Night Thoughts on Martin Wolf’s Shocking Shifts: Daily Focus

Martin Wolf’s column this week contains a very nice precis of the main argument of his recent The Shifts and the Shocks:

Martin Wolf: The Curse of Weak Global Demand: “This feeble performance–even the 6 per cent rise in real demand in the US…

…over more than six years is pathetic by historical standards–occurred despite the most aggressive monetary policies in history…. Yet this has not been nearly enough…. How do we explain such weak demand?… Three sets…. The first… stresses the post-crisis overhang of private debt and the damage to confidence caused by the sudden disintegration of the financial system…. The second… argues that the pre-crisis demand was unsustainable because it relied on huge accumulations of private and public debt…. The implication of this is that economies suffer not just from a post-crisis balance-sheet recession, but from an inability to generate credit-driven demand on the pre-crisis scale. Behind the unsustainability of pre-crisis demand lie global imbalances, shifts in income distribution and structurally weak investment…. The third set… points to a slowdown in potential growth, due to some combination of demographic changes, slowing rises in productivity and weak investment… feeds directly into the second…. The reason that extreme policy has been so ineffective is that the economies suffer from such deep-seated ailments. It is not just about weak supply. But it is also not just about weak demand. Nor is it just about the debt overhang or financial shocks. Each economy also has a different combination of ailments…

The deep-seated ailments that Wolf identifies are, I think, sixfold:

  1. In economic reality: the great rise in income and wealth inequality, with its consequent pressures for (i) overleverage and (ii) volatility of demand–the non-rich are pressured to spend by their needs for the necessities and their desires for the conveniences of life, while the rich are not.
  2. In economic reality: the emergence of the emerging-market liberalization, technological globalization, and first-world aging-driven “global savings glut”–or perhaps the global investment shortage–with its consequent extraordinary rise in global demand for assets perceived to be safe.
  3. In economic theory: the “insouciance” generated by the rational-expectations and efficient-markets hypotheses that produced a deep skepticism of pragmatic regulation to minimize systemic risk, a skepticism apparently and temporarily confirmed by the fact of the Great Moderation.
  4. In economic policy: the resulting production of both the deregulation of the 2000s that made it easy to sell assets perceived to be safe that were not in fact so, and the policy-making climate in which it apparently made sense in 2008 and since to do what was but no more than necessary to handle the crisis.
  5. In finance: the fact that tail risks had not been realized for generations meant that they were underweighted and portfolios were not properly hedged: as Minsky said, the fact of past stability destabilizes the future.
  6. In economic policy: the hubris of settling on a 2%/year inflation target as providing enough sea-room, and the greater hubris of the euro–the creation of a single currency over an area vastly greater than any optimum currency area, especially when coupled with the absence of the fiscal-union and banking-union supports that might have provided safety valves and with the assignment of a leading role in the eurozone to a Germany hag-ridden by an economic episteme that made the maintenance of aggregate demand always somebody else’s problem.

The financial crisis that hit the North Atlantic in 2008 hit a world economy that had just undergone these six shifts, and the consequence was a disaster that looks like it has permanently robbed the North Atlantic of about 10% of its wealth.

As to what ought to be done right now in the short run to try to recoup at least part of that permanent wealth-destruction, my reading of Martin Wolf’s book leads me to believe that he sees, as I see:

  • A North Atlantic desperately short of both public and other long-term investment spending.
  • A North Atlantic in which a continued shortage of supply of safe assets relative to demand at full employment puts downward pressure on spending.
  • A North Atlantic in which the sub-2%/year trend of inflation creates unjustifiable risks of the ZLB trap, and even worse, unjustifiable risks of deflation.

These seem to me at least to call for easy solutions:

  • Reserve-currency issuing governments that increase their investment spending and increase their guarantees of long-term investments.
  • Reserve-currency issuing governments that finance these increased spending projects by issuing high-quality debt to resolve the safe asset shortage.
  • Reserve-currency issuing governments that monetize enough of this debt to raise the trend inflation rate from 2%/year to 3%/year or 4%/year.

As to what ought to be done in the medium run, Martin calls for:

  • “The Eurozone [to] confront an existential challenge… decide either to break up… or to create a minimum set of institutions and policies that would make it work…”
  • Strong regulatory mandates to greatly diminish leverage and the use of debt.

I certainly agree with the first–but I see no political road to the creation of even the minimum set of institutions and policies in the eurozone.

I am less sure about the second. Debt is a very useful social instrumentality: we do not want everyone to have to pay all the attention all the time to all of their investments that we demand of prudent equity-holders. A focus on making sure that debts are good via aggressive stress-testing coupled with prudent government backstops via resolution mechanisms, guarantees, and aggregate spending targeting feels better to me. Yes, I know that this means that at times the government will wind up paying money out to feckless lenders and the government will thus provide business opportunities to feckless borrowers. But this ain’t a morality play: credit card companies do not attempt to eliminate credit card fraud but simply to balance its costs against the provision of convenience to their customers. Governments should have the same attitude toward the regulation of debt and risk.

And for the long run, Martin calls for:

  • A more equal distribution of income and wealth.
  • A better economics–one less in thrall to rational-expectations and efficient-market ideologues.
  • “More globalization and less–more global regulation and cooperation, and more freedom for individual countries to craft their own responses to the pressures of a globalizing world…”
  • Additional reforms of finance that diminish “its role in generating property bubbles… [as] the leveraging up of the stock of land is a consistently destabilizing phenomenon…”

I suspect that the fourth of these looms large in Martin’s mental universe simply because he is based in London. I am not sure it is that big a deal for the world as a whole–my reading of 2008- is that the property booms and busts did not create systemic risk any more than the dot-com boom and bust of the previous decade did, but rather that the critical flaws were elsewhere in high finance.

And as for the other three, the question is: How do we get there? If 2005-2014 does not create a new and very different economics in the universities and among the policy-making community, what would? Today’s superrich and even rich have a very strong material interest in not having a more equal distribution of wealth and income, and they hold a great deal of political power. And when Wolf call for both “more globalization and less” what I hear is a disheartened cry for better policymaking. But we will get that only when we live in Platonis πολιτείᾳ, non in Romuli faece–when we live in the republic of Plato, not in the shit of Romulus.


1275 words

Morning Must-Read: Robert Rubin: A First-Person History Lesson

William Cohan: A First-Person History Lesson From Robert Rubin: “Asked why he was a Democrat…

…Rubin explained that his grandfather ran ‘the most powerful political club’ in Brooklyn, was a delegate to the 1936 Democratic Convention, and then added:

I’m in more of an eclectic position than most folks. I could have been a moderate Republican or a moderate Democrat, a centrist in either one, except if I look at where I am and then look at the people who are left on the spectrum, I relate to their values and the things that concern them. There are a number of areas where I don’t agree with them… [but] their concern for the poor and their concern for having a society that works for everybody instead of just for a few, the notion that you can’t put people out on their own to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, and you have a society that helps people when they need it.

Morning Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Unwisdom of Crowding Out

Paul Krugman: The Unwisdom of Crowding Out: “I am, to my own surprise, not too happy…

…with the defense of Keynes by Peter Temin and David Vines…. Temin-Vines… seems to conflate several different bad arguments under the heading of ‘Ricardian equivalence’, and in so doing understates the badness. The anti-Keynesian proposition is that government spending to boost a depressed economy will fail…. I actually see five arguments out there–two (including the actual Ricardian equivalence argument) completely and embarrassingly wrong on logical grounds, three more that aren’t logical nonsense but fly in the face of the evidence. First, there’s the Say’s Law argument…. ‘This is just accounting,’ declared John Cochrane. No, it isn’t–and it was the remarkable fact that prominent economists were saying things like this, as if none of the debates of the 1930s had happened, that led me to proclaim a Dark Age of macroeconomics. Second, there’s the misuse of Ricardian Equivalence…. Even if it were (it isn’t), what the anti-Keynesians were saying was wrong, as I tried to explain a number of times…. Third, there’s the standard textbook crowding-out story… [which] doesn’t work when we’re at the zero lower bound…. Fourth, there’s the claim that we’re at full employment, or maybe always at full employment…. Finally, there’s the confidence fairy…. You do a disservice to the debate by calling all of these things Ricardian equivalence; and the nature of that disservice is that you end up making the really, really bad arguments sound more respectable than they are…

Hoisted from Comments: “Tom” on the Absence of Right-Wing Health Care Reform Policies

tom: Hoisted from the Internet from One Year Ago:

Re: “Automatically signing people up for low-cost default insurance”

Yet another instance of conservatives proposing ideas based purely on how they sound as slogans, and purely as a moving the bar trick: it is not intended as a replacement, only to sound like a plausible replacement, but only until when what it is proposed to replace is no longer in effect….

Yesterday James Capretta, today Megan McArdle trot out supposedly more palatable alternatives to Obamacare that are in fact rephrased versions of single payer or a public option. Why? Because there is no room to the right of Obamacare, except for nothing. That is why the Republican agenda sloganized as ‘repeal and replace’ amounts in practice to ‘repeal.’

Over at Grasping Reality: Whence the Right-Wing Confidence Back a Year Ago in ObamaCare’s Failure?

Hoisted from the Internet from One Year Ago: Please read:

  • Richard Epstein
  • John Cochrane

and tell me what is going on here. Anyone have any plausible answers for me?

The lack of any public or even private willingness to mark one’s beliefs to market is amazing. As is the inexorable and irresistible desire to call the pitch a strike before the pitcher has even walked to the mound.

It’s not as though either Cochrane or Epstein has the confidence that would have been created by a lifetime of calling the balls and strikes more accurately than anyone else that might have motivated such hubris.

Nor do either of them have any standing other than that that comes from a perception of being smart.

Noted for Your Morning Procrastination for November 19, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Mark Thoma: When Piketty Argued for Income Redistribution, He Changed Economics: “Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century… has it changed anything within economics?… Piketty has… revive[d] the study of the distribution of wealth without violating the positive and normative distinction that economists hold so dear…. Whether or not Piketty is correct about the fundamental determinants of these distributions remains to be seen, but he deserves much credit…. Another thing Piketty deserves credit for is the revival of the historical, narrative methodology…. In his 1919 presidential address to the American Economic Association, Irving Fisher said, ‘The real scientific study of the distribution of wealth has, we must confess, scarcely begun as yet.’ Nearly a hundred years later that, along with a revival of historical methods and perspective, may finally be changing.”

  2. Robert F. Martin et al.: Potential Output and Recessions: Are We Fooling Ourselves?: “The economic collapse in the wake of the global financial crises (GFC) and the weaker-than-expected recovery in many countries have led to questions about the impact of severe downturns on economic potential. Indeed, for several major economies, the level of output is nowhere near returning to pre-crisis trend (figure 1). Such developments have resulted in repeated downward revisions to estimates of potential output by private- and public-sector forecasters. In addition, this disappointment in post-recession growth has contributed to concerns that the U.S. economy, among others, is entering an era of secular stagnation. However, the historical experience of advanced economies around recessions indicates that the current experience is less unusual than one might think. First, output typically does not return to pre-crisis trend following recessions, especially deep ones. Second, in response, forecasters repeatedly revise down measures of trend…”

  3. James Pethokoukis: The GOP needs to rethink its approach to tax cuts: “Steve Moore… doesn’t like the conservative idea of cutting the tax burden and increasing take-home pay of American parents by expanding the child tax credit…. So the Republican Party — tagged as the ‘party of the rich’–should head into 2016 with a plan to cut taxes on the rich and raise them on working class Americans? Hmm. (And by the way, there doesn’t seem to be any evidence that turning people into non-income taxpayers nudges them into greater support for expanding government.) Anyway, what should the GOP pitch to the middle-class be, according to Moore? This: cutting the top income tax rate would boost GDP growth, which in turn would broadly boost middle-class incomes…. When incomes for the top 1% have risen by 200% over the past three decades vs. for 40% for the middle class, it’s not surprising that Americans wonder about the wisdom of cutting top tax rates…”

  4. Ed O’Keefe: Samuel Alito Fails to Quote Straight: “‘Some of the columns that are written, you know, are another story,’ Alito said, in a rare public lecture on Constitutional history and law presented by the New York Historical Society on Saturday. ‘Some of them are written by people who are not very knowledgeable…. I was reading one, actually, reading one this morning that was complaining about the current membership of the Court, because unlike in past days, according to this columnist, we don’t have a representation of drunks, philanderers, and a few, you know, a few other n’er do wells.’… [Dahlia Lithwick’s] column…. ‘Compared with the political operators, philanderers, and alcoholics of bygone eras, they are almost completely devoid of bad habits or scandalous secrets. This is, of course, not a bad thing.’ American legal scholar and Yale University professor Akhil Reed Amar, who moderated the discussion and referred to Alito by his first name throughout the event, politely described the column as ‘interesting’, and quickly moved on to other topics…”

  5. Charles Pierce: Here’s Some Stupid For Lunch: “The editorial board of The Washington Post [serves up] the absolutely perfect Beltway word-souffle: ‘[Obama] has tried compromise, and the Republicans spurned him. We will not relitigate that last contention except to note that behind the legislative disappointments of the past six years lies fault on both sides.’ Wow.”

  6. Scott Lemieux: Today In People Insulting Your Intelligence – Lawyers, Guns & Money : Lawyers, Guns & Money: “Shorter David Brooks: ‘If Obama takes unilateral action on immigration, congressional Republicans will stop cooperating with his initiatives!’ Shorter Lambert Strether: ‘We would totally have had single-payer if it wasn’t for the meddling of President, Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, Secretary of State, Chief Justice of the United States, and longtime don of the Gambino crime family Jonathan Gruber.  Also, I have no idea what was actually in the Heritage health care proposal, and think that governors rule Massachusetts like kings.’ Shorter Verbatim Megan McArdle: ‘So what would I have done, when Obamacare was tanking in the polls and Scott Brown was elected to the Senate on an anti-Obamacare platform? I would have passed something more modest that still significantly expanded coverage, expanding Medicaid to 150 to 200 percent of the poverty line and creating a national high-risk pool to insure anyone who’d been turned down for coverage more than twice in the past 12 months, at prices comparable to what a healthy person of their age would pay in the insurance market. Again, much cheaper, much less intrusive, no blowback from people who lost their policies, and very unlikely to have been tampered with by the Supreme Court.‘ Oh, yes, the Supreme Court tampering with an expansion of Medicaid–that’s unpossible!” :: Postmodulator says: “I liked this even better: ‘creating a national high-risk pool to insure anyone who’d been turned down for coverage more than twice in the past 12 months, at prices comparable to what a healthy person of their age would pay in the insurance market.’ So, make the bill more palatable by putting the public option back in. I genuinely refuse to believe this woman is the same species as me.”

  7. Jonathan Chait: Bush Official Flip-Flopping on Obamacare — NYMag: “Getting in his licks today is Tevi Troy, former Bush administration health official, who takes to the Wall Street Journal editorial page to denounce Obamacare’s ‘Cadillac tax’…. Troy’s column does not mention that the Cadillac tax–or, usually, even more stringent versions of it–have been a mainstay of Republican health-care plans as well…. Troy’s op-ed also fails to mention that he himself used to oppose the tax break for employer-sponsored health insurance. In a 2007 speech, he explained that Bush proposed to cap the health-insurance tax deduction to exclude the more expensive plans: ‘The President’s proposal would allow every taxpayer with health insurance that meets certain basic criteria… to deduct $15,000 for a family…. These numbers we’re pretty confident are large enough to cover all but the most expensive Cadillac-type plans.’… Obama’s Cadillac tax kicks in at a threshold of $30,000 per year, compared to the $15,000-per-year threshold Troy endorsed under Bush. Troy has more recently changed his thinking on the issue. As the president of the American Health Policy Institute, Troy’s work now focuses on warning America about the dangerous burdens of the Cadillac tax he once endorsed…. Troy’s op-ed doesn’t mention that either…”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Molly Redden: Catholic Church Argues It Doesn’t Have to Show Up in Court Because Religious Freedom: “When Emily Herx first took time off work for in vitro fertilization treatment, her boss offered what sounded like words of support: ‘You are in my prayers.’ Soon those words took on a more sinister meaning. The Indiana grade school where Herx was teaching English was Catholic. And after church officials were alerted that Herx was undergoing IVF—making her, in the words of one monsignor, ‘a grave, immoral sinner’—it took them less than two weeks to fire her. Herx filed a discrimination lawsuit in 2012. In response, St. Vincent de Paul School and the Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, her former employers, countered… [that] its religious liberty rights protect the school from having to go to court at all…”

  2. Nicholas Carlson (2012): Romney Was So Proud Of His Universal Healthcare Law He Included It In His Official Portrait: “One of Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s campaign promises is that he will do everything he can to repeal the Affordable Care Act, aka ‘Obamacare.’ But Romney hasn’t always been so opposed to the ideas behind ‘Obamacare,’ such as the act’s requirement that all individuals buy health insurance. While he was governor of Massachusetts, Romney’s own signature legislation was a healthcare reform act built around the idea of an individual mandate. In 2005, Romney even called it ‘the ultimate conservative idea.’ In materials from his 2008 campaign for President, Romney cited reports that the bill had ‘newly insured’ some 300,000 people. In fact, Romney was so proud of this legislation that he insisted his official governor’s portrait include a copy of the bill…”

  3. Brian Buetler: Reihan Salam Obamacare Article Shows Why the Debate Will Never End: “The trick is to make the opposition look more sporting. Salam laments that Democrats tailored their health care legislation to obscure and delay transfers so that budget analysts wouldn’t treat the law as they might a single-payer program where… everything coming in is a tax, and everything going out is an expenditure…. The right’s memory has grown conveniently spotty…. In 2011, in a different context, Salam mocked the kind of scolding he’s now directing at Obama. ‘Ah, he made the program marginally less politically poisonous, which will make it harder for us to demonize him. Now let’s attack him for hypocrisy!’ he wrote, paraphrasing critics. The policy architect in that instance was Paul Ryan, who proposed phasing out the existing Medicare program, but only after 10 years, and only for future retirees. At the time, Salam didn’t believe his opponents’ rhetorical strategy had much merit. ‘I mean, I get it,’ he added. ‘But also: let’s move on’…”

Afternoon Must-Read: Charles Pierce: Here’s Some Stupid For Lunch

What are the odds that future generations will not dismiss the stories of Fred Hiatt’s shop at The Washington Post as improbable fictions? When Paul Krugman denounced “opinions of shape of earth differ” journalism, he was making a joke!

Charles Pierce: Here’s Some Stupid For Lunch: “The editorial board of The Washington Post [serves up] the absolutely perfect Beltway word-souffle:

[Obama] has tried compromise, and the Republicans spurned him. We will not relitigate that last contention except to note that behind the legislative disappointments of the past six years lies fault on both sides.

Wow.

Missing corporate income and the question of U.S. tax progressivity

The New York Times earlier this week published a column by Steven Rattner, a Wall Street financier and former Obama administration official, that looks at all the ways in which inequality as commonly understood might be understated in the United States. Rattner analyzes a variety of measures that show the relatively low U.S. tax progressivity compared to other rich economies. He cites data from the accounting firm KPMG, but other data sources including the Congressional Budget Office show the U.S. tax system remains progressive but less so than is generally assumed.

Yet a recently released paper argues that widely accepted economic models of our tax system—models like CBO’s that policymakers will rely on when making any legislative changes to our tax code— actually overstate U.S. tax progressivity. What’s causing analysts to overstate this progressivity? According to Patrick Driessen of Bloomberg Government, the culprit is the treatment of corporate income in economists’ favored models.

Thes models used by the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation were originally built to understand the distributional effects of changes in tax policy at the individual level. CBO and JCT built these models with an eye on the need to evaluate reductions or increases in individual income taxes. This means the corporate income tax became the “neglected-but-younger-and-complicated sibling,” as Driessen puts it.

The standard models—a type known as capital-gain-realization, or CGR models—measure corporate income tax by looking at how much capital gains were realized by individuals and then imputing those gains back to corporations. But Driessen argues this method has big flaws because it misses a number of sources of corporate income, most of all deferred foreign earnings.

Because the United States doesn’t tax corporate income earned overseas until it returns to the United States, corporations have increasingly kept earnings oversees. According to Driessen, foreign deferral was about $50 billion 25 years ago. Now it’s $400 billion. The CGR models don’t capture this income and therefore doesn’t account for it in the calculation of tax rates.

Driessen presents another way of calculating corporate incomes—one that accounts for foreign deferral and other holes in the CGR models. His result is this—the U.S. corporate income tax base is increased by $1 trillion and the corporate tax rate falls to 14 percent. In contrast, the CGR models calculate a corporate tax rate of 41 percent from a corporate income tax base of about $500 billion. This 14 percent tax rate is close to other recent estimates of the effective tax rate paid by corporations.

The result of all these adjustments by Driessen is that the tax rate on U.S. corporate income is much lower than the standard distributional models would have you believe. The progressivity of the corporate income tax depends on part on who bears most of its cost: capital or labor. This is a contested issue within economics. Some economists and analysts argue that labor actually pays most of any corporate tax because corporations pass on the cost to labor in the form of lower compensation. But, at least in the range he considers, Driessen finds that the incidence doesn’t affect progressivity much. And regardless of your view of the effects the corporate income tax on society, we can all agree that it would be best to account for all the income being taxed in any distributional model. On that front, we all owe Driessen thanks.

Afternoon Must-Read: Mark Thoma: When Piketty Argued for Income Redistribution, He Changed Economics

Mark Thoma: When Piketty Argued for Income Redistribution, He Changed Economics: “Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century

…has it changed anything within economics?… Piketty has… revive[d] the study of the distribution of wealth without violating the positive and normative distinction that economists hold so dear…. Whether or not Piketty is correct about the fundamental determinants of these distributions remains to be seen, but he deserves much credit…. Another thing Piketty deserves credit for is the revival of the historical, narrative methodology…. In his 1919 presidential address to the American Economic Association, Irving Fisher said, ‘The real scientific study of the distribution of wealth has, we must confess, scarcely begun as yet.’ Nearly a hundred years later that, along with a revival of historical methods and perspective, may finally be changing.