The Federal Reserve and Borg Assimilation: Focus

Larry Summers: Only raise US rates when whites of inflation’s eyes are visible: “Aborting recovery and risking a further slowing of price rises is potentially catastrophic…”

Paul Krugman: Insiders and Outsiders Redux – NYTimes.com: “Matt O’Brien praises Larry Summers for his ‘don’t raise rates’ op-ed…

and rightly so–or at least I agree, and have been saying the same thing…. But I’m interested in Matt’s remark that Larry would have made a good Fed chairman. Quite possibly–but would he be saying the same thing if he were in fact at the Fed?… There is a big divide on monetary policy right now among people who seem to share the same model of how the world works…. Everything seems to depend on whether you are currently in an official position or not. Stan Fischer and Olivier Blanchard are pretty Keynesian, but seem ready to hike; Larry and yours truly think about the asymmetry of risks, and are aghast at the thought. So if Larry were at the Fed, would he be saying what he is, or would he have been assimilated by the FedBorg?

And:

Claudia Sahm: Is Resistance Futile?: “Krugman…. ‘So if Larry [Summers] were at the Fed, would he be saying what he is, or would he have been assimilated by the FedBorg?’… This got me wondering: In the past 7+ years have I, as a staff economist, been ‘assimilated by the FedBorg?’… What are some Fed-specific signs that I have changed as an economist?: Fedspeak: My economic writing tends to be more factual and less forceful now…. The staff view: As an economist, I uttered the words: ‘we think xyz’ much, much less before joining the Fed…. The Fed: More than once I have thought how wonderful it would be if monetary policy in the real world were like in Woodford’s textbook…. I am constantly amazed at the array of inputs to and outputs from the policy work at the Fed. And I am pretty sure that most academic economists could learn something from reflecting more on this…. So it seems to me the good part of assimilating is learning new things, the bad part of assimilating is forgetting what you knew…”

I think that everyone who has ever worked for Larry will have the same reaction to Paul’s question: “Of course he would not be assimilated!”, followed by laughter. What you need most in Larry’s office is not to guard against groupthink and paying too much attention to the recent-past consensus, but rather someone whose core competence is: “Let’s think about this some more. If we still think this is a good idea in a week, we could always do it then…” Someone with as much confidence in his own judgment and as much enthusiasm as Summers is the personality type least likely to be assimilated by the constant drip-drip-drip of concerns and questions.

Indeed, the argument that Janet Yellen would be significantly better at making the Fed run in harness smoothly while Larry Summers would be better at taking bold action when it was called for even without an FOMC consensus behind him was the substantive point at issue in the choice between the two.

Where I think Federal Reserve groupthink takes hold is in a narrowing-down of the tails: you run your models, you make your forecasts, most of the time the outcome is pretty close to what you had forecast, and so you gain confidence–especially because there is an immense amount of information flooding in that validates and backs your central-tendency forecast.

The main argument against a June 2015 interest-rate liftoff and a 0.25%-point/meeting climb in interest rates thereafter to a normal level of 4% in mid-2017 are, after all, two:

  1. The financial markets are betting that such a liftoff would then be reversed and interest rates lowered sometime in 2016.

  2. With such a path two bad shocks in 2016 would create a very dangerous situation; while with liftoff delayed two good shocks in 2016 would not cause serious trouble.

But Fed groupthink has the effects, I guess, of making the Federal Reserve confident that, like Jon Snow, the financial markets know nothing; and of focusing attention on central tendencies at the expense of giving proper weight to the asymmetry of risks in the tails…

Evening Must-Read: Claudia Sahm: Is Resistance Futile?

Claudia Sahm: Is Resistance Futile?: “Krugman…. ‘So if Larry [Summers] were at the Fed…

would he be saying what he is, or would he have been assimilated by the FedBorg?…

This got me wondering: In the past 7+ years have I, as a staff economist, been ‘assimilated by the FedBorg?’… What are some Fed-specific signs that I have changed as an economist?: Fedspeak: My economic writing tends to be more factual and less forceful now…. The staff view: As an economist, I uttered the words: ‘we think xyz’ much, much less before joining the Fed…. The Fed: More than once I have thought how wonderful it would be if monetary policy in the real world were like in Woodford’s textbook…. I am constantly amazed at the array of inputs to and outputs from the policy work at the Fed. And I am pretty sure that most academic economists could learn something from reflecting more on this…. So it seems to me the good part of assimilating is learning new things, the bad part of assimilating is forgetting what you knew…

Evening Must-Read: “There Can Be No Partnership with the King”: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England’s East Indian Merchant Empire

Dan Bogart: “There Can Be No Partnership with the King”: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England’s East Indian Merchant Empire: “The English East India Company helped build…

…Britain’s colonial empire, but the Company was not a leader in East Asian trade for nearly a century after its founding in 1600. This paper argues that its early performance was hindered by a problem of regulatory commitment. It gives a brief history of the torturous renegotiations over its monopoly trading privileges and the fiscal demands by the monarchy. It also analyzes the effects of political instability, warfare, and fiscal capacity on the Company’s investment in shipping tonnage. Regressions show the growth of shipping tonnage declined significantly when there were changes in government ministers, when Britain was at war in Europe and North America, and when shipping capacity exceeded central government tax revenues. The findings point to the significance of regulatory institutions in Britain’s development and its links with politics and war. They also provide an important case where regulatory uncertainty lowers investment.”

Lunchtime Must-Read: Trevon Logan and John Parman: The National Rise in Residential Segregation

Trevon Logan and John Parman: The National Rise in Residential Segregation: “We exploit complete census manuscript files to derive a measure of segregation…

…based upon the racial similarity of next-door neighbors. Our measure allows us to analyze segregation consistently and comprehensively for all areas in the United States and allows for a richer view of the variation in segregation across time and space. We show that the fineness of our measure reveals aspects of racial sorting that cannot be captured by traditional segregation indices. Our measure can distinguish between the effects of increasing racial homogeneity of a location and the tendency to segregate within a location given a particular racial composition. Analysis of neighbor-based segregation over time establishes several new facts about segregation. First, segregation doubled nationally from 1880 to 1940. Second, contrary to previous estimates, we find that urban areas in the South were the most segregated in the country and remained so over time. Third, the dramatic increase in segregation in the twentieth century was not driven by urbanization, black migratory patterns, or white flight to suburban areas, but rather resulted from a national increase in racial sorting at the household level. The likelihood that an African American household had a non-African American neighbor declined by more than 15 percentage points (more than a 25% decrease) through the mid-twentieth century. In all areas of the United States–North and South, urban and rural–racial segregation increased dramatically.

Trying to Understand the Current State of Health-Care Debate. And Failing…: Focus

Can someone point me to something Stuart Butler has written in the past three years that has turned out to be correct?

I mean, it seems to be blinkered, partisan, wrong–and obviously wrong at the time, both in its analysis of the political forces and of the policy substance. Am I wrong? Take a look:

Stuart Butler (2012): End of the Threat to Obamacare? Not at All: “The core elements of the ACA remain very much in play…

…[because of] the continuing problems with the federal budget deficit and the national debt and the worrying long-term weakness of the economy…. 2013… a year for buyer’s remorse in Congress and around the country…. Employers[‘]… concerns about mandatory benefits are slowing their hiring… lower-wage employers are moving towards hiring part-time employees to avoid the ACA’s penalties. These patterns will only grow…. The possibility of larger-than-expected enrollment in health insurance exchanges will sharply increase the budget costs… force Congress to reopen key ACA coverage provisions….

It’s also hard to imagine the expansion of Medicaid proceeding as planned… even the short-term prospect of Washington picking up expanded Medicaid costs is not likely to prevent a strong pushback by states….

The prospects for serious Medicare reform are actually on the rise. The Ryan version of premium support…. Obama’s initial large lead as the best defender of Medicare slid to just 5 points by the election…. Romney… won the senior vote…. Relying on the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) of experts in health care economics and the health care system to crack down on physicians and hospitals is hardly going to make the ACA more popular among seniors…

Stuart Butler (2013): Is Medicaid Expansion Really a No-Brainer for States?: “The Obama Administration is pressing states to see this…

…as a deal that no sensible governor and state legislature can refuse and to think that doing so would harm the state and its clinicians and health care facilities…. Some Republican governors, such as Rick Scott… say there is no sense in leaving federal money on the table. Still, others are balking… Bobby Jindal. Are they lacking common sense?…

Most states taking the deal would still have to dig deep into their already overstretched budgets in the future…. A recent Heritage Foundation simulation… makes it clear that although most states will enjoy a net budget gain for the first 3 years, they will be experiencing a rapidly escalating trajectory of state costs by the end of the period…. The Medicaid expansion could be much more costly to states…. There is no guarantee that the deficit-burdened federal government will be able to maintain its funding promises….

Fearing that the ACA’s design of Medicaid expansion could end up as a Faustian bargain for state budgets… there are far better ways to approach this particular group of the uninsured than simply expanding Medicaid….

Pressing states to participate in the expansion of Medicaid is a bad idea…. The ACA’s approach threatens future state finances and locks in an approach that makes it less likely to ensure Medicaid coverage that will be affordable to future federal and state taxpayers while providing adequate health services to beneficiaries.

Stuart Butler (2013): Are Health Costs Really Slowing?: “We should remember Aristotle’s dictum…

…‘One swallow does not make a summer.’ Three years of slow health spending growth is welcome, but it would be unwise to open the champagne just yet. This is definitely not the time to ease up on seeking reforms in Medicare and Medicaid to limit the unfunded obligations on our children and grandchildren. And it is no time to cease challenging the new entitlements and cost-reduction wishful thinking of the ACA.

I mean:

  • The combination of interest rates and even a subnormal posture made for a much more optimistic budget picture in 2012 than Butler claimed…
  • The claim that ACA exchange subsidies would turn out to be an unexpectedly-large budget buster was simply wrong…
  • I look monthly for disemployment effects from the ACA, and if I look really hard I can find things that might be very small ones…
  • No, there were no politically-viable prospects for serious Medicare reform…
  • The Heritage Foundation “simulation” that states would benefit budgetarily from Medicaid expansion for only the first three years–I haven’t heard anyone repeat that lately…
  • The claim that the federal government was likely to renege on its Medicaid-expansion funding promises seemed deaf to the real politics at the time and seems even deafer now…
  • The Republican argument that expanding Medicaid would be a bad idea for a state looked bad at the time and looks worse and worse with every passing day…
  • Expanding Medicaid has not locked anybody into an unsustainable policy path…
  • The cost-reduction thinking of the ACA does not, at least now, look wistful…
  • If it is not now time to open the champagne at the improvement in the health-care spending-path trajectory, when would it be time?

And when I look at what Stuart Butler is writing today, I see no talk about how his root-and-branch opposition to Medicaid expansion, unwarranted budgetary and health-care spending-growth pessimism, and belief that the politics were still favorable for ACA repeal were all misjudgments. I see no talk about how the fact that the world has turned out to be a different place from what he claimed it was back in 2012 and 2013 has led him to rethink. I read, instead:

Stuart Butler: Two Cheers for the GOP’s Burr, Hatch and Upton Alternative to Obamacare: “It’s high time for the GOP to move away…

…from going-nowhere votes to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA or ‘Obamacare’)… adopt the strategy of achieving a more conservative vision of health through structural–and potentially bipartisan–amendments to the ACA…

Shouldn’t this denunciation of a GOP pursuing “going-nowhere… repeal… [of] ObamaCare…” come with, at the very least, an admission that this is a reversal-of-field on Butler’s part as well? Especially as the politicians Butler wants to praise today–Burr, Hatch, and Upton–are still pursuing that will-o’the-wisp forcefully, so that Butler asks us to:

Put aside… the lawmakers’ statement that the first thing to do is to repeal the ACA… the important thing is to focus on the core elements of the proposal as potential vehicles for broad-based reform…

where I take “broad-based” to be a synonym for “bipartisan”.

And why no mention anywhere that Burr-Hatch-Upton’s plan is a minor reworking of last year’s Burr-Coburn-Hatch proposal? Why the pretense that this is a new offer, rather than an attempt to revive something that did not get traction with the leadership of either party last year?

And why call for two cheers for a plan that Butler says has these features:

  • “The specific [health-care insurance] credit design is imperfect…”
  • “Regrettably, the new plan raises the cap [on the deductibility of employer-sponsored health insurance] above the thresholds even for the badly designed ACA ‘cadillac tax’ on high-cost plans…”
  • “The GOP plan could have moved much more decisively towards state-led reform… within the ACA itself is a provision that allows states to propose radical changes…. Rather than seek to repeal… §1332, the plan sponsors would have been much wiser to have proposed strengthening it…”
  • “The proposal has attracted liberal criticism, with some critics raising design concerns that need to be addressed…”

And yet his bottom line is:

The Burr-Hatch-Upton plan is an important proposal from leading GOP lawmakers and includes approaches that contain the basis for agreement. If the White House and congressional Democrats are willing to look seriously at several of its central provisions, they will see opportunities for addressing the impasse over the ACA and achieving health coverage goals that are widely shared.

But why does Butler say this is superior to the ACA? He says its steps away from incentivizing employer-sponsored insurance are inferior to the ACA’s. He doesn’t see the point of the Dingbat Kabuki involved in not building on §1332. It has serious design flaws. And its tax-credit design is “imperfect”. And Butler seems to me to give us no reason to prefer it to the ACA save one:

  • It is a proposal by Republicans.

Well, the core design of the ACA was once a proposal by Republicans too. As Jon Gruber likes to say, ObamaCare is RomneyCare. Why not simply stick where we are and see how the policy bets we have placed with ObamaCare turn out, so that we actually learn something about what does and does not work?

Things to Read on the Morning of February 10, 2015

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Michael Hiltzik: When a State Blocks Obamacare, ERs Close: The Lesson of Louisiana: “Baton Rouge… is about to lose one of its crucial hospital emergency rooms…. Gov. Bobby Jindal has refused to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, and won’t put up any other money to keep the facility open. Because of the scheduled closure of the ER of Baton Rouge General Medical Center-Mid City, patients needing emergency treatment will have to travel as much as 30 minutes longer…. Jindal has tried to position himself as the last stalwart Republican opponent of the ACA, but his state’s experience shows that his position is folly…. In the expectation that Medicaid would pick up the slack, the ACA reduced so-called disproportionate share hospital payments, which went to hospitals serving a large number of the uninsured. So institutions in states that have refused to expand Medicaid, like Louisiana, have faced a double-whammy–they still have to serve a large number of uninsured patients, but they have less money to do so. The ACA has reduced uncompensated care costs… by $5.7 billion in fiscal 2014 compared with what they would have been otherwise…”

  2. Barry Eichengreen:: Cassandras and Currency Wars: “Economic analysis, it seems, is the art of recycling old ideas under new names. So it is with the debate over currency wars, which parallels exactly the 1930s debate over competitive currency devaluation. David Woo, meet Ragnar Nurkse. Nurkse, in… 1944… [argued that] competitive devaluation was a negative-sum game. These are exactly the arguments made by today’s Cassandras of currency wars…. Subsequent scholarship shows, however, that the main reason monetary policy didn’t work more powerfully in the 1930s was that it wasn’t tried…. Central banks in the 1930s were reluctant to utilise their newfound monetary freedom… failed to make open-ended commitments to raise prices… effectively transform expectations… supplement the new monetary regime with supportive fiscal action… failed to convince investors that they were committed to a fundamentally new policy regime…. And because they failed to coordinate their monetary and exchange rate policies internationally, haphazard exchange rate changes only created volatility and uncertainty, as argued here. Today, in contrast, central banks like the Bank of Japan and European Central Bank are making open-ended commitments to do what it takes…. Without that action and those steps, however, the Cassandras of currency wars will be right.”

  3. Tim Duy: On The Fed Credibility Gap: “David Wessel opines…. ‘The markets think Fed officials and staff economists are overly optimistic about the U.S. economy, as they have been in the past….’ I will suggest another framework: Financial markets are pricing in a ‘secular stagnation’ scenario that is at odds with Federal Reserve thinking…. Suppose that the short term equilibrium real rate has fallen to zero…. Change the estimate of NAIRU from 5.6% to 5%… close to pre-recession Fed estimates. The results… [are] fairly close to market expectations…. It thus appears reasonable to argue that financial market participants are pricing in a secular stagnation story combined with a pre-recession level of NAIRU. In contrast, the Fed is not seriously contemplating such a story…. The biggest risk to the expansion is a dogmatic view… on the part of the Federal Reserve…. Financial market participants are saying the Fed has less room to maneuver than monetary policymakers believe. The Fed, I fear, is not taking sufficient heed of those signals. Would it be outrageous to think that the Federal Reserve could find itself backtracking after just 200bp of rate hikes? Not if Sweden serves as any example…. The Fed… risk[s] tightening too aggressively and turning an expansion that should last at least four more years into one with only two left.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Paul Krugman: Greece: The Tie That Doesn’t Bind: “I’ve long believed that Matthew Yglesias hit on something… when he noted that small-country politicians… have personal incentives to go along with troika demands…. ‘Normally you would think that a national prime minister’s best option is to try to do the stuff that’s likely to get him re-elected…. But in the era of globalization and EU-ification… if you leave office held in high esteem by the Davos set, there are any number of European Commission or IMF or whatnot gigs that you might be eligible for even if you’re absolutely despised by your fellow countrymen…. The ultimate demonstration of solidarity to the ‘international community’ would be to do what the international community wants even in the face of massive resistance from your domestic political constituency.’ But a genuine government of the left… is very different–not because its policy ideas are wild and crazy, which they aren’t, but because its officials are never going to be held in high esteem by the Davos set. Alexis Tsipras is not going to be on bank boards of directors, president of the BIS, or, probably, an EU commissioner. Varoufakis doesn’t even like wearing ties…. There will be no consolation prizes for failing conventionally. Do Berlin and Brussels understand this? If not, they are operating under a dangerous misconception.”

  2. Andrew Kaczynski: New Jeb Bush Chief Technology Officer Deleting Old Tweets About “Sluts”: “Ethan Czahor’s tweets began disappearing today after news broke that he had been hired by Jeb Bush…. After the story of his hiring broke, tweets on his Twitter account started disappearing. The Twitter account is linked from his personal website. The count this morning was 177 tweets…. The latest tweet count is 132. Several of the deleted tweets refer to women as ‘sluts’…. Right to Rise did not return request for comment on the deleted tweets.”

  3. The Onion: Health Experts Recommend Standing Up At Desk, Leaving Office, Never Coming Back: “Experts at the Mayo Clinic issued a new set of health guidelines Thursday recommending that Americans stand up at their desk, leave their office, and never return. ‘Many Americans spend a minimum of eight hours per day sitting in an office, but we observed significant physical and mental health benefits in subjects after just one instance of standing up, walking out the door, and never coming back to their place of work again,’ said researcher Claudine Sparks, who explained that those who implemented the practice in their lives reported an improvement in mood and reduced stress that lasted for the remainder of the day, and which appeared to persist even into subsequent weeks…”

Morning Must-Read: Michael Hiltzik: When a State Blocks Obamacare, ERs Close: The Lesson of Louisiana

Michael Hiltzik: When a State Blocks Obamacare, ERs Close: The Lesson of Louisiana: “Baton Rouge… is about to lose one of its crucial hospital emergency rooms….

…Gov. Bobby Jindal has refused to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act, and won’t put up any other money to keep the facility open. Because of the scheduled closure of the ER of Baton Rouge General Medical Center-Mid City, patients needing emergency treatment will have to travel as much as 30 minutes longer…. Jindal has tried to position himself as the last stalwart Republican opponent of the ACA, but his state’s experience shows that his position is folly…. In the expectation that Medicaid would pick up the slack, the ACA reduced so-called disproportionate share hospital payments, which went to hospitals serving a large number of the uninsured. So institutions in states that have refused to expand Medicaid, like Louisiana, have faced a double-whammy–they still have to serve a large number of uninsured patients, but they have less money to do so. The ACA has reduced uncompensated care costs… by $5.7 billion in fiscal 2014 compared with what they would have been otherwise…

Morning Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Cassandras and Currency Wars

Barry Eichengreen:: Cassandras and Currency Wars: “Economic analysis, it seems…

…is the art of recycling old ideas under new names. So it is with the debate over currency wars, which parallels exactly the 1930s debate over competitive currency devaluation. David Woo, meet Ragnar Nurkse. Nurkse, in… 1944… [argued that] competitive devaluation was a negative-sum game. These are exactly the arguments made by today’s Cassandras of currency wars…. Subsequent scholarship shows, however, that the main reason monetary policy didn’t work more powerfully in the 1930s was that it wasn’t tried…. Central banks in the 1930s were reluctant to utilise their newfound monetary freedom… failed to make open-ended commitments to raise prices… effectively transform expectations… supplement the new monetary regime with supportive fiscal action… failed to convince investors that they were committed to a fundamentally new policy regime…. And because they failed to coordinate their monetary and exchange rate policies internationally, haphazard exchange rate changes only created volatility and uncertainty, as argued here. Today, in contrast, central banks like the Bank of Japan and European Central Bank are making open-ended commitments to do what it takes…. Without that action and those steps, however, the Cassandras of currency wars will be right.

Morning Must-Read: Tim Duy: On The Fed Credibility Gap

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Mark Thoma sends us to

Tim Duy: On The Fed Credibility Gap: “David Wessel opines….

The markets think Fed officials and staff economists are overly optimistic about the U.S. economy, as they have been in the past….

I will suggest another framework: Financial markets are pricing in a ‘secular stagnation’ scenario that is at odds with Federal Reserve thinking…. Suppose that the short term equilibrium real rate has fallen to zero…. Change the estimate of NAIRU from 5.6% to 5%… close to pre-recession Fed estimates. The results… [are] fairly close to market expectations…. It thus appears reasonable to argue that financial market participants are pricing in a secular stagnation story combined with a pre-recession level of NAIRU. In contrast, the Fed is not seriously contemplating such a story…. The biggest risk to the expansion is a dogmatic view… on the part of the Federal Reserve…. Financial market participants are saying the Fed has less room to maneuver than monetary policymakers believe. The Fed, I fear, is not taking sufficient heed of those signals. Would it be outrageous to think that the Federal Reserve could find itself backtracking after just 200bp of rate hikes? Not if Sweden serves as any example…. The Fed… risk[s] tightening too aggressively and turning an expansion that should last at least four more years into one with only two left.