Should-Read: Mark Thoma: Trump’s Apprenticeships are Based upon a Problem That Doesn’t Exist

Should-Read: Mark Thoma: Trump’s Apprenticeships are Based upon a Problem That Doesn’t Exist: “The evidence… points to a skills mismatch… http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2017/06/19/Trump-s-Apprenticeships-are-Based-upon-Problem-Doesn-t-Exist

…workers employed in jobs that do not match their qualifications, or unemployed workers with the right skills but located in the wrong place – rather than a shortage of workers with the requisite skills. Once again, the solution to this problem is for firms to offer higher wages and induce qualified unemployed workers to relocate or change jobs…. [But] firm owners would prefer to fix the problem in another way. If the supply of qualified workers can be increased sufficiently through government supported retraining programs and increased immigration, then the upward pressure on wages will disappear….

[Should] job retraining programs… be paid for by the government or individual businesses[?]… Consider… the degree of specialization in training. The government should help with very general skills that are useful across a wide variety of occupations, but the more specialized the training becomes in terms of skills that are only useful in a particular industry, the larger the share of the costs that should be paid by the firms who benefit…. The problem isn’t a skills gap. There will always be counterexamples to point to in a technologically dynamic economy, but the labor market signals we would expect to see if there was a widespread shortage of qualified workers are not there. The problem is the reluctance of firms to raise wages. Give them time. If businesses need workers as much as they say–if the unfilled positions are that important – business owners will eventually stop whining about the skills gap and begin increasing wages to attract the workers they need…

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: A Finger Exercise On Hyperglobalization

Should-Read: Paul Krugman: A Finger Exercise On Hyperglobalization: “I find myself trying to find simple ways to talk about ‘hyperglobalization’… https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/a-finger-exercise-on-hyperglobalization/

…The idea here is to think about the effects of transport costs… the same way trade economists have long thought about ‘effective protection’…. To overcome 10% transport costs this assembly operation must be 38% cheaper than in the advanced country. But this in turn means that even a seemingly small decline in transport costs could have a large effect on the location of production, because it drastically reduces the production cost advantage emerging markets need to have. And it leads to an even more disproportionate effect on the volume of trade, because it leads to a sharp increase in shipments of intermediate goods as well as final goods…. We get a lot of ‘value chain’ trade. This, I think, is what happened after 1990, partly because of containerization, partly because of trade liberalization in developing countries. But it’s also looking more and more like a one-time thing…

Should-Read: Izabella Kaminska: On the rise of unproductive entrepreneurs like Travis Kalanick

Should-Read: Izabella Kaminska: On the rise of unproductive entrepreneurs like Travis Kalanick https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/06/15/2190201/on-the-rise-of-unproductive-entrepreneurs-like-travis-kalanick/?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true: “Robert E. Litan and Ian Hathaway… citing the work of William Baumol, who passed away last month…

…Baumol’s overarching theory is fantastically compelling. It suggests the number of entrepreneurs in an economy is essentially fixed and what influences a nation’s entrepreneurial output is how those entrepreneurs are incentivised….

Entrepreneurs are always with us and always play some substantial role. But there are a variety of roles among which the entrepreneur’s efforts can be reallocated, and some of those roles do not follow the constructive and innovative script that is conventionally attributed to that person. Indeed, at times the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the economy. How the entrepreneur acts at a given time and place depends heavily on the rules of the game—the reward structure in the economy—that happen to prevail.

Baumol’s paper references Rome as a historic example of these poor incentives structures in play…. Technologies which were fully available in Roman times languished even though they would spread like wildfire during the high middle ages. What this implies is that innovation and output doesn’t necessarily languish because of a lack of entrepreneurs willing to take risk. It languishes because entrepreneurs are incentivised to direct their efforts to parasitical ventures based on rent-seeking, monopoly formation or unproductive vanities—that potentially includes everything from fintech and the digital app industry to the re-emergence of luxury artisanal or service-oriented craft ventures….

It should be noted that no company exemplifies this unproductive practice more than Uber. Hence it’s worrying that amidst all the focus on Uber’s horrible corporate culture, very little attention is still being paid to the underlying non-viability of the business model, which is mostly based on undercutting the competition via free giveaways, exploiting drivers and/or adjusting the rules of the regulatory framework to suit the company’s own monopolistic agenda…. Thank goodness then for Hubert Horan….

Uber’s strategy was always to skip the hard “create real economic value” parts of this process, and focus strictly on the pursuit of artificial market power that global dominance would provide…. Amazon could fund its growth out of positive cash flow. By contrast, Uber’s carefully crafted “narrative” allowed it to pursue predatory competition for seven years without serious scrutiny of its financial results or whether its anticipated dominance would improve industry efficiency or consumer welfare…

Hoisted from the Archives from 2007: How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down…

Hoisted from the Archives: How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down… http://www.bradford-delong.com/2007/04/how_supplyside_.html: Bruce Bartlett’s piece on supply-side economics:

How Supply-Side Economics Trickled Down – New York Times: AS one who was present at the creation of “supply-side economics” back in the 1970s, I think it is long past time that the phrase be put to rest. It did its job, creating a new consensus among economists on how to look at the national economy. But today it has become a frequently misleading and meaningless buzzword that gets in the way of good economic policy…

sparked an interesting and useful debate at Mark Thoma’s Economist’s View (which I previously noted).

After thinking about it, I want to weigh in again–on the side of Bruce Bartlett as opposed to Paul Krugman. It’s not that Paul says anything wrong about what he and his MIT colleagues thought at the end of the 1970s, but IMHO he underestimates the intellectual gulf between Cambridge and Washington.

There are two issues here–stabilization policy and growth policy.

(1) On stabilization policy: Bartlett says that the Keynesians around 1980 believed that full employment should be produced via fiscal policy–spending increases and tax cuts, preferably spending increases, to boost aggregate demand–and that inflation should be controlled via incomes policy–jawboning unions to restrain wages and businesses to keep a lid on prices, tax penalties for price increases, excess-profits and other taxes to provide incentives to keep wages and prices close to previous nominal anchors, and the threat and perhaps the reality of wage and price controls. Monetary policy, Bartlett says they said, was next to useless in controlling aggregate demand. And the principal effect of fiscal policy was not its impact on the supply side–on incentives to work and invest–but its demand-side impact on the volume of spending.

Krugman protests that what he and his Keynesian colleagues at MIT taught around 1980 was very different from Bartlett’s parody of modern Keynesianism. MIT’s Robert Solow had argued for JFK in the early 1960s that a good fiscal policy needed to pay at least as much attention to the supply side as the demand side. And certainly those teaching macroeconomics at MIT at the end of the 1970s–Stan Fischer, Rudi Dorbusch, and company–placed enormous stress on the power of monetary policy to affect aggregate demand, shape expectations, and control inflation. All this is true. And yet, and yet…

Matthew Shapiro of the University of Michigan perhaps puts it best. He went to Yale as an undergraduate in the late 1970s and to MIT as a graduate student in the early 1980s. He says (roughly, this is my memory and not verbatim):

At Yale in the 1970s, I was taught that the Chicago School was bad and wrong because they believed that monetary policy had powerful effects on production and unemployment. Then I get to MIT in the early 1980s and was taught that the Chicago School was bad adn wrong because they believed that monetary policy did not have powerful effects on production and unemployment.

The second Chicago School was made up of the rational expectations revolutionaries of the late 1970s. The first Chicago School was that of Milton Friedman’s monetarists who thought that controlling inflation was simple: don’t use open market operations to expand the money supply. They were opposed by Old Keynesians who thought that monetary restraint was ineffective, by those who thought that monetary restraint was too effective (i.e., would cause too much unemployment), and by those (like Arthur Burns) who thought monetary restraint was impossible (i.e., that the Congress would never allow the Federal Reserve to stop inflation by generating a recession the size of 1982).

My take on this story is found in J. Bradford DeLong (1997), “America’s Peacetime Inflation”; and J. Bradford DeLong (2000), “The Triumph? of Monetarism”.

The first Chicago School by and large won the day, and Paul Krugman takes their substantial victory as natural and inevitable, and it did indeed seem that way from MIT in 1980, but not from the trenches of the Joint Economic Committee where Bruce Bartlett wallowed in the political trench-warfare mud in the late 1970s. So it seems to me that Bruce is more right than Paul.

(2) I’m less sure that Bruce Bartlett was on the side of the angels on growth policy.

I was taught that one sought to have cyclical deficits in recessions, but a budget in balance or surplus on average over the business cycle, so that the mix of policy tended toward a tight fiscal-easy money configuration that would produce high investment and rapid wage, output, and productivity growth, and one paid attention to high marginal tax rates and the deadweight losses they caused. Nothing that Bruce would disagree with there. And certainly I am on Bruce’s side against those who focused exclusively on how high marginal tax rates were a good thing because they improved the distribution of income, and those who focused exclusively on fiscal policy as a manager of aggregate demand.

But in practice… it seemed to me that Bruce’s political masters like Jack Kemp were excesssively eager to throw the “budget in balance or surplus on average over the business cycle,” and that the eager embrace of deficits and their crowding-out of investment did more harm than the focus on reducing marginal tax rates did good. We can argue about that, however.

A good deal of the problem is that there were so many factions.

On the left side, there was the Solow tight fiscal-easy money tradition; the Musgrave progressive-redistributive-tax-system tradition; the vulgar Keynesians who never met a deficit or a price control they didn’t like; the New Keynesian faction to which Krugman belongs, and others.

On the right side, there were Bruce Bartlett and company; the neoconservatives who wanted rhetoric but didn’t care about getting economic policy right; those who were loyal to Reagan whatever Reagan would decide but had no clue about policy; David Stockman who hoped that cutting taxes now would produce a wave of revulsion against deficits that would enable him to cut spending later; the Buchanan-Niskanen “we are betrayed” faction that protested against the embrace of deficit spending by the Republicans; and the “starve the beast” faction. “What the supply-siders thought” depends very much on who is included in the charmed circle, and when. And the same applies to “What the Keynesians thought.”

The unfortunate power of stereotypes

A gavel sits on a desk inside a court of appeals in Colorado, January 2013.

One question that comes up time and time again is whether discrimination is real. Are differences in outcomes for Group A and Group B due to factors that are intrinsic to people in each group, such as requiring firefighters to carry a 250-pound dummy up many flights of stairs? Or are differences due to implicit bias—or flat-out discrimination—such as finding that orchestras are more likely to hire women when they cannot see the candidate during the hiring performance? Then there’s the sticky question of whether discrimination is rational. If most women don’t have the strength to carry a heavy person out of a burning building, is it reasonable to assume that women cannot be firefighters?

In a new working paper, Princeton University economists David Arnold and Will Dobbie and Harvard Law School’s Crystal S. Yang seek to tease out prejudice from reasonableness by looking at bail judges. They use administrative court data from Miami and Philadelphia and find evidence of significant racial bias. They argue, however, that the evidence they find isn’t prejudice so much as it is “racially biased prediction errors.” What’s the difference? Their research leads them to conclude that some of the judges are making faulty decisions due to a systemic lack of accurate information based on stereotypes that drive bail decisions rather than on obvious prejudice.

The three researchers were able to tease out the difference because defendants are quasi-randomly assigned to bail judges, which allows the scholars to see whether judges accurately predict whether released defendants will engage in pre-trial misconduct. The judges have to make quick decisions about setting bail—they often will only see the defendant during a short video call—and have to balance the need to reduce jail costs and allow defendants to keep their jobs while awaiting trial with the probability that the defendants will engage in misconduct before the trial.

If a judge is not racially biased, then there should be no difference in the probability of pre-trial misconduct between black and white defendants, all else being equal. If white defendants have a higher rate of misconduct, that means judges overestimate the relative likelihood of black defendants to reoffend. The researchers find that bail judges are indeed racially biased. Compared with black defendants, whites are 18 percentage points more likely to be rearrested prior to disposition. This means that judges are systemically underestimating white defendants’—and overestimating black defendants’—probability of engaging in misconduct.

Yet the authors conclude that their study is consistent with the conclusion that bail judges are not making racially biased decisions due to a direct prejudice against black defendants because they are making guesses as to whether the accused is a danger to society while awaiting trial based on “racially biased prediction errors.” In other words, they incorrectly think that black defendants, on the margin, are more likely to reoffend.

They make this conclusion because an important factor driving racial bias turns out to be the individual judge’s experience setting bail terms. They find much more racial bias among inexperienced and part-time judges. Those judges hear far fewer cases and don’t have extensive experience to guide them. It’s possible that after enough experience, the racial stereotypes start to hold less salience for more experienced judges. This is underscored by the finding that when looking at high-risk defendants, judges are more likely to make racially biased decisions.

This has important implications. If stereotypes lead judges to snap judgements that are racially biased, then they almost certainly will have an impact in other important areas where such arbitrary decisions could be made. A better understanding of how these stereotypes can be broken down and eliminated will help create policies that lessen such racially inequitable outcomes.

Must-Read: David Glasner: Fifteen Thousand Words on Temporary Equilibrium, Expectations, and Consistency of Plans

Must-Read: David Glasner says smart things about what Hayekian business cycle theory would have been had Hayek based his business cycle theory on his own insights into the price mechanism, rather than following the path he did, of attempting to reanimate a zombie version of the monetary overinvestment cycle.

It has always struck me as very strange: monetary overinvestment business cycle theories have very strong implications about how price systems are incapable of handling coordination problems. Yet the entire thrust of the rest of Hayek’s economics is on how price systems are often able to do so rather well…

David Glasner: FIFTEEN THOUSAND WORDS ON TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIUM, EXPECTATIONS, AND CONSISTENCY OF PLANS:

The defining characteristic of an intertemporal equilibrium is that agents all share the same expectations… over their planning horizons…. [Thus] the optimizing plans of the agents are consistent, because none of the agents would have any reason to change his optimal plan as long as price expectations do not change, or are not disappointed as a result of prices turning out to be different from what they had been expected to be…. If agents have different information, so that their expectations of future prices are not the same, the plans on which agents construct their subjectively optimal plans will be inconsistent and incapable of implementation without at least some revisions….

[But] if markets for current delivery and for existing assets are in equilibrium in the sense that prices are adjusting in those markets to equate demand and supply in those markets, how can we understand the idea that  the optimizing plans that agents are seeking to implement are mutually inconsistent? The classic attempt to explain this intermediate situation which partially is and partially is not an equilibrium, was made by J. R. Hicks in 1939 in Value and Capital, when he coined the term “temporary equilibrium” to describe a situation in which current prices are adjusting to equilibrate supply and demand in current markets even though agents are basing their choices of optimal plans to implement over time on different expectations of what prices will be in the future….

For Hayek the Hicksian temporary-equilibrium construct would have been the appropriate theoretical framework within which to formulate a monetary analysis consistent with equilibrium analysis. Although there are hints in the last part of The Pure Theory of Capital that Hayek was thinking along these lines, I don’t believe that he got very far, and he certainly gave no indication that he saw in the Hicksian method the analytical tool with which to weave the two threads of his analysis…. [If] agents understand that their… plans may have to be revised… [and] recognize that… not all debt instruments (IOUs) are equally reliable… it [will be] profitable for some… to specialize in debt assessment… financial intermediaries….

In adjusting their plans when they observe that their price expectations are disappointed, agents may… increase sales or decrease purchases of particular goods and services… [or] scrap their old plans, replacing them with completely new plans… [which] may cause other agents to conclude that the plans that they had expected to implement are no longer profitable and must be scrapped…. But here’s the problem. There is no guarantee that, when prices turn out to be very different from what they were expected to be, the excess demands of agents will adjust smoothly to changes in current prices… violating a basic assumption—the continuity of excess demand functions—necessary to prove the existence of an equilibrium…. C. J. Bliss made such an argument in a 1983 paper (“Consistent Temporary Equilibrium” in the volume Modern Macroeconomic Theory edited by  J. P. Fitoussi) in which he also suggested, as I did above, that the divergence of individual expectations implies that agents will not typically regard the debt issued by other agents as homogeneous. Bliss therefore posited the existence of a “Financier” who would subject the borrowing plans of prospective borrowers to an evaluation process….

Explicitly introducing banks that simultaneously provide an economy with a medium of exchange… while intermediating between ultimate borrowers and ultimate lenders seems to be a promising way of modeling a dynamic economy that sometimes may—and sometimes may not—function at or near a temporary equilibrium… with reasonably high employment, increasing per capita output and income, and reasonable price stability…. A macroeconomic model should be able to account in some way for the diversity of observed macroeconomic experience. The temporary equilibrium paradigm seems to offer a theoretical framework capable of accounting for this diversity of experience and for explaining at least in a very general way what accounts for the difference in outcomes: the degree of congruence between the price expectations of agents….

This, I think, is the insight underlying Axel Leijonhufvud’s idea of a corridor within which an economy tends to stay close to an equilibrium path. However if the economy drifts or is shocked away from its equilibrium time path, the stabilizing forces that tend to keep an economy within the corridor cease to operate at all or operate only weakly, so that the tendency for the economy to revert back to its equilibrium time path is either absent or disappointingly weak. The temporary-equilibrium method, it seems to me, might have been a path that Hayek could have successfully taken in pursuing the goal he had set for himself early in his career: to reconcile equilibrium-analysis with a theory of business cycles. Why he ultimately chose not to take this path is a question that, for now at least, I will leave to others to try to answer.

Must-Read: Neel Kashkari: Why I Dissented Again

Must-Read: Even if people are unconvinced by Neal Kashkari’s other arguments, I truly do not understand why his risk management argument is not decisively convincing:

Neel Kashkari: Why I Dissented Again: “The economy is sending mixed signals: a tight labor market and weakening inflation… https://medium.com/@neelkashkari/why-i-dissented-again-b8579ab664b7

…For me, deciding whether to raise rates or hold steady came down to a tension between faith and data…. I am inclined to believe in the logic of the Phillips curve…[but] the data aren’t supporting this story, with the FOMC coming up short on its inflation target for many years in a row, and now with core inflation actually falling even as the labor market is tightening. If we base our outlook for inflation on these actual data, we shouldn’t have raised rates this week. Instead, we should have waited to see if the recent drop in inflation is transitory to ensure that we are fulfilling our inflation mandate.

When I’m torn between faith and data, I look at decisions from a risk management perspective. The risk of raising rates too soon is a continuation of the FOMC’s track record of coming up short of our inflation objective…. If inflation expectations drop, as we’ve seen in some other countries (and there are signs it might be happening here in the United States), it can be very challenging to bring them back up. The risk of not moving soon enough generally doesn’t appear to be large…

Weekend reading: Shifting targets edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Some critics of the disability insurance system in the United States think it is too easy to access. They argue that if the cost of applying for disability goes up, then the people who don’t really need disability coverage will be the ones to not apply. New research finds, in fact, the opposite happens.

The Federal Reserve raised interest rates on Wednesday afternoon despite data showing a weakening in inflation. Given that inflation has been below 2 percent for almost five years, perhaps it’s time to rethink the current targeting regime.

Seventeen percent of workers in the United States have unpredictable, variable schedules as the result of “lean labor strategies.” The effects of these kind of schedules are just now starting to be understood. Bridget Ansel rounds up some research in this area.

The Kansas supply-side tax cut experiment failed. Understanding why it failed is important given that the same model underlies the proposed tax reform of the Trump administration. Greg Leiserson runs through the flaws in the line of thinking bedind the Kansas experiment.

A tax deduction for migrating birds? Kavya Vaghul shows how conservation easements have been exploited and turned into another inequitable feature of the U.S. tax system.

Links from around the web

The number of job openings as a share of total employment is near historic highs. The time it takes to fill an open job is also quite high. Is this a sign of a major skill-gap in the labor market? Noam Scheiber talks to a number of researchers and they all don’t think that’s the case. [nyt]

Over the courses of the current U.S. economic recovery, the Federal Reserve has continuously underestimated how much lower the unemployment rate can go. Cardiff Garcia floats the idea that this discounting of how much the labor market can heal is behind its “continued failure to produce an economy that sustainably keeps inflation near the target, and which includes healthier wage growth.” [ft alphaville]

“It is not just that tax cuts didn’t achieve their purpose,” writes Max Ehrenfreund. “New research suggests that the cuts were, in fact, counterproductive.” Here’s his look at new research on the Kansas tax cuts. [wonkblog]

“Today’s inconspicuous consumption is a far more pernicious form of status spending than the conspicuous consumption of Veblen’s time,” argues Elizabeth Currid-Halkett. She finds that spending by elites is now less about demonstrating financial capital and more about showing off cultural capital than in the Robber Baron era. [aeon]

The effects of a losing your job might have an effect on you for the rest of your life, but also on your community and the young people who live there. Alana Semuels writes about new research connecting widespread layoffs in a community to lower rates of college attendance rates for low-income children. [the atlantic]

Friday figure

Figure from “Time for the Fed to look beyond 2 percent target inflation?” by Nick Bunker

Must- and Should-Reads: June 16, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Must-Read: Janet Yellen and Nancy Marchall Genzer: Janet Yellen Interested in Reevaluating 2%

Must-Read: Janet Yellen gets it right. As I find myself saying a lot these days, if I were the Fed I would appoint an Inflation Target Level Technical Advisory Commission to write a report, and make Ben Bernanke and Larry Summers co-chair it:

Janet Yellen and Nancy Marchall Genzer: Janet Yellen Interested in Reevaluating 2% https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4673824/janet-yellen-interested-reevaluating-2: “Nancy Marchall Genzer, Marketplace: ‘Recently, a group of economists sent the Fed a letter…

…disagreeing with your 2% inflation target and saying they would like the economy to run a bit hotter. They don’t think the labor market is so tight. You say you’re committed to the 2% target, but what do you say to them?”

Janet Yellen: “At the time when we adopted the 2% target… in 2012… we have a very thorough discussion of the factors that should determine what our inflation objective should be. I believe that was a well thought out decision…. At the moment, we are highly focused on trying to achieve our 2 percent objective, and we recognize the fact that inflation has been running below and its essential for us to move inflation back to that objective.

“Now we’ve learned a lot in the meantime. And assessments of the level of the neutral likely level currently and going forward of the neutral federal funds rate have changed and are are quite a bit lower than where they stood in 2012 or earlier years. That means that the economy has the potential where policy could be constrained by the zero lower bound more frequently than at the time when we adopted our 2% objective….

“It’s that recognition that causes people to think that we might be better off with a higher inflation objectives. This is one of our most critical decisions and one we’re attentive to evidence and outside thinking. It’s one that we will be reconsidering at some future time. It’s important for our decisions to be informed by a wide range of views and research, which is ongoing inside and outside the Fed. But a reconsideration of that objective needs to take into account not only benefits of a higher inflation target, but also the potential costs. It needs to be a balanced assessment.

“I would say that this is one of the most important questions facing monetary policy around the world in the future. We very much look forward to seeing research by economists that will help inform our future decisions on this…”


As you know if you have been reading this weblog http://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/06/yes-the-zlb-is-a-big-deal-or-brad-goes-down-a-rabbit-hole.html, I have been playing with adding in the zero lower bound on the short-term safe nominal policy interest rate to the setup of Larry Ball (1997): EFFICIENT RULES FOR MONETARY POLICY http://delong.typepad.com/ball-1997-efficient-rules.pdf:

MathType 2017 06 11 Ball 1997 Optimal Taylor Rule Calibration pdf PDF

For Ball’s baseline case, with the zero lower bound on the nominal policy rate imposed, with equal shock variances of 0.000, with equal weights on reducing the variance of output and of inflation, with an r* = 1%, and with a 2% symmetric inflation target, the optimal monetary policy rule in the absence of the zero lower bound blows up the economy in a bad way about 1/3 of the time every twenty-five year generation:

2017 06 12 Notes on Ball 1997 Efficient Rules for Monetary Policy numbers

The quickest-and-dirtiest way to eliminate this singularity is to impose a maximum rate of deflation -πmin on the economy: that eliminates the Fisherian debt-deflation death spiral that is implicit in Ball’s (1997) setup with the zero lower bound added in:

MathType 2017 06 11 Ball 1997 Optimal Taylor Rule Calibration pdf PDF

Setting πmin at -1.5%/year gives us an average monetary stabilization loss function of -0.00093 for the monetary policy rule optimal without considering the zero lower bound, along with some truly extended periods with the economy at the zero lower bound and with deflation at its speed limit:

2017 06 12 Notes on Ball 1997 Efficient Rules for Monetary Policy numbers

Shifting from a 2% to a 5% symmetric inflation target gets us a loss function of -0.00051 and an inflation rate that kisses the deflation speed limit only 0.3% of the time, with “normal” behavior on the part of the Ball setup:

2017 06 12 Notes on Ball 1997 Efficient Rules for Monetary Policy numbers

As I have said, this is neither the right model nor the right calibration. It is, however, a baseline to start thinking about what the right model and the right calibration are, as it is the setup Ball (1997) put forward to assess under what circumstances interest rate rules would be optimal—and what interest rate rule would be optimal.

What is the optimal interest rate rule conditional on the inflation target π* and the Wicksellian neutral real policy rate r*? I want to get comfortable with a model and calibration I can defend before I start the numerical optimization…