In Which I Confess, Once Again, That I Do Not Understand the Argument for the Taper as Long as Inflation is Below Its Target…: Monday Focus

As you know, I am of the view that the Federal Reserve ought to be following feedback rule by which it should add to its balance sheet when nominal GDP is below its target and reduce its balance sheet nominal GDP is or imminently threatens to rise above its target. Part of this is that it is not clear to me what the risks are of the Federal Reserve’s having a larger balance sheet as long as inflation is and is expected to remain below its target. It has always seem to me that the more rapid and the more imminent the Federal Reserve can make expectations of economic normalization, the more will long-term interest rates approach their normal levels and the less tempted will be organizations, like commercial banks and insurance companies whose business model is that of holding duration, to reach for yield and so run excessive risks. Conversely, the more rapidly people expect the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to be unwound and reduced, the greater are the risks of getting stuck for a long time at the ZLB and losing not just one decade–we have already lost one decade of economic growth–but two.

I do not count the risks of the Federal Reserve would have to lose by selling long-term bonds some of the money it is made since 2007 as a risk at all. Does anybody else see that as a risk?

These are serious questions: How does prolonging the time the economy spends at and near the ZLB enhance financial stability? In what sense are the possible losses that the Federal Reserve would suffer on its bond portfolio from a rapid normalization of the interest rates a risk?

Does anybody have any answers?





November 17, 2014

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