Weekend Reading

Recovery from the Great Recession

Neil Irwin finds five sectors to blame for the slow recovery from the Great Recession. [the upshot]

Dean Baker does a similar exercise and finds a different story. [beat the press]

Structural or cyclical?

What’s driving the increase in part-time employment? [atlanta fed]

Innovation

Ben Cassleman says don’t believe the hype. Corporate America hasn’t been disrupted [fivethirtyeight]

Inequality at the high end

Isabella Kaminska on Piketty and the role of randomness in the distribution of wealth. [ft alphaville]

Matt Ygelsias make the case for a maximum wage [vox]

Reactions to the S&P report on inequality and economic growth

Paul Krugman: inequality’s a drag [ny times]

Jared Bernstein on what he knows and what he doesn’t know about inequality and growth [on the economy]

Things to Read on the Afternoon of August 8, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

  1. Robert Solow (2012): Hayek, Friedman, and the Illusions of Conservative Economics: “There was a Good Hayek and a Bad Hayek… a serious scholar who was particularly interested in the role of knowledge in the economy… [the] system of competitive markets is a remarkably efficient way to aggregate all that knowledge while preserving decentralization. But the Good Hayek also knew that unrestricted laissez-faire is unworkable… monopoly power… better-informed actors can exploit the relatively ignorant… distribution of income… grossly unequal and… unfair… unemployment and underutilized capacity… environmental damage…. Half of Angus Burgin’s book is about the Good Hayek’s attempts to formulate and to propagate a modified version of laissez-faire that would work better and meet his standards for a liberal society…. The Bad Hayek emerged when he aimed to convert a wider public… overreach[ed]…. The Road to Serfdom was a popular success but was not a good book…. Sixty-five years later, Hayek’s implicit prediction is a failure, rather like Marx’s forecast of the coming ‘immiserization of the working class’….

    “The source of their alarm was not the danger from Soviet communism or Nazi Germany, but rather the rash of interventionist economic policies everywhere, the New Deal here and the Labor Party there, designed to ameliorate and to reverse the ravages of falling incomes and rising unemployment…. Lionel Robbins… Friedrich von Hayek… Frank Knight… Jacob Viner… Henry Simons… [all] wanted both to propagate ideas and to change the world. (It is worth mentioning that both Knight and Viner were later privately critical of The Road to Serfdom.) What seems off-key (at least now, at least to me) is that they all felt themselves to be in a struggle between free markets and collectivism (or socialism) with no possible intermediate stopping point. That is the meaning of ‘the road to serfdom’…. This apocalyptic tone survived into the period dominated by Milton Friedman, who is the subject of the second half of Burgin’s book. It is the language of the Tea Party Hayekians…”

  2. Julie L. Hotchkiss: Adjusted Employment-to-Population Ratio as an Indicator of Labor Market Strength: “There have been calls to pay closer attention to the movement in the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP), as opposed to the UR, as a measure of labor market strength…. Since the end of the Great Recession… the UR has fallen dramatically… but the EPOP has barely budged…. The purpose of this paper is… to… propose a methodology for adjusting the EPOP in a way that accounts for individual willingness to work…. The basic strategy… is to estimate individual probability of employment as a function of month/year indicators, then to enhance the model… with individual characteristics and… the individual’s propensity to be in the labor force…. The adjusted EPOP has regained its prerecession level of nearly 63 percent. Youth have regained even more, and those 25 to 54 regained 71 percent of their loss over the sample period. As a point of reference, by the end of 2013 the UR had recovered roughly 66 percent of the climb to its peak of 10 percent…”

  3. Jared Bernstein: Inequality and Growth: What I Think We Know and Don’t Know “This new S&P study on inequality and growth is creating a bit a buzz, mostly because it’s from a firm we associate with financial markets, not inequality analysis…. Though in an earlier study I raised some questions about the claim that high inequality dampens growth, I clearly think there’s something there, especially as regards mobility barriers…. What follows is my brief overview of the basic channels by which economists think inequality hurts growth…. Ours is a 70% consumer spending economy…. Evidence: This is a solid theory but the evidence is weaker than you’d expect…. Our historically high levels of inequality threaten to undermine both parents’ and society’s ability to invest…. Evidence: Again, solid theory but not a lot of proof…. Regressive tax and transfer policies…. Evidence: This is a well-known development and it makes sense…. But how is this a drag on macroeconomic growth? S&P doesn’t say and it’s not obvious….. Leverage, bubbles, and busts: OTEers know that I think this one is big. The chain of events is simple and empirically plausible…. Evidence: I found this paper by Cynamon and Fazzari to be the most systematic and compelling analysis…. Money in politics… my other top candidate…. Evidence: The linkages here include dysfunctional politics that hurt growth in obvious and visible ways from government shutdowns, under-regulation of financial markets, threats to default, and underinvestment in public goods, from medical research to transportation to education…. So that’s the skinny on what I think we know…”

  4. John Quiggin: Reagan and the Great Man in History: “The outsize Republican idolatry of Reagan is explained in part by the fact that there’s no one else in their history of whom they can really approve…. Eisenhower looks pretty good on most historical rankings, but he’s anathema to movement conservatives…. Theodore Roosevelt is problematic for related but different reasons…. The ‘party of Lincoln’… doesn’t pass the laugh test…. So they have little choice but to present Reagan as the savior of the nation…”

  5. Sarah Kliff: How Arkansas used Obamacare to cut its uninsured rate by 45 percent “Count this as a big Obamacare win for Arkansas: the state drove down its uninsured rate faster than any other, according to new Gallup data. Since the law’s open enrollment period, the state’s uninsured rate has fallen from 22.5 to 12.4 percent. That works out to 45 percent fewer uninsured Arkansans.”

  6. Matt O’Brien: Europe’s low inflation is sending it into a lost decade “They had one job. The European Central Bank (ECB) was supposed to keep inflation close to, but below, its 2 percent target. It’s failed miserably, and it’s not going to stop anytime soon…. Europe’s inflation is already too low, and it’s going to stay that way for too long—even if everything goes according to plan. It needs a better plan. It needs to do more.”

  7. John Quiggin: Reagan and the Great Man in History: “A lot of the discussion is based on an implicit or explicit assumption that the shift to the right in the US since the 1970s can be explained by the successful organizing efforts of movement conservatism, culminating in Reagan’s 1980 election victory. That’s an explanation with a lot of contingency attached…. [But] other English-speaking countries, with very different political histories followed much the same route…. I don’t want to overstate the determinism here. Individuals matter, and national circumstances differ. Still, I think we are talking about variations on a common theme, driven by global economic events, rather than a US-specific story beginning with Reagan’s 1964 address in support of Goldwater.”

  8. Paul Krugman: On Reaganolatry “The truly vile attack on Rick Perlstein’s new book has been revealing in a number of ways… supposedly reasonable, civilized conservatives have contorted themselves to support the party line (which they always do when it matters, no matter how much open-mindedness they seem to display when it doesn’t). And why this determination to quash Perlstein? It’s all about Reaganolatry…. I’d just add that the economic myth of Reagan is truly remarkable. Everyone on the right knows that Reagan presided over job creation on a scale never seen before or since; but it just isn’t so…. You may have known that Clinton was a better ‘job creator’ than Reagan, but did you know that over the course of the Carter administration… the economy actually added jobs faster than it did under Reagan?… The supposed awesomeness of Reagan’s economic record just doesn’t pop out of the data. But don’t expect the Reaganlators to acknowledge that…”

And:

Should Be Aware of:

  1. Dean Baquet: The Executive Editor on the Word ‘Torture’ “When the first revelations emerged a decade ago, the situation was murky…. The Justice Department insisted that the techniques did not rise to the legal definition of ‘torture’. The Times… avoided a label that was still in dispute, instead using terms like harsh or brutal interrogation methods. But… reporters and editors have revisited the issue…. The Justice Department… has made clear that it will not prosecute…. The result is that today, the debate is focused less on whether the methods violated a statute or treaty… the disputed legal meaning of the word ‘torture’ is secondary to the common meaning: the intentional infliction of pain to make someone talk. Given those changes, reporters urged that The Times recalibrate its language. I agreed…”

  2. K.M. Harris and D.K. Remler: Who is the marginal patient? Understanding instrumental variables estimates of treatment effects: “We generate Monte Carlo data designed to resemble typical data sets where detailed health-status information is unavailable and the treatment-assignment process is unobserved. The model used to generate our data makes the realistic assumption that unobservable health status characteristics of patients influence the treatment assignment process and the effectiveness of treatment…. IV estimates are useful… when the subpopulation to which the IV estimate refers is the same or very similar to the population whose treatment status is affected by the policy change…. Health services researchers cannot take for granted that IV estimates generalize to the same population represented by the sample… must rely on their knowledge of clinical practice and theory regarding the treatment assignment process in interpreting their results…”

  3. Tim Duy: On That ECI Number “I understand why market participants might be a little hypersensitive to anything related to wages. Indeed, wage growth is the missing link in the tight labor market story.  But I don’t think the Fed will react much to these numbers; they will place them in context of recent behavior, and in that context they are not much different than current trends.  Watch the upcoming employment reports for signs of diminishing underutilization of labor – that is where the Fed will be looking.”

Afternoon Must-Read: Inequality and Growth: What I Think We Know and Don’t Know

Jared Bernstein: Inequality and Growth: What I Think We Know and Don’t Know “This new S&P study on inequality and growth…

…is creating a bit a buzz, mostly because it’s from a firm we associate with financial markets, not inequality analysis…. Though in an earlier study I raised some questions about the claim that high inequality dampens growth, I clearly think there’s something there, especially as regards mobility barriers…. What follows is my brief overview of the basic channels by which economists think inequality hurts growth…. Ours is a 70% consumer spending economy…. Evidence: This is a solid theory but the evidence is weaker than you’d expect…. Our historically high levels of inequality threaten to undermine both parents’ and society’s ability to invest…. Evidence: Again, solid theory but not a lot of proof…. Regressive tax and transfer policies…. Evidence: This is a well-known development and it makes sense…. But how is this a drag on macroeconomic growth? S&P doesn’t say and it’s not obvious….. Leverage, bubbles, and busts: OTEers know that I think this one is big. The chain of events is simple and empirically plausible…. Evidence: I found this paper by Cynamon and Fazzari to be the most systematic and compelling analysis…. Money in politics… my other top candidate…. Evidence: The linkages here include dysfunctional politics that hurt growth in obvious and visible ways from government shutdowns, under-regulation of financial markets, threats to default, and underinvestment in public goods, from medical research to transportation to education…. So that’s the skinny on what I think we know…

Afternoon Must-Read: Julie L. Hotchkiss: Adjusted Employment-to-Population Ratio as an Indicator of Labor Market Strength

Julie L. Hotchkiss: Adjusted Employment-to-Population Ratio as an Indicator of Labor Market Strength: “There have been calls to pay closer attention…

…to the movement in the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP), as opposed to the UR, as a measure of labor market strength…. Since the end of the Great Recession… the UR has fallen dramatically… but the EPOP has barely budged…. The purpose of this paper is… to… propose a methodology for adjusting the EPOP in a way that accounts for individual willingness to work…. The basic strategy… is to estimate individual probability of employment as a function of month/year indicators, then to enhance the model… with individual characteristics and… the individual’s propensity to be in the labor force…. The adjusted EPOP has regained its prerecession level of nearly 63 percent. Youth have regained even more, and those 25 to 54 regained 71 percent of their loss over the sample period. As a point of reference, by the end of 2013 the UR had recovered roughly 66 percent of the climb to its peak of 10 percent…”

Lunchtime Must-Read: Robert Solow (2012): Hayek, Friedman, and the Illusions of Conservative Economics

Just as I finish writing up my office-hour thoughts on a framework for organizing one’s thoughts on Friedrich A. von Hayek and twentieth century political economy, along comes the esteemed Lars P. Syll with a link to an excellent piece–one I had never read–on the same thing by Equitable Growth’s Fearless Leader Bob Solow…

Robert Solow (2012): Hayek, Friedman, and the Illusions of Conservative Economics: “There was a Good Hayek and a Bad Hayek…

…a serious scholar who was particularly interested in the role of knowledge in the economy… [the] system of competitive markets is a remarkably efficient way to aggregate all that knowledge while preserving decentralization. But the Good Hayek also knew that unrestricted laissez-faire is unworkable… monopoly power… better-informed actors can exploit the relatively ignorant… distribution of income… grossly unequal and… unfair… unemployment and underutilized capacity… environmental damage…. Half of Angus Burgin’s book is about the Good Hayek’s attempts to formulate and to propagate a modified version of laissez-faire that would work better and meet his standards for a liberal society…. The Bad Hayek emerged when he aimed to convert a wider public… overreach[ed]…. The Road to Serfdom was a popular success but was not a good book…. Sixty-five years later, Hayek’s implicit prediction is a failure, rather like Marx’s forecast of the coming ‘immiserization of the working class’….

The source of their alarm was not the danger from Soviet communism or Nazi Germany, but rather the rash of interventionist economic policies everywhere, the New Deal here and the Labor Party there, designed to ameliorate and to reverse the ravages of falling incomes and rising unemployment…. Lionel Robbins… Friedrich von Hayek… Frank Knight… Jacob Viner… Henry Simons… [all] wanted both to propagate ideas and to change the world. (It is worth mentioning that both Knight and Viner were later privately critical of The Road to Serfdom.) What seems off-key (at least now, at least to me) is that they all felt themselves to be in a struggle between free markets and collectivism (or socialism) with no possible intermediate stopping point. That is the meaning of ‘the road to serfdom’…. This apocalyptic tone survived into the period dominated by Milton Friedman, who is the subject of the second half of Burgin’s book. It is the language of the Tea Party Hayekians…

Magic Asterisks in the Budget: Robert Waldmann Continues the “Civility” Discussion: Friday Focus for August 8, 2014

Document1Larry Kotlikoff strikes Robert Waldmann speechless:

Robert Waldmann: Should Economists Be Honest or Civil? “Kotlikoff offers Krugman this advice…

…I think public intellectuals, like Paul Krugman, have a responsibility to act like grownups in speaking with the public. If they start calling people with different views “’stupid’, they demean themselves and convey the message that name calling rather than respectful debate is appropriate conduct…. What I’m writing about is not Paul Ryan. I’m writing about the level of national discourse. No one, and I mean no one, deserves to be called stupid.

Brad DeLong has already pointed out that Krugman did not call Congressman Ryan stupid. What Paul was really saying is that the Republican fiscal policy wonk was a con artist….

Ryan has often called for large reductions in taxes on the well to do. Kotlikoff… frets that we are not raising enough in taxes to pay for all the things that the government has promised. And yet Kotlikoff wants us to be nice to politicians like Paul Ryan who are not being honest with us.

I’m speechless.

I must say that I do not share Robert’s speechlessness. But I do share his confusion. Ever since the start of 1981 and the miseducation of David Stockman, the bane of a sensible American fiscal policy has most often been the magic asterisk: the implicit claim that some policy that the politician dares not name or some magical Budget Fairy will fly down from above and make everything OK. When this magic asterisk is found, by my guess 90% of the time it is in budget “plans” from Republicans–but a good 10% of the time it is found in plans from Democrats (yes, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and Gene Sperling, I am looking at you).

It has always seemed to me that fighting against the magic asterisk requires from serious professional economists a zero-tolerance policy that needs to have three components:

  1. Politicians who will not present plans in enough detail for CBO to score them need to be ridiculed and hooted off the platform.
  2. Politicians whose plans are scorable by CBO need to have those plans presumed to have the effects that CBO says they do.
  3. Politicans who wish to overcome the presumption that their plan will do what CBO says that it will do need a supporting analysis that jumps an Olympic-class high-jump bar before they can be admitted to the rational public sphere.

Ryan flunks and has always flunked (1). We never even get to a score. And we definitely never get to an argument that CBO’s score is not the right forecast.

The presence of Paul Ryan and his budget plans–and the presumption of “civility” that requires taking his unscorable pieces of paper seriously–is, I think, the principal thing keeping Larry Kotlikoff’s ideas about the budget from getting any air. And yet Kotlikoff opposes attempts to cure this situation? Comes out in favor of respecting people’s magic asterisks?

It simply does not compute. I can make no sense of it.


There is, moreover, an important rhetorical question. When some analysis is genuinely harmful to the debate and is “not even wrong”–degrades the quality of the debate so much that pushback against the appearance of this kind of thing is optimal–is it most helpful and constructive to call it:

  1. stupid
  2. mendacious
  3. the work of someone who has not done their homework

?

I tend to be strongly in favor of (3): when people are saying things that are clearly wrong, the strong presumption should simply be not they are incapable of conducting the analysis or that they are trying to deceive but rather that they have just not thought about the question deeply enough…

Lunchtime Must-Read: Mark Schmitt: Righting the GOP: Rick Perlstein’s The Invisible Bridge

Mark Schmitt: Righting the GOP: Rick Perlstein’s *The Invisible Bridge*: “Perlstein’s subject is always political movements and political culture…. [Perlstein] rests too much agency in Reagan, the individual, when the whole point of the Perlstein project is to trace the lines of the conservative counterrevolution, undistracted by the charms and psychodrama of its front men. The book works best when it does exactly that, just as the 1976 Reagan campaign… the movement–in the form of its issues and its direct-mail operations–was more successful than the man…. There is a great book within *The Invisible Bridge*, but it would be about 500 pages… about the structure and strength of the conservative movement, the continuities between Nixon’s politics and Reagan’s, the failure of liberals and Democrats (and organized labor, whose disintegration during the decade goes mostly unmentioned) to speak to the economic and cultural panic of the decade…”

Making Sense of Friedrich A. von Hayek: Focus/The Honest Broker for the Week of August 9, 2014

One way to conceptualize it all is to think of it as the shape of a river:

The first current is the Adam Smith current, which makes the classical liberal bid: Smith claims that the system of natural liberty; with government restricted to the rule of law, infrastructure, defense, and education; is the best of all social arrangements.

This first current is then joined by the Karl Polanyi current: Polanyi says that, empirically, at least in the Industrial Age, the system of natural liberty fails to produce a good-enough society. The system of natural liberty turns land, labor, and finance into commodities. The market then moves them about the board in its typically disruptive fashion: “all that is solid melts into air”, or perhaps “established and inherited social orders are steamed away”. But land, finance, and labor–these three are not real commodities. They are, rather, “fictitious commodities”, for nobody wants their ability to earn a living, or to live where they grew up, or to start a business to be subject to the disruptive wheel of market fortuna.

The social disruption produced by allowing the prices of these “fictitious commodities” to be set by market forces is too great to be sustained. Politics will not allow it. And so a good society needs to regulate: A good society needs to regulate the market for land so that people are not thrown off of what they have good reason to regard as theirs even if they lack the proper pieces of paper. A good society needs to regulate the market for finance in order to maintain full employment and price stability. A good society needs to regulate the market for labor to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to work at a living wage.

Thus we must move forward from classical liberalism to social democracy.

That is Karl Polanyi’s argument. And it is convincing. Classical liberalism supports and justifies economies that produce a great deal of unnecessary human misery: that seems very, very clear indeed by the time of the Great Depression. As John Maynard Keynes wrote in his 1926 essay, “The End of Laissez Faire”, nineteenth and early twentieth-century history teach one big lesson:

It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic activities. There is no ‘compact’ conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately. We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail… distinguish afresh the Agenda of government from the Non-Agenda; and… devise forms of government within a democracy which shall be capable of accomplishing the Agenda…

Why then was classical liberalism so strong at the end of the nineteenth century? Keynes’s view:

The early nineteenth century… harmonised the conservative individualism of Locke, Hume, Johnson, and Burke with the socialism and democratic egalitarianism of Rousseau, Paley, Bentham, and Godwin…. Nevertheless, that age would have been hard put to it to achieve this harmony of opposites if it had not been for the economists…. To the philosophical doctrine that the government has no right to interfere, and the divine that it has no need to interfere, there is added a scientific proof that its interference is inexpedient…. The corruption and incompetence of eighteenth-century government… material progress between 1750 and 1850 came from individual initiative, and owed almost nothing to the directive influence of organised society… the innovations of Darwin…. The economists were teaching that wealth, commerce, and machinery were the children of free competition–that free competition built London. But the Darwinians could go one better than that–free competition had built man…. Socialist interferences became, in the light of this grander synthesis, not merely inexpedient, but impious….

These reasons and this atmosphere are the explanations… why we feel such a strong bias in favour of laissez-faire…. We have not read these authors…. Nevertheless we should not… think as we do, if Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Paley, Adam Smith, Bentham, and Miss Martineau had not thought and written…. I have said that it was the economists who furnished the scientific doctrine by which the practical man could solve the contradiction between egoism and socialism…. I hasten to qualify…. It is what the popularisers and the vulgarisers said…. The popularity of the doctrine must be laid at the door of the political philosophers of the day, whom it happened to suit, rather than of the political economists…

Classical liberalism–laissez-faire–was a mighty intellectual current. But empirical reality was mightier still, especially in the form of the Great Depression. And so the main channel became social democracy. And so, I think, it remains today.

But as the river entered its delta, it did spread out. There are three other channels in the delta besides Polanyi-style social democracy: call them Leninism, Keynesianism, and Hayekism:

  1. Lenin says the social democracy or democratic socialism is unstable. The bourgeoisie is hegemonic. It will turn the mechanisms of the democratic state to its own purposes. What is needed is aggressive communism to exterminate the bourgeoisie as a class. Only after the aristos and the bourgeoisie and the hep-men and the kulaks and the careerist bureaucrats have been eliminated can a properly-good society be built.

  2. Keynes says that we really need much less social democracy (or democratic socialism) than the main Polanyi current believes. Simply stabilize aggregate demand at a high level via clever central bank financial engineering, and people will not mind that the market treats the “fictitious commodities” like commodities. Moreover, the taste-making and the thrift-promoting virtues of the bourgeoisie sitting at the top of a fairly-steep socioeconomic pyramid are a feature, not a bug, for a good society.

  3. Hayek says that the problem with classical liberalism was that it was not pure enough. The government needed to restrict itself to establishing the rule of law and to using antitrust to break up monopolies. It was the overreach of the government beyond those limits, via central banking and social democracy, that caused all the trouble. A democratic government needs to limit itself to rule of law and antitrust–and perhaps soup kitchens and shelters. And what if democracy turns out not to produce a government that limits itself to those activities? Then, Hayek says, so much the worse for democracy. A Pinochet is then called for to, in a Lykourgan moment, minimalize the state. After social democracy has been leveled and the rubble cleared away, then–perhaps–a limited range of issues can be discussed and debated by a–limited–restored democracy, with some kind of group of right-wing army officers descended from latifundistas Council of Guardians in the background to ensure that property remains sacred and protected, and the government small enough to fit in a bathtub.

And as you study the thought of Hayek, recognized that there are three very different and distinct subcurrents reinforcing, opposing, and confusing each other:

The Good Economist Hayek is the thinker who has mind-blowing insights into just why the competitive market system is such a marvelous societal device for coordinating our by now 7.2 billion-wide global division of labor. Few other economists imagined that Lenin’s centrally-planned economy behind the Iron Curtain was doomed to settle at a level of productivity 1/5 that of the capitalist industrial market economies outside. Hayek did so imagine. And Hayek had dazzling insights as to why. Explaining the thought of this Hayek requires not sociology or history of thought but rather appreciation, admiration, and respect for pure genius.

The Bad Economist Hayek is the thinker who was certain that Keynes had to be wrong, and that the mass unemployment of the Great Depression had to have in some mysterious way been the fault of some excessively-profligate government entity (or perhaps of those people excessively clever with money–fractional-reserve bankers, and those who claim not the natural increase of flocks but rather the interest on barren gold). Why Hayek could not see with everybody else–including Milton Friedman–that the Great Depression proved that Say’s Law was false in theory, and that aggregate demand needed to be properly and delicately managed in order to make Say’s Law true in practice is largely a mystery. Nearly everyone else did: the Lionel Robbinses and the Arthur Burnses quickly marked their beliefs to market after the Great Depression and figured out how to translate what they thought into acceptable post-World War II Keynesian language. Hayek never did.

My hypothesis is that the explanation is theology: For Hayek, the market could never fail. For Hayek, the market could only be failed. And the only way it could be failed was if its apostles were not pure enough.

The structure of the argument is familiar: We first see it in the syllogism:

  1. YHWH had promised victory to his people Israel if they were faithful.
  2. We tried to be faithful.
  3. Here we are captive in Babylon.
  4. Clearly we were not faithful enough to YHWH.
  5. We need to strive much harder to be more faithful to YHWH in the future.

But that the argument is familiar to us all does not make it right.

And, indeed, right now as I am opening my mail I find, from the President of the Cato Institute:

Scan Aug 6 2014 1 20 PM pdf 1 page

“Pure capitalism”. Impure capitalism, you see, doesn’t work. The blurb from Charles Koch–which did not scan–is: “Required reading…. Shows how our economic crisis was a failure, not of the free market, but of government.”

Enough said?

The Political Economist Hayek is the founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, who sets as his post-World War II lifetime task the rollback of social democracy. That is the Hayek who, we think, urges Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s to pull a Pinochet in Britain on the Labour Party and the United Mine Workers. She answers him thus:

The progression from Allende’s Socialism to the free enterprise capitalist economy of the 1980s is a striking example of economic reform from which we can learn many lessons. However, I am sure you will agree that, in Britain with our democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent, some of the measures adopted in Chile are quite unacceptable. Our reform must be in line with our traditions and our Constitution. At times the process may seem painfully slow. But I am certain we shall achieve our reforms in our own way and in our own time…

The original letter from Hayek appears to be missing from the places it should be. I suspect it was a real doozy.

With respect to this Hayek, I believe that three important questions naturally suggest themselves: Why the urgency of the task? Why the certainty of the aim? WTF with democracy and Pinochet?

Why the urgency of the task? The post-World War II world outside of the Iron Curtain sees remarkable prosperity: rapid growth, the egalitarian distribution, an increase in the human freedoms along nearly every dimension. The post-World War II social democracies are neither bureaucracies that stifle enterprise and produce economic stagnation nor murderous Jacobins. To the east across the Iron Curtain remains the great grave threat of Stalin. Why not declare a domestic political truce in the west and focus on the Cold War?

The answer, I think, is that how you really believe that social democracy was The Road to Serfdom–that German social democracy had led to Weimar which led to Hitler by sapping the love of liberty and independence of the people, and that the same process was already well into train in the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Why Hayek thought this as decade after decade went by with no great upward leaps in the degree of central planning after Attlee’s prime Minister ship is not at all clear. What is clear is that he greeted the stagflation of the 1970s as evidence that he had been completely right all along.

Perhaps it was Hayek’s social conservatism allowed him to be confident that he was right even during the days of prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s. Uppity Negroes, uppity women, uppity hippies–all, to him, signs of deep moral and spiritual decay that by the logic of The Road to Serfdom had to bring economic and then political catastrophe in their train. But this is speculation.

Why the certainty of the aim? this, I think, is clear. Hayek was not a believer in technocracy. For Hayek, the government would always be the tool of the ruling class. The ruling class might, briefly, be the envious poor who would destroy the economy by confiscating entrepreneurial wealth and then sharing it out. The ruling class might be the monopolists. The ruling class might be the “New Class” of anti-entrepreneurial do-gooder social-worker types. In any case, the results of giving the government more power would be bad. Much better to limit the government to establishing the rule of law and breaking up private monopolies via antitrust. (And Hayek’s students would quickly ditch that last part.)

But in addition there is a fourth possible ruling class: one modeled after the Habsburg aristocracy that ruled the land in which Hayek was born.

WTF with democracy and Pinochet? it is very clear that Hayek was very comfortable saying that he would much rather have an authoritarian classical-liberal government then a democratic government that followed “illiberal” economic policies. But where are these authoritarians respect the rule of law supposed to come from? Why should governments that do not respect the lives of their people–that throw people out of helicopters into the South Pacific–or the liberty of their people–that “disappear” critics who cross the line and are too strident–respect the property of their people? Both theoretical and empirical considerations would tend to teach the lesson respect for the rule of law is a seamless garment: governments committed to respecting free speech and free elections would seem to be much more likely to commit themselves to respecting property than those that did not. Yet Hayek does not see it in the way I would regard as natural. Why not?

The natural place to look is, I think, to recognize that Hayek was not born on the shores of the North Atlantic. The North Atlantic’s dictators–Adolf Hitler, Francisco Franco, Vidkun Quisling, Philippe Petain, Antonio Salazar–are none of them prizes. But Hayek was formed in Austria. From his perspective the property and enterprise respecting Imperial Habsburg government of Franz Josef eager to make no waves, to hold what it has, and to keep the lid off the pressure cooker appears not unattractive. This is especially so when you contrasted would be really existing authoritarian alternatives: anti-Semitic populist demagogue mayors of Vienna; nationalist Serbian or Croatian politicians interested in maintaining popular legitimacy by waging class war or ethnic war; separatists who seek independence and then one man, one vote, one time. An “authoritarian” after the manner of Franz Josef looks quite attractive in this context–and if you convince yourself but they are as dedicated to small government neoliberalism as you are, and that the Lykourgan moment of the form will be followed by soft rule and popular assent, so much the better. And if the popular assent is not forthcoming? Then Hayek can blame the socialists, and say it is their fault for not understanding how good a deal they are offered.


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Things to Read at Lunchtime on August 7, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads: (move up to below “plus” and before “and over here”)

  1. Mark Schmitt: Righting the GOP: Rick Perlstein’s The Invisible Bridge: “Perlstein’s subject is always political movements and political culture…. [Perlstein] rests too much agency in Reagan, the individual, when the whole point of the Perlstein project is to trace the lines of the conservative counterrevolution, undistracted by the charms and psychodrama of its front men. The book works best when it does exactly that, just as the 1976 Reagan campaign… the movement–in the form of its issues and its direct-mail operations–was more successful than the man…. There is a great book within The Invisible Bridge, but it would be about 500 pages… about the structure and strength of the conservative movement, the continuities between Nixon’s politics and Reagan’s, the failure of liberals and Democrats (and organized labor, whose disintegration during the decade goes mostly unmentioned) to speak to the economic and cultural panic of the decade…”

  2. David Weigel: Rick Perlstein’s Critics: The Plagiarism Dead-Enders Alexandra Alter… [said] Sam Tanenhaus… ‘Lamenting the lack of primary sources’… ‘wrote that Mr. Perlstein had “adopted the methodology of the web aggregator”‘. It was a serious accusation, but now that Tanenhaus’s review is up, there’s very little to it. Tanenhaus[‘s calling]… the mid-1970s… the moment when right-wingers became ‘inverse Marxists’ and ‘revanchists’. How is this different than Perlstein’s argument? Perlstein just lacks Tanenhaus’s pompous fatalism…. The ‘web aggregator’ line looks even worse…. Reading [Tanenhaus], you might assume that Perlstein abandoned the archives to write this book. But Perlstein’s online notes refer to findings from Michael Deaver’s papers… Reagan’s papers… Nixon’s papers… half a dozen other primary source archives. Perlstein does use more online sources than his 2001 book. Has anything happened since 2001? Have more sources been placed online? Why, yes, they have…. Paul Bedard, the Washington Examiner’s replacement level gossip columnist, reports… ‘the Atlantic magazine said Perlstein has shown in his latest political history that he is less a researcher-historian than a simple “web aggregator” who collects publicly available information and stitches it into a book’…”

  3. Richard Mayhew: Brad Delong Smackdown Watch “Brad Delong… is getting one thing significantly wrong…. Recently, I wrote about AIDS medications and Gresham’s Law applying to health insurance… the first salvo of the ‘brainpower health insurance companies devoted to gaming the system’ as it is the most obvious target to create policies that are amazingly ugly to people with chronic, expensive conditions…. We’re seeing this with AIDS/HIV patients for two reasons. The first is that this is a population with known high costs that insurers really want to avoid. Secondly, there is a significant network of very effective advocates who are able to identify this as a business strategy of some insurers and scream about it. I would be shocked if other very high cost but very small population diseases are not being ‘top-tiered/specialty tier for generics’ as a risk avoidance strategies, but I have not heard about them. The policy solution is simple, engage in a regulatory arms race to force insurance companies to compete on providing health coverage and health improvement instead of cherry picking good risk and off-loading bad risk to competitors and/or government programs. This will work in most Blue states and some Red states…”

  4. Perry Link: Evan Osnos: He Exposed Corrupt China Before He Left: “Osnos begins by noticing a bifurcation in popular Western views of China—roughly, a good China of rising material standards and a bad China of repressive government—and he wants to reconcile the two…. When we reach the book’s powerful end it is obvious that he does [understand]…. Osnos is able, much to his credit, to take the further step of estimating what [the Chinese] would think if they lived with a free press. His expatriate friends criticize him for paying too much attention to dissidents who are ‘famous in New York or Paris [but] unknown to ordinary Chinese citizens’…. The intensity with which they censor a writer like Liu Xiaobo is eloquent evidence of their own judgment that Liu’s ideas would have strong appeal if they were allowed out…. By the end of his book Osnos has moved a considerable distance from China as an amusing place to China as a distressed place. He invites the question of how long the Chinese people are going to put up with their situation…. Osnos relates how a woman with connections near the top of the Party approached his wife, Sarabeth, asking that the Osnos couple relay to Michael Forsythe, then a Bloomberg News reporter who had revealed that the family of China’s president Xi Jinping was worth hundreds of millions of dollars, this message: Forsythe and his family ‘can’t stay in China…. Something will happen. It will look like an accident…. He’ll just be found dead’…. I was struck that Osnos is publishing Age of Ambition as he leaves China to go write for The New Yorker from Washington, D.C. Would he have written the same way if he had wanted to stay longer?…”

  5. Barry Ritholtz: Naming the Biggest Losers in America “When we look at the weak sectors… it should be obvious that our national economic wounds are mostly self-inflicted…. During a recession and recovery, spending should rise and the Fed should make credit less expensive. Except in this cycle. Before you start telling me about beliefs and ideology and the deficit, all one needs to do is compare federal spending during the 2001 recession cycle, with a Republican controlling the White House…. The importance of reducing deficits and having a smaller government only applies when the GOP doesn’t control the White House…. Block grants to the states could have helped… as they have in past recessions. But they weren’t, for partisan political reasons. The nation is worse off for it. Business equipment investment and other forms of capital expenditures have been jump started with an accelerated depreciation tax allowances in past recessions. For some reason, this was allowed to lapse in 2013. This wasn’t very smart…. The biggest drag of all has been the persistent weakness in residential real estate…. As we noted in ‘The Best Housing Program You’ve Never Heard of’, there were some attempts to ameliorate this, but they amounted to too little too late…. There is plenty of blame to spread around, but not in equal measures to both parties…. Congress is a national embarrassment. That sentence is one we all have believed at one time or another to be true. But the sentence I never imagined I would ever write is this: Thank goodness for the Federal Reserve.”

  6. Robert Farley: The Strategic Problems in Ukraine “Putin does not want to invade Ukraine; if he actively sought this end, he would already have ordered military action…. He wants… to minimize US and European sanctions, and to maximize the size of the buffer zones…. Putin has to contend with… pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and Russian nationalists in Russia…. Energy sanctions are a two way street…. The military balance, however, strongly favors Russia…. My guess is that we’ll see a short, conventional war of maneuver between Russia and Ukraine, that the Russians will win, but will restrain its activities to Donetsk, Luhansk, and environs. It’s going to be very difficult for the Ukrainian military to restrain itself short of complete victory over the separatists, and the drive for victory will probably spur Russian intervention.  With luck, however, the war will be quick, only moderately destructive, and the political aftermath will be manageable.”

And:

Should Be Aware of:

  1. Scott Lemieux: The conservative legal case against ObamaCare keeps getting nuttier “In the latest legal battle over ObamaCare, sensible observers are having what can only be described as a crazy-pills moment…. In last month’s ruling in Halbig v. Burwell…. The Obama administration has asked for an en banc hearing — that is, a hearing before the D.C. Circuit as a whole. The panel’s extremely weak opinion has no chance of surviving an en banc hearing if it is granted. And since the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument accepted by Halbig, there would be no lower-court split for the Supreme Court to resolve, making it much less likely that the nation’s highest court would take the case…. According to White and Adler, this case does not meet the standard of ‘exceptional importance’ required by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for an en banc rehearing. To restate these arguments is to refute them. The panel’s holding would throw the American health insurance market into chaos…. The argument is also a monument to bad faith. If the entire D.C. Circuit vacates the Halbig ruling, it is certain that Adler and his colleagues will immediately rediscover the importance of the case, and ask the Supreme Court to review it…”

  2. Takatoshi Ito: We Are All QE-sians Now: “The four major banks (BOJ, FRB, BOE and ECB) have adopted unconventional monetary policy, or broadly-defined quantitative easing (QE), in the last several years. The broadly-defined QE can be classified into comprehensive easing (CE) and pure-QE. The former is aimed at purchasing assets of dysfunctional markets and the latter is aimed at expanding monetary base to stimulate demands. The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, various QE adopted by four central banks are classified into CE and pure-QE. Second, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is a harbinger for most QE measures in its earlier QE period of 2001-2006. Third, effects of BOJ’s QE measures are empirically investigated with focus on the three possible transmission channels with monthly data since January 1999. The long-term interest rate tends to be lower and the yield curve tends to be flattened when the monetary base expands faster than nominal GDP. The yen vis-à-vis the US dollar tends to depreciate when the Japanese monetary base expands faster than the US monetary base. An impact of monetary base expansion on the inflation expectation is not confirmed. Findings are consistent with a view that QE is effective, by lowering the long-term interest rate and the currency depreciation.”

Lunchtime Must-Read: Richard Mayhew: Brad Delong Smackdown Watch

Richard Mayhew: Brad Delong Smackdown Watch “Brad Delong… is getting one thing significantly wrong…. Recently, I wrote about AIDS medications and Gresham’s Law applying to health insurance… the first salvo of the ‘brainpower health insurance companies devoted to gaming the system’ as it is the most obvious target to create policies that are amazingly ugly to people with chronic, expensive conditions…. We’re seeing this with AIDS/HIV patients for two reasons. The first is that this is a population with known high costs that insurers really want to avoid. Secondly, there is a significant network of very effective advocates who are able to identify this as a business strategy of some insurers and scream about it. I would be shocked if other very high cost but very small population diseases are not being ‘top-tiered/specialty tier for generics’ as a risk avoidance strategies, but I have not heard about them. The policy solution is simple, engage in a regulatory arms race to force insurance companies to compete on providing health coverage and health improvement instead of cherry picking good risk and off-loading bad risk to competitors and/or government programs. This will work in most Blue states and some Red states…”