Unemployment and models of U.S. consumption


In this Thursday, March 3, 2016, photo, Georgia Department of Labor services specialist Louis Holliday, left, helps a woman with a job search at an unemployment office in Atlanta.

If you lost your job tomorrow, how much would you have to pull back on spending? The answer to that question and the answer that millions of other U.S. workers could give would help economists get a really good handle on which models of consumption actually do a good job of explaining the world around us. Not only would economists want to know how much you’d cut back on, they’d also want to know what specific kinds of consumption you’re pulling back on as well as how you might react to loosing unemployment insurance. Unfortunately, no one has access to data that can answer all those questions for everyone in the United States. But recent research can offer some answers for a subset of U.S. workers.

The research, recently highlighted in a brief from the JPMorgan Chase & Co Institute, is by economists Peter Ganong, currently of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Pascal Noel of Harvard University. (The research was partially funded by an Equitable Growth academic grant in 2014 for Pascal.) What the two economists are looking at is how consumption changes when a worker loses a job and then goes on unemployment insurance. Using anonymized data from JPMorgan Chase, Ganong and Noel can look at the actual transactions that show up in a bank account instead of asking workers what they spent their money on. And they also can see when workers receive payments from the unemployment insurance system. Accountholders at JP Morgan might not be representative of the overall population, but they end up being fairly representative of workers who end up receiving unemployment benefits as many low-income workers are ineligible.

According to the data, once workers loses their jobs and go on unemployment insurance their consumption drops by 6 percent. Now perhaps this drop is because these workers no longer have worker-related expenditures. But looking at the data, Ganong and Noel see that only about one-fourth of the drop in spending can be explained by a decline in work-related consumption. Over time, as workers continue to rely on unemployment insurance, spending drops an extra 1 percent every month they are receiving benefits. And then, if they don’t find a job before their UI eligibility expires, the consumption decline (at an 11-percent clip) for a worker when they run out of benefits is even larger than when the workers lost their jobs.

What does this tell economists and policymakers about the consumption behavior of households? The fact that workers were so sensitive to changes in monthly incomes means the permanent income hypothesis doesn’t do well in explaining the data. But at the same time, these workers’ consumption doesn’t drop off as much as might be expected if a “hand-to-mouth” model was appropriate and households were totally at the whim of monthly changes in income. Instead, Ganong and Noel find evidence for a “buffer stock” model, in which households hold some savings—a bit less than a month of income—in reserve in case of an economic shock and then draw down on that savings if they lose their jobs. So households do boast some form of insurance by having liquid savings to draw down, but they don’t have that much.

How applicable the results from the JPMorgan Chase & Co Institute data are for the general public is up for debate, but given the checks the co-authors ran it’s seem likely that they are. Seeing more studies like this one that actually look at the balance sheets of households in the face of big economic shocks would be great way to keep digging into these important questions.

Must-Read: Bill White: Ultra-Easy Money: Digging the Hole Deeper?

Must-Read: The problem is that ultra-easy money that creates financial imbalances is also supposed to create real-side imbalances as well. That is, in fact, how you know that there are financial imbalances: financial assets are supposedly “backed” by real-side assets that simply aren’t there. The financial imbalance of too much CDS in 2005 was matched by real houses that had been built that were occupied by “owners” who had no chance of paying their mortgages, and could only come out whole if the cycle continued another round at yet a higher level of prices. The financial imbalance of too much dollar-denominated Latin American debt in 1982 was matched by a real export sector in Latin American that simply could not export to earn enough hard currency to make up the debt amortization. In both cases, lenders made soporific by easy money did not do their due diligence as to what their debtors were doing (or, rather, not doing) to build (or, rather, not build) real assets of the value to back their financial debts.

And the result of ultra-easy money is inflation, in assets or in real currently-produced commodities, as financial and spending values outrun real production values, and accelerating inflation until the crash comes.

But where is the inflation? It’s not in any currently-produced goods and services. It’s not in any risky financial assets where buyers are ignoring disaster scenarios. Rather, the assets that are high priced are the Treasuries, which are valuable precisely because investors are conspicuously not underpricing risk and not ignoring disaster scenarios:

Bill White: Ultra-Easy Money: Digging the Hole Deeper?

Ultra Easy Monetary Policy: Why it Hasn’t Worked as Intended

  • Premised on belief that it will stimulate demand BUT
  • Smacks of panic and raises levels of uncertainty
  • Bringing spending forward only works for a while
  • Consumers restrained by many factors including debt
  • While corporate investment also faces headwinds
  • Just as Keynes himself suggested

Ultra Easy Monetary Policy: Why Unintended Consequences Matter

  • McKinsey says global debt ratios are almost 20 percentage points of GDP above pre crisis levels
  • Asset prices in AMEs raised to unsustainable levels?
  • Risk Off/Risk On investment patterns and other market “anomalies”
  • Threatened financial institutions also lower “potential” growth
  • EME corporates run many risks
  • Other “unintended consequences”?
  • More dangers now than in 2007?

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: The Fed Is About to Make a Mistake

Must-Read: Narayana Kocherlakota: The Fed Is About to Make a Mistake:

More than seven years after the recovery began in mid-2009, inflation remains below the central bank’s 2-percent target…

…indicating that the economy is still operating below potential. As of July, consumer prices… excluding volatile food and energy goods and services… were up 1.6 percent. Worse, markets appear to be losing confidence that the Fed will ever reach its target: Yields on Treasury bonds suggest that traders expect inflation to average less than 2 percent five to 10 years from now. As the experience of the Bank of Japan indicates, restoring such confidence is not easy…. Although the unemployment rate has returned to its 2007 level of 5 percent, the fraction of Americans in their prime working years who have a job remains well below its pre-recession level.  All this argues for the Federal Open Market Committee, the central bank’s policy-making arm, to provide added stimulus by cutting interest rates….

Unfortunately, I’m confident that the Fed won’t cut rates. Doing so now might require officials to raise rates more rapidly in the future–an outcome that they are, for reasons that are unclear to me, determined to avoid. So the central bank will either raise rates by a quarter percentage point or do nothing. The latter appears more likely, given that two Fed governors have spoken out in favor of caution. The last time the Fed took an action from which two governors dissented was in 1993. In either case, it will be the wrong move.

Must-Read: Harry Brighouse: Why Have Classroom Discussions Anyway?

Must-Read: Harry Brighouse: Why Have Classroom Discussions Anyway?:

I didn’t give any reasons why students actually should discuss….

When I first started teaching I didn’t understand why, either. Here’s why…. Students were–and still are–not like me. Hardly any of them are like me. Not that they are less smart, but they have different ways of learning than mine (most of them having not been treated to a diet of BBC Radio 4 for most of their waking hours during childhood, and not having been surrounded by books and the expectation of reading them, and many of them having had other, more appealing, things to do). I now believe that most people can’t listen, usefully, to even a more expert speaker than I am, for 75 minutes straight…. But the students were–and my current students are–like me in one way…. They need to talk in order to learn. They need to hear the words coming out of their mouths, practice making arguments, giving reasons, and hearing reasons from others to whom they do not feel an immediate inclination to defer (i.e. not just me).

And… I did all these things, and learned a lot from them, just not really in class…. I had weekly tutorials… [and,] much more significant… after just about every lecture I retired to the student refectory with friends and discussed the lecture and/or the readings and/or the essays we were writing. This, I am sure, is where I learned the most. My students don’t have tutorials. And most are not habituated to discussing their classwork outside of class…. So they need to discuss intellectual issues in class, both to do the learning of the discipline-specific content and skills that can only occur through discussion – through practical application if you like – and to get habituated to doing the same outside of class. They need, I think, to be told explicitly why classroom discussion is such an important part of the class, and that they should discuss the material with friends or classmates outside of class….

My previous post… prompted a hallway discussion, during which I revealed that… my ambition is that, on average, I should be speaking for no more than 25% of class time. My colleague looked horrified: “But don’t we want them to learn how to think in a certain way?”. Yes, we do. But how to we get them to think in that way? I am just skeptical that, for most of them, simply being in a room with us, the experts, thinking out loud in that certain way (usually without much expertise, and with no training, as speakers) is optimal for getting them to think in that way….

There’s another reason for wanting discussion…. Students vary a lot in how confident they are…. Confidence, while it correlates with social class, does not correlate tremendously well with competence…. So we have a duty to elicit, by whatever means necessary, participation and discussion from all students, regardless of their predisposition to participate: they all need to learn through discussing, and they all need to learn through hearing others participate….

I’ve also been talking about small classes of 20 or so. Things are different in the large lecture…

More women in the United States are working past retirement age

It’s not uncommon for working women and men to scale back their hours to part-time as they grow older. But a growing number of women are bucking this trend, working past the traditional retirement age. According to a new paper by Harvard University economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, the growth in women’s increased labor force participation beyond their 50s and into their 60s and 70s is overwhelmingly driven by those working full-time.

So why are more women working longer? Part of the explanation has to do with women’s increased labor force participation overall. The women who today are in their 60s and 70s are much more likely to have worked throughout their life compared to those who were at those same ages 10 years or 20 years ago. Education also plays a role:  College-educated women (as well as college-educated men) are much more likely to work full time into their 60s and 70s compared to less-educated Americans. The number of older women in the workforce with a bachelor’s degree also is rising. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

At first glance, it may seem that anemic savings have something to do with this new labor force trend. About 60 percent of all U.S. households have no savings in an Individual Retirment Account or defined-savings retirement plan such as a 401(k) account. A recent Federal Reserve report on economic well-being finds that 26 percent of those surveyed claimed their retirement plan is to “keep working as long as possible.”

But Goldin and Katz find that financial insecurity isn’t the whole story. The increase in later-life employment is happening among women who are better educated and healthier, which tend to go hand-in-hand, and therefore are more likely to be in white-collar occupations that are relatively well-paid. What seems to matter is whether women enjoy their jobs. As Goldin and Katz say, “As jobs become more enjoyable and less onerous and as various positions become part of one’s identity, women work longer.”

What your spouse does also matters. Women are more likely to remain working if their partner is working, too, compared to other married women. Considering that a larger number of couples are delaying retirement than they were two decades ago, this also plays into this trend.

The same can be said for women’s early work history. Women who reach a certain level of career advancement early on are much more likely to still be employed past their 50s, regardless of how much they earned. In addition, while those who have children are less likely to be working full time (or at all) between the ages of 25 and 44, kids don’t seem to affect their return to the workforce later on, although it does have a major impact on women’s wages throughout their lifetime.

This finding is important considering that Goldin and Katz find that more recent cohorts of 40-year-old women are less likely to be working between the ages of 25 and 44 compared to older generations. A college-educated woman born between 1964 and 1968, for example, was less likely to be working at age 40 compared to her counterpart born between 1944 and 1948, which the authors attribute to a lack of family friendly policies such as paid leave (a sentiment other researchers have echoed). But considering the increase in education and more young women joining the labor force in recent decades, researchers suggest that older women’s employment will only grow in the coming decades, despite the dip in participation when raising children.

All of these factors play a quantifiable, predictive role in driving older women’s labor force participation. But Goldin and Katz note that the number of college-educated women in their 60s still working is higher than these factors would anticipate, meaning that there is an unknown factor keeping them in the labor force. The same can be said for younger women as well, who will “likely retire later than one would have predicted based on their educational attainment and lifecycle participation rates.”

Regardless of why, what’s clear is that this is not an isolated phenomenon: Women are likely to continue working past “traditional” retirement age for years to come. This could have important implications for the size and productivity of the U.S. workforce in the future.

Must-Read: Ben Thompson: What the Media Misses About Facebook, Facebook’s Missing Humans, Will the iPhone 7 Be a Hit?

Must-Read: In the age of the modern internet, according to Ben Thompson, publications must either…

  • chase the mass advertising-based audience, and so succumb to spending most of their time publishing clickbait…
  • rely on a niche audience and subscriptions, and thus block (most of their) valuable content from (the long tail of most of) their potential readership (most of the time).
  • accept that they are going to be endothermic: burn more money than they take in, and survive off of sugar mommies and sugar daddies of one form or another.

If he is right, this is not a good situation from many perspectives. But is their an argument that he is wrong?

Ben Thompson: What the Media Misses About Facebook, Facebook’s Missing Humans, Will the iPhone 7 Be a Hit?:

Media executives need to take a very hard look at their businesses and decide where they can survive…

…because the implications of their choice run in two very different directions: niche means heavy investment in differentiation, presentation, depth, and a willingness to forgo easy traffic for the sake of lifetime value that is exceptionally difficult to realize. Scale means cutting costs, simplifying presentation, breadth, and the uncertainty of living on another platform which doesn’t hate you but also doesn’t give you any special favors and may occasionally wrong you without meaning to. Doing both means death…

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Economics, DSGE and Reality

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis recounts his career history and how it has shaped his thought. I have enormous respect for him. But I still do not understand why it would be a good thing to require that models have all of:

  • a representative agent
  • an Euler equation governing consumption
  • Calvo pricing and the associated forward-looking Phillips Curve
  • TFP residuals as an explanatory variable

All of these are either rejected by the data–strongly–or cheat by taking one of your model’s fit errors and claiming that it is a well-understood driving factor:

Simon Wren-Lewis: Economics, DSGE and Reality:

Just before 1990… with colleagues I showed that entering the ERM at an overvalued exchange rate would lead to a UK recession…

A well respected Financial Times journalist responded that we had won the intellectual argument, but he was still going with his heart that we should enter at 2.95 DM/£. The Conservative government did likewise, and the recession of 1992 inevitably followed. This was the first public occasion where academic research that I had organised could have made a big difference to UK policy and people’s lives…. It was also the first occasion that I saw close up academics who had not done similar research but who had influence use that influence to support simplistic reasoning. It is difficult to understate the impact that had on me: being centrally involved in a policy debate, losing that debate for partly political reasons, and subsequently seeing your analysis vindicated but at the cost of people becoming unemployed….

I went to Strathclyde University… to build a new UK model…. The writing was on the wall for this kind of modelling in the UK, because it did not fit the ‘it has to be DSGE’ edict from the US. A third round of funding, which wanted to add more influences from the financial sector into the model using ideas based on work by Stiglitz and Greenwald, was rejected because our approach was ‘old fashioned’ i.e not DSGE. (The irony given events some 20 years later is immense.)… I had no problem moving with the tide…. Having to ensure everything was microfounded I think created more heat than light, but I learnt a great deal from this work which would prove invaluable over the last decade….

After the financial crisis… governments from around the world first went with what macroeconomic theory and evidence would prescribe, and then in 2010 dramatically went the opposite way. The latter event was undoubtedly the underlying motivation for me starting to write this blog…. I discovered not just that the Coalition government’s constant refrain was simply wrong, but also that the Labour opposition seemed uninterested in what I found….

You can see from all this why I have a love/hate relationship to microfoundations and DSGE…. More traditional forms of macromodelling also had virtues that were lost with DSGE…. [But] those who believe microfounded modelling is a dead end are wrong….

Austerity is not the first time good advice has been ignored at considerable cost. And for the few that sometimes tell me I should ‘stick with the economics’, you can see why given my experience I find that rather difficult to do. It is a bit like asking a chef to ignore how bad the service is in his restaurant, and just stick with the cooking.

Must-Read: Laura Tyson and Anu Madgavkar: The Great Income Stagnation

Must-Read: It’s time to work toward a better definition of “equitable growth” than the vague and implicit one that we have been working with so far. Elements needed are that prosperity should be (a) broad-based, (b) fair, and also (c) substantial. That means substantial economic growth, but it also means conforming to people’s reasonable expectations of how economic growth was going to be divided and a relatively low level of inequality:

Laura Tyson and Anu Madgavkar: The Great Income Stagnation:

MGI surveys in France, the United Kingdom, and the US have found…

…that people whose incomes are not growing, and who do not anticipate an improvement, tend to view trade and immigration much more negatively than those who are experiencing or foresee gains. The Brexit vote in the UK and bipartisan opposition to trade agreements in the US are clear signs of this. Recent debate about income inequality in the US and other developed countries has focused on the rapid surge in incomes for the few. But stagnating or falling incomes for the many add a different dimension to the debate – and demand different types of solutions that emphasize wage growth for the majority of the income distribution. With most households continuing to face stagnating or falling incomes – and with younger generations thus on track to be poorer than their parents – such solutions are urgently needed.

Must-Reads: September 19, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan: Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards

Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan (2010): Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards:

Outsourcing of labor services grew substantially during the 1980s and 1990s….

Two occupations… janitors and guards…. The outsourcing wage penalty ranged from 4% to 7% for janitors and from 8% to 24% for guards… not due to compensating differentials for higher benefits or lower hours, skill differences, or the types of industries that outsourced. Rather, outsourcing seems to have reduced labor market rents for workers, especially for those in the upper half of the occupational wage distribution. Industries with higher historical wage premia were more likely to outsource service work.