Weekend reading: tax “reform” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

This week’s Working Paper series release features two papers. The first paper argues that the decline in the labor share of income can be traced back to the slowdown in productivity growth. The second uses online surveys to look at what Americans think about taxing capital.

Nisha Chikhale writes about the second paper, focusing on its finding that Americans seem to favor a wealth tax, especially if the wealth is inherited.

In the latest issue of Democracy Journal, Heather Boushey reviews Richard V. Reeves’s book, Dream Hoarders, looking at the privileges of the United States’s “favored fifth.”

As part of the Equitable Growth in Conversation series, Heather Boushey talks to Reed College economist Kimberly A. Clausing about reforming the corporate income tax.

Reforming the tax code is supposed to lead to a simpler code with fewer loopholes. Greg Leiserson argues the “Unified Framework” for tax code changes from the Trump Administration and Congressional Republicans would create two new wasteful tax expenditures.

Bridget Ansel and Heather Boushey write in a new report for the Hamilton Project about the reforms needed to update labor standards for 21st century families.

Links from around the web

Many details of the tax code changes proposed in the “Unified Framework” are still hazy. Ernie Tedeschi points out that the clearest proposals would boost the incomes of richer taxpayers while those purporting to boost the incomes of those at the middle and the bottom are the fuzziest. [the upshot]

The problem of regional inequality is increasingly shaping U.S. politics and doesn’t seem to be going away anytime soon. Ryan Avent writes about potential policy solutions. [the economist]

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century sparked a wide-ranging conversation about wealth and income inequality. But the tome had some important gaps. Melissa S. Kearney reviews After Piketty, an attempt to fill in those gaps. [foreign affairs]

Matthew C. Klein writes about a new paper from Harvard University economist (and Equitable Growth Steering Committee member) Jason Furman on the relationship between inequality and growth. Furman suggests that policymakers might want to spend more time looking at the distributional impacts of policy and less on the growth effects. [ft alphaville]

Are today’s technology giants just another version of the IBMs and Hewlett-Packards of the past that were disrupted by new start-ups? No, argues Farhad Manjoo. The new “frightful five” have taken steps to prevent the emergence of new competitors. [nyt]

Friday figure

Figure is from “The ‘Unified Framework’ is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures,” by Greg Leiserson

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Taylor and His Rule Are Not What the Fed Needs

Must-Read: Endorse. The biggest reason not to name John Taylor to run the Fed is his persistent refusal to take any steps to mark his beliefs to market—to perform any kind of view-updating exercise in response to the extraordinary economic troubles of the past decade. That is just not right for anyone claiming to be an economist. And that is doubly not right for anyone being considered for any senior policymaking position. If Taylor is nominated, the Senate Banking Committee should not confirm him:

Noah Smith: Taylor and His Rule Are Not What the Fed Needsg: “How much should the Fed worry about inflation versus unemployment?…

The Taylor Rule contains two number…. When Taylor made the rule, he rather arbitrarily set both values to be 0.5…. When compared to the numbers Taylor picked, it looks like the Fed assigns more weight to unemployment and less to inflation. The Fed’s approach seemed to work fairly well in the 1980s and 1990s…. Only in the Great Recession did this approach seem inadequate — the Fed lowered rates all the way to zero, at which point it could lower them no further (since nominal interest rates can’t go much below zero). Taylor, however, would have done things differently. In a blog post in June 2011 — when interest rates were at zero and the Federal Reserve was contemplating engaging in further rounds of quantitative easing — Taylor wrote that the Fed ought to raise rates instead….

Taylor’s recommendation relied on his original rule, with its original arbitrary round numbers. That rule recommended raising interest rates above zero as early as 2010, and would have had rates at almost 4 percent in 2012. The Fed didn’t take Taylor’s advice. Instead, it kept rates at zero, and continued its program of QE. Inflation, which Taylor warned about, failed to appear. Taylor also warned of financial market volatility if interest rates weren’t raised. But that also failed to appear…. It’s safe to say that the outcome was fairly good. And none of the dangers that Taylor prophesied came to pass.

One would think that Taylor would have reconsidered his more hawkish policy rule in light of these developments. But he continued to defend his version of the rule, and to criticize the Fed’s actions, years later. This apparent refusal to revise his views, combined with a general reputation for monetary hawkishness, probably goes a long way toward explaining why Taylor appeals to the Trump White House…. As Fed chief, it’s impossible to know in advance if Taylor would live up to these expectations of hawkishness…. But if Taylor did let himself be significantly influenced by the rule that bears his name, it would almost certainly push him to raise interest rates above what other Fed leaders like Yellen might choose. And that would pose a danger to the real economy.

Tax Reform and Equitable Growth

As members of Congress consider tax reform, their focus should be the living standards of American families, particularly middle-class families and families striving to reach the middle class. This page collects recent research, analysis, and commentary from Equitable Growth that can help policymakers understand the consequences for American families of potential changes in tax law and inform their choices about the substance of tax reform.
 

Issue Briefs

If U.S. tax reform delivers equitable growth, a distribution table will show it
Greg Leiserson

What is the federal business-level tax on capital in the United States?
Greg Leiserson

 

Columns

The ‘Unified Framework’ is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures
Greg Leiserson

False promises about corporate taxes and American workers
Kimberly A. Clausing

In defense of the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate
Greg Leiserson

It’s no surprise that the Kansas tax cut experiment failed to create jobs
Greg Leiserson


 

Reports

Strengthening the indispensable U.S. corporate tax
Kimberly A. Clausing

Taxing Capital: Paths to a fairer and broader U.S. tax system
David Kamin


 

Testimony

Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means Tax Reform Forum
Heather Boushey

 

Value Added

Expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit is worth exploring in the U.S. tax reform debate
Nisha Chikhale

How would homebuyers respond to a less generous U.S. mortgage interest deduction?
Nisha Chikhale

Preferential pass-through tax rates and the declining share of labor income in the United States
Nisha Chikhale

Must-Read: Ryan Avent: How should recessions be fought when interest rates are low?

Must-Read: Ryan Avent: How should recessions be fought when interest rates are low?: “ONE day… bad news will blow in… a new recession will begin…

…During the next recession, the “zero lower bound” (ZLB) on interest rates will almost certainly bite again…. Broadly, economists see two possible ways out…. One is to change monetary strategy. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve during the crisis, proposed a clever approach: when the economy next bumps into the ZLB, the central bank should quickly adopt a temporary price-level target. That is, it should promise to make up shortfalls in inflation resulting from a downturn…. If credible, that promise should buck up animal spirits, encourage spending, and drag the economy back to health…. Less clear is whether a central bank could fulfil its promise. The Fed has failed to hit its 2% inflation target for the past five years, after all….

The constraints facing central banks suggest better hopes for the second way forward—greater reliance on fiscal policy. This was the theme of a contribution to the conference from Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers…. Fiscal and monetary policy would have to be closely co-ordinated—amounting, in all likelihood, to a loss of central-bank autonomy…. Just how troubling a loss of independence would be is intensely debated. Messrs Blanchard and Summers are themselves at odds on it….

Central-bank independence was an institutional response to the inflation of the 1970s, just as government business-cycle management was a response to the Depression. But the rules that underpinned the conditions of the 1970s seem no longer to apply…. In the 1970s, an intellectual shift within economics took place in tandem with the change in policy practice. The discipline could explain why predictable monetary policy set by independent central banks was preferable to a government’s attempts to spend its way to full employment. Yet things need not unfold that way this time. With economists at odds as future ZLB episodes loom, the example of the 1930s might be more apt. Then populist politicians struck out in unorthodox new directions, for better and occasionally much worse. It was only later that experts could settle on a coherent narrative of the crisis and recovery. That is not the ideal way forward. Yet it may be the only option available.

Should-Read: Greg Leiserson: The Unified Framework is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures

Should-Read: Greg Leiserson: The Unified Framework is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures: “Unified Framework’s core proposal: preferential rates for business income…

https://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/the-unified-framework-is-a-proposal-for-two-new-wasteful-tax-expenditures/ Both comprehensive (integrated) income tax and consumption tax apply same rate to business and non-business income. Widely understood that preferential pass-through rate is a preference; same is true for sharply lower corporate rate.

Best approach: start over, focus on reforms to the tax base https://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/in-defense-of-the-statutory-u-s-corporate-tax-rate/.

Current approach: struggle with short list of (existing) tax expenditures, lose revenue (TBD scale), windfalls for wealthy & old capital.

Alt approach: scale back/eliminate the (new) tax expenditure that preferential business rates create via surtax on domestic cash flow. Effectively uses mini DBCFT as an offset for tax reform, rather than larger DBCFT as replacement for business income taxes. Ex: DBCFT as offset for modest corporate rate cut reduces harms (e.g. cost/deficits, sheltering) and reduces regressivity. Smaller scale of DBCFT-as-offset moderates challenges of the border adjustment in the Better Way plan 10/10…

The ‘Unified Framework’ is a proposal for two new wasteful tax expenditures

President Donald Trump speaks about tax reform.

The “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code” recently released by the Trump administration and congressional Republicans proposes sharp reductions in the corporate tax rate—from 35 percent to 20 percent—and in the tax rate for income from pass-through businesses, from 39.6 percent to 25 percent. These two proposals and a related proposal to repeal the corporate alternative minimum tax would cost more than $2.5 trillion over the next decade, according to the Tax Policy Center’s preliminary analysis. Together, they account for more than all of the plan’s net cost.

While proposals for large rate cuts may seem consistent with the tax reformer’s mantra of broadening the base and lowering rates, these preferential rates for business income are better understood as two huge new tax expenditures. The broaden-the-base, lower-the-rate mantra applies to the tax system as a whole. Corporate income taxes and individual income taxes on income from pass-through businesses are constituent parts of the tax system. Preferential rates for specific types of income are appropriately viewed as tax expenditures.

There is no reason to accept the creation of these new tax expenditures as a necessary element of reform. Superior approaches exist that would—at much lower cost—achieve proponents’ stated objectives with respect to the financial incentives for profit shifting, inversions, and capital investment. However, if policymakers continue to place preferential business rates at the center of their proposals, recognizing that preferential rates would create new tax expenditures also points to a new class of offsets that should be considered: surtaxes on the domestic cash flow of U.S. businesses. A surtax on the domestic cash flow of U.S. businesses would scale back or eliminate the tax expenditure for excess returns that preferential rates create, while still providing the reduction in the headline rate and the change in financial incentives for which proponents advocate.

Preferential business rates should be viewed as tax expenditures

Tax expenditures are defined by the Congressional Budget Act as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax law which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Of course, as noted by the U.S. Treasury Department in its annual summary of tax expenditures, the determination of which provisions of law are tax expenditures depends critically on the hypothetical tax system to which the actual tax system is compared.

The Treasury’s traditional approach uses two baselines, both of which are modeled after a comprehensive income tax.1 However, the baselines include certain features of the existing tax code that would not be present in a more conceptually pure comprehensive income tax such as taxing capital gains when assets are sold rather than as they accrue and taxing nominal gains and losses rather than adjusting those gains and losses for inflation. Importantly, both baselines assume the existence of a separate corporate income tax in addition to the individual income tax. Thus, while a preferential rate for pass-through income should be viewed as a tax expenditure against either of these baselines, a substantial reduction in the corporate tax rate might not be viewed as a tax expenditure.

In contrast to the income tax benchmarks used in the annual Treasury analysis, a true comprehensive income tax would tax all income once according to a single rate schedule. In other words, the corporate income tax would be integrated with the individual income tax. It does not necessarily matter whether income is taxed on a separate corporate tax return or the profits are allocated to owners on their individual tax return (or both), but the combined effect of the tax system would be to tax corporate income at the same rate as income from noncorporate businesses, wages, or any other source. (The Treasury Department has provided analysis using this type of benchmark as a supplemental analysis in the past.)

Judged against this true comprehensive income tax hypothetical, a sharply lower tax rate on corporate income would be appropriately viewed as a tax expenditure because the lower corporate rate would provide a preferential rate of tax for income earned by corporations compared to other sources of income such as wages.

Notably, the conclusion that preferential business rates are appropriately viewed as tax expenditures is unaffected by the debate over whether an income tax or consumption tax would be a preferable system of taxation, which frequently plagues tax expenditure analysis. (The same Treasury analysis providing estimates using a comprehensive income tax benchmark also provided analysis using a comprehensive consumption tax.) The key difference between a consumption tax and an income tax is the treatment of deductions for capital investment. A comprehensive consumption tax would allow businesses to write off capital spending when it occurs—also known as expensing. A comprehensive income tax would instead allow businesses to write off the cost of assets over time as they lose value. In either system, the same statutory rate would apply to business income as to other types of income.2

Preferential business rates create a tax expenditure for excess returns—returns in excess of the risk-free return, including returns to risk, luck, market power, and labor when not paid out as wages. Excess returns would also include returns to tax avoidance and sheltering strategies that involve shifting income from the individual tax base into the business tax base motivated by preferential rates. As noted above, these returns are part of the tax base in both income tax systems and consumption tax systems. Judged relative to an income tax system, preferential business rates also create tax expenditures relating to the normal return.

One criticism of this argument could be that the U.S. tax system creates the potential for double taxation of corporate income because corporations are subject to the corporate income tax and investors are subject to tax on capital gains and dividends. Thus, according to this view, a lower corporate rate could be a desirable step toward achieving the same rate of tax on income from all sources. However, recent research questions the practical relevance of investor-level taxes on average. Burman, Clausing, and Austin (2017), Austin and Rosenthal (2016), and the U.S. Treasury Department (2017) all find that the share of corporate equities held in taxable accounts is about 25 percent to 30 percent (see Figure 1). Moreover, even when investors are subject to tax, preferential rates generally apply. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office (2014) estimates that only 70 percent of interest payments deducted at the corporate level are taxable when received by lenders. Finally, the maximum corporate rate of 35 percent is already below the maximum individual rate of 39.6 percent. Thus, it is difficult to argue that a large reduction in the statutory corporate rate is necessary to avoid double taxation. A preferential rate for corporate income is appropriately viewed as a tax expenditure.

Figure 1

Superior alternatives to preferential business rates exist

Tax expenditures can be justified if they achieve a compelling policy objective at reasonable cost, but preferential business rates fail this test. A reform that includes preferential business rates would be more expensive, more regressive, and less economically beneficial (if not actively harmful) than one that focuses on the tax base.

Proponents of preferential business rates—or of a sharply lower corporate rate in isolation—tend to fall back on the idea that it is too politically difficult to pursue one of these superior approaches to reform. Yet, at the same time, it is a widely shared goal that tax reform be revenue neutral, and starting with statutory rate cuts means that policymakers aiming to achieve revenue neutrality will ultimately be looking for policies to offset the cost of those rate cuts, with only a very short list of politically difficult options to choose from. The major options include such controversial notions as restricting or repealing interest deductibility, the mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for charitable contributions, the state and local tax deduction, and the deduction for employer-provided health insurance premiums. There is little reason to think these offsets are easier to enact than a superior approach to tax reform would be in the first place. Moreover, even if legislation following this approach were enacted, a large portion of the gross revenue changes from the component policies would be attributable to swapping an existing set of tax expenditures for a new set of even more regressive tax expenditures.

However, if policymakers recognize that preferential business rates are appropriately viewed as tax expenditures, it expands the universe of offsets that should be considered and creates a third potential path for tax legislation. Under this approach, policymakers would offset the cost of preferential business rates with measures that have the effect of scaling back or eliminating the tax expenditures resulting from preferential business rates.

The essence of such an approach would be to combine reducing statutory business tax rates with the creation of new surtaxes on businesses’ domestic cash flow.3 Such a surtax is not a base-broadener in the traditional sense of repealing a tax expenditure on the annual lists put forth by the Treasury Department or the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. Rather it would serve to offset the newly created tax expenditure resulting from the creation of preferential business rates, while still addressing the concerns about the international tax system and the cost of capital that motivate many to call for reductions in the statutory corporate tax rate.

In effect, rather than converting taxes on business income into a destination-based cash flow tax—as was proposed in modified form in the blueprint for tax reform released by House Republicans in 2016—this approach to reform would use a modestly scaled destination-based cash flow tax as an offset that scales back the tax expenditure created by cutting statutory tax rates.

The modified destination-based cash flow tax proposed in last year’s blueprint raised several major concerns in the public debate. First, it applied a preferential rate of tax to corporate income. As discussed above, a preferential rate for corporate income relative to other types of income would constitute a large and extremely regressive tax expenditure. Second, to neutralize the impact on the public of the border adjustment implicit in the proposal, the dollar would have needed to appreciate by roughly 25 percent. This required appreciation in the exchange rate naturally raised questions about the economic impacts of an appreciation at that scale, as well as questions of whether the exchange rate would, in fact, appreciate by 25 percent. And third, to comply with World Trade Organization rules, the border adjustment would have needed to be considered part of a consumption tax system. However, the blueprint contained an explicit denial that it included a value-added tax, or VAT, and a reinterpretation of the broader U.S. tax system as a subtraction method VAT would have been challenging.

To illustrate the advantages of using a surtax to avoid creating a tax expenditure for excess returns attributable to domestic operations, consider an alternative proposal that reduces the statutory corporate tax rate by 7.65 percentage points and creates a new 7.65 percent surtax on corporations’ domestic cash flow. All three of the concerns about the blueprint reviewed above would be moderated under this approach. First, by imposing a surtax at a rate equal to the reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate, it would eliminate the tax expenditure associated with preferential treatment of domestic profits. Second, a more modest tax on domestic cash flow would result in smaller exchange rate movements.4 And third, with a surtax at a rate that matches the employer portion of the payroll tax, U.S. tax law could be more easily amended to explicitly create a subtraction-method value-added tax that would be compatible with World Trade Organization requirements.5

Conclusion

The proposals at the center of the “Unified Framework” are large cuts in the statutory tax rates on business income. While these cuts may seem consistent with the broaden-the-base, lower-the-rate mantra of tax reformers, they are more appropriately viewed as new tax expenditures. Ideally, the notion of making large statutory business rate cuts the starting point for reform would be discarded. But, failing that, reformers should add offsets that scale back or eliminate the very tax preferences they are creating to the list of those under consideration to pay for reform.

Must- and Should-Reads

We re All Public Intellectuals Now The National Interest

Over at Equitable Growth: Must- and Should-Reads:


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Issi Romem: Paying For Dirt: Where Have Home Values Detached From Construction Costs?

Should-Read: Issi Romem: Paying For Dirt: Where Have Home Values Detached From Construction Costs?: “In the expensive U.S. coastal metros, home prices have detached from construction costs…

…and can be almost four times as high as the cost of rebuilding existing structures…. Absent restrictions on housing supply, competition among developers tends to maintain average metropolitan home prices tethered to the cost of construction. This study estimates the average home value to replacement cost ratio for the largest U.S. metro areas, as well as several related measures, and maps them by zip code area within each metro. The high cost of housing in expensive coastal metros is not driven by construction costs. It is driven by the high cost of land which, in turn, reflects a scarcity of zoned units, not a scarcity of land per se.

The scarcity of zoned units afflicts the expensive coastal metros in their entirety but, even within more affordable metro areas, sought-after districts suffer from such scarcity. The disconnect between home values and construction costs in the expensive coastal metros does not imply that real estate development is necessarily lucrative. Because developers must acquire valuable land, construction costs can still be pivotal with respect to the viability of projects and, as a result, they can still influence the housing supply. The timing of developers’ land acquisition vis-a-vis the housing cycle can be crucial…

Paying For Dirt Where Have Home Values Detached From Construction Costs

Must-Read: Melissa S. Kearney: How Should Governments Address Inequality?

Must-Read: Melissa S. Kearney: How Should Governments Address Inequality?: “Putting Piketty Into Practice

Capital in the Twenty-first Century… by… Thomas Piketty… examined the massive increase in the proportion of income and wealth accruing to the world’s richest people…. Policymakers would be able to make better decisions about “soaking the rich” if they had a clearer sense of the tradeoffs involved. In After Piketty, three left-of-center economists—Heather Boushey, J. Bradford DeLong, and Marshall Steinbaum—have curated an impressive set of essays responding to Piketty’s work and taking a few steps toward answering those questions…. The essays put Piketty’s arguments into a broad historical and intellectual context and highlight some noteworthy omissions that call into question his book’s most dire predictions. At the end of the volume, Piketty himself weighs in. The result is an intellectual excursion of a kind rarely offered by modern economics….

To more fully answer the questions Piketty’s book raised and to start crafting policies to tackle growing inequality, economists and policymakers need to know much more than they currently do about the causes and consequences of today’s concentration of wealth at the top… enhance the skills and opportunities of the disadvantaged… pursue tax reform and changes to corporate-governance rules that will create more shared prosperity. But policymakers also need to avoid steps that would impede innovation and productivity….

[For] the bottom 90 percent… technology, trade, unionization, and minimum wages have shaped… fortunes…. Less well understood are the causes of the tremendous surge in income among extremely high earners, meaning the upper 1.0, 0.1, and 0.01 percent. From a policymaking point of view, the most important question is how much of the ultrarich’s income reflects activity, such as technological innovation, that benefits the broader economy…. There are likely compelling reasons to raise the top income tax rates—as a way of funding public services and investing in infrastructure, for example. But policymakers would be able to make better decisions about “soaking the rich” if they had a clearer sense of the tradeoffs involved…. In Piketty’s view, the primary factors driving the rise in executive pay at the top are not technology or imperfect markets but eroded social norms, questionable corporate-governance practices, and declining union power. Tyson and Spence favor more research to weigh the relative impact of market forces and institutional factors…. Wealth concentration [perhaps] negatively affects economic growth, shared prosperity, and democratic institutions….

Even if the income of top earners reflects genuinely worthwhile contributions to society and does not impede economic growth, today’s extreme inequality does threaten social cohesion. I used to contend that economists and policymakers need not worry about inequality and should instead focus on reducing poverty and expanding opportunity. But after years of researching the topic, I’ve come to believe that policymakers cannot achieve those goals without directly addressing inequality. In the winner-take-all economy of the contemporary United States, the gap between the top and the bottom has grown so large that it undermines any reasonable notion of equal opportunity. As inequality has increased, the country has witnessed a fraying of communities and institutions and deepening divisions along socioeconomic lines…