Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Reform and Revolution in Macroeconomics

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Reform and Revolution in Macroeconomics): “With respect to the failure… to ask the right questions prior to the crisis…

…There was no shortage of tools…. The problem was that we had been told by the eminent thought leader(s) within the profession that the problem of deep recessions had been solved (if not by policy, then by the improvement in the operation of the economy brought about by modern technology… especially financial markets with their digital technology and physics brains). Thus, theoretical questions about deep recessions induced by financial panics were ignored or shunted off to the side…. It was a combination of the belief that the questions were unimportant combined with sociology within the profession that placed a lower value on pursuits that might have allowed us to be better prepared when the recession hit…

Trekonomics Teaser Clip: 95% of the Way to Replicator for Basic Foodstuffs

Manu Saadia, the author of the forthcoming book, Trekonomics, discusses the economic theories behind the creation of the Star Trek with J. Bradford DeLong, professor of Economics at UC Berkeley and former Deputy Assistant Secretary at the US Treasury. Inkshares’ Adam Gomolin is the moderator:

We have already gone 95% of the way to the replicator for basic foodstuffs…:

Things to Read on the Afternoon of August 19, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Musings on the Incidence of ObamaCare

The scarily-sharp Josh Barro tweets:

And he sends me to an interesting, but I think largely-wrong, piece from Megan McArdle:

Megan McArdle: Republicans’ Obamacare Alternative, Finally: “Republicans have been saying ‘repeal and replace’…

…[but] the party has conspicuously failed to… [offer] a plausible replacement… giv[ing] these words the hollow sound of a Southern matron greeting a mortal enemy over mint juleps…. [Now] both Walker and Rubio are endorsing… converting Obamacare to a simpler, flatter tax credit… Obamacare is now setting the terms of the debate. And that debate will ultimately be fought over who Obamacare is for…. Obamacare promised that it was for the middle class. In practice, it has overwhelmingly been a program for the poor and near-poor… Medicaid… exchange policies… popular among… [the] heavily subsidized, but… with anyone who has to pay a significant chunk of the bill…. Republicans [will] become the party of universal, but lean, benefits that won’t be enough to lift people out of poverty, while Democrats become the party of generous benefits for the poor…. Who wins that debate will tell us a lot about what kind of government we’ll have in 50 years.

First of all, I think McArdle is somewhat off on the incidence of Medicaid. As best as I can tell, Medicaid dollars ultimately stick with one-third benefitting the disabled, one-third benefitting the non-disabled poor, and one third going to hospitals and practices.

The one-third of Medicaid dollars that wind up ultimately sticking to the disabled wind up making the lives of the disabled–both young and old–much better. The disabled are poor. But the disabled are not the poor. This part of Medicaid expansion is, as we tend to think of things, largely distributionally neutral. Only the truly rich can afford to pay for any prolonged period of disability out of their own resources. The rest–poor, working class, and middle class; young and old–become poor when they become disabled.

The one-third of Medicaid money that flows to the disabled makes their lives less harsh, and makes the risk of future disability less catastrophic for everybody. This is of big benefit to those current members of the middle class who are the future disabled, but do not know it yet. To say “Medicaid = the poor” is simply not right.

As best I can tell, a second third of Medicaid dollars wind up in the hands of nurses, doctors, and hospitals. They will be made richer as a result. The hope is that this money flow will diminish the amount of financial three-card-monte the medical system has to engage in. It is thus supposed to lead to a system of medical finance which is less of a cost-covering and more of a market-seeking-efficiency process.

We will see.

This shift from cost-covering to market-seeking-efficiency in health-care finance has, however, been a big–I would say the big–right-wing priority in health-finance reform for decades. And either something like Medicaid expansion–or pushing the sick poor to die in ditches–is a necessary prerequisite for it. To claim that you want a market-driven health care system while being opposed to both Medicaid expansion and pushing the sick poor to die in ditches is, at best, confused and incoherent.

It is only the third third of Medicaid dollars that winds up truly sticking to those whom McArdle’s readers think of when they think of the poor that would ever count as a redistribution. And it is not really a boost to your income–you do not, after all, spend your Medicaid benefit on riotous living. Your Medicaid benefit means that if you are poor and become sick you have a good chance of not dying, or of being poor and sick for a shorter time, or of being poor and less sick. McArdle writes of how generous health benefits that “lift people out of poverty”. This doesn’t lift anyone out of poverty the way we usually think of poverty: people in ICUs are receiving huge amounts of medical care, and if they are on the government’s dime they are the beneficiaries of enormous social-insurance transfers. But they are not thereby “lifted out of poverty”–at least, not the way most people understand “lifted out of poverty” to mean. They get more and better health care when sick. Full stop.

But that is not all!

McArdle also, I think, somewhat misses the mark when she talks about how exchanges are only attractive to the subsidized.

Who are those who would not be subsidized if they purchased on the exchanges? They are, predominantly, those who have the option of buying employer-sponsored insurance. And employer-sponsored insurance comes with its own big honking subsidy through the tax code–a subsidy that is not conditioned upon their being low- or moderate-income.

No subsidy if you purchase through the exchange.

A big subsidy if you pick up benefits through your employer.

Is it any surprise that exchange policies and pick-up among those with incomes too high to be eligible for exchange subsidies has been low? The middle class has already gotten its big health-care insurance subsidy via the combination of employer-sponsored coverage and the tax code. The exchanges simply equalize the social insurance benefit to some degree.

Moreover, the availability of the exchanges is of massive benefit to the middle class in terms of the extra freedom it provides. Families, especially families with some members subject to a pre-existing condition or that suffer some serious health problem, now know that losing your employer-sponsored insurance job no longer leaves you exposed to catastrophe. A serious medical problem is still a crisis–but not a catastrophe. This is social insurance doing what it is supposed to do. And this is of immense benefit to the middle-class right now.

Moreover as Obamacare implementation rolls forward, the balance of benefits may shift more towards the middle class. We will see choice-of-system operating at two margins: At one margin, people and employers will be choosing to take up and offer employer-sponsored coverage or resort to the exchanges. If projections that employers will continue to drop employer-sponsored health insurance are accurate, the availability of the exchanges will turn out in the long run to be of massive benefit to the middle class as employer-sponsored insurance ebbs away.

At the other margin, states and the federal government will be trying to figure out where to set the Medicaid-exchange line.

We are unlikely to wind up with employer-sponsored insurance for nearly everyone. But it could be that the exchanges will prove more attractive than Medicaid. And it could be that Medicaid will prove more attractive than the exchanges. We could, ultimately, wind up with single-payer under guise of Medicaid, with universal exchanges, or with some stable division of systems. The ObamaCare structure is very flexible. It is much more a structure to provide options for the future evolution of social insurance and private payment in health financing than in any once-and-for-all-time distribution of benefits.

Stepping back, the major argument against a relatively-generous social insurance system is always that it encourages featherbedding and idleness. But slimmer health benefit packages will not solicit greater market labor supply. It is only to a small degree that we control whether we get sick, and how sick we get–and when we do make decisions that are bad for us anyway, making those decisions even worse for us is unlikely to have much impact on behavior unless the nudges are very carefully and expertly designed.

Thus slimming down the benefits package for those who get sick seems an extraordinarily bizarre place to concentrate your energy on, if you are indeed worried about promoting featherbedding or idleness.

The only benefit for slimming down the benefits package for those who get sick is that they will allow for lower taxes on the upper middle-class (who if they get sick will then find themselves caught by the slimmer benefits package), and on the rich (who have the resources to insulate themselves from threadbare social insurance).

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior: “We analyze how quits responded to arbitrary differences in own and peer wages…

…using an unusual feature of a pay raise at a large U.S. retailer. The firm’s use of discrete pay steps created discontinuities in raises, where workers earning within 1 cent of each other received new wages that differed by 10 cents. First, we estimate a regression discontinuity (RD) model based on own wages; we find large causal effects of wages on quits, with quit elasticities less than -10. Next, we address whether the overall quit response reflects the impact of comparisons to market wages or to the wages of in-store peers. Here we use a multi-dimensional RD design that includes both a sharp RD in the own wage and a fuzzy RD in the average peer wage. We find that the large quit response mostly reflects relative-pay concerns and not market comparisons. After accounting for peer effects, quits do not appear to be very sensitive to wages – consistent with the presence of significant search frictions. Finally, we find that the relative-pay effect is nonlinear and driven mainly by workers who are paid less than their peers – suggesting concerns about fairness or disadvantageous inequity.

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets: “Commodity prices continue to fall…

…With US companies almost having completed announcing their profits for the second quarter, only one sector has disappointed the forecasts set for it two months ago. That is industrials, the most directly exposed to China…. According to Citi, the 48 largest developed market stocks that get at least 30 per cent of their sales from China have collectively fallen 10 per cent since June…. It is best to assume that the PBoC really means that it merely wants to bring market discipline to its currency and does not want to devalue; and instead to focus on the risk that problems in the Chinese economy end up forcing a devaluation anyway…

Must-Read: Matt Bruenig: The Success Sequence Is Extremely Misleading and Impossible to Code

Must-Read: Matt Bruenig: The Success Sequence Is Extremely Misleading and Impossible to Code: “The “Success Sequence” is explained most recently as…

…(1) Graduate from high school; (2) Maintain a full-time job or have a partner who does; and (3) Have children while married and after age 21, should they choose to become parents. Together, this is supposed to keep your risk of poverty very low. Last week I pointed out that rule (2) is doing basically all of the work in the 2007 dataset that Sawhill and Haskins used….

Efforts to replicate their norm groupings were a total failure…. Nonetheless, because I have isolated the overall population Sawhill/Haskins is working with, I am able to do some fun calculations of my own…. First, if you take… families whose head meets the full-time work definition… that alone gets you almost entirely to the low-poverty conclusion… a poverty rate of 4%…. [Add] high school education or greater (which is 2 of the norms), you get a poverty rate of 2.7%…. just 0.7 percentage points shy of the Sawhill/Haskins 3-norm poverty rate.

Full-time work gets you the vast majority of the way to the low-poverty conclusion and then high-school education gets you basically right up to it. Bringing in the marriage and child-delay stuff is totally unnecessary and then can’t even be properly identified in the data. Adding a condition that does basically no work for your conclusion that you can’t even identify is utterly baffling…

Must-Read: Ravi Kanbur and Joe Stiglitz: Wealth and Income Distribution: New theories Needed for a New Era

Must-Read: Ravi Kanbur and Joe Stiglitz: Wealth and Income Distribution: New theories Needed for a New Era: “Kaldor (1957) put forward a set of stylised facts on growth and distribution…

…for mature industrial economies… the constancy of the share of capital…. Kuznets (1955) put forward a second set… that while the interpersonal inequality of income distribution might increase in the early stages of development, it declines as industrialised economies mature. These empirical formulations brought forth a generation of growth and development theories whose object was to explain the stylised facts…. However, the Kaldor-Kuznets stylised facts no longer hold…. Bringing these facts centre stage has been the achievement of research leading up to Piketty (2014).

It stands to reason that theories developed to explain constancy of factor shares cannot explain a rising share of capital….Piketty… the empirical observation that the rate of return to capital, r, systematically exceeds the rate of growth, g…. What Piketty and others measure as wealth ‘W’ is a measure of control over resources, not a measure of capital K, in the sense that that is used in the context of a production function…. There is a fundamental distinction between capital K, thought of as physical inputs to production, and wealth W, thought of as including land and the capitalised value of other rents….

We need to break away from competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns and model mechanisms which generate rents with consequences for wealth inequality…. We need to focus on the interaction between income from physical and financial capital and income from human capital in determining snapshot inequality, but also in determining the intergenerational transmission of inequality…

Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Excess Supply

Hoisted from the Archives: Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Excess Supply: In our normal, microeconomic world it is not a big deal when excess demand emerges in one market and excess supply emerges in another–it is, in fact, a good thing, because it induces shifts in production that make the structure of what is made correspond more closely to what people want (or perhaps to what the people with money want).

There is excess demand in one industry. Sales exceed production, inventories fly off the shelves, and cupboards and supply chains become bare. Producers and entrepreneurs see large profit opportunities if they expand production to rebuild inventories and satisfy higher demand–and they do. They expand factories. They run more shifts. They offer workers more money for overtime, they offer workers more money to stay with their firm, and they offer workers not in the industry more money to come on over.

Where does the added supply of workers to swell the ranks of those in the industry whose products are in excess demand come from? From the industry whose products are in excess supply. There, producers see inventories piling up on their shelves. They are forced to liquidate products and lines of business at a loss. They are forced to lay off some workers, and lay off others lest they lose all their capital.

Overall unemployment may rise a bit or for a while as this process of adjustment takes place–it depends whether entrepreneurs and producers in the expanding industry where excess demand emerges are more or less on the ball, keen-eyed, and keen-witted than those in the industry where excess supply emerges and where businesses shrink. But the process of adjustment, even with frictional unemployment while it takes place, is a good thing–it makes us all richer. Attempts to stop it in its tracks or short-circuit its mechanisms are counterproductive and harmful. The end of the process comes and excess demand and supply are eliminated when there are more people making the things that are wanted more and fewer people making the things that are wanted less.

But in macroeconomics things are different. The excess supply is economy-wide–throughout all commodity markets, producing supply in excess of demand for goods, services, labor, and capacity. Producers and entrepreneurs respond to an aggregate demand shortfall just as individual producers respond to a particular shortfall of demand for their products: they hold sales to liquidate inventories, they cut prices, they cut wages to try to preserve margins, they fire workers. In the macroeconomic case, the dynamic process that leads to the elimination of excess supply and its counterbalancing excess demand in the microeconomic case gets underway–or, rather, half of it gets underway.

The problem is that the set of industries that are shrinking is made up of pretty-much-everybody. There are no industries that are expanding. The excess demand is not for the products of a goods-and-services producing industry that can rapidly ramp-up production by employing lots more labor. The excess demand is in finance: for means-of-payment, or safe high-quality assets, or for long-duration sales vehicles. There is a rise in unemployment from the flow out of goods-and-services producing industries where the excess supply has appeared. But there is no countervailing flow out of unemployment. How do you put large numbers of people to work making more Federal Reserve notes or increasing the supply of liquid assets that are means-of-payment that are the reserve deposits of banks? How do you shift the flow of production to instantaneously raise the stock of long-duration assets, of claims to wealth that are shares in companies with secure long-run prospects that are vehicles for moving purchasing power across time from the present to the future? You can’t.

Thus workers fall into unemployment from the excess supply in the goods and services industries. But no workers are pulled out of unemployment by expanding production in growing goods-and-services industries. Incomes fall as the unemployed sit idle. Asset prices jump in the financial markets until markets clear. But markets clear and excess demand in finance is eliminated with incomes reduced by the amount of the lost earnings of the unemployed. The excess supply in goods-and-services is also eliminated in this rationed-equilibrium situation: inventories are no longer growing–but that is because the unemployed are not making anything.

And there the economy sits.

Whether this is an ‘equilibrium’ or not is a matter of taste and definition.

Supply equals demand market by market in the markets for goods, services, and assets. There are no falling inventories or rising inventories to signal that any branch of production should be expanded or contracted.

There are, however, lots of unemployed workers who would like jobs. Their existence should aid employers in their bargaining with workers. Wages should then fall. And when wages fall higher profits should induce employers to expand production even without any increase in spending. Eventually wages should fall low enough that the economy returns to full employment and to normal levels of production and capacity utilization even without any increase in asset supplies.

Or will it? Falling wages means that households have even less money. Some of them will default on their loans. Some banks will find that their reserves are no longer large enough to provide an ample cushion because of these loan defaults. They will cut back the number of deposits they accept–and the money supply will shrink as a result, producing another round of excess demand for financial assets. Or if they are not deposit- but are themselves bond-financed their bonds will suddenly become shaky in quality, and we will see the emergence of an excess demand for safe, high-quality financial assets. In either case, Walras’s Law will kick in again and this excess demand will be reflected in another round of excess supply for goods, services, labor, and capacity. Relying on nominal deflation of wages to restore full employment runs the risk of creating yet another shock of excess demand in finance and excess supply in goods and services to deepen the depression. The hoped-for cure’s first effect is to worsen the disease.

We trust the market to take care of a microeconomic excess-demand excess-supply situation in a few industries in a productive way in a short period of time. Do we trust the market to do the same way to a macroeconomic imbalance, to quickly resolve a depression in a productive way without help? No, we do not. Rather than relying on economy-wide deflation to eventually restore balance, we should pursue other alternatives.

Noted for Lunchtime on August 18, 2015

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Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of: