Afternoon Must-Read: Carter Price: Why Should Policymakers Care About Economic Inequality?

If you did not see this when it came whizzing by, go take a look:

Carter Price: Why should policymakers care about economic inequality?: “It was long assumed [not just that] economic growth led to less economic inequality…

…but also that any economic policy efforts to alleviate inequality would necessarily slow economic growth. These views, however, were formed in an era before there was sufficient data to truly test this view…. In an early survey… Roland Benabou at Princeton University in 1996 found that the vast majority of studies said high and rising inequality harmed economic growth…. Sarah Voitchovsky… find[s]… substantial disagreement about the relationship between inequality and growth…. Recent work by… Andrew Berg, Jonathan Ostry, and Charalombos Tsangaridis… Roy van der Weide… and Branko Milanovic of the City University of New York have robustly found a negative relationship between economic inequality for developed countries and within the United States…. Other studies find that a highly skewed distribution of income and wealth depresses consumption… leading to unsustainably excessive borrowing…”

Afternoon Must-Read: Jon Cunliffe: Bankers Earn Too Much, Reducing Returns to Investors

Paul Hannon: BOE’s Cunliffe Says Bankers Earn Too Much, Reducing Returns to Investors: “Mr. Cunliffe… noted that bankers continue to be paid very highly…

…relative to the returns they generate for shareholders. ‘Another driver of low returns on assets and equity is the fact that banks’ pay bill has not adjusted to the smaller returns banks are now earning,’ he said. ‘Put simply, shareholders have gone from getting 60 cents for every dollar in pay for staff to getting 25 cents per dollar…. But, given lower levels of leverage, it is unlikely that we will see, or want to see again, the returns on equity that we saw before the crisis. In the new world, pay bills may well have further to adjust.’

Very Rough: Exploding Wealth Inequality and Its Rent-Seeking Society Consequences: (Early) Monday Focus for October 27, 2014

Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman: Exploding wealth inequality in the United States: “The share of total income earned by the top 1%…

…less than 10% in the late 1970s but now exceeds 20%…. A large portion of this increase is due to an upsurge in the labor incomes earned by senior company executives and successful entrepreneurs. But… did wealth inequality rise as well?… The answer is a definitive yes…. We use comprehensive data on capital income—such as dividends, interest, rents, and business profits—that is reported on individual income tax returns since 1913. We then capitalize this income so that it matches the amount of wealth recorded in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds…. In this way we obtain annual estimates of U.S. wealth inequality stretching back a century. Wealth inequality, it turns out, has followed a spectacular U-shape evolution over the past 100 years…. How can we explain the growing disparity in American wealth? The answer is that the combination of higher income inequality alongside a growing disparity in the ability to save for most Americans is fueling the explosion in wealth inequality. For the bottom 90 percent of families, real wage gains (after factoring in inflation) were very limited over the past three decades, but for their counterparts in the top 1 percent real wages grew fast. In addition, the saving rate of middle class and lower class families collapsed over the same period while it remained substantial at the top…. If income inequality stays high and if the saving rate of the bottom 90 percent of families remains low then wealth disparity will keep increasing. Ten or twenty years from now, all the gains in wealth democratization achieved during the New Deal and the post-war decades could be lost…. There are a number of specific policy reforms needed to rebuild middle class wealth…. Prudent financial regulation to rein in predatory lending, incentives to help people save… steps to boost the wages of the bottom 90 percent of workers are needed…. One final reform also needs to be on the policymaking agenda: the collection of better data on wealth…

What I would like to see Emmanuel and Gabriel guess it is the share of wealth that is productive–that boosts the productivity of the working class and that shares those productivity benefits with workers–and the share of wealth that is extractive–that are pure claims on income rather than useful instruments of production, and thus that erode rather than boost the incomes of others. Wealth plays two roles, you see: as useful factors of production that boost productivity, and as extractive social power that is the result, the cause, and the maintainer of the rent-seeking society.

Taking off from my Mr. Piketty and the Neoclassicists, once we had such guesses we could build a balanced-growth model…

The important quantities would be:

(1) The annual rate of population and labor force growth: n.

(2) The annual rate of labor productivity growth: g.

(3) The warranted annual rate of accumulation ra = n + g: the rate at which wealthholders’ assets need to grow if their wealth-to-national-income ratio to be constant.

(4) The wedge ω between the rates of accumulation and net profit: what share of their current assets the wealth spend, dissipate, lose to Wall Street sharks, consume, give away, and so forth.

(5) The resulting warranted annual rate of net profit rw= n + g + ω: The warranted annual rate of net profit at which wealthholders’ have a constant ratio of their wealth to national income. If the actual average rate of profit r > rw, the rich become richer in relative terms. If the actual average rate of profit r < rw, the rich lose ground in relative terms. If the actual average rate of profit r = rw, the wealth of the rich remains a stable multiple of national income.

From the warranted annual rate of net profit rw, we then need to know:

  • How the annual rate of net profit r in the productive sector depends on the size of the stock of physical capital–which is rented out to workers at its marginal product–relative to annual income K/Y.

    • To calculate this we need to know:
      • What the physical net annual marginal product of capital is at some baseline physical capital-income ratio K/Y, say 3.
      • What the elasticity of the net rate of annual profit r in the productive sector with respect to the productive capital-income ratio is.
  • How the annual rate of net profit in the rent-seeking sector depends on the size of the stock of rent-seeking property relative to national income R/Y.

    • To calculate this we need to know:
      • What the rate of rent extraction ε is at some baseline rent-seeking property-income ratio, say 3.
      • What the elasticity of the net rate of rent extraction ε in the rent-seeking sector is with respect to the rent-seeking property-income ration R/Y.

If we know all those, we can then calculate:

(6) The physical capital-annual income ratio at the warranted rate of net profit: (K/Y)*

(7) The rent-seeking capital-annual income ratio at the warranted rate of profit: (R/Y)*

(8) (W/Y)* = (K/Y): The total wealth-annual income ratio at the warranted rate of profit: (W/Y)

(9) The income-from-wealth share of total income: rw x (W/Y)*, given:

(10) The physical net annual marginal product of capital at K/Y = 3: ρK

(11) The annual net return on rent-seeking capital at R/Y = 3: ρR

(12) The elasticity of the rate of profit on physical capital: λK

(13) The elasticity of the rate of profit on rent-seeking capital: λR

Which I believe gets us to this spreadsheet. If you download it and edit it in interesting ways, please send me a copy…

For the particular parameters I have chosen, we have the wealthholders cumulatively investing 2.1 times a year’s GDP in productive capital that boosts the wage level, and 0.6 times in year’s GDP in rent-extraction property that subtracts from the wage level. And we have a Belle Epoque and a Future Second Gilded Age in which wealthholders do indeed hold a greater multiple of GDP’s worth of useful, productive, wage-boosting capital–3.4 times a year’s national income–but also hold vastly more rent-seeking property: 5.2 times a year’s national income.

In this interpretation of Piketty, thrift on the part of the rich is indeed beneficial to the working class–as long as it is channeled into productive investment. But if it is used to create, politically maintain, and profit from rent-extraction property… well, it is not so nice.


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Things to Read on the Afternoon of October 25, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Gauti Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra: Secular stagnation and the paradox of worth: “It is important to ensure that the asset cannot operate as a perfect storage technology as this may put a zero bound on the real interest rate… a secular stagnation equilibrium remains a possibility as the natural rate can be negative while the discount rate relevant for risky assets remains positive. The real interest rate and the possibility of a secular stagnation can also be affected by the presence of bubble assets… [such] bubbles may be efficient, but depending on the stability of the bubble, interesting tradeoffs may emerge between the level and volatility of employment…”

  2. Izabella Kaminska: Cult Markets: When the bubble bursts: “We’re going to stick our neck out at this stage and call this the end of Bitcoin… the positive-feedback loop forces which drove Bitcoin to $1124.76 have now become the same very same which will drive it down… the fact that the mechanism that ensures coins cannot be overproduced to benefit from high prices also prevents supply from being contracted when prices/demand collapses… in a race to the bottom it doesn’t pay to switch off your mining machine if you’re the most efficient miner. So how did we find ourselves on this delusional joy ride to begin with?… It’s the same old story of frivolity, irrational exuberance, hysteria and of course the mistaken belief that something like a free lunch is truly possible… the sort of irrationality and bad allocation of capital that the Fed is trying to shake-out at this stage with tightening talk. We’re sure we may still see a few deep pocketed VCs or ‘believers’ throw more money at defending the dream, but chances are we’ve now gone through the exponential break point. Time and money would probably be better spent trying to pump up Bitcoin V.2.”

  3. Larry Mishel: The Wage Message: “The intellectual basis for [skill-biased technological change, SBTC] in my view has collapsed. It has very little to contribute to the understanding over inequality over the last 20 years, and is not the basis for thinking about the future so much.”

  4. David Drake: Newsletter #82: “I was a conservative kid. Dad worked with his hands–he was an electrician–but he was anti-union and identified with the middle class rather than radical labor. Our family had middle-class values, read slick magazines rather than pulps, and voted Republican…. A lot of people raised the way I was think that Something Should Be Done about this or that world problem… Boko Haram’s kidnapping… the Lord’s Resistance Army… the Islamic State…. All of these organizations do horrific things by the standards of any civilized human being, myself included… [and] are demonstrably beyond the capacity of local governments to deal with…. If I hadn’t ridden a tank in SE Asia, I probably would have been on one or all of those bandwagons and on many others over the years. The thing is, I know what Doing Something means at the sharp end. I’ve helped to burn a village, I’ve watched a gutshot girl die (she’d been transporting rice for the NVA), and I was involved with a variety of other things that make me doubt the value to the ordinary people of Viet Nam and Cambodia of what we did there. Would it be different in Africa or the Middle East? Maybe, but I find wars have a logic of their own for the people in the mud and the dust and the insects. I think it would be good for folks who say, ‘We have to do something!’ to at least talk to some of us who’ve Done Something ourselves. Talk to us–or keep their mouths shut.”

  5. Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger: High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1%? Lessons from a Life Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk: “Very high marginal labor income tax rates are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have preferences with high labor supply elasticity, make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. To make this point we construct a large scale Overlapping Generations Model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a wealth distribution that matches the data well, and then use it to characterize fiscal policies that achieve a desired degree of redistribution in society. We find that marginal tax rates on the top 1% of the earnings distribution of close to 90% are optimal. We document that this result is robust to plausible variation in the labor supply elasticity and holds regardless of whether social welfare is measured at the steady state only or includes transitional generations.”

  6. Barry Eichengreen: Doctrinal Determinants, Domestic and International, of Federal Reserve Policy 1914-1933: “International considerations were part, but only part, of the constellation of factors shaping the Fed’s outlook and policies in the gold standard era… and their importance waxed and waned with circumstance, personality, and the changing influence of competing doctrines…. Gold Standard Doctrine… rules and, more broadly, the gold standard mentalité were standard central banking doctrine in this period…. Real Bills Doctrine… enshrined in the ‘elastic currency’ terminology of the Federal Reserve Act. Riefler-Burgess Doctrine… pointed to interest rates as the only adequate summary statistics for the stance of monetary policy. Warburg Doctrine… emphasized the advantages of internationalizing the dollar…. privileged developing a market in trade acceptances–an instrument which, it turned out, was also convenient for intervening in financial markets. Strong Doctrine: Strong’s views are not easily summarized…. Rather than looking exclusively at interest rates, he looked also at money and credit aggregates…. Believed in discretionary policy…. Comfortable with… steriliz[ing] gold inflows… to achieve other targets…. Harrison Doctrine… difference from Strong was primarily one of temperament, not doctrine… where Strong was willful and assertive, Harrison was thoughtful and reflective…”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Paul Krugman: The Invisible Moderate: “[O]ne of the enduringly weird aspects of our current pundit discourse: constant calls for a moderate, sensible path that supposedly lies between the extremes of the two parties, but is in fact exactly what Obama has been proposing…. [Brooks:] ‘The federal government should borrow money at current interest rates to build infrastructure, including better bus networks so workers can get to distant jobs. The fact that the federal government has not passed major infrastructure legislation is mind-boggling, considering how much support there is from both parties.’ Well, the Obama administration would love to spend more on infrastructure; the problem is that a major spending bill has no chance of passing the House. And that’s not a problem of ‘both parties’…. Also, there’s this: ‘[T]he government should reduce its generosity to people who are not working but increase its support for people who are. That means reducing health benefits for the affluent elderly…’ Hmm. The Affordable Care Act subsidizes insurance premiums for lower-income workers, and pays for those subsidies in part by eliminating overpayments for Medicare Advantage. So conservatives are celebrating both ends of that deal, right? Oh, wait, death panels. It’s an amazing thing: Obama is essentially what we used to call a liberal Republican, who faces implacable opposition from a very hard right. But Obama’s moderation is hidden in plain sight, apparently invisible to the commentariat.”

    • Duncan Black: Eschaton: Savvy “One of the most annoying tics of our establishment press is, years later, to announce ‘yes we all knew that’ when new information comes to light. Yes we did all know that the AIG bailout was a bailout of the vampire squids, but our insider press generally talked about things as if that wasn’t the case. ‘Critics’ spend years trying to point this out, and then when it becomes irrefutable suddenly it’s ‘yes that’s old news’…”
  2. Josh Marshall: Sarah, Bristol & The Recurrence Of The Eternal Victim: “In very broad terms, the origin of Fox News is analogous. Conservatives in the ’70s and ’80s looked at the mainstream media and saw it as liberal and against them. That was largely bogus but not entirely. The mid-late 20th century elite ‘media’ did generally buy into a series of cosmopolitan assumptions about public and private life. That worldview generally aligns more with liberalism than conservatism, but the two are by no means identical. And this did shape coverage in significant ways. But many conservatives genuinely believed that most people in media were and are little different from Democratic political operatives writing propaganda. So when they went to create ‘their’ media, that’s basically what they created, a propaganda network. The reality is as much a matter of genuine misperception as bad faith, though it’s both and together they make for a toxic brew. But again, if you see these issues as just a cudgel that people hit each other with, it’s easy to say things that are basically nonsense. Because who cares? None of it means anything anyway. So no. Bristol is not a battered woman. She is a battering woman, which may give her some claim to being a feminist icon, as she suggests. I don’t blame or care if the Palins are defending themselves or making up stories or doing whatever else. That’s just the drama and involuntary performance art that makes up their public lives. But their dead-ender defenders need to accept that if you’re a public figure, a recent candidate for national office, and you crash a party drunk and the fists start flying and the police have to show up to sort everything out, people may end up hovering over the details and getting a chuckle out of it. That’s life.”

  3. William Black: Jamie Dimon: U.S. Must Create a “Safe Harbor” Where JPM’s Corruption Is Not “Punished” – New Economic PerspectivesNew Economic Perspectives: “It never dawns on Sorkin during the interview that there might be something desperately wrong about Dimon’s belief that multinational corporations have the inalienable right to buy influence through their hires of ‘ex government officials’ and ‘Chinese princelings’ and that the duty of the U.S. government is to create a ‘safe harbor’ for JPM’s officers so that they can be assured that they can freely buy influence with no risk of ‘getting punished.’  There epitome of merit-based hiring at JPM’s China operations is based on the answer to the colloquial question:  ‘who’s your daddy?’”

Is There Really a Profits-Investment Disconnect?: (Late) Friday Focus for October 24, 2014

I think Paul Krugman gets one wrong–or, at least, I need more convincing before I think he gets this one right, in spite of the extraordinary empirical success of my rules (1) and (2):

The Profits Investment Disconnect NYTimes com

Paul Krugman: The Profits-Investment Disconnect: “Profits are very high…

…so why are companies concluding that they should return cash to stockholders rather than use it to expand their businesses? After all, we normally think of high profits as a signal: a profitable business is one people should be trying to get into. But right now we see a combination of high profits and sluggish investment. What’s going on? One possibility, I guess, is that business are holding back because Obama is looking at them funny. But more seriously, this kind of divergence — in which high profits don’t signal high returns to investment — is what you’d expect if a lot of those profits reflect monopoly power rather than returns on capital. More on this in a while.

Graph Real Gross Domestic Product FRED St Louis Fed

As a result of the housing bubble, the mortgage frauds, the attempts at regulatory arbitrage on their balance sheets by the money-center universal banks, the financial crisis, et sequelae, U.S. real GDP today is now 12% below what we back in 2007 expected it to be now. Since the post financial-crisis trough U.S. real economic growth has proceeded at 2.24%/year, compared to the 3.00%/year growth rate we saw between 1990 and 2007.

So far there are no signs anywhere that the gap between today and the pre-2007 trend in levels will be made up. So far there are no signs anywhere that the gap between today and the pre-2007 trend in growth rates will be made up.

That means that, come 2024 a decade hence, we can now expect a U.S. economy to be 19.5% smaller than the economy we confidently projected as of 2007 we would have.

And, with a capital-output ratio of roughly 3, that means that between 2007 and 2024 cumulative net investment will be lower than projected back in 2007 by 58.5%-point years of GDP–and cumulative gross investment considerably lower.

Given this extraordinary shift in our long-run growth trajectory and in the investment requirements consistent with that trajectory, is it really surprising that investment in this “recovery” is not matching previous patterns?

Paul Krugman says that because profits are high, the marginal return on capital is high, and that means that firms ought to be eager to add to their capital stocks via investment in order to achieve high returns and further boost their profits. This seems to me to rely on an identification of average-Q with marginal-Q that I have always found suspect. Remember: Profits are not high now because demand is high, throughput is high, and capacity is being fully used. Profits are high now because the labor share is unusually low. Firms almost surely, given the collapse in the labor share over the past fifteen years, operating with too much capital and too little labor along the isoquant to be profit maximizing. Why shouldn’t we presume that–just as after 1973 and 1979 they shifted to more energy-intensive mixes, and productivity growth was thus lower than previous experience would have predicted–firms are now shifting to more labor- and information-intensive mixes, and that investment (in everything except real investments in information technology) is lower than previous experience would have predicted?

I do see a puzzle needing explanation in the extraordinary shortfall in housing investment–in the now 8 million people who ought to be out on their own in apartments and houses but who are instead living in their sisters’ or other relatives’ basements.

I still have to be convinced that there is any shortfall or puzzle needing explanation in non-housing investment…


UPDATE: Now Paul could respond that my point is really his: that you do not get a wedge between marginal-Q and average-Q in any competitive marketplace with constant-returns-to-scale firms and labor and capital as the factors of production. You need an additional factor of market position or some such that it is difficult to invest in and then profit from for any of a number of reasons. Too that I would say “touché…”, but then I would add that I think saying that there are the two and only the two boxes of “return on invested capital” and “monopoly power” is much too simple to be of much use…

Afternoon Must-Read: Larry Mishel: The Wage Message

Larry Mishel: The Wage Message: “The intellectual basis for [skill-biased technological change, SBTC]…

…in my view has collapsed. It has very little to contribute to the understanding over inequality over the last 20 years, and is not the basis for thinking about the future so much.

That still leaves 1970-1994, no? And even though shifting numbers of non-college and college-educated workers relative to requirements don’t have much any purchase on rising inequality since the mid-1990s, any labor-force strategy that spends money and gets people to complete college is still a very high-return human capital investment, no?

That said, these are caveats to what Larry says, not disproofs of it…

Afternoon Must-Read: David Drake: Newsletter #82

David Drake: Newsletter #82: “I was a conservative kid…

…Dad worked with his hands–he was an electrician–but he was anti-union and identified with the middle class rather than radical labor. Our family had middle-class values, read slick magazines rather than pulps, and voted Republican…. A lot of people raised the way I was think that Something Should Be Done about this or that world problem… Boko Haram’s kidnapping… the Lord’s Resistance Army… the Islamic State…. All of these organizations do horrific things by the standards of any civilized human being, myself included… [and] are demonstrably beyond the capacity of local governments to deal with…. If I hadn’t ridden a tank in SE Asia, I probably would have been on one or all of those bandwagons and on many others over the years. The thing is, I know what Doing Something means at the sharp end. I’ve helped to burn a village, I’ve watched a gutshot girl die (she’d been transporting rice for the NVA), and I was involved with a variety of other things that make me doubt the value to the ordinary people of Viet Nam and Cambodia of what we did there. Would it be different in Africa or the Middle East? Maybe, but I find wars have a logic of their own for the people in the mud and the dust and the insects. I think it would be good for folks who say, ‘We have to do something!’ to at least talk to some of us who’ve Done Something ourselves. Talk to us–or keep their mouths shut.

Afternoon Must-Read: Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger: High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1%? Lessons from a Life Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk

Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger: High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1%? Lessons from a Life Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk: “Very high marginal labor income tax rates are an effective tool for social insurance…

…even when households have preferences with high labor supply elasticity, make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. To make this point we construct a large scale Overlapping Generations Model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a wealth distribution that matches the data well, and then use it to characterize fiscal policies that achieve a desired degree of redistribution in society. We find that marginal tax rates on the top 1% of the earnings distribution of close to 90% are optimal. We document that this result is robust to plausible variation in the labor supply elasticity and holds regardless of whether social welfare is measured at the steady state only or includes transitional generations.”

Weekend reading

This is a weekly post we publish every Friday with links to articles we think anyone interested in equitable growth should read. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week we can put them in context.

Market power

Ryan Avent thinks concerns about the market power of Amazon.com Inc. are overblown. [free exchange]

Joshua Gans agrees that antitrust remedies are not the best way to deal with concerns about the company, but concerns should be voiced. [digitopoly]

Timothy Taylor looks at the possibility of anti-trust concerns writ global that cross borders. [conversable economist]

Paul Krugman wonders about the broader question of the disconnect between profits and investments and considers the role of monopoly power. [ny times]

Taxation at the top

“The question, then, is if confronted with a vastly higher tax rate, would Jamie Dimon still behave like LeBron James.” Ben Walsh on a new paper that argues the optimal top tax rate is 90 percent whether the payee is a sports superstar or one of the best-rewarded executives on Wall Street. [huff post]

Data deep dives

Where can someone in the United States earning the median income get the most bang for the buck? Dylan Matthews takes a look. [vox]