vision, and when there is no vision the people perish…

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2015): Insiders, Outsiders, and U.S. Monetary Policy

Must-Read: As I periodically say, there are two rules that would have made me much smarter had I adopted them back in, say, 1996:

  1. Paul Krugman is right.
  2. If you think Paul Krugman is wrong, consult rule #1.

May I have unanimous consent on the proposition that Paul Krugman was right back at the start of 2015 on this issue?:

Paul Krugman (2015): Insiders, Outsiders, and U.S. Monetary Policy: “I ran into Olivier Blanchard over breakfast… in Hong Kong…

…Many of the people who either make monetary policy or comment on it from fairly influential perches are members of what you might call the 1970s Cambridge mafia… most of this group shares fairly similar views…. Which brings me to the point. Unusually, Olivier and I do have a significant disagreement right now, over US monetary policy…. I’m very worried that the Fed may be gearing up to raise rates too soon; he’s sanguine, considering the risk of a Japan-type trap in the US minimal and the case for a rate hike this year solid…. Our disagreement… is part of a wider split…. There’s a surprisingly sharp divide over near-term US monetary policy. And the divide seems to depend on one thing: whether the economist in question is currently in a policy position….

So why this divide? We don’t have access to different facts; we don’t, in any fundamental sense, have different economic models. It’s an uncertain world, but why do those in office come down on one side of that uncertainty, while those outside come down on the other? Well, even smart, flexible people can fall prey to incestuous amplification. And I worry that this is what is happening to the insiders. On the whole, it seems less likely for the outsiders, although it’s true that the Keynesian econoblogs form what amounts to a tight ongoing discussion group…. But if you ask me, there’s a worrying complacency among the insiders right now, and I would urge them to consider the potential consequences if they’re wrong.

And this is why I find myself worrying that this today is also much too sanguine. The very sharp Olivier Blanchard argues that it is not too sanguine:

Our goal was less ambitious and more realistic. It was to see if the eurozone could function and handle shocks without further political integration if political realities made it impossible for the time being. Our answer is a qualified yes, but it is surely not an endorsement of a do-nothing strategy…

But I think back to the start of 2015. And I remember the two rules that would have made me look like a fracking genius if I had been smart enough to adopt them back in 1996…

Must-Read: Nancy LeTourneau: What Happens When One Party Doesn’t Care About Governing?

Must-Read: I want to play the bipartisan-technocrat policy game.

The old conventional wisdom was that playing that game was productive and fun. You see, members of the Senate and the House. Thus, and so the two houses–everybody in them–shared the goal of trying to arrange things so that they each looked good to their local constituents. And good technocratic policies were an effective move in that win-win–or mostly win-win–game.

But now? The political-economy and political-structural questions are:

  1. Has this changed–is the game now to make the president of the other party look bad?
  2. Did the game change with the Democrats under Richard Nixon–who was genuinely bad–and have Republicans just been playing tit-for-tat since?
  3. Did the game change with the accession of Newt Gingrich–and his strange and false belief that he would have a better and longer career as a partisan bomb thrower than as a statesman?
  4. Did the game change with George W. Bush–and his decision that Democratic members of the House and Senate who supported him on policy would not be cut any campaign fund-allocation breaks at election time?
  5. Did the game change with the election of a Black man?

And how do we get back–if we can get back? And do we want to get back?

These are all the questions that I wish political scientists were trying to answer for me. Yet few are–save Tom Mann, Norm Ornstein, Rick Perlstein, and a very few others…

Nancy LeTourneau: What Happens When One Party Doesn’t Care About Governing?: “Over the course of the Obama presidency, we’ve watched as Republicans have thrown out many of the norms…

…[Not] just things like shouting ‘You lie!’ in a presidential address… not just a requirement that basically any vote (including presidential nominations) get a super majority… includes… overtly undermining the executive branch during complex negotiations with other countries… failing to give a Supreme Court nominee a hearing… threatening to not raise the debt limit…. These are the kinds of things a party does when it doesn’t care about governing…. I am reminded of something a blogger named mistermix wrote back in 2010 during the height of the budget negotiations.

As Tim F. posted earlier, Ezra Klein thinks that Obama’s a bad poker player…. The analogy isn’t helpful. Poker is a win/lose game. Negotiation is a win/win game…. Republicans aren’t playing poker or negotiating. They are playing another game, call it ‘You Must Lose’. They’re happy with win/lose, if they win, but they’ll tolerate lose/lose as long as Obama loses. The only analogy that springs to mind when I look at the Republicans’ recent behavior is a bad divorce…. Bob is so hell-bent on hurting Lisa that he doesn’t care about their kids or their bank account. Bob will deploy a hundred variations on the same tactic: put the Lisa in a bind where she has to choose between damaging the children and losing money. Lisa will lose money almost every time in order to save the children….

That caught my eye because, as a former family therapist I know the analogy well…. It actually becomes calcified and intractable when both parents buy in–which ensures that everyone always loses. Think about that next time you hear a liberal suggest that Democrats should employ the same tactics as the Republicans…. Here is how Mike Lofgren described it back in 2011:

A couple of years ago, a Republican committee staff director told me candidly (and proudly) what the method was to all this obstruction and disruption. Should Republicans succeed in obstructing the Senate from doing its job, it would further lower Congress’s generic favorability rating among the American people. By sabotaging the reputation of an institution of government, the party that is programmatically against government would come out the relative winner.

So what are the Democrats’ options in a situation like this? First of all, they shouldn’t take the bait and join in a guaranteed lose-lose game….At some point, voters have to decide if it is in their interest to elect politicians who are simply using them as their pawns in a power game. I know that as a family therapist, when I saw that a divorce wars situation was intractable, I would eventually go to the kids to begin the process of empowering them to make good choices (luckily in my practice they were adolescents)….

The old conservative vs liberal arguments aren’t much in play this election. That is obvious in the presidential contest. But it is also true in House/Senate races…

Must-Read: David Glasner: What’s Wrong with Econ 101?

Must-Read: David Glasner: What’s Wrong with Econ 101?: “The deeper problem… [with] Econ 101 is… fragility…

…Its essential propositions.. are deducible from the basic postulates of utility maximization and wealth maximization…. Not only are the propositions based on questionable psychological assumptions, the comparative-statics method imposes further restrictive assumptions designed to isolate a single purely theoretical relationship…. The bread and butter of Econ 101 is the microeconomic theory of market adjustment in which price and quantity adjust to equilibrate what consumers demand with what suppliers produce. This is the partial-equilibrium analysis derived from Alfred Marshall…. [But] all partial-equilibrium analysis relies on the–usually implicit–assumption that all markets but the single market under analysis are in equilibrium…. start[s] from an equilibrium state… [which] must be at least locally stable… restricted to markets that can be assumed to be very small relative to the entire system….

So the question naturally arises: If the logical basis of Econ 101 is as flimsy as I have been suggesting, should we stop teaching Econ 101? My answer is an emphatic, but qualified, no. Econ 101 is… still the most effective tool we have for systematically thinking about human conduct and its consequences, especially its unintended consequences. But we should be more forthright about its limitations and the nature of the assumptions that underlie the analysis…

Macroeconomics, Fantasy, Reality, and Intellectual Utility…

A very nice overview piece this morning from smart young whippersnapper Noah Smith:

Noah Smith: Economics Struggles to Cope With Reality: “Four different activities… go by the name of macroeconomics. But they actually have relatively little to do with each other….

  1. ‘coffee-house macro,’ and it’s what you hear in a lot of casual discussions. It often revolves around the ideas of dead sages–Friedrich Hayek, Hyman Minsky and John Maynard Keynes. It doesn’t involve formal models, but it does usually contain a hefty dose of political ideology.

  2. Finance macro. This consists of private-sector economists and consultants who try to read the tea leaves on interest rates, unemployment, inflation and other indicators in order to predict the future of asset prices (usually bond prices). It mostly uses simple math, though advanced forecasting models are sometimes employed. It always includes a hefty dose of personal guesswork.

  3. Academic macro. This traditionally involves professors making toy models of the economy–since the early ’80s, these have almost exclusively been DSGE models (if you must ask, DSGE stands for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium). Though academics soberly insist that the models describe the deep structure of the economy, based on the behavior of individual consumers and businesses, most people outside the discipline who take one look at these models immediately think they’re kind of a joke. They contain so many unrealistic assumptions that they probably have little chance of capturing reality. Their forecasting performance is abysmal. Some of their core elements are clearly broken. Any rigorous statistical tests tend to reject these models instantly, because they always include a hefty dose of fantasy….

  4. Fed macro. The Federal Reserve uses an eclectic approach, involving both data and models. Sometimes the models are of the DSGE type, sometimes not. Fed macro involves taking data from many different sources, instead of the few familiar numbers like unemployment and inflation, and analyzing the information in a bunch of different ways. And it inevitably contains a hefty dose of judgment, because the Fed is responsible for making policy.

However, I think he has picked the wrong four.

Let’s start with Noah’s second: finance macro. It needs to be divided: One of its pieces–call that the second of our four components of macro–is grifter-finance macro: essentially affinity fraud to terrify rich people and get them to let you overcharge them to manage your money or simply to sell some snake oil you have to offer. I think it should come first:

  1. Grifter macro

The other piece of Noah’s second–call that the useful finance-forecasting macro–is really the same thing as Fed-technocratic macro: the flow of ideas and people is large, and convergence not to a consensus model or approach but to a near-consensus distribution of models and approaches is relatively rapid. But let’s postpone that.

Instead, turn to Noah’s third, academic macro. It too needs to be divided: One of its pieces–DSGE macro–has indeed proven a degenerating research program and a catastrophic failure: thirty years of work have produced no tools for useful forecasting or policy analysis. As Noah puts it:

Academic macro has basically failed the other three…. Because academic macro is so useless for forecasting–including predicting the results of policy changes–the financial industry can’t use it for practical purposes. I’ve talked to dozens of people in finance about why they don’t use DSGE models, and some have indeed tried to use them–but they always dropped the models after poor performance.

Hence Noah’s first two need to be:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro

The other piece of Noah’s third is composed of that part of the academic community that is in dialogue with both finance-forecasting and Fed-technocratic macro. Noah says:

My view is that academic macro has basically failed the other three…. The Fed has had to go it alone when studying how the macroeconomy really works. Regional Fed banks and the Federal Reserve Board function as macroeconomic think tanks, hiring top-level researchers to do the grubby data work and broad thinking that academia has decided is beneath it. But that leaves many of the field’s brightest minds locked in the ivory tower, playing with their toys…

I think this is wrong. Academics are not locked in the ivory tower. Rather, some academics–unfortunately, many academics–lock themselves in their own ivory tower. And I question Noah’s description of the people as “brightest”. If you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring a single consumption Euler equation (rather than, say, risk-averse rich 70-somethings with short horizons; myopic middle-class 40-somethings, and the liquidity constrained); if you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring that firms engage in Calvo pricing; If you insist on trying to understand business cycles by requiring rational expectations (rather than anchored, adaptive, extrapolative, perfect-foresight, and Panglossian)–well, then you really aren’t very bright at all, are you?

In fact, there is a dialogue between Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting, and what we might call useful-academic. This dialogue is strong enough that they are pretty much the same thing: the flow of ideas and people is large, and convergence not to a consensus model or approach but to a near-consensus distribution of models and approaches is relatively rapid. Thus Noah’s first three should be:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro

And then there is Noah’s first, coffee-house macro:

Because academic macro models are so out of touch with reality, people in causal coffee-house discussions can’t refer to academic research to help make their points. Instead, they have to turn back to the old masters, who if vague and wordy were at least describing a world that had some passing resemblance to the economy we observe in our daily lives…

What this leaves out, I think, is that there is substantial idea-flow from coffee-house macro into useful Fed and forecasting macro. The useful macro community has spent the last decade realizing that there is a lot more to be learned from Keynes and Minsky than it had thought, and has been busily revising how and what it thinks under pressure of events. In some sense this was or ought to have been obvious. As Larry Summers said to me back in 1983: “There ought to be an awful lot of excellent careers to be made in macro by mathing-up more pieces of Keynes”. (There is also, alas!, substantial idea-flow from coffee-house macro into grifter macro–Hayek, von Mises, etc.)

Thus if I were to write down a quadriad, I would modify Noah’s into:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro
  4. Coffee-house macro

I would say that (2) is in dialogue with nobody and nothing. I would say that (1) is in dialogue with the wing nuttier parts of (4). And I would say that (3) and (4) are in useful dialogue–albeit one-way dialogue, so far at least, as useful macro is a recipient of big ideas from coffee-house macro rather than a generator of new and different big ideas for coffee-house macro.

And I would add a fifth:

  1. Grifter macro
  2. Pointless (academic DSGE) macro
  3. Useful (Fed-technocratic, finance-forecasting) macro
  4. Coffee-house macro
  5. Policy macro

Policy macro is the intellectual framework that underpins the policies that the North Atlantic has followed since the start off 2010.

It is not in close dialogue with any of the others.

It has been, on the fiscal side, a complete disaster. It has been, on the regulatory side, a mixed bag. And it has been, on the monetary side, a very partial success.

Noah concludes with optimism:

Justin Wolfers… a conference celebrating the career of MIT economist Olivier Blanchard…. Wolfers suggested abandoning DSGE models, saying that they ‘haven’t worked’… suggests that the new macroeconomics will focus on empirics and falsification… fertilized by other disciplines… will incorporate elements of behavioral economics….

I think the new macroeconomics… will redefine what ‘macroeconomics’ even means…. ‘Macro-focused micro’–studies of businesses, competition, markets and individual behavior that have relevance for macro… business dynamism, price adjustment, financial bubbles and differences between workers. Let’s hope more and more macroeconomists focus on these things, instead of trying to make big, grandiose, but ultimately vacuous models of booms and recessions. When we understand the pieces of the economy better, we’ll have a much better chance of grasping the whole…

I am not sure. Macroeconomics needs, desperately, better and real behavioral microfoundations at the sector and the market level. But it also needs much better approaches to aggregation–to understanding how macroeconomic phenomena emerge out of real microfoundations.

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Republic of Science or Empire of Ideology?

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Republic of Science or Empire of Ideology?: “[Jim Tankersley of] The Washington Post has a long story about Charles’ Koch’s attempt to influence the economics profession with massive donations…

…The Post’s article is titled ‘Inside Charles Koch’s $200 million quest for a ‘Republic of Science'”. This is a reference to a 1962 article by Michael Polanyi called ‘The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory’….The Post article’s author, Jim Tankersley, drily notes:

[Koch’s donation effort] raises the question of whether Koch has become, for university researchers, the sort of distorting force that Polanyi warns against.

Why yes. Koch is making a sustained, multi-hundred-million dollar effort to push the academic economics profession toward a libertarian ideology. This is a ‘Republic of Science’ to the same degree that North Korea is a ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’…. I don’t like it…. It sets back our understanding of the world when people try to flood any portion of academia with researchers whom they think will promote a certain set of conclusions. I don’t have much more to say than that, so here’s one of my favorite Feynman quotes:

Our responsibility is to do what we can, learn what we can, improve the solutions, and pass them on. It is our responsibility to leave the people of the future a free hand. In the impetuous youth of humanity, we can make grave errors that can stunt our growth for a long time. This we will do if we say we have the answers now, so young and ignorant as we are. If we suppress all discussion, all criticism, proclaiming ‘This is the answer, my friends; man is saved!’ we will doom humanity for a long time to the chains of authority, confined to the limits of our present imagination. It has been done so many times before.

A real ‘Republic of Science’ would focus on an open-minded search for truth, not the enshrinement of one pre-decided dogma.

Updates: I also thought this passage from Tankersley’s article was interesting:

None of the largest recipients of Koch dollars appear on a list of the most influential academic economic departments in the United States, as calculated by the research arm of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Only one professor who works at one of Koch’s most-supported centers cracks a similar list that calculates the top 5 percent of influential economists in the research community
Koch-funded researchers make a larger impact in the public arena. They frequently testify before Republican-led committees in Congress. Their work often guides lawmakers, particularly conservatives, at the state level in drafting legislation, and they have provided the foundations for judicial opinions that affect the economy on issues such as whether the government should intervene to stop large companies from merging.

It’s possible that the Koch doesn’t want to influence economic science itself, as much as he wants to sculpt its public-facing component. The end result could be two econ professions – a dispassionate, truth-seeking one occupying the upper levels of the ivory tower, at MIT and Princeton and Stanford, doing hard math things and careful honest data work that slowly trickles out through traditional media channels, and another in the lower-ranked schools, doing a slightly fancier version of the kind of political advocacy now done by conservative think tanks. The former would have the best brains and the best understanding of the real world, but the latter would have much more policy influence and impact on the wider intellectual world. This is different from the wholesale yoking of science to ideology that I was envisioning, but it also doesn’t seem like a pleasant vision of the future.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Friedman and the Austrians

Must-Read: Paul Krugman (2013): Friedman and the Austrians: “Still thinking about the Bloomberg Businessweek interview with Rand Paul…

…in which he nominated Milton Friedman’s corpse for Fed chairman. Before learning that Friedman was dead, Paul did concede that he wasn’t an Austrian. But I’ll bet he had no idea about the extent to which Friedman really, really wasn’t an Austrian. In his ‘Comments on the critics’ (of his Monetary Framework) Friedman described the ‘London School (really Austrian) view’

that the depression was an inevitable result of the prior boom, that it was deepened by the attempts to prevent prices and wages from falling and firms from going bankrupt, that the monetary authorities had brought on the depression by inflationary policies before the crash and had prolonged it by ‘easy money’ policies thereafter; that the only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring down money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms.

and dubbed this view an ‘atrophied and rigid caricature’ of the quantity theory. [His version of the] Chicago School, he claimed, never believed in such nonsense. I have, incidentally, seen attempts [by Larry White and company] to claim that nobody believed this, or at any rate that Hayek never believed this, and that characterizing Hayek as a liquidationist is some kind of liberal libel. This is really a case of who are you gonna believe, me or your lying eyes. Let’s go to the text (pdf), p. 275:

And, if we pass from the moment of actual crisis to the situation in the following depression, it is still more difficult to see what lasting good effects can come from credit expansion. The thing which is needed to secure healthy conditions is the most speedy and complete adaptation possible of the structure of production to the proportion between the demand for consumers’ goods and the demand for producers’ goods as determined by voluntary saving and spending.

If the proportion as determined by the voluntary decisions of individuals is distorted by the creation of artificial demand, it must mean that part of the available resources is again led into a wrong direction and a definite and lasting adjustment is again postponed. And, even if the absorption of the unemployed resources were to be quickened in this way, it would only mean that the seed would already be sown for new disturbances and new crises. The only way permanently to ‘mobilize’ all available resources is, therefore, not to use artificial stimulants—whether during a crisis or thereafter—but to leave it to time to effect a permanent cure by the slow process of adapting the structure of production to the means available for capital purposes.

And so, at the end of our analysis, we arrive at results which only confirm the old truth that we may perhaps prevent a crisis by checking expansion in time, but that we can do nothing to get out of it before its natural end, once it has come…

If that’s not liquidationism, I’ll eat my structure of production…

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/friedman-and-the-austrians/?_r=0

Must-Read: John Whitehead: The Conservative Bias in Economics?

Must-Read: I think the rather sharp John Whitehead gets this critique of Mark Thoma wrong. Rather than being “ultra conservative”, Milton Friedman is rather a squish. The Stigler-Coase position is:

  1. If the government does not prevent it via misregulation, the private sector will contract to internalize all externalities, and
  2. Even if the private sector does not, government failure is still much worse than market failure.

Those two arguments were necessary to move away from the Henry Simons position that the government must and shall enforce competition–that the FTC should be the largest and most aggressive arm of government. If Chicago wanted to influence in the business-governed councils of the Republican Party and to please donors to the university, it needed to find a way to wriggle out of that first-generation Chicago-school economics midwestern-populist commitment. And it did.

Friedman, by contrast, was more of a wet. He wanted to make the market work, and he wanted in the here-and-now to make the market work better. That meant: a k%/year monetary growth rule. That meant: Pigovian taxes to substitute for incredibly inefficient command-and-control regulation. Via clever rhetoric Friedman could minimize his philosophical differences with the von Miseses and company. And the question of what to do after the Revolution… that would never arise…

John Whitehead: The Conservative Bias in Economics?: “Is [Thoma’s] argument liberal or conservative? I’d say neither…

…I’m tempted to add [ultra] or something like that to conservative in this excerpt because the argument is straight from the conservative economist Milton Friedman…. I pulled my copy of Free to Choose off the shelf and read the section on the environment…. Rather than a description of Coasian free-market environmentalism, it is a description of mainstream Pigouvian environmental economics. For example, on page 207:

Most economists agree that a far better way to control pollution than the present method of specific regulation and supervision is to introduce market discipline by imposing effluent charges.

Mainstream economists tend to be in favor of imposing market discipline with pollution taxes or permit markets relative to the ‘idea that markets work best when they are left alone.’