Lunchtime Must-Read: Chris Rock: It’s Not Black People Who Have Progressed. It’s White People

Chris Rock:
It’s Not Black People Who Have Progressed. It’s White People:
“When we talk about race relations…

…it’s all nonsense. There are no race relations. White people were crazy. Now they’re not as crazy. To say that black people have made progress would be to say they deserve what happened to them before…. To say Obama is progress is saying that he’s the first black person that is qualified to be president. That’s not black progress. That’s white progress. There’ve been black people qualified to be president for hundreds of years. If you saw Tina Turner and Ike having a lovely breakfast over there, would you say their relationship’s improved?… A smart person would go, ‘Oh, he stopped punching her in the face.’… Ike and Tina Turner’s relationship has nothing to do with Tina Turner. Nothing. It just doesn’t.

The question is, you know, my kids are smart, educated, beautiful, polite children. There have been smart, educated, beautiful, polite black children for hundreds of years. The advantage that my children have is that my children are encountering the nicest white people that America has ever produced. Let’s hope America keeps producing nicer white people…

Lunchtime Must-Read: Hiroshi Nakaso: The Potential Impact of Large-Scale Monetary Accommodation

Hiroshi Nakaso:
The Potential Impact of Large-Scale Monetary Accommodation:
“The Bank of Japan introduced the QQE…

…to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years… to dispel a view that… prices would not rise… to raise inflation expectations through a strong and clear commitment to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent, and at the same time to exert downward pressure across the entire yield curve through massive purchases of government bonds.

As a result, real interest rates will decline, thereby stimulating such private demand components as business fixed investment, private consumption, and housing investment. The upward pressure on prices will grow stronger as demand increases and the output gap narrows accordingly. Rises in actual inflation rates will be translated into higher expected rates of inflation and thus lower real interest rates. This will reinforce the virtuous cycle as the economy is provided with additional stimulus. Since its inception, the QQE has been producing the intended effects….

In recent months, however… the decline in demand following the consumption tax hike has been somewhat protracted… crude oil prices have declined substantially… slowing the CPI inflation rates… down to 1.0 percent in September…. The temporary weakness in demand associated with the consumption tax hike has already started to wane. Meanwhile, the decline in crude oil prices will have positive effects on economic activity and push up prices over the longer-run. Nevertheless… we decided to take preemptive actions to expand the QQE at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on October 31….

I would like to address a frequently cited remark that unconventional monetary stimulus could destabilize financial markets and the economy at large by encouraging ‘search for yield’ activities…. A rise in asset prices and a decline in volatility are intended effects of the QQE…. [But] we should be mindful of the risk that ‘search for yield’ activities enter into a self-fulfilling cycle…. If a rise in asset prices creates overly bullish expectations among non-financial entities such as the corporate and household sectors, it could trigger excessive risk-taking behavior in these sectors as well. Thus far, we have not observed signs of self-fulfilling, overheated price movements…

Lunchtime Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Dean Baker on Robert Samuelson’s Famous Fake Prediction Failures

Paul Krugman:
Famous Fake Prediction Failures:
Dean Baker is annoyed, and rightly so, at claims like this from Robert Samuelson

…that Keynesians failed to predict the slow recovery. Dean and I were both tearing our hair out in early 2009, warning that the Obama stimulus was too small and too short-lived…. Samuelson is taking the fact that this business cycle didn’t look like previous cycles as evidence that we don’t understand macroeconomics, so we shouldn’t even try to help the economy. But I was predicting a protracted jobless recovery long before the recession was official, and explained carefully why.

But then I also fairly often get comments along the lines of ‘If you’re so smart, how come you didn’t see the housing bubble’, when I not only did see it (although Dean saw it much earlier), but got a lot of flak for daring to raise questions about the Bush Boom. Well, I guess you can’t expect people to be aware of what I was saying, seeing as how I only write for an obscure publication nobody has heard of.

Morning Must-Read: Nick Bunker: Thanksgiving Weekend Reading

Nick Bunker:
Thanksgiving weekend reading – Washington Center for Equitable Growth: “Secular stagnation: Greg Ip argues that the growing tide…

…of elderly in wealthy countries explains a lot of secular stagnation [the economist]. The Economist also created a series of accompanying graphics [the economist]. Shane Ferro looks at the troubling demographic situation in Japan [business insider]. Hidden wealth of nations: Matthew Klein looks at London School of Economics professor Gabriel Zucman’s research on the offshoring of wealth and profits [ft alphaville part 1, part 2]. The roots of upward mobility: Richard Reeves looks at research that finds a link between inequality of non-cognitive skills and intergenerational mobility [brookings]. Derek Thompson poses a dilemma for Millennials: move to a city with affordable housing or a city with a good track record of upward mobility [the atlantic]. More work and less play than expected: Dylan Matthews tries to figure out why we don’t have 3-hours workdays as Keynes predicted [vox]. Timothy Taylor considers two approaches to encouraging work: tax incentives and social support [conversable economist]…

Free exchange: No country for young people | The Economist | “Secular stagnation” in graphics: Doom and gloom | The Economist | How a Limo Ride With Paul Krugman Changed the Course of Abenomics – Bloomberg | The costs of offshore tax avoidance, part 1 | FT Alphaville | The costs of offshore tax avoidance, part 2 | FT Alphaville | The “Great Gatsby Curve” for Character Skills and Mobility | Brookings Institution | Why It’s So Hard for Millennials to Find a Place to Live and Work – The Atlantic | Why 3-hour workdays haven’t happened yet – Vox | CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST: Encouraging Work: Tax Incentives or Social Support?

Things to Read on the Morning of December 1, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Ed Luce:
    Hillary Clinton’s rickety bridge to the White House:
    “Voters lack a compelling reason to embrace Democrats, as opposed to simply rejecting Republicans…. Without a credible economic plan, the US left risks being little more than a rainbow coalition. This is the danger facing Mrs Clinton’s candidacy. It is possible–perhaps even likely–that Republicans will select a nominee who has alienated so many Americans that he will be unable to compete in a general election. It is also plausible that Mrs Clinton will appeal to enough women, Hispanics and others to ensure her electoral maths are prohibitive. That is the working theory. Unless Mrs Clinton can find a positive story to engage America’s middle classes it is the only one that is likely to work in practice…. Mrs Clinton’s network of donors are comfortable with social liberalism. The bulk of her money will come from places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, which are either neutral or supportive on social issues. Their focus is on lower taxes and fewer regulations. Mrs Clinton’s challenge will be to square her donors’ priorities with America’s increasingly apolitical young voter…. Those who are unemployed want jobs. Those who have jobs want a pay rise. All that most will remember is eight lean years under President Barack Obama…. Mrs Clinton will need new ideas and new faces. Who they will be–and what they will advise–is anyone’s guess…. In the absence of new ones, Mrs Clinton’s bridge to the White House looks rickety.”
  2. Nicholas Bagley:
    Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act:
    “Adler and Cannon have offered a strained interpretation of the ACA that, if accepted, would make a hash of other provisions… and undermine its stated purpose…. The more natural reading… [is that] the “by the State” language just reflects Congress’s assumption, unchallenged at the time, that the states would establish their own exchanges. But even if you think that Adler and Cannon’s claim is plausible… the contrary interpretation offered by the government is at least reasonable. That brings me to the aspect of their argument that troubles me the most: their unyielding conviction that they’ve identified the only possible construction of the ACA. Nowhere do they so much as acknowledge the possibility that maybe, just maybe, they’re wrong. That’s because they can’t admit to doubt. Because of the deference extended to agency interpretation, doubt means they lose. But their unwillingness even to acknowledge ambiguity reflects an important difference between legal advocacy and neutral interpretation…. The courts would violate their obligation of fidelity in statutory construction if they mistook [their legal] ingenuity for genuine obeisance to congressional will. The latest challenge to the ACA is political activism masquerading as statutory restraint.”
  3. Paul Krugman:
    The German Inflation Undershoot: The European Outlier:
    “The point is a simple but important one: at this point any European imbalances associated with the surge in capital flows to the periphery after the formation of the euro have been worked off via extremely painful and costly disinflation…. From 1999 to the present, most of Europe has had cost growth and inflation just about consistent with the ECB’s long-standing just-under-2 percent inflation target. There’s just one big outlier…. The European imbalance problem is a German problem, caused by Germany’s persistent failure to have wage and price increases in line with what the euro requires. This German undervaluation is in turn exporting deflation to the rest of Europe. By contrast, France, Spain, and even Italy have been playing by the rules.”
  4. Peter Hart:
    NYT Columnist Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Faulty Attack on Elizabeth Warren’s ‘Rage’:
    “Not so fast, says Sorkin–this is no normal inversion: ‘While the merger is technically an inversion, it isn’t comparable to so many of the cynically constructed deals that were done this year simply to reduce taxes.’
    That’s what Burger King says–though Stephen Shay… says, ‘I would be surprised if in five years’ time, their tax rate does not come down reasonably dramatically.’… This is the crux of Sorkin’s argument that Warren ‘is, to put it politely, mistaken.’ She calls this a tax inversion, and it’s not–or actually it is, since it’s ‘technically an inversion.’ Is that clear enough for you?… Sorkin admits that Warren could have had a better argument if she wasn’t so blinded by her rage: ‘It is true that Mr. Weiss doesn’t have a lot of experience in the regulatory arena… will be the beneficiary of a policy at Lazard that vests his unvested shares… by taking a government job…. Ms. Warren might be more persuasive if she focused on those issues.’ Good point: Warren should have focused on his lack of regulatory experience. Oh wait, she did…. ‘That raises the first issue. Weiss has spent most of his career working on international transactions–from 2001 to 2009 he lived and worked in Paris–and now he’s being asked to run domestic finance… oversee consumer protection and domestic regulatory functions at the Treasury.’ Free tip for Andrew Ross Sorkin: Don’t say someone should have emphasized a point they in fact raised as ‘the first issue.’ It makes it seem like you didn’t read the article you’re critiquing.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Wolfgang Münchau:
    The Juncker fund will not revive the eurozone:
    “As a financial instrument Jean-Claude Juncker’s new investment fund is very clever. As an economic measure it will not work…. It reminds me of a product that was briefly popular in the credit bubble of the past decade: a synthetic collateralised debt obligation… an attempt to get from nothing to something.
    I have no problems with structural finance if it can be applied to a useful social purpose, as in the case of Mr Juncker’s fund. My objections are practical…. The commission starts off with €8bn… as collateral for a guarantee of €16bn…. The European Investment Bank adds another €5bn… use the €21bn to raise some €60bn in cash by issuing bonds…. It could then use the €60bn to co-finance €315bn in investments from the private sector…. Mr Juncker wants to encourage €300bn in investment over three years, which translates to roughly 0.8 per cent of the EU’s gross domestic product per year. This would make a difference. But even if he manages to achieve this headline number, it is not clear that he will have prompted new investments…. Mr Juncker’s fund could turn out to be both a bureaucratic triumph, and an economic non-event…. The heavy lifting will have to come from the European Central Bank… a programme of quantitative easing will have to be drawn up that is quite different in spirit from Mr Juncker’s €300bn programme. It will have to go on for as long as it takes, and it will have to involve real money upfront, and no guarantees, and no tricks. The eurozone needs a truly grown-up response if growth is to be revived.”
  2. John Hussman:
    Hard-Won Lessons and the Bird in the Hand:
    “The tendency [today] for extremely overvalued, overbought, overbullish syndromes to extend much further than in prior market cycles, without material correction, as a result of Fed-induced yield seeking by speculators with little regard for valuation…. In prior market cycles, extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions had almost invariably resulted in steep and abrupt market declines in relatively short order…. I hear that I’m a polarizing figure in internet chat circles. While I write a lot of market commentary, I rarely read comments on social media, following Neil Stephenson’s rule that ‘arguing with anonymous strangers on the Internet is a sucker’s game–they turn out to be indistinguishable from self-righteous sixteen-year-olds with infinite free time’…. Given extreme bullish sentiment and the necessity of justifying prices that are so disconnected from historically reliable valuation measures here, it’s also not a surprise that value-conscious, historically-informed views are increasingly polarizing. As George Orwell wrote, ‘The further a society drifts from truth, the more it will hate those who speak it.’… The S&P 500 is more than double its historical valuation norms on reliable measures… sentiment is lopsided… dispersion across market internals…. None of those considerations inform us that the U.S. stock market currently presents a desirable opportunity to accept risk…. I know exactly the challenge that Fed-induced yield-seeking has posed to our discipline in recent years…. During the Depression, valuations similar to those of 2008 were still followed by a loss of two-thirds of the stock market’s value to its final low in 1932…. The equity market is now more overvalued than at any point in history outside of the 2000 peak… 115% above reliable historical norms…. Even 3-4 more years of zero short-term interest rates don’t ‘justify’ more than a 12-16% elevation above historical norms…. We estimate that the S&P 500 is likely to experience zero or negative total returns for the next 8-9 years…. The suppressed Treasury bill yields engineered by the Federal Reserve are likely to outperform stocks over that horizon, with no downside risk…. Wall Street is quite measurably out of its mind…. Yet somehow the awful completion of this cycle will be just as surprising as it was the last two times around…. Honestly, you’ve all gone mad…. I encourage… investors to understand the actual depth of market declines that have been part and parcel of market cycles… 30-50% and occasionally more…”

Evening Must-Read: Ed Luce: Hillary Clinton’s rickety bridge to the White House

Ed Luce:
Hillary Clinton’s rickety bridge to the White House:
“Voters lack a compelling reason to embrace Democrats…

…as opposed to simply rejecting Republicans…. Without a credible economic plan, the US left risks being little more than a rainbow coalition. This is the danger facing Mrs Clinton’s candidacy. It is possible–perhaps even likely–that Republicans will select a nominee who has alienated so many Americans that he will be unable to compete in a general election. It is also plausible that Mrs Clinton will appeal to enough women, Hispanics and others to ensure her electoral maths are prohibitive. That is the working theory. Unless Mrs Clinton can find a positive story to engage America’s middle classes it is the only one that is likely to work in practice….

Mrs Clinton’s network of donors are comfortable with social liberalism. The bulk of her money will come from places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, which are either neutral or supportive on social issues. Their focus is on lower taxes and fewer regulations. Mrs Clinton’s challenge will be to square her donors’ priorities with America’s increasingly apolitical young voter…. Those who are unemployed want jobs. Those who have jobs want a pay rise. All that most will remember is eight lean years under President Barack Obama…. Mrs Clinton will need new ideas and new faces. Who they will be–and what they will advise–is anyone’s guess…. In the absence of new ones, Mrs Clinton’s bridge to the White House looks rickety.

Evening Must-Read: Nicholas Bagley: Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act

Nicholas Bagley:
Three Words and the Future of the Affordable Care Act:
“Adler and Cannon have offered a strained interpretation of the ACA that…

…if accepted, would make a hash of other provisions… and undermine its stated purpose…. The more natural reading… [is that] the “by the State” language just reflects Congress’s assumption, unchallenged at the time, that the states would establish their own exchanges. But even if you think that Adler and Cannon’s claim is plausible… the contrary interpretation offered by the government is at least reasonable.

That brings me to the aspect of their argument that troubles me the most: their unyielding conviction that they’ve identified the only possible construction of the ACA. Nowhere do they so much as acknowledge the possibility that maybe, just maybe, they’re wrong. That’s because they can’t admit to doubt. Because of the deference extended to agency interpretation, doubt means they lose.

But their unwillingness even to acknowledge ambiguity reflects an important difference between legal advocacy and neutral interpretation…. The courts would violate their obligation of fidelity in statutory construction if they mistook [their legal] ingenuity for genuine obeisance to congressional will. The latest challenge to the ACA is political activism masquerading as statutory restraint.

Over at the Cato Institute: Waving a Magic Wand for Economic Growth: Daily Focus

Over at the Cato Institute:

Waving a Magic Wand

J. Bradford DeLong :: U.C. Berkeley

Brink Lindsey asked me what I would do to the U.S. economy to increase economic growth if I could just “wave a magic wand”.

The problem I have with such questions–with such “magic wands”–is that I am never sure just how powerful they are supposed to be.

Let me propose three, all of which are small scale in terms of policies but larger scale in that in order to become durable policies they do require, as John Adams said, changes “in the hearts and minds of our countrymen [and women]…”:

(1) A Federal Reserve committed to nominal GDP level targeting, with a trend growth rate in nominal GDP of 7%/year: In my view the question of the origin of “general gluts”–demand-side business cycles characterized by (i) insufficient demand for pretty much every currently-produced good and service, and (ii) positively- rather than negatively-correlated fluctuations relative to trend of prices and employment–was decisively and correctly answered by John Stuart Mill back in 1829. A general glut arises when if there is full employment workers, savers, and managers wish to hold more in the way of liquid cash and readily-collateralizable safe savings vehicles than the economy is supplying. READ MOAR

The private sector then cannot produce cash and savings vehicles believed to be safe by any means short of deploying huge amounts of labor and capital to the Witwatersrand to dig rocks, and cannot produce large quantities of cash and safe savings vehicles quickly in any event. Only those organizations whose solvency is not just certain, but of which it is common knowledge of the solvency is certain, can issue cash and safe savings vehicles. Others can only issue assets that are almost as good as cash until the tide goes out and you see how naked they are. And in a crisis of which institutions is it common knowledge that it is common knowledge that they are solvent?

When, if there is full employment, workers, savers, and managers wish to hold more in the way of liquid cash and readily-collateralizable safe savings vehicles than the economy is supplying everyone tries to build up their holdings by cutting their spending below their income. But since everyone’s income is other people’s spending that does not work. Employment, production, and incomes drop until workers, savers, and managers feel so poor that they no longer wish to build up their stocks of cash and safe savings vehicles. And the economy undergoes a “general glut”.

A well-functioning free-market economy thus requires more than just property rights cut at the joints to minimize externalities, Pigovian taxes and bounties levied to compensate for remaining externalities, tort laws, contract laws, police, and judges. It also requires a “neutral” monetary policy–i.e., one that matches the economy’s supply of liquid cash and readily-collateralizable safe savings vehicles to the demand if there is full employment from workers, savers, and managers. The hope is that a central bank that has the power to target and does target a simple nominal GDP level-feedback rule–if nominal GDP is below the target, do more in the way of standard open-market operations, lending at the discount window on collateral that is good in normal times at a penalty rate, quantitative easing, and social-credit operations–will finally accomplish a properly “neutral” monetary policy.

A look back at previous ideas for what a “neutral” monetary policy–Newton’s fixed price of gold, Hayek’s fixed nominal GDP level, Fisher’s fixed price-level commodity basket, Friedman’s stable M2 growth rate, the NAIRU targeting of the 1970s, Bernanke’s inflation-targeting–leads immediately to the conclusion that anybody who claims to have uncovered the Philosopher’s Stone of a proper “neutral” monetary policy is a madman. But it is worth trying. Full employment is a very powerful boost to economic growth. And so is the elimination of future risks that businesses face as they try to calculate the chances that the profits to amortize investments will not be there because they will find themselves trying to sell into a “general glut”.

(2) State and local governments committed to raising salaries of K-12 public-school teachers relative to median salaries by 50%, in exchange for severe reductions in teacher tenure: As Eddie Lazear tirelessly points out, our state and local governments still substantially set public-school teachers’ salaries following a sociological pattern set generations ago, when the occupations open to women were (a) housekeepers, (b) laundresses, (c) waitresses, (d) telephone switchboard-operators, (e) secretaries, (f) nurses, and (g) teachers. Those days are long gone: women who would have become teachers and nurses in the 1950s are now becoming doctors, lawyers, managers, and bankers. School boards across the country have responded to the difficulties of hiring as the coming of feminist liberties has allowed their captive female labor pool to escape by offering tenure in order to attract the risk-averse to teaching without having to require their taxpayer principals to face reality. But this is, at most, a second-best solution.

A nationwide network of good schools is both one of the very best ways to build productive capital–human capital–and a powerful step toward turning equality of opportunity in America from a sick and cynical joke to something not that far moved to reality.

How to actually wave this magic wand, however, is beyond me. My reading of the evidence is that charter schools have been disappointing in ways somewhat similar to those in which 401(k)s have been disappointing–too-high rewards to flash and marketing and too-little repetition for successful social learning about true quality to take place. Teachers will fight attempts to disrupt security of employment unless they have confidence that the grand bargain by which they trade security for higher salaries will be kept–which they do not have. Fiscal conservatives will fight teacher-salary increases unless they are confident that the Democratic Party-public sector union complex will then disarm itself of its weapons–which they are not. And the very smart Jesse Rothstein in the building next door thinks that eliminating teacher tenure is in no wise low-hanging fruit–that it substantially boosts the salary needed to acquire good teachers as it leads the risk-averse to exit the profession, and that nearly all who should not be teachers as identified as such before they gain tenure.

Suggestions?

(3) Increasing the number of legal immigrants from roughly one million per year to 2.5 million per year–0.75% of the population per year: Everywhere else in the world, social conservatives are totally and completely terrified of our culture. Whether they admire American culture or despise it, all those who are attached to their own culture and do not want their young talking about going to Mt. St. Michel for le weekend or making hip-hop videos for Youtube are terrified of it. Yet we, somehow, fear that raising legal immigration above its current 0.3% of the population per year will in some way disrupt our culture? And we, somehow, fear that our politics is sufficiently broken that we cannot figure out a way to make increased immigration win-win for all current residents? Already for a 20 year old to crawl through a storm sewer from Tijuana to San Diego boosts the present value of future world GDP by $200 thousand. Give each one a green card too as he or she emerges and that number is boosted to about $400 thousand.

And let me note that I am not that big a fan of selling immigration licenses.

It strikes me that the kind of people who, illiterate, make it across the U.S. border from Chiapas on foot are likely to be at least as large as political and economic assets as the princelings of the Chinese Communist Party and the others who would buy their way in, eager and able as the latter are to pay.

1318 words

Things I Should Have Written About When They Were Published: Lawrence Summers on ‘House of Debt’

Lawrence Summers: On ‘House of Debt’: “Atif Mian and Amir Sufi’s House of Debt, despite some tough competition…

…looks likely to be the most important economics book of 2014; it could be the most important book to come out of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession…. It persuasively demonstrates that the conventional meta-narrative of the crisis and its aftermath, which emphasises the breakdown of financial intermediation, is inadequate. It then goes on to provide a supplementary and in some ways alternative explanation focusing on the deterioration of household balance sheets, an analysis that has profound implications for policy directed both at preventing crises and responding to them when prevention fails….

It is a summary of a highly serious programme of economic research–one that is in many ways a model for what economists should do…. They argue that, rather than failing banks, the key culprits in the financial crisis were overly indebted households. Resurrecting arguments that go back at least to Irving Fisher and that were emphasised by Richard Koo in considering Japan’s stagnation, Mian and Sufi highlight how harsh leverage and debt can be….

Their analysis, presented with far more depth and subtlety than I have been able to reflect here, is a major contribution that furthers our understanding of the crisis. It certainly affects what I will examine in trying to predict and forestall future crises. And it should influence policies aimed at crisis prevention by demonstrating the insufficiency of keeping financial institutions healthy and by making a case for macroprudential measures directed at preventing runaway growth in household debt.

When one has a persuasive and novel idea, there is an inevitable temptation to push it a bit too far and to weight it excessively relative to less novel truths. Mian and Sufi succumb to this temptation in the last third of their book, where they discuss the policy responses to the crisis…

Economists–well, sane economists who have done their homework–divide into three groups on the causes of the deep and long Lesser Depression:

  1. Those who believe it was the attempted regulatory arbitrage by the major universal money-center banks and their consequent collapse when the housing bubble collapsed that destroyed financial-center risk tolerance and the credit channel. (I tend to be in this camp, most of the time at least).

  2. Those who believe that even if the financial-market collapse of 2008-9 had been properly handled (i.e., no uncontrolled Lehman bankruptcy, etc.), we would still be on the same track unless we had dealt with the enormous overhang of bad housing-purchase and home-equity loans created by the collapse of the housing bubble. (Mian and Sufi are in this camp. I am sometimes in this camp.)

  3. Those who believe that even if housing finance and high finance had been better handled, we would still be on the same track because it was the collapse of housing wealth and its knock-on effects on consumption spending that are at the root. (Dean Baker tends to be in this camp.)

I must confess that as time passes and as single-family housing construction continues to fail to recover, I find myself shifting from (1) to (2), or perhaps from (1) to (1) and (2)…

Afternoon Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The German Inflation Undershoot: The European Outlier

Paul Krugman:
The German Inflation Undershoot: The European Outlier:
“The point is a simple but important one…

…at this point any European imbalances associated with the surge in capital flows to the periphery after the formation of the euro have been worked off via extremely painful and costly disinflation…. From 1999 to the present, most of Europe has had cost growth and inflation just about consistent with the ECB’s long-standing just-under-2 percent inflation target. There’s just one big outlier…. The European imbalance problem is a German problem, caused by Germany’s persistent failure to have wage and price increases in line with what the euro requires. This German undervaluation is in turn exporting deflation to the rest of Europe. By contrast, France, Spain, and even Italy have been playing by the rules.