Morning Must-Read: Atif Mian and Amir Sufi: The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion

Atif Mian and Amir Sufi: The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis: “The sharp increase in mortgage defaults in 2007…

…is significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes, or ZIP codes with a disproportionately large share of subprime borrowers as of 1996. Prior to the default crisis, these subprime ZIP codes experience an unprecedented relative growth in mortgage credit. The expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime ZIP codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the past eighteen years in which income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. We show that the expansion in mortgage credit to subprime ZIP codes and its dissociation from income growth is closely correlated with the increase in securitization of subprime mortgages.

Blog You Need to Read: Tim Duy’s Fed Watch: Daily Focus

As all of you know by now, I am a big fan of Tim Duy of the University of Oregon and his Fed Watch. Here is a sample–ten very useful and informative takes from the past half-year or so:

Always judicious, always giving a fair shake to all the currents of thought in the Federal Reserve, to the data, and to the live and serious models of how the economy works.

Read Tim Duy, and you have a sophisticated, broad, and truly balanced understanding of what the Federal Reserve is thinking, what it is doing, why it is doing it, and what the likely outcomes of its actions are. That is a package that is very hard to find anyplace else.

It still surprises me that Tim Duy does not get significantly more airplay in the general conversational mix than he does…

Who Really Thinks That Japan Is Argentina?: Daily Focus

Paul Krugman: Japan on the Brink: “Japan’s current plan to hike consumption taxes a second time…

…has become… a sort of Rubicon for policy. And let me admit that people I respect–like Adam Posen, and some officials at international organizations–believe that Abe should go through with the hike. But I strongly disagree…. Right now, Japan is struggling to escape from a deflationary trap; it desperately needs to convince the private sector that from here on out prices will rise…. The pro-tax-hike side worries that if Japan doesn’t go through with the increase, it will lose fiscal credibility and… the bond vigilantes will attack. Why don’t I share that view? Partly because I don’t see how this supposed crisis of confidence is supposed to work…. When a country borrows in its own currency and doesn’t face inflationary pressure (quite the contrary), it’s very hard to see how a Greek-style crisis is even possible. Short-term interest rates are controlled by the Bank of Japan; long-term rates mainly reflect expected short rates. Yes, investors could push the yen down, but that would be a good thing from Japan’s point of view. Posen says stocks could crash, but I guess I don’t see why if interest rates stay low and corporate Japan becomes more competitive thanks to a weaker yen. Seriously: tell me how this is supposed to work… [how a] fear that Japan might eventually monetize some of its debt–isn’t actually a positive development. Meanwhile, it seems to me that Japan should be very, very afraid of losing momentum in the fight against deflation…. Could I be wrong?… Of course…. But it’s all about weighing the risks. Right now, the risk of losing anti-deflation credibility looks much worse than the risk of losing fiscal credibility. Please, don’t hike those taxes!

Continuing to worry my head about our intellectual adversaries here–including the very sharp and serious Adam Posen, over their fear that unless Japan raises taxes to begin closing its (admittedly huge) current budget deficits it runs serious risks of becoming “Argentina”.

I get that part of the argument is that Japan can hit the same nominal GDP growth target by pairing a looser monetary with a tighter fiscal policy, and should do so. And to the extent that that is what is at issue–a call for fiscal tightening coupled with even more aggressive monetary loosening to hit the same nominal GDP growth target, and that what is being advocated is not just an increase in taxes but an increase in taxes coupled with full monetary offset in the form of additional monetary goosing, I get the argument. I even agree with it.

But to the extent that it is more than that…

The basic model of the taxmongers is, I think, the following:

  1. E(π) = π + δ(rD – σ) :: Inflation Expectations
  2. π = E(π) + β(u* – u) :: Phillips Curve
  3. r = r* + γ(u – u) + θ(π – π) :: Monetary Policy

That is:

  1. Inflation Expectations: Expected inflation E(π) is equal to current inflation π plus some parameter times the difference between debt amortization rD and the expected primary surplus of the government σ.

  2. Phillips Curve: Current inflation π is equal to expected inflation E(π) + a parameter times the difference between the natural rate of unemployment and the actual rate of unemployment.

  3. Monetary Policy: The higher either the gap between the current inflation rate π and the central bank’s target inflation rate π* or the higher the required gap between the natural rate of unemployment u* and the current unemployment rate u, the more the central bank must raise the interest rate r over the Wicksellian natural rate r* in order to achieve its monetary policy target–and then the higher is required debt amortization rD.

It then follows that the unemployment rate and the real interest rate will both be increasing functions of the fiscal financing gap rD-σ:

  • u = u* + (δ/β)(rD – σ)
  • r = r* + (γδ/β)(rD – σ) + θ(π – π*)

Taking differentials in response to a shock dr* to the Wicksellian natural rate r*, we get:

  • du = D(δ/β)dr
  • dr = dr* + D(γδ/β)dr
  • du = [(δ/β)D/(1 – D(γδ/β))]dr*

Which tells us that if the debt D grows so large that Dγδ/β approaches one, even a very small adverse shock to the Wicksellian natural rate of interest dr* could cause the unemployment rate u to explode–unless the central bank abandons its monetary policy of inflation control, that is, of non-permanent-monetization of the debt.

For a country that does not borrow in its own currency, it is very easy to see why it must seek to avoid even a whisper of debt monetization. Such a whisper is an upward shock to E(π), and to the extent that is transmitted through to the current inflation rate such transmission produces an immediate jump in required debt service which makes the situation much worse.

But in a country that does borrow in its own currency and does control its own interest rates debt monetization and a resulting burst of inflation is no biggie: some of the debt is no-longer interest-bearing D that must be amortized but is money M. And to the extent that the rest of the debt has a duration greater than zero the increase in the price level reduces the value of the debt and thus the seriousness of the debt overhang problem.

Yes: I realize that this is arcana imperii. I do realize that I am not supposed to point out that reserve-currency issuing sovereigns with exorbitant privilege that thus control their own interest rates and borrow in their own currencies have a degree of freedom to use inflation as a tool of debt management that the Argentinas of the world do not. But an upward shift in expected inflation is what we are trying to generate here and now in Japan. And such an upward shift is only to be feared if Japan pretends that it is Argentina, and that it thus has no ability to monetize any of its debt.

If you are Argentina, then yes, sure: as Dγδ/β approaches one you get into the territory where a small upward shock to interest rates will cause either a Great Depression or force a price-spiral that, absent a currency reform, turns into hyperinflation.

But who thinks that Japan is Argentina?

Evening Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Japan on the Brink

Paul Krugman: Japan on the Brink: “Japan’s current plan to hike consumption taxes a second time…

…has become… a sort of Rubicon for policy. And let me admit that people I respect–like Adam Posen, and some officials at international organizations–believe that Abe should go through with the hike. But I strongly disagree…. Right now, Japan is struggling to escape from a deflationary trap; it desperately needs to convince the private sector that from here on out prices will rise…. The pro-tax-hike side worries that if Japan doesn’t go through with the increase, it will lose fiscal credibility and… the bond vigilantes will attack. Why don’t I share that view? Partly because I don’t see how this supposed crisis of confidence is supposed to work…. When a country borrows in its own currency and doesn’t face inflationary pressure (quite the contrary), it’s very hard to see how a Greek-style crisis is even possible. Short-term interest rates are controlled by the Bank of Japan; long-term rates mainly reflect expected short rates. Yes, investors could push the yen down, but that would be a good thing from Japan’s point of view. Posen says stocks could crash, but I guess I don’t see why if interest rates stay low and corporate Japan becomes more competitive thanks to a weaker yen. Seriously: tell me how this is supposed to work… [how a] fear that Japan might eventually monetize some of its debt–isn’t actually a positive development. Meanwhile, it seems to me that Japan should be very, very afraid of losing momentum in the fight against deflation…. Could I be wrong?… Of course…. But it’s all about weighing the risks. Right now, the risk of losing anti-deflation credibility looks much worse than the risk of losing fiscal credibility. Please, don’t hike those taxes!

Evening Must-Read: Nick Rowe Gets Tired of Whack-a-Mole…

Nick Rowe: Worthwhile Canadian Initiative: Neo-Fisherites and the Scandinavian Flick: “If you look at Sweden…

…reality just confirmed that beloved economic theory. The Riksbank raised interest rates because it was scared that low interest rates would cause financial instability. Lars Svensson resigned in protest. Then inflation fell, and the Riksbank needed to cut interest rates even lower than before…. If you don’t know how to drive a car, and you don’t even have a clue whether you turn the steering wheel clockwise or counter-clockwise if you want to turn right, one good strategy is to borrow a car, and a wide open field, and experiment. Make a random turn of the wheel, and see what happens. The recent data point in Sweden was a natural experiment like that…. Theory says, and the data confirm, and the advice of experienced practitioners confirms, that if it wants to raise inflation the central bank should first lower interest rates. Then, when inflation and expected inflation starts to rise, it can raise interest rates, higher than they were before. Then, and only then, does the Fisher effect kick in…. That is the Scandinavian flick we saw recently… the wrong way round…. Figuring out the intuition behind John Cochrane’s paper, to see what was really going on in his model, really drained me. Do I really have to wade through that Stephanie Schmidt-Grohe and Martin Uribe paper too, and reverse-engineer their result as well? I’m too old for this. Don’t any of you young whippersnappers have an economic intuition? Do you all get snowed by every fancy-mathy paper that comes along? I expect I will have to. Pray for me.

Wages, full employment and reducing inequality

The Washington Monthly magazine earlier this week published their latest issue, which focuses on equitable growth across generations of families in the United States. Figuring out how inequality interacts with economic growth and how to promote equitable growth requires looking at how an individual’s economic decisions and experiences change over a lifetime. The issue looks at a variety of issues at different times along this generational arc, including early childhood, K-12 education, higher education, and retirement. A few of the pieces take a more overarching look at these issues, including the essay by Alan Blinder on raising wages. Blinder, a professor of economics at Princeton University and former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, looks at the current state of wage growth in the United States. Unsurprisingly, the state of wage growth is not strong. From 1979 to 2012, inflation-adjusted wage growth for the median worker was only 5 percent. Compare that to wage growth at the 99th percentile, the lower bound of the top 1 percent, which was 154 percent over that same period. How can we boost wage growth for a broad section of U.S. workers? Blinder proposes seven policy responses that would boost the productivity of workers, reduce the gap between productivity and wages, and raise net wages relative to gross wages. But one solution deserves a bit more inspection: a call for a high-pressure economy. Blinder shows the unemployment rate, as a measure of the tightness of the labor market, is strongly related to wage growth and income inequality. Reductions in unemployment are associated with stronger growth in wages and compensation. This relationship is known as the wage Phillips curve. Recent research has shown that the relationship is stronger for low-wage workers.

blinder-gini-unempl

High levels of unemployment are associated with high levels of income inequality. Blinder charts the unemployment rate over the years against the change in the Gini coefficient, a common measure of inequality, for each year. He finds a positive correlation between the two. That is, inequality increases when unemployment is high. He also point out that data from 1968 to 2012 show inequality has rarely fallen when the unemployment rate is above 6 percent. As policy advice, “have a low unemployment rate” can seem just as unhelpful as “just get a job.” But Blinder’s call to promote full employment is important nonetheless. It is a framework for thinking about what successful fiscal and monetary policy should look like. If policymakers focused on getting unemployment as low as they could via stronger economic growth then wage growth would be stronger and inequality would be lower. The hard part will be getting more policymakers to share this mindset.

State-by-state minimum to median wage ratios

The data

Under “Downloads”, to your right, you will find the data used to create the interactive “Where does your state’s minimum wage rank against the median wage?”. Please cite the Washington Center for Equitable Growth if you use the data.

Methodology

The state-level minimum-to-median wage ratio is the ratio of the average of the state minimum wage to the state’s median wage in that year. The median wage is the median hourly wage in the Outgoing Rotation Group of the Current Population Survey of earners who work at least 35 hours per week and who are not self-employed. The national minimum-to-median wage ratio is the population-weighted mean of state minimum wages divided by the median national wage.

Entrepreneurship, creative destruction, and inequality at the top of the income ladder

Why has the share of income going to those at the very top of the U.S. income ladder grown so rapidly over the past 35 years while that same share in France remained relatively flat? Understanding the difference in income trends across countries at the top of the income spectrum has been a challenge for economists and other researchers for a while now. A new National Bureau of Economic Research working paper released yesterday offers one explanation: the difference in payoffs for engaging in entrepreneurship.

Charles I. Jones of Stanford University and Jihee Kim of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology start their investigation into top incomes by first recognizing that the distribution at the top is a so-called Pareto distribution. This means there’s a reoccurring level of inequality within each top income share. The top 1 percent, for example, have about 40 percent of the income going to the top 10 percent, and the top 0.1 percent have about 40 percent of the income going to the top 1 percent, and so-on.

What can explain a shift in the distribution that concentrates even more income at the top? Jones and Kim quickly dismiss skill-biased technology change, which they find can only explain a shift of the income curve over to the right (a larger difference between the top and bottom) but not the steepening of the curve itself over the past (the rapid increase at the top). What they instead believe explains the sharp rise is a change in the rewards for entrepreneurship, based on a new model they present in the paper.

Let’s start with the quite broad definition of entrepreneurship that Jones and Kim use in their model. A programmer who starts a business in Silicon Valley counts as an entrepreneur, as does a musical artist who writes a hit song and a middle manager at a firm who gets promoted after coming up with a new management process.

The two authors then factor in several developments that can increase the share of income going to the top of the income distribution. One is technological change—such as the invention of the Internet—that can allow for greater business opportunities and thus greater income gains for entrepreneurs. Another is a reduction in red tape. Yet intriguingly, these two factors don’t affect long-term economic growth but do increase top end inequality in their model.

What they do find are two factors that can affect both inequality and growth. An increase in the share of the population that works in research and development boosts economic growth, according to their model, as does a reduction in the ability of already existing firms to block innovation. They find that both of these factors result in more “creative destruction,” reducing the share of income going to those at the top as more entrepreneurs can enter the market.

So what we can take away from the paper? Well, the rise in top end inequality within a country might be the result of positive developments, such as the Internet, or negative developments, such as monopolies or oligopolies crushing new innovations. Factors that increase top end income inequality can be good or bad for economic growth. Just another reminder that looking at the specifics is always important.

Things to Read on the Morning of November 4, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Mark Dow: The Second Wave of the Bubble Unwind is Upon Us: “A pre-crisis boom in commodities lifted gold and silver…. Post-crisis monetary policy then turbo-charged it, as people feared rapid inflation, renewed systemic crisis, a dollar crash, and bond vigilantes. Macro tourists lined up to pile in. Big name guys wearing money halos. ETFs and electronic futures trading for the masses poured the gasoline. In short, they built a bubble. A bubble replete with charlatans hawking it on every medium…. The irony of the precious metals bubble is that it was the guys yelling ‘bubble’, bubbles of every stripe—bond, stock, credit—who sought refuge in the only asset class that was truly in a bubble. In other words, the fear of bubbles created its own bubble, trapping the bubblers. Karma really is running over dogma…. When I’m asked how far do I think gold can ultimately fall, my answer is I don’t know…. The statute of limitations on ‘not wrong, just early’ ran out a long time ago. By the time this is over only Peter Schiff, Zerohedge and Jim Grant will be waving their arms…”

  2. Cathy O’Neil: “Hand To Mouth” and the rationality of the poor: “I’ve long thought that the ‘marshmallow’ experiment is nearly universally misunderstood: kids wait for the marshmallow for exactly as long as it makes sense to them to wait. If they’ve been brought up in an environment where delayed gratification pays off, and where the rules don’t change in the meantime, and where they trust a complete stranger to tell them the truth, they wait, and otherwise they don’t–why would they? But since the researchers grew up in places where it made sense to go to grad school, and where they respect authority and authority is watching out for them, and where the rules once explained didn’t change, they never think about those assumptions. They just conclude that these kids have no will power. Similarly, this GoodBooksRadio interview with Linda Tirado is excellent in explaining the rational behavior of poor people. Tirado just came out with a book called Hand To Mouth: Living in Bootstrap America and was discussing it with Dr. John Cook, who was a fantastic interviewer. You might have come across Tirado’s writing–her essay on poverty that went viral, or the backlash against that essay. She’s clearly a tough cookie, a great writer, and an articulate speaker. Among the things she explains is why poor people eat McDonalds food (it’s fast, cheap, and filling), why they don’t get much stuff done (their lives are filled with logistics), why they make bad decisions (stress), and, what’s possibly the most important, how much harder work it is to be poor than it is to be rich. She defines someone as ‘rich’ if they don’t lease their furniture…. As the Financial Times review says, ‘Hand to Mouth – written with scorching flair–should be read by every person lucky enough to have a disposable income.’”

  3. David Fiderer: A Review of Fragile By Design: “Fragile By Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit is a tour de force, and not in a good way…. The narrative… is highly selective and misleading. Worse, the section that covers U.S. banking over the past 25 years is a set of distortions and falsehoods…. Calomiris… and… Haber[‘s] familiar narrative [is] identified as ‘The Big Lie’ by Joe Nocera, Barry Ritholtz…. Calomiris and Haber embrace The Big Lie, and double down by tracing everything to Bill Clinton’s grand strategy of income redistribution as a response to economic inequality or as a sop to community activists at ACORN…. The lack of response to the critics of The Big Lie…. There is zero evidence that the loans described by Calomiris and Haber ever existed. From 2001 through 2006, GSE originations that had loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 95 percent or higher and FICO scores of 639 or lower represented between 1 and 2 percent of total originations. According to GSE credit guidelines, those borrowers had characteristics that disallowed any kind of reduced documentation, much less no documentation or employment…. The amount of low-down-payment loans available in the marketplace was never decided by the GSEs. It was decided by private mortgage insurers, which were not regulated by the federal government…. Moreover, the financial meltdown of September 2008 was not triggered by bank failures; it was triggered by the failures of non-banks and by the unforeseen consequences of derivatives. The government had a clear legal path and precedent for dealing with bank failures like Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and IndyMac. But it had no clear path and no precedent for dealing with the imminent collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG…”

  4. Richard Sutch: The Liquidity Trap, the Great Depression, and Unconventional Policy: “John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory offered a rich analysis of the problems that appear at the zero lower bound and advocated the very same unconventional policies that are now being pursued. Keynes’s comments on these issues are rarely mentioned… because the subsequent simplifications and the bowdlerization of his model obliterated this detail…. This essay employs Keynes’s analysis to retell the economic history of the Great Depression in the United States. Keynes’s rationale for unconventional policies and his expectations of their effect remain surprisingly relevant today. I suggest that in both the Depression and the Great Recession the primary impact on interest rates was produced by lowering expectations about the future path of rates rather than by changing the risk premiums that attach to yields of different maturities. The long sustained period when short term rates were at the lower bound convinced investors that rates were likely to remain near zero for several more years. In both cases the treatment proved to be very slow to produce a significant response, requiring a sustained zero-rate policy for four years or longer.”

  5. Paul de Grauwe: The ECB should stop fearing the Germans | The Economist: “From 2012 to 2014 the Fed added $1 trillion to its balance sheet…. Exactly the opposite occurred in the euro zone…. There can be little doubt that the decision of the ECB to reduce the money base by 30% at a time when the euro zone had not recovered from the sovereign-debt crisis contributed to pushing the euro zone into a deflationary dynamic, out of which it still tries to extricate itself…. The American monetary authorities, correctly, understood that the crisis had led to a balance-sheet recession…. The ECB, on the other hand, was caught in a narrative that the problem came from… too many rigidities on the supply side. If these were fixed by structural reforms output would increase by itself…. Only by the beginning of 2014, the ECB started to recognise that this narrative did not fit the facts…. However, in the face of the fierce opposition of German economists and media the ECB was caught in a double bind. German opposition made it impossible for the ECB to use the technically easiest way to increase the money base, i.e. buying government bonds…. The question that arises now is what the ECB should do. At a minimum it should take its responsibility of keeping inflation close to 2% seriously…. By not acting forcefully today the ECB risks unleashing the rejection of the monetary union. This is a much higher risk than the risk of German ire against the use of an instrument, the purchase of government bonds that in the rest of the world is considered to be standard practice.”

  6. Paul Krugman: Business vs. Economics: “Business leaders often give remarkably bad economic advice, especially in troubled times…. Think of the hugely wealthy money managers who warned Ben Bernanke that the Fed’s efforts to boost the economy risked ‘currency debasement’; think of the many corporate chieftains who solemnly declared that budget deficits were the biggest threat facing America, and that fixing the debt would cause growth to soar…. And on the other side, the past few years have seen repeated vindication for policy makers who have never met a payroll, but do know a lot about economic theory and history. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have navigated their way through a once-in-three-generations economic crisis under the leadership of former college professors…. The answer… is that a country is not a company. National economic policy… needs to take into account kinds of feedback that rarely matter in business life…. A successful businessperson… sees the troubled economy as something like a troubled company, which needs to cut costs and become competitive…. And surely gimmicks like deficit spending or printing more money can’t solve what must be a fundamental problem…. In reality, however, cutting wages and spending in a depressed economy just aggravates the real problem, which is inadequate demand…. But how can this kind of logic be sold to business leaders, especially when it comes from pointy-headed academic types? The fate of the world economy may hinge on the answer…”

  7. Anne Seith: Monetary Fallacy?: Deep Divisions Emerge over ECB Quantitative Easing Plans: “Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann is opposed to most of these costly programs. They’re the reason he and ECB President Mario Draghi are now completely at odds. Even with the latest approved measures not even implemented in full yet, experts at the ECB headquarters a few kilometers away are already devising the next monetary policy experiment: a large-scale bond buying program known among central bankers as quantitative easing…. It is a fundamental dispute that is becoming increasingly heated…. Is it important that the ECB adhere to tried-and-true principles in the crisis, as Weidmann argues? Or can it resort to unusual measures in an emergency situation, as Draghi is demanding?… ‘Abenomics,’ worked only briefly…. Businesses and private households were simply too far in debt to borrow even more, no matter how cheap the monetary watchdogs had made it…. ‘For decades, the Japanese government did not institute the necessary structural reforms,’ says Michael Heise, chief economist at German insurance giant Allianz…”

  8. Paul Krugman: Flattening Flattens: “As I see it, ‘hyperglobalization’–the big increase in trade relative to GDP in the two decades after 1990–was a one-off affair, driven by trade liberalization in developing countries and the rise of containerization, which led to a breakup of the value chain, with labor-intensive segments of production moving to China and other emerging economies. There wasn’t any comparable boom in trade or abolition of distance between economies at similar wage levels; if anything, interregional trade and specialization within the US may have declined. The flattening out of flattening is neither good nor bad, it’s just what happens when a particular trend reaches its limits. What is important to realize, however, is that trends do tend to do that.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Josh Marshall: Paulism Captured Perfectly: “In his on-going effort to appeal to DC elites as a different kind of Republican, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) says it’s ‘dumb’ of Republicans to emphasize their support for voter ID laws which have been shown repeatedly to cut voting rates for minorities and poorer voters. He still they’re awesome. But it’s ‘dumb’ to make a big deal out of them because black voters can get the wrong impression. Watch.”

  2. Walter Scheidel: State revenue and expenditure in the Han and Roman empires: “Comparative analysis of the sources of income of the Han and Roman imperial states and of the ways in which these polities allocated state revenue reveals both similarities and differences. While it seems likely that the governments of both empires managed to capture a similar share of GDP, the Han state may have more heavily relied on direct taxation of agrarian output and people. By contrast, the mature Roman empire derived a large share of its income from domains and levies that concentrated on mining and trade. Collection of taxes on production probably fell far short of nominal rates. Hano fficialdom consistently absorbed more public spending than its Roman counterpart, whereas Roman rulers allocated a larger share of state revenue to agents drawn from the upper ruling class and to the military. This discrepancy was a function of different paths of state formation and may arguably have hadlong-term consequences beyond the fall of both empires.”

Morning Must-Read: Mark Dow: The Second Wave of the Bubble Unwind is Upon Us

Mark Dow: The Second Wave of the Bubble Unwind is Upon Us: “A pre-crisis boom in commodities lifted gold and silver…

…Post-crisis monetary policy then turbo-charged it, as people feared rapid inflation, renewed systemic crisis, a dollar crash, and bond vigilantes. Macro tourists lined up to pile in. Big name guys wearing money halos. ETFs and electronic futures trading for the masses poured the gasoline. In short, they built a bubble. A bubble replete with charlatans hawking it on every medium…. The irony of the precious metals bubble is that it was the guys yelling ‘bubble’, bubbles of every stripe—bond, stock, credit—who sought refuge in the only asset class that was truly in a bubble. In other words, the fear of bubbles created its own bubble, trapping the bubblers. Karma really is running over dogma…. When I’m asked how far do I think gold can ultimately fall, my answer is I don’t know…. The statute of limitations on ‘not wrong, just early’ ran out a long time ago. By the time this is over only Peter Schiff, Zerohedge and Jim Grant will be waving their arms…