Should-Read: Fabio Ghironi: Micro Needs Macro

Should-Read: Fabio Ghironi: Micro Needs Macro: “An emerging consensus on the future of macroeconomics views the incorporation of a role for financial intermediation, labor market frictions, and household heterogeneity in the presence of uninsurable unemployment risk as key needed extensions to the benchmark macro framework… http://faculty.washington.edu/ghiro/GhiroFuture.pdf

…I argue that this is welcome, but not sufficient for macro and international macro to tackle the menu of issues that have been facing policymakers since the recent global crisis. For this purpose, macro needs more micro than the benchmark setup has been incorporating so far. Specifically, artificial separations between business cycle analysis, the study of stabilization policies, and growth macro, as well as between international macroeconomics and international trade, must be overcome. I review selected literature contributions that took steps in this direction; outline a number of important, promising directions for future research; and discuss methodological issues in the development of this agenda…

Should-Read: Nancy MacLean: Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America

Should-Read: Nancy MacLean: Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America http://amzn.to/2voi3qD: “As 1956 drew to a close, Colgate Whitehead Darden Jr., the president of the University of Virginia, feared…

…second Brown v. Board of Education ruling, calling for the dismantling of segregation in public schools with “all deliberate speed.” In Virginia, outraged state officials responded with legislation to force the closure of any school that planned to comply…. Darden… could barely stand to contemplate the damage…. Even the name of this plan, “massive resistance,” made his gentlemanly Virginia sound like Mississippi.

On his desk was a proposal, written by the… chair of the economics department… James McGill Buchanan [who] liked to call himself a Tennessee country boy. But Darden knew better…. Without mentioning the crisis at hand, Buchanan’s proposal put in writing what Darden was thinking: Virginia needed to find a better way to deal with the incursion on states’ rights represented by Brown.

To most Americans living in the North, Brown was a ruling to end segregated schools—nothing more, nothing less. And Virginia’s response was about race. But to men like Darden and Buchanan, two well-educated sons of the South who were deeply committed to its model of political economy, Brown boded a sea change on much more…. Federal courts could no longer be counted on to defer reflexively to states’ rights…. The high court would be more willing to intervene when presented with compelling evidence that a state action was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection”…. States’ rights… were yielding in preeminence to individual rights. It was not difficult for either Darden or Buchanan to imagine how [the Warren] court might now rule if presented with evidence of the state of Virginia’s archaic labor relations, its measures to suppress voting, or its efforts to buttress the power of reactionary rural whites by underrepresenting the moderate voters of the cities and suburbs of Northern Virginia. Federal meddling could rise to levels once unimaginable.

James McGill Buchanan was not a member of the Virginia elite. Nor is there any explicit evidence to suggest that for a white southerner of his day, he was uniquely racist or insensitive to the concept of equal treatment. And yet, somehow, all he saw in the Brown decision was coercion. And not just in the abstract. What the court ruling represented to him was personal. Northern liberals… who looked down upon southern whites like him,… were now going to tell his people how to run their society. And… he and people like him with property were no doubt going to be taxed more…. What about his rights? Where did the federal government get the authority to engineer society to its liking and then send him and those like him the bill? Who represented their interests in all of this?

I can fight this, he concluded. I want to fight this. Find the resources, he proposed to Darden, for me to create a new center on the campus of the University of Virginia, and I will use this center to create a new school of political economy and social philosophy… an academic center… with a… political agenda: to defeat the “perverted form” of liberalism that sought to destroy their way of life, “a social order,” as he described it, “built on individual liberty,” a term with its own coded meaning but one that Darden surely understood. The center, Buchanan promised, would train “a line of new thinkers” in how to argue against those seeking to impose an “increasing role of government in economic and social life.” He could win this war, and he would do it with ideas.

While it is hard for most of us today to imagine how Buchanan or Darden or any other reasonable, rational human being saw the racially segregated Virginia of the 1950s as a society built on “the rights of the individual,” no matter how that term was defined, it is not hard to see why the Brown decision created a sense of grave risk among those who did. Buchanan fully understood the scale of the challenge he was undertaking and promised no immediate results. But he made clear that he would devote himself passionately to this cause.

Some may argue that while Darden fulfilled his part—he found the money to establish this center—he never got much in return. Buchanan’s team had no discernible success in decreasing the federal government’s pressure on the South all the way through the 1960s and ’70s. But take a longer view… a different picture… a testament to Buchanan’s intellectual powers and… the ideological origins of the single most powerful and least understood threat to democracy today: the attempt by the billionaire-backed radical right to undo democratic governance…. A quest that began as a quiet attempt to prevent the state of Virginia from having to meet national democratic standards of fair treatment and equal protection… would, some sixty years later, become… a stealth bid to reverse-engineer all of America, at both the state and the national levels, back to the political economy and oligarchic governance of midcentury Virginia, minus the segregation…

Must- and Should-Reads: August 12, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Preferential pass-through tax rates and the declining share of labor income in the United States

A new working paper underscores the importance of pass-through businesses, such as sole proprietorships, S corporations, and partnerships, in the forthcoming debate on U.S. tax reform in Congress. The reason: The shift in business activity into pass-through form in recent decades, and a corresponding shift in income reported for tax purposes from wages to business profits, underscores just how consequential the compliance problems would be if Congress were to enact a preferential rate for income from pass-through businesses.

Nearly all of the rise in top incomes since 2000 in the United States has come in the form of business income, according to the new working paper by Matthew Smith of the U.S. Treasury Department; Danny Yagan of the University of California, Berkeley, and the National Bureau of Economic Research; and Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick, both of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Business income now accounts for a larger fraction of the income of the top 0.1 percent of income earners than either nonbusiness capital income, such as interest, or wage income. Most of this business income growth comes from pass-through businesses, which do not pay the corporate income tax. Instead, owners of these businesses pay taxes on their share of their firm’s profits on their individual income tax returns. In general, business income is a combination of capital income and labor income, and distinguishing the relative shares can be difficult. Moreover, the line between business income and nonbusiness capital income is itself ambiguous.

There are many interesting findings in the paper worthy of discussion, but one for policymakers to consider is that business owners show a substantial ability to reclassify income by type, such as from business profits to wages, when there are tax advantages to doing so. The magnitude of this response, even for businesses currently subject to rules intended to discourage such behavior, highlights the potential for compliance problems under a preferential rate for pass-through income—an idea included in several recent tax reform proposals.

The shift of business activity from C corporations—traditional corporations subject to U.S. corporate taxes—to pass-throughs began in earnest after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which reduced the top personal income tax rate below the top corporate income tax rate. Today, C corporations no longer earn the vast majority of business income, earning less than half of business income as pass-throughs grow in importance. By 2011, 54.2 percent of all U.S. business income was earned by pass-throughs, compared with just 20.7 percent in 1980.

Under current law, active business owners typically face the lowest statutory tax rate on their profits if they conduct business activities in S corporation form. (Other tax considerations, however, may also affect the relative advantages of the choice of form, such as flexibility in allocating income and losses.) If owners “materially participate” in a firm’s operation, then their business income faces only the ordinary income tax—at a maximum rate of 39.6 percent. In contrast, C corporations pay a 35 percent tax on profits, and owners pay additional taxes at the investor level when earnings are distributed—at a maximum rate of 23.8 percent. Wage payments are deducted from business income and taxed at a maximum rate of 43.4 percent at the individual level regardless of the type of business.

Thus, owners of a closely held C corporation would realize tax advantages from paying higher wages and realizing lower profits, while owners of a closely held S corporation would realize tax advantages from realizing income in the form of business profits rather than wages. Both C corporations and S corporations are subject to requirements that wage compensation paid to owner-employees must be reasonable, thus—in theory—limiting the ability of C corporation owner-employees to overstate wages and the ability of S corporation owner-employees to understate wages.

Nonetheless, the data show exactly these kinds of shifts in the 21st century. Studying firms that switch from C corporations to S corporations, authors Smith, Yagan, Zidar, and Zwick observe a substantial reallocation between wages and profits. On average, wage payments fell by 1.95 percent relative to sales during the year of the switch, and profits grew by 1.76 percent relative to sales. (see Figure 1) For dentists’ and physicians’ offices, the swings were more dramatic, with profits increasing 7.81 percent and wages falling 6.36 percent. There was no discernible difference among firms with sales of more than $50 million, but firms with sales of less than $5 million acted much like the full sample of companies surveyed, with wages declining about 2 percent and profits increasing 1.75 percent. Firms with sales of less than $5 million account for the overwhelming majority of the firms in the analysis.

Figure 1

The analysis by the four researchers also finds that the shift of business activity from C corporations to S corporations since the 1980s has reduced the measured share of labor income. The growth in S corporations, and the corresponding shift from wages to profits, skews the measurement of the labor share of income in the corporate sector. The researchers estimate that the decline in the corporate labor share is overstated by 19 percent, as earned income has increasingly taken the form of S corporation profits. Policymakers may soon have to decide if they want to further incentivize this shift through a preferential rate for pass-through businesses.

Should-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Revenge of the Experts

Should-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Revenge of the Experts: “The Brexit debate is an endless source of mirth for anyone with a dark sense of humor… https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economists-right-about-brexit-impact-by-barry-eichengreen-2017-08

…My own favorite quote is from Michael Gove, currently Britain’s environment secretary…. “People in this country have had enough of experts,” Gove testily explained…. Indeed, we economists have had little success at reliably predicting when and why uncertainty spikes. And there is little agreement on the severity of its impact. Maybe we would be better off placing less weight on the effects of uncertainty when making forecasts in general, and in the case of Brexit in particular. But this view looks rather less compelling with the passage of a couple of additional quarters….

The drop in confidence, some might object, reflects an inconclusive general election and a hung parliament, not the Brexit vote. Or worsening conditions can be blamed on the government’s less-than-stellar negotiating strategy and the appearance that it is entering discussions with its EU partners unprepared. But the inconclusive election reflects the schizophrenia of both the Conservative and Labour parties…. Some argue that if the government adopted a more coherent negotiating strategy the damage would be less. But the fact is that there is no coherent negotiating strategy. May’s objectives–restriction of immigration from the EU while maintaining full access to the European single market–are fundamentally incompatible. The only surprise is that it took so long for the consequences to materialize….

What the late, great MIT economist Rudi Dornbusch–that most expert of experts–said about Mexico’s peso crisis in the 1990s applies to the damage from Brexit as well. A crisis, Dornbusch noted, “takes a much longer time coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would have thought.”

Should-Read: Dean Baker: Opposition to Trade Deals: Brad DeLong’s “Socialism of Fools” Might Look Like Common Sense to Those Outside the Fraternity

Should-Read: A well-argued smackdown from the smart Dean Baker:

Dean Baker: Opposition to Trade Deals: Brad DeLong’s “Socialism of Fools” Might Look Like Common Sense to Those Outside the Fraternity: “First, Brad is well aware that the economy has operated well below full employment… http://cepr.net/blogs/beat-the-press/opposition-to-trade-deals-brad-delong-s-socialism-of-fools-might-look-like-common-sense-to-those-outside-the-fraternity

…I would argue this has been the case for almost all of the period since the collapse of the stock bubble in 2001. But he attributes this to a simple failure of the government to run full employment policies, rather than the large trade deficits we saw develop following the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. While… the government could maintain full employment by running much larger budget deficits… that does not appear to be politically feasible. Even among Democrats, very few are willing to say that we should have larger budget deficits to bring the economy to full employment….

The costs of being below full employment are disproportionately borne by disadvantaged groups in the labor market, especially African Americans and Hispanics.

Anyhow, if the political reality is that we will not have full employment fiscal policies, does it take a “fool” to argue that big trade deficits are a real problem? The cost of the shortfall in demand that we have seen over the last decade almost certainly exceeds $10 trillion by now and it is enduring, as we have seen lasting reductions in capacity, as Brad has written about himself. And millions have seen their lives and families disrupted by long periods of unemployment. Should we not worry about this damage from the demand shortfall created by trade deficits because there is in principle an economic fix, even though everyone knows it is not politically feasible?…

The loss of manufacturing jobs, which offered relatively good paying employment for people without college degrees (roughly two-thirds of the labor force), had a large effect on the wages of this group of workers. There was both the immediate effect on the displaced workers and their communities, which has been well-documented by David Autor and his various co-authors, and also the longer term effect from the reduced demand for less-educated workers…

I really have no good answer to his first and second points—they are good ones, and my only practical out for the future is a hope that the Federal Reserve will move to and then achieve a higher inflation target. The third I would push back against—the “loss of manufacturing jobs” is overwhelmingly not a trade phenomenon, and the net factor content of our exports and of activities financed by capital inflows is not that different from the net factor content displaced from employment by imports. We should be focusing on policies to achieve equitable growth, not less-inequitable stagnation…

The importance of equitable growth for future mobility in the United States

A father watches television with his daughters in Denver.

New York Times columnist David Leonhardt made an excellent point in a column yesterday about the pace of U.S. economic growth and where the gains of that growth have accrued. Commenting on a graph made using data from a distributional national accounts data set, Leonhardt notes that the growth of the past several decades hasn’t resulted in most families getting much in the way of raises. It may be all but impossible to get back to the levels of aggregate growth levels of the postwar era, he argues, but “there is nothing natural about the distribution of today’s growth.”

The consequences of such inequitable growth don’t just weigh on the living standards of one generation. They also affect the course of growth for future generations. Stanford University economist Raj Chetty and a group of researchers recently looked at the state of absolute mobility in the United States, or the likelihood that a child would earn the same amount of money or more than their parents at the same age. They found that the American dream, defined by levels of absolute mobility, is fading. A child born in 1940 had an almost 92 percent chance of earning more than their parents. Forty years later, someone born in 1980 would only have a 50 percent chance of outearning their parents.

The two big differences between the 1940–1970 period of high mobility and the 1980–2010 period of low mobility is that the second period had higher levels of income inequality and a lower rate of economic growth. Boosting both would almost certainly increase absolute mobility, but is one factor more significant than the other?

Chetty and his co-authors help answer this question by calculating how absolute mobility would change if they changed the income distribution and/or the level of growth. Figure 1 below shows four different scenarios. Two are easy enough to understand—the actual trends in mobility for the cohorts born in 1940 (the solid green line) and 1980 (the solid red line). But the other two lines are counterfactual trends. One line (the red dashed line) imagines a world where we keep the trends of high income inequality for the 1980 cohort but manage to boost growth from 1980 to 2010 to the fast pace that the U.S. economy experienced from 1940 to 1970. The other line (the green dashed line) imagines that we keep the slower growth of 1980 to 2010, but the growth ended up being distributed like the growth during 1940 to 1970. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

What the graph shows is that a faster-growing economy, but one that is still highly unequal, boosts mobility, but the increase in mobility is much higher when the distribution of slower growth is more equitable. The average rate of mobility when inequality and growth are both high would have been about 62 percent, compared with the average rate of about 80 percent when inequality and growth were both low.

Of course, absolute mobility is highest—an average of about 92 percent—when growth is both strong and equitably distributed. If we want to boost the living standard of future generations, policymakers need to take steps to boost economic growth and ensure that its benefits are broadly distributed.

Should-Read: PGL: The Output Gap per the Gerald Friedman Defenders

Should-Read: IMHO, the smart PGL does good here…

And, J.W. Mason, please don’t say that Coibion et al.’s state-of-the-art potential output estimate “gives a very similar estimate for the output gap as simply looking at the pre-2008 forecasts or extrapolating from the pre-2008 trend”. That’s not the way to gain a reputation—at least, not they way to get any reputation that you would like to have.

The Blanchard-Quah concept potential output estimates being made by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Ulate http://delong.typepad.com/w23580.pdf do not look to me “very similar estimate for the output gap as simply looking at the pre-2008 forecasts or extrapolating from the pre-2008 trend”. Look at the gap between the current estimate—the purple line—and the red or dot-dash green line that are the 2007 and 2009 vintage BQ forecasts. Look at the thick blue line that is (my drawing) of the upper hull of real output in this millennium a la Menzie Chinn:

Papers nber org tmp 51391 w23580 pdf

Yes, BQ gives a large current output gap. No, BQ as applied by Coibion et al. does not give a “very similar estimate for the output gap as simply looking at the pre-2008 forecasts or extrapolating from the pre-2008 trend”. You should not say it does.

PGL: The Output Gap per the Gerald Friedman Defenders: “Menzie Chinn back on February 20, 2016 had some fun with the defenders of that awful paper by Gerald Friedman… http://econospeak.blogspot.com.br/2017/08/the-output-gap-per-gerald-friedman.html

…the trend line extrapolated from 1984-2007 implies that the output gap as of 2015Q4 is… -18%… I want to stress that estimating potential GDP and the output gap is a difficult task…

It is a difficult task and perhaps the CBO estimate of the gap is understating it. But to pretend the potential GDP would continue to grow by something akin to 3.4% from 2000 to 2015 is just absurd. Well it seems this crowd has “updated” their trend line analysis. J. W. Mason writes:

This alternative measure [from Coibion et al.] gives a very similar estimate for the output gap as simply looking at the pre-2008 forecasts or extrapolating from the pre-2008 trend…

The ‘alternative measure’ comes from an interesting new paper… [that] suggests that the output gap may be as large as 10%. [But] Mason’s back flip is not justified…

My view as to how much slack there is and the desirability of expanding aggregate demand is and always has been: we don’t know how much slack there is, expanding aggregate demand to see is good policy.

My guess? That BQ produces estimated output gaps that are larger than the real thing. Applying Okun’s Law to the prime-age employment-to-population ratio gives us 4%-points of slack. That’s the hill I would die on. But my real answer is: “we don’t know, and we should pursue expansionary policies to find out”.

We shouldn’t promise unicorns and rainbows: it’s highly unprofessional to say that we have even some confidence that sufficient demand expansion would get us back to the pre-2008 trend; and it’s wrong to cite Coibion et al. in support of that claim. And CBO’s current forecast of potential output growth is a reasonable one in the absence of a major policy shift to major aggregate demand expansion.

And: Mason: don’t write: “I don’t really want to engage with this guy… but if there’s a lone crank in this discussion it ain’t me…”

And don’t write that your claim that potential output today is well estimated by “simply looking at the pre-2008 forecasts or extrapolating from the pre-2008 trend” has been “reviewed by Obama CEA chair Jason Furman and Laurence Ball… presented… to a group including Furman, Dean Baker, Josh Bivens, Lawrence Mishel and a number of other people with solid macro credentials… [with a] positive response…”

Your Roosevelt paper http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Monetary-Policy-Report-070617-2.pdf is much better than your blog post http://jwmason.org/slackwire/what-recovery-the-conversation-continues/ or your comment http://econospeak.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-output-gap-per-gerald-friedman.html?showComment=1501729914146#c1316241742813017907. Stick to the Roosevelt paper.

Disclosing salary history perpetuates past discrimination

Job seekers and recruiters meet during a job fair in Philadelphia, June 2014.

 Two people working for the same employer do the exact same job, have the exact same qualifications, and are equal in output and productivity. The only difference? One gets paid more than the other. Perhaps one of them successfully negotiated a better salary, which is much more likely for men. Or perhaps one of them is a woman or person of color, which suggests that discrimination may be at play.

 Or maybe it’s simply that one worker was underpaid at her last job, while the other was not. When workers apply for jobs, they often receive a salary offer based on what they earned at previous jobs. This kind of situation is not uncommon, as employers frequently evaluate or make job offers to job candidates based on their previous salary history. In fact, half of all workers report that their current employer learned about their previous wage level during the application process. But in doing so, these employers may be unwittingly perpetuating even a single instance of pay discrimination that happened early on in a worker’s career—and impeding wage growth throughout his or her lifetime.

 That is why a growing number of states and cities such as Massachusetts, New York City , Philadelphia, and Delaware are passing legislation banning employers from asking about salary history during the job application process. These bills are aimed at trying to close long-standing gender and racial pay gaps. Even when controlling for factors such as education, occupation, labor force experience, and union status, women and people of color still get paid less than white men, and researchers attribute this to discrimination. Having a salary that is too low also may shut people out of jobs altogether. Because some employers use an applicant’s prior compensation to evaluate that worker’s productivity, a salary that is too low may, in the case of discrimination, erroneously signal a lack of ability and result in the employer not making an offer.

 These state- and city-level policies were enacted relatively recently, so economists and policymakers are still unable to evaluate their effects fully. But a recent field experiment by Moshe A. Barach of Georgetown University and John J. Horton of New York University gives us some hope that the reforms may be effective. They find that employers who could not see applicants’ previous salaries responded by evaluating more workers, asking more questions, and arranging more in-person interviews. These employers also interviewed and hired workers with relatively lower past wages when compared with employers who did have access to applicants’ compensation history. Not having to reveal previous wages also gave workers more bargaining power, and they were offered higher initial salaries compared with those who did have to reveal their pay history.

 This is just a single study, and more research needs to be done to discern the full effects of this policy. But these initial results are promising and have implications for other groups as well. Banning salary history could help workers recover from an economic downturn, when they may have had to take a lower-paying job. It could also help older workers who were laid off at the peak of their careers but cannot find a job because potential employers view them as too expensive. Without applicants’ salary history, applicants may have more leverage to bargain for higher pay. It also means that employers must evaluate applicants’ concrete skills and experience—what they should have been evaluating in the first place.

Must-Read: Peter Conti-Brown: Health Care, the Congressional Budget Office, and “Audit the Fed”

Must-Read: Is “Audit the Fed” like creating the CBO, or like trying to destroy the CBO? Does the Federal Reserve need more oversight from the Congress, or less?

Shades of the Mytilene and Syracuse debates: with respect to the Federal Reserve, is Congress best seen as (a) a useful oversight body, or (b) a source of chaos and policy disaster that should be kept far away from a closed guild of hermetic monetary technocrats?

The very smart Peter Conti-Brown weighs in, tentatively, in favor of (b):

Peter Conti-Brown: Health Care, the Congressional Budget Office, and “Audit the Fed”: “One of the most intriguing institutional players… was the Congressional Budget Office… http://yalejreg.com/nc/health-care-the-congressional-budget-office-and-audit-the-fed/

…[its] verdict on the nature of cuts to Medicaid and the increased number of the uninsured became a rallying cry for those opposed to the Republicans’ efforts…. The CBO’s role… led to deep criticisms…. The White House cast aspersions on the credibility of past CBO analysis. President Trump’s budget director, former Republican Congressman Mick Mulvaney, offered an even more existential critique, saying that the CBO’s role providing independent analysis has “probably come and gone.” And the House Freedom Caucus, that group of legislators who pride themselves on their fiscal conservatism, would essentially gut the CBO… [which] was created toward the end of the Nixon Administration as a means of asserting Congress’s role in the budgetary process….

Its role also extended to creating a common ground for legislators to understand the consequences of any proposed legislative change. It’s not a very old office, but its role is about resolving a conflict of interest: when the president asks Congress to exercise its power of the purse, Congress, through the CBO, has a means of checking the math behind these requests…. I have an informed citizen’s level of expertise and opinion on health care policy, not more. But the CBO’s role in the health care debate and especially its treatment by the Republican critics remind me of a similar debate about the Federal Reserve. The so-called “Audit the Fed” bill…. Their pitch is simple…. We don’t need to eliminate the central bank altogether, but we need to make it more answerable to the common citizen through her representatives in Congress….

First is the misleading use of accounting jargon to accomplish a task that has nothing to do with accounting…. The strongest argument in favor of increasing Congress’s ability to oversee the Fed through the GAO has always been the CBO argument…. Congress has a few dozen overstretched staffers trying to make sure the Fed is doing the work it is designed to do. The “Audit the Fed” bill is designed, its proponents say, to even the playing field by harnessing the expertise and resources of the GAO. Republican hostility to the CBO’s inconvenient analysis of the health care bills should call into question the sincerity of this view….

The overlap between those who support Audit the Fed and those who would repeal the ACA is extensive. If the resource mismatch argument were really motivating Fed reformers—that is, if the motivation for the political audit of the Fed is about institutional credibility and congressional oversight—we should’ve seen many, many more Republicans calling foul on CBO criticism. Instead, we see fouls called on the CBO itself. The Republican reaction to the CBO provides strong evidence that the “resource mismatch” argument is part of a marketing campaign to give partisans more tools to accomplish partisan ends. I would expect that under an Audit the Fed regime the first time the GAO reaches a conclusion about Fed policy that is inconvenient for partisans, we will see the CBO criticisms redux. At that point, the whole exercise of Audit the Fed will be worse than pointless: we will have also damaged the Fed, the GAO, and congressional oversight in the process.