Evening Must-Read: Noah Smith: Ten Investing Facts of Life

Noah Smith:
Ten Investing Facts of Life:
“Morgan Housel recently came up with an impressive list of 122 investing aphorisms….

…Almost all… are good advice…. There was really only one I didn’t like: ’67. Finance would be better if it was taught by the psychology and history departments…’. As someone who teaches finance, I might sound a little self-serving for saying that academic finance has valuable things…. But… [many of] Housel’s… aphorisms… come from… finance professors!… 10 of my favorites….

(6)… Erik Falkenstein says: ‘In expert tennis, 80% of the points are won, while in amateur tennis, 80% are lost. The same is true for… investing’…. (14)… Nick Murray…. ‘Timing the market is a fool’s game, whereas time in the market is your greatest natural advantage.’… (24)… 40% of stocks have suffered ‘catastrophic losses’ since 1980…. If you understand the math of the random walk… this won’t be very surprising! (28.)… 72% of mutual funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 underperformed…. Finance profs have been yelling about this for decades…. (44). Our memories… extend… a decade back…. [Time] erases many important lessons…. (46)… The most boring companies… can make some of the best long-term investments…. Finance researchers have noticed the outperformance of value stocks over glamor stocks for decades! (50)… U.S. stocks increased 2,000-fold between 1928 and 2013, but lost at least 20% of its value 20 times…. (68)… Tim Duy, ‘As long as people have babies, capital depreciates, technology evolves, and tastes and preferences change, there is a powerful underlying impetus for growth that is almost certain to reveal itself in any reasonably well-managed economy.’ This is great advice. But it’s also a reason not to invest in stocks in Japan…. (90)… Those who trade the most earn the lowest returns…. (97)… The single best three-year period to own stocks was during the Great Depression. Not far behind was the three-year period starting in 2009…. Long-run predictability is one of the most interesting facts discovered by finance researchers… what earned Yale economist Bob Shiller his 2013 Nobel…. Housel’s compilation of aphorisms is a good list. Check it out. And remember, finance academics are hard at work discovering interesting and useful facts about investing, trading and asset markets.”

Morning Must-Read: Martin Feldstein: The Fed’s Needless Flirtation With Danger

Martin Feldstein:
The Fed’s Needless Flirtation With Danger:
“The risks involved in… quantitative easing…

…[which] reduced long-term interest rates and raised… equities and real estate… caused lenders and investors to reach for yield… taking greater risks through lower-quality loans… and accepting narrower spreads…. The risks… were unnecessary. Well-designed tax policies… an enlarged investment tax credit… converting the deduction for business interest to a credit… allowing deductions for dividends on common or preferred equity…. The resulting revenue loss could be balanced by a temporary rise in the corporate income-tax rate… taxing more highly the return on old capital while stimulating new investment…. A direct tax incentive to home builders…. The… deduction of mortgage interest… extended to non-itemizers… converted to an optional tax-credit…. Quantitative easing increase[s] the risk of financial instability…. Increased government spending and reduced tax revenue increase budget deficits and national debt…. Changes in the tax structure could stimulate spending… without raising… deficits.

Things to Read on the Evening of December 24, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. James Heckman (1995);
    Cracked Bell:
    “The same remarks apply to [Herrnstein and Murray’s Bell Curve’s] study of racial and ethnic differentials in socioeconomic outcomes…. Evidence that racial differentials weaken when ability is controlled for using regression methods does not rule out an important role for the environment…. In the presence of measurement error in the environment, the authors’ analysis will overstate the ‘true’ effect of ability on those outcomes. There are methods for addressing these problems, but Murray and Herrnstein do not use them…. By its very construction… the ‘two-standard deviation’ range in measured IQ… [covers] 95 percent of the population. A ‘two-standard deviation’ range of their family background index does not include 95 percent of the population, because that measure does not come from a bell curve…. By restricting the range of the environmental variable they understate the role of the environment in affecting outcomes relative to the role allocated to IQ…”

  2. Paul Krugman:
    Recession, Recovery, and Gold:
    “Dave Weigel notes that when President Obama get reelected, the usual suspects told us to run for the hills, buying gold along the way. Zimbabwe! Or, actually, not…. Gold prices are down…. Why they were high in the first place[:] Gold is not, in fact, a hedge against inflation. It’s something people buy when real returns on alternative assets are low…. Gold went up as real interest rates turned negative, thanks to a depressed economy…. As recovery has gathered strength, real rates have gone up and gold has gone down…”

  3. Matt O’Brien:
    Now that the Dow has hit 18,000, let us remember the worst op-ed in history:
    “The stock market… isn’t the best barometer…. And the Dow isn’t even the best barometer of the stock market…. But if arbitrary round numbers are your thing, the Dow… above 18,000 for the first time. And that brings us to the worst op-ed in history. On March 6, 2009, former George W. Bush adviser Michael Boskin offered whatever the opposite of a prophecy is when he said that ‘Obama’s Radicalism Is Killing the Dow.’… Boskin… didn’t think that this once-in-three-generations financial crisis was to blame for the market meltdown. Instead, he blamed it on Obama for… talking about raising taxes? ‘It’s hard not to see the continued sell-off on Wall Street and the growing fear on Main Street,’ Boskin philosophized, ‘as a product, at least in part, of the realization that our new president’s policies are designed to radically re-engineer the market-based U.S. economy.’ What followed was the usual conservative jeremiad against higher taxes on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and deficit spending. Obama’s trying to turn us into Europe, and that’s why markets are pricing in the possibility of a Great Depression—not the dying economy he inherited. It was… extraordinarily ill-timed…. Obama’s radicalism has killed the Dow to the tune of a 171 percent return since Boskin’s op-ed.

  4. David Weigel:
    Republicans Block Reappointment of CBO Chief Doug Elmendorf:
    “Incoming Republican leaders in Congress won’t reappoint Doug Elmendorf to another term as head of the Congressional Budget Office, according to a party aide…. Elmendorf, 52, an economist with experience at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, was appointed to run the CBO in 2009 when then-director Peter Orszag was picked by President Barack Obama to run the White House Office of Management and Budget. In 2011, Elmendorf won a full four-year term, after Republicans took control of the House while Democrats retained the Senate. A CBO conclusion that Obama’s signature domestic achievement — the 2010 Affordable Care Act — was cutting costs pleased Democrats, while Republicans appreciated the office’s finding that the health-care law and a proposed minimum wage increase would cost jobs…”

  5. Duncan Black (2004):
    Minitrue Sullivan:
    “Not to beat a dead horse which no one much cares about anyway, but I was a bit puzzled earlier when I was having some trouble hunting down a particular story with a mention of [Andrew] Sullivan’s 5th column nonsense. A reader reminds me why–Sullivan, as he tends to do, edited the article he had publishsed in the Times of London before posting it in his ‘best of’ section on his website. On his site: ‘The decadent Left in its enclaves on the coasts is not dead–and may well mount what amounts to a fifth column…’ Original quote: ‘The decadent left in its enclaves on the coasts is not dead -and may well mount a fifth column…’ The former at least has one little toe in the land of metaphor, the latter doesn’t. Sullivan literally and explicitly suggested that the ‘decadent Left’ and their soulmates, Muslims advocating theocracy, would join hand in hand.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Barkley Rosser:
    The People the Wall Street Journal Put on Its Op-Ed Page… Get Less Hinged as Time Passe[s]:
    “It has never been clear that Cochrane is even all that good at studying asset pricing. Even to this day, his famous grad textbook, called, well, Asset Pricing, does not have any of the following words in its index (or enywhere in the book, for that matter): kurtosis, leptokurtosis, fat tails. Nowhere, nada, even though supposedly financial traders all know that most financial returns exhibit those characteristics, which came home to roost big time in 2008. Of course at that time he publicly declared that… Fama would talk about them in his classes, having first heard of them in from Benoit Mandelbrot of all people. But, that has somehow still not gotten Cochrane to mention them himself anywhere in his supposedly wonderful textbook.”

  2. Duncan Black:
    Eschaton: Innumeracy):
    “Silly [Andrew] Sully[van] is back on his Bell Curve kick because Coates wrote some hurtful things which failed to realize the overall importance of being incredibly civil in the high minded intellectual debate about whether black people are, in fact, stupid, and whether the innumerate editor of a prominent magazine might have some responsibility for catapulting racist pseudoscience he’s incapable of understanding into the discourse…. I’d often try to find an excuse to sneak a Bell Curve lecture into my courses. By the end of my teaching career none of my students had actually heard of it, which was good, but it still provided a way of teaching various lessons…. And I knew it was a zombie superhero, destined to return again and again no matter how many bullets we put into its brain.”

Evening Must-Read: James Heckman (1995): Cracked Bell

James Heckman (1995);
Cracked Bell:
“The same remarks apply to [Herrnstein and Murray’s Bell Curve’s]…

study of racial and ethnic differentials in socioeconomic outcomes…. Evidence that racial differentials weaken when ability is controlled for using regression methods does not rule out an important role for the environment…. In the presence of measurement error in the environment, the authors’ analysis will overstate the ‘true’ effect of ability on those outcomes. There are methods for addressing these problems, but Murray and Herrnstein do not use them….

By its very construction… the ‘two-standard deviation’ range in measured IQ… [covers] 95 percent of the population. A ‘two-standard deviation’ range of their family background index does not include 95 percent of the population, because that measure does not come from a bell curve…. By restricting the range of the environmental variable they understate the role of the environment in affecting outcomes relative to the role allocated to IQ…

Evening Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Recession, Recovery, and Gold

Paul Krugman:
Recession, Recovery, and Gold:
“Dave Weigel notes that when President Obama get reelected…

…the usual suspects told us to run for the hills, buying gold along the way. Zimbabwe! Or, actually, not…. Gold prices are down…. Why they were high in the first place[:] Gold is not, in fact, a hedge against inflation. It’s something people buy when real returns on alternative assets are low…. Gold went up as real interest rates turned negative, thanks to a depressed economy…. As recovery has gathered strength, real rates have gone up and gold has gone down…

Morning Must-Read: Matt O’Brien: Now that the Dow Has Hit 18,000, Let Us Remember the Worst Op-Ed in History

Matt O’Brien:
Now that the Dow has hit 18,000, let us remember the worst op-ed in history:
“The stock market… isn’t the best barometer….

…And the Dow isn’t even the best barometer of the stock market…. But if arbitrary round numbers are your thing, the Dow… above 18,000 for the first time. And that brings us to the worst op-ed in history. On March 6, 2009, former George W. Bush adviser Michael Boskin offered whatever the opposite of a prophecy is when he said that ‘Obama’s Radicalism Is Killing the Dow.’… Boskin… didn’t think that this once-in-three-generations financial crisis was to blame for the market meltdown. Instead, he blamed it on Obama for… talking about raising taxes?

‘It’s hard not to see the continued sell-off on Wall Street and the growing fear on Main Street,’ Boskin philosophized, ‘as a product, at least in part, of the realization that our new president’s policies are designed to radically re-engineer the market-based U.S. economy.’ What followed was the usual conservative jeremiad against higher taxes on the rich, lower taxes on the poor, and deficit spending. Obama’s trying to turn us into Europe, and that’s why markets are pricing in the possibility of a Great Depression—not the dying economy he inherited. It was… extraordinarily ill-timed…. Obama’s radicalism has killed the Dow to the tune of a 171 percent return since Boskin’s op-ed.

Is the Fed in a Trap?: I Really Cannot See It…: Daily Focus

The very sharp and smart Stephen Roach is seriously alarmed–and I think he is wrong.

Stephen Roach:

Stephen S. Roach:
The Fed Sets Another Trap:
“America’s Federal Reserve is headed down a familiar…

…and highly dangerous path… the same incremental approach that helped set the stage for… 2008-2009. The consequences could be similarly catastrophic… incremental approach… condoning mounting excesses in financial markets and the real economy…. [The] macro-prudential tools… approach… fails to address the egregious mispricing of risk brought about by an overly accommodative monetary policy….

The Fed’s $4.5 trillion balance sheet… no inclination to scale back… passed the quantitative-easing baton to the BoJ and the ECB…. The longer central banks promote financial-market froth, the more dependent their economies become on these precarious markets…. What do independent central banks stand for if they are not prepared to face up to the markets and make the tough and disciplined choices that responsible economic stewardship demands?… Now it is time for the Fed and its counterparts elsewhere to abandon financial engineering and begin marshaling the tools they will need to cope with the inevitable next crisis…

A financial crisis happens when something leads to a sharp fall in the risk tolerance of the market; that fall in risk tolerance reduces the price of risky assets in such a way that highly-leveraged financial intermediaries become illiquid and possible insolvent; that possible insolvency produces a sharp shift in the riskiness of assets as many previously classified as safe are no longer so; thus the fall in the demand for risky assets (and the rise in the demand for safe assets) triggers a huge rise in the supply of risky assets (and a huge fall in the supply of safe assets), and the downward spiral commences.

Those of us watching financial markets in 2005 worried about such a financial crisis triggered by a full-scale run on the dollar. See, for example, me from March to May:

Perhaps the clearest statement I made is this: Our Twin Financial Puzzles: The Long Run May Come Like a Thief in the Night:

The optimists… have only one economic argument: long-term interest rates are relatively low, and are not pricing the dollar-collapse and the U.S.-interest-rates-spike scenarios as having any substantial probability at all. The pessimists on Wall Street are puzzled at why this economic argument is supposed to have force. From their perspective, demand for long-duration dollar-denominated securities is high because the Asian central banks are buying as if there were no tomorrow in order to keep the value of their currencies down, the U.S. Treasury is borrowing short (it is not issuing that many long-duration securities), and U.S. companies are cautious and are not undertaking the kinds of investments that would lead them to issue lots of long-duration bonds.

We economists respond by saying that for every market mispricing there is an open profit opportunity: if long-term interest rates are indeed too low–if long-term bonds are indeed priced too high–there is money to be made by shorting long-term U.S. bonds, parking the money in some other investment vehicle that is not underpriced [and] waiting for bond prices to return to fundamentals…. But the Wall Street types have a counterargument: For any one financial institution to make the international bet–to bet on the decline of the dollar against the yuan over the next five years in a very serious, leveraged way is to put its survival at risk should the trades somehow go wrong. And trades do go wrong….

We economists believe that market forces drive prices to fundamentals. But we are not careful enough to distinguish situations in which equilibrium-restoring forces are strong from those in which equilibrium-restoring forces are weak. At the moment those forces are weak. And this adds an additional danger: at any moment those forces may become strong. The long run in which the dollar falls and U.S. long-term interest rates rise may come like a thief in the night as a very sudden shock…. On that day the long run future will be, as football coach George Allen (not the “macaque” one) used to say, now…. Should that day come, keeping a financial crisis from becoming a major disaster may well require swift and rapid action by a Federal Reserve and a Treasury Department that have powerful and unconditional White House and Congressional support….

That is me back in 2005. Was I then sounding enough like Stephen Roach sounds now–in 2014?

So why am I so much more sanguine now?

Note what I said then: “Should that day come, keeping a financial crisis from becoming a major disaster may well require swift and rapid action by a Federal Reserve and a Treasury Department that have powerful and unconditional White House and Congressional support…” May well require–a full-blown run on the dollar could, I thought, be successfully managed by competent technocrats. In fact, I put the chances of a truly hard landing conditional on a major dollar crisis at only 10%. Why so low? Back then I wrote down the argument at an undergraduate level:

Some Simple Analytics for a Hard Landing:

Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf Web archive org web 20140326173802 http www j bradford delong net movable type pdf hard landing pdf

I still think that looks pretty good as a thinking-through back in 2005 of how a financial crisis could be generated by a run on the dollar, and why it probably would not produce a hard landing.

What is the equivalent argument at the undergraduate or graduate level supporting Stephen Roach’s fears? I just do not see it.

Of course, we did not get the dollar-run crisis: we got a very different one…

Evaluating labor standards and employment outcomes

After the Bureau of Labor Statistics announced earlier this month that employers added 321,000 jobs in November—the most in nearly three years—journalists and pundits alike reacted with a flurry of excitement.  The news was indeed good. As Ben Casselman of FiveThirtyEight proclaimed, the BLS report “crushed it.”

Employment numbers alone, however, do not give us a full picture of what is really going on in the labor market. That is why the Washington Center for Equitable Growth has awarded one of its 2014 inaugural grants to T. William Lester, an Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina’s Department of City and Regional Planning. Lester seeks to use differences in local labor laws to understand how labor standards affect employment practices and outcomes in terms of wages, benefits, turnover, on-the-job training, and productivity.

The jobs that have been created since the end of the Great Recession in 2009 have been concentrated within services industries, such as restaurants, retail stores, and entertainment establishments. Many of these jobs are characterized by low wages, unpredictable schedules, the absence of benefits, and little to no opportunity for advancement. State and local governments are taking notice, and campaigns to improve job quality by improving labor standards – in the form of minimum wage increases or paid sick day legislation – are gaining significant momentum. These new policies are well-studied—and controversial—but tend to focus only on their effects on overall employment rates.

But how these mandates affect the employment relationship within the firms themselves—in terms of turnover, productivity, training, tenure, and industry-specific norms—is what Lester calls the “black box” of understanding among researchers interested in these questions. The classic supply and demand model of the labor market assumes that if an employer cuts wages, even by a minimal amount, then employees will quit and begin their search for another job. Lester’s project begins with the research-backed premise that workers understand finding a job is costly, even in the best of circumstances. As a result, he argues, the classic supply-and-demand model may be flawed.

For starters, employees aren’t the only ones who conduct job “searches.” In a tight labor market, with a shortage of qualified workers, the employer may have to raise wages in order to attract the right people.  If, however, workers incur any kind of monetary or non-monetary cost to change jobs, a situation that economists see as far more prevalent than previously thought, then the employer has the advantage, and can therefore pay lower salaries.

Lester focuses on the full-service restaurant industry, generally a lower-wage sector of the economy, in two regions with vastly different labor laws: San Francisco, which has the nation’s highest minimum wage, paid sick leave requirements, and a citywide pay-to-play healthcare mandate; and the Research Triangle region in North Carolina, which has no locally mandated labor standards.

Lester preliminary results show that that North Carolina restaurants have a much wider divergence in terms of wage distribution. While the majority of employers will use a low-wage, high-turnover model to maximize profits—with employers willing to hire anyone with a “good attitude” and a “good smile—some restaurants pay much higher wages in order to attract and retain top talent. In San Francisco, where the minimum wage is much higher, there is less variation and a higher average wage compared to the Research Triangle area. Employers, therefore, seek new strategies —such as offering better than required health benefits and incorporating continuous learning techniques—to retain their best workers.

As a result, there is a greater “professionalization” of the restaurant labor market in San Francisco, and employers pay more attention to searching for and retaining “career” servers and line cooks who can ultimately increase the restaurant’s productivity. Lester’s work suggests that labor standards reshape the employment relationship by leading to stronger matches, higher productivity, lower turnover and the development of professional norms within low-wage labor markets.

This research is consistent with other work that indicates that high-quality human resource practices are linked to lower turnover. And studies have looked at the regional variation in human resource practices across different restaurant markets. But Lester’s work is the first to analyze how labor standard mandates and legislation specifically affect the employment relationship within firms in traditionally low-wage industries. As a result, it’s a critical piece of the puzzle for understanding the way in which new labor laws, such as raising the minimum wage or paid sick days, will affect individual businesses and their employees.

Evening Must-Read: David Weigel: Republicans Block Reappointment of CBO Chief Doug Elmendorf

David Weigel:
Republicans Block Reappointment of CBO Chief Doug Elmendorf:
“Incoming Republican leaders in Congress won’t reappoint Doug Elmendorf…

…to another term as head of the Congressional Budget Office, according to a party aide…. Elmendorf, 52, an economist with experience at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, was appointed to run the CBO in 2009 when then-director Peter Orszag was picked by President Barack Obama to run the White House Office of Management and Budget. In 2011, Elmendorf won a full four-year term, after Republicans took control of the House while Democrats retained the Senate. A CBO conclusion that Obama’s signature domestic achievement — the 2010 Affordable Care Act — was cutting costs pleased Democrats, while Republicans appreciated the office’s finding that the health-care law and a proposed minimum wage increase would cost jobs…

Creating a new understanding of economic growth and well-being

Rising income inequality in the United States over the past several decades is well-documented. But how this trend affects economic growth and well-being requires researchers to look beyond incomes to other factors in the lives of people from all walks of life.

That is why the Washington Center for Equitable Growth has awarded one of its inaugural grants to Timothy Smeeding, the Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Public Affairs and Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He, along with his coauthors –  Jonathan Fisher of Stanford University, Jeff Thompson of the Federal Reserve Board, and David Johnson of the Bureau of Economic – will analyze income, wealth, and consumption records in order to understand how changes in the distribution of income and wealth affects consumption and savings decisions, and then show how these factors affect the U.S. economy.

His research may well be central to our understanding of whether and how economic inequality impacts growth given the sudden divergence in consumption inequality and income inequality following the Great Recession of 2007-2009. From 1984 to 2006, consumption and income inequality increased in parallel, as one would expect. As higher income households gained income, they also spent more.

Yet Smeeding noticed that something interesting began to happen in 2006—consumption inequality fell and continued to fall throughout the Great Recession. Smeeding and his two colleagues, Jonathan Fisher and David Johnson, find that it was, somewhat surprisingly, the top of the income distribution that had the biggest decrease in consumption during the recession while those at the bottom of the income ladder cut their spending by much smaller margins. High-income households usually have better savings and financial tools during economic downturns, which usually buffers them from having to drastically change their spending habits. But during the Great Recession these high-income households lost a great deal of these savings, and cut back on consumption as a means to rebuild their wealth.

The Great Recession also created a loss in confidence, which may have motivated the top income to increase their savings because they were pessimistic about the economy overall.  Economists understand that consumption and income inequality diverged during the Great Recession, and that wealth may have played a role, but they do not yet have a complete picture of how consumption, income, and wealth (three widely accepted components of economic growth and well-being) interact. Nor has anyone evaluated changes in the distribution of these measures over time.

Smeeding and his colleagues will use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, or PSID, alongside the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finance to compare and contrast all three measures of economic well-being for the same individuals at the same time.

In particular, Smeeding will use all this data to create a model examining the average propensity to consume (the percentage of income  and wealth spent on goods and services rather than savings) as well as the marginal propensity to consume (the increase in spending, as opposed to saving, resulting from an increase in income or wealth ) over  the 1989-2013 period . Smeeding anticipates that these models will show that as savings and wealth as a percentage of income goes up, consumption as a percentage of income goes down.

Smeeding’s work provides an alternative to a purely income-based definition of household living standards. Income and consumption alone do not accurately paint a picture of whether a household’s well-being is sustainable. If an individual making a decent living is suddenly hit with an emergency medical expense, for example, it may require withdrawals from savings, which compromises long-term economic security.  Understanding the distribution of income, consumption, and wealth should help researchers and policymakers see a much more accurate picture of economic growth and well-being.