Lunchtime Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: On the Stupidity of Demand Deficient Stagnation

Simon Wren-Lewis:
On the Stupidity of Demand-Deficient Stagnation:
“Demand deficiency when inflation is persistently below target…

…should not occur, because it is easy to solve technically…. The huge waste of resources that we see in the long and incomplete US recovery, the even slower UK recovery and the absence of recovery in the Eurozone are all unnecessary…. We have become fixated by the labels ‘monetary’ and ‘fiscal’ policy, and created an independent institution to handle the former…. Within the existing institutional framework, there is plenty to be done to convince fiscal policy makers that reducing deficits should not be a priority in the short term, or in trying to improve the monetary policy framework so liquidity traps happen less often. Yet it would be better still if we had an institutional framework which was a little more robust to failures on either front. We need to regain the possibility of money-financed fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap…

My Equitable Growth “A-List” from the Fall of 2014: Daily Focus

The Financial Times has regrouped, reconfigured, and relaunched what was its , now calling it “Exchange”. When I first saw the title “A-List”, I was envious–it seemed so perfectly right.

So now that it has been abandoned, I am going to pick up the name. I am going to set up my own A-List by asking: what, in my view, was the Washington Center for Equitable Growth’s A-List of people to pay attention to in the fall of 2014? What things I read led me to say “this is a must-read!” and “this is about ‘equitable growth'”?

As with all revealed-preference exercises, there is no thought behind the list. It should, ideally, be combined with a top-down conscious assessment of influence and worth, for both conscious classifications and unconscious emergence can easily lead us astray. But I want to leave that for some future date.

So this is what a look back at my preferences as written in electrons by the “must reads” I have posted at http://equitablegrowth.blog reveals: a list of 101:

My most striking reaction to this emergent list is how many people are not on it. I think everyone on it deserves to be in the top 101. But I also can think of at least three times as many other people who deserves to be in the top 101 as well, as measured by their intelligence, insight, thoughtfulness, and ability to draw me in an keep me awake.


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In Which Martin Wolf, Eric Rauchway, and Paul Krugman Watch Those Crying “Flood, Flood!” in Surtur’s Fire, and Warn of an Even Bigger Fire Next Time: Daily Focus

The erudite Eric Rauchway has a very nice review of Martin Wolf’s excellent The Shifts and the Shocks:

Eric Rauchway:
Debt Piled Up:
“Martin Wolf… holds that we knew how to avoid, counter and cure these troubles…

…we have simply–largely out of wilful ignorance and lack of courage–failed…. This system was vulnerable to shocks, which bankers and regulators either failed to predict or succeeded in ignoring…. Ben Bernanke… collapses in unreliable securities were ‘unlikely to seriously spill over to the broader economy or the financial system’–a view that Wolf describes as ‘almost clueless’…. Keynes is only one of a canonical series of economists who remain right, and ignored…. Wolf asked… Summers whose analyses he finds useful…. Summers suggested Walter Bagehot… Kindleberger… Keynes… Minsky…. The same Summers who served a US government that ignored their recommendations. We know what to do, but we will not do it: hence the impatience of Wolf, and also of Paul Krugman….

Wolf says finance desperately needs a bit of that old-time repression now… more capital… deprived of their ability to generate money at whim…. Both these solutions were… also Keynes’s ideas, published and defended before the Great Depression…. Even though he has carefully reinvented the Keynesian wheel, Wolf despairs of seeing anything like the necessary reforms implemented, mainly because they would inconvenience terribly rich people…. And so this politically moderate Commander of the British Empire, a stalwart of the Financial Times features pages, concludes his book with a chapter title borrowed from… James Baldwin…. It is in the nature of the system that there will be another shock, and surely we will see ‘fire next time’.

I keep going around and around and around this without resolution. Back before World War I, you see, there was a deflation caucus–a great mass of wealth committed to investments in long-term nominal bonds and in real estate rented out in long term leases at fixed nominal rates. This deflation caucus had a very strong material interest in the hardest of hard monies and, by virtue of its wealth, a dominant political voice.

Since every nominal asset comes with a nominal liability, arithmetic tells us that, as far as economic material interest is concerned, the soft money-caucus has as much at stake at the margin as does the hard-money caucus. But back before World War I a great deal of the soft-money caucus did not have the vote. Combine the restriction of the formal franchise with wealth’s dominance of the informal franchise and it is not surprising that–except in times of total war or revolution–hard money ruled in the North Atlantic core of the global economy from the days of Sir Isaac Newton to World War I. In between World Wars I and II ,as the material power of the hard money caucus ebbed, it made sense that its ideological power would wane only with a lag.

Since World War II, however, there has been no material hard-money caucus: all of the rich have broadly diversified portfolios. And everyone has the franchise. Since World War II, the stakes in the zero-sum hard-money soft-money debate are now very low. Since World War II, we all have a common interest in full employment and shared prosperity–we are all the 100%.

So whence come the many policy disasters since 2007? How are we to explain what has happened? We have managed to throw away between 5%-10% of the potential wealth of the North Atlantic, and we appear to have thrown it away permanently. How? Why? And why can’t we fix it?

And, of course, why haven’t we drawn the obvious and transparent lessons from the past seven years of what we need to do in order to keep this from happening again? Let me turn the microphone over to Paul Krugman:

Paul Krugman:
“I find myself in meetings with international financial types…

…It’s all the usual discussions, and they don’t like to talk domestic U.S. politics, but then at some point, somebody says, what if we had another major financial crisis? What if we really needed something like TARP again? What are the chances that something like TARP could actually happen in this political environment? And everybody goes quiet, and looks down at their blotter…


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Lunchtime Must Read: Robert Lucas Rejects the “Microfoundational” Project

Robert Lucas’s rejection of the very idea of microfoundations:

Robert Lucas:
Rational Expectations Panel:
“One thing economics tries to do is to make predictions about the way large groups of people…

…say, 280 million people are going to respond if you change something in the tax structure, something in the inflation rate, or whatever…. Neurophysiology is exciting, cognitive psychology is interesting… Freudian psychology…. Kahnemann and Tversky haven’t even gotten to two people; they can’t even tell us anything interesting about how a couple that’s been married for ten years splits or makes decisions about what city to live in–let alone 250 million. This is like saying that we ought to build it up from knowledge of molecules or–no, that won’t do either, because there are a lot of subatomic particles…. We’re not going to build up useful economics… starting from individuals…. Behavioral economics should be on the reading list…. But to think of it as an alternative to what macroeconomics or public finance people are doing or trying to do… there’s a lot of stuff that we’d like to improve–it’s not going to come from behavioral economics… at least in my lifetime…”

Over at Project Syndicate: Try Everything

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Over at Project Syndicate: Try Everything: When it became clear in late 2008 that the orgy of deregulation coupled with global imbalances was confronting the global economy with a shock at least as dangerous as the Great Crash that had initiated the Great Depression, I was alarmed but hopeful. We had, after all, seen this before. And we had models from the Great Depression for how to mitigate the damage–basically, try everything that might work to boost demand and production and reduce jobless workers, and reinforce success.

In the United States, for example, after 3 1/2 years during which Herbert Hoover had focused on restoring business confidence via balancing the budget, in 1933 the new President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried everything: abandoning the gold standard, monetary reflation, deficit spending–at least to the extent of no longer making budget-balance an immediate priority–direct employment by the government, government loan guarantees, corporatist industry-level cartelization, aggressive antitrust policy to break up monopolies, and yet more. These policies sometimes conflicted with each other. A serious chunk of them were counterproductive. But Roosevelt tried everything, and reinforced success, and in the end the United States economy was much healthier than those that had remained with the Gold Bloc.

Thus in late 2008 the correct policy course appeared to me to be obvious: Recapitalize banks? Yes. Guarantee loans? Yes. Use Fannie and Freddie to resolve underwater mortgages? Yes. Drop short-term interest rates to zero? Yes. Engage in quantitative easing? Yes. Deficit spending? Yes. Change the regime of monetary policy-making so that businesses and savers would be confident that their previous expectations would be validated and the economy would not suffer from deflation or lowflation? Yes. And then, as events evolved, reinforce those policies that seemed to be working, and gradually drop those that seemed to be ineffective or counterproductive.

Yet that was not what we did. There was a remarkably large amount of root-and-branch opposition to different possibly-helpful policies: Recapitalizing the banks would simply reward institutions and executives who had caused the problem, and generate moral hazard and more problems with the future (alas, an objection that had a point–even though big bank shareholders lost 80% of their wealth in the crisis). Resolving underwater mortgages would reward feckless borrowers who ought to be punished. Expansionary fiscal policy was, logically, Ineffective by necessity. Expansionary monetary policy could only produce inflation and not recovery. Expansionary fiscal policy would do more harm because higher debts would reduced confidence than good by encouraging spending. Quantitative easing would, somehow, generate a new financial crisis. As near as I can see, all of these arguments could not and cannot be made with a straight face by people who had done their intellectual homework. But they were and are made by many.

But perhaps more damaging and more decisive in producing the grossly inadequate response two 2007-2009 that we have seen were those advocating their favorite stimulative policy at the expense of other policies. “Don’t do deficit spending–resolve underwater mortgages!” “Don’t do expansionary monetary policy–fiscal policy can do the job!” “There’s no need to raise expectations of future inflation–recapitalizing the banks is what is really needed!”

And we saw the latest of these the day after Christmas in the Wall Street Journal, with the extremely sharp Martin Feldstein’s “The Fed’s Needless Flirtation with Danger” http://www.wsj.com/articles/martin-feldstein-the-feds-needless-flirtation-with-danger-1419543510. The demand-stimulative policies advocated–investment tax credits, changing deductions to credits focused on increasing incentives to invest, shifting corporate tax burdens to those with low rather than high marginal propensities to spend–are all promising. They belong in the “try everything” basket.

But then there is the surrounding rhetoric.

It starts with the headline: “The Fed’s Needless Flirtation With Danger”. It continues with claims that the Fed’s policies “increase the risk of financial instability…”; that his recommended policies are a “safe and effective alternative”; that they are not an additional arrow in the quiver but rather replacements for “traditional Keynesian policies… [that] increase… national debt”.

The net effect, in my view at least, is at best a zero. Rather than having the effect intended of pushing us toward more effective demand-stimulus policies, the real-world effect is to diminish support for those demand-stimulus policies we are now undertaking without successfully assembling a coalition that can flick the switch and get us to undertake policies that we are not.

And when I look back at everything I have written since 2008, I find that I am also part of the problem. I find that I, too, have been too cocksure that my favorite policies recommended by my favorite theories have been the ones to push. And I have been insufficiently respectful of the wisdom of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that:

The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something…


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Afternoon Must-Read: Paul Krugman: “I find myself in meetings…

Paul Krugman:
“I find myself in meetings with international financial types…

…It’s all the usual discussions, and they don’t like to talk domestic U.S. politics, but then at some point, somebody says, what if we had another major financial crisis? What if we really needed something like TARP again? What are the chances that something like TARP could actually happen in this political environment? And everybody goes quiet, and looks down at their blotter…

Things to Read on the Afternoon of December 31, 2014

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. William Barnett, ed.::
    Rational expectations: A Panel Discussion: “Kevin Hoover: ‘Kevin Hoover: Bob, did you want to comment on that? You’re looking unhappy, I thought.’ Robert Lucas: ‘No. I mean, you can’t read Muth’s paper as some recipe for cranking out true theories about everything under the sun…. My paper on expectations and the neutrality of money was an attempt to get a positive theory about what observations we call a Phillips curve. Basically it didn’t work…. I thought my model was going to explain price stickiness, and it didn’t. So we’re still working on it…. I don’t think we have a satisfactory solution… but I don’t think that’s a cloud over Muth’s work. If Jack [Muth] thinks it is, I don’t agree with him. Mike [Lovell] cites some data that Jack [Muth] couldn’t make sense out of using rational expectations…. There’re a lot of bad models out there. I authored my share, and I don’t see how that affects a lot of things we’ve been talking about earlier on about the value of Muth’s contribution…. You know, people had no trouble having financial meltdowns in their economies before all this stuff we’ve been talking about came on board. We didn’t help, though; there’s no question about that. We may have focused attention on the wrong things; I don’t know…'”

  2. Duncan Black:
    Does Anybody Remember MOOCs?:
    “They were all anybody who wrote about education would talk about for awhile. Where did that all go? Apparently administrators finally figured out that a ‘course in a box’ actually costs a lot of money, that it doesn’t scale nearly as well as they hoped, that they are a substitute for ‘learning from a book’ not ‘learning from a person,’ and you can’t charge $50,000 per year tuition simply because your prestigious name will be on the online course degree. I knew all of this because I saw people experimenting with online courses… 15 years ago. The technology, except maybe easy use of video (you could use video, it was just a bit more of a pain), was all there then…”

  3. Paul Krugman:
    Keynesians and the Volcker Disinflation:
    “Right-wing economists like Stephen Moore and John Cochrane–it’s becoming ever harder to tell the difference–have some curious beliefs…. One… is that the experience of disinflation in the 1980s was a huge shock to Keynesians, refuting everything they believed. What makes this belief curious is that it’s the exact opposite of the truth. Keynesians came into the Volcker disinflation… with a standard… model…. And events matched…. Cutting inflation would require a temporary surge in unemployment. Eventually, however, unemployment could come back down to more or less its original level; this temporary surge in unemployment would deliver a permanent reduction in the inflation rate, because it would change expectations…. [That’s] what the Volcker disinflation actually looked like…. It was the other side of the macro divide that was left scrambling for answers. The models Chicago was promoting in the 1970s, based on the work of Robert Lucas and company, said that unemployment should have come down quickly…. Those models were unsustainable in the face of the data. But… most of those guys went into real business cycle theory–basically, denying that the Fed had anything to do with recessions. And from there they just kept digging ever deeper into the rabbit hole…

  4. Laura Tyson and Lenny Mendonca:
    Obamacare and Effective Government:
    “When historians look back on the United States’ Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act… they will not devote much attention to its regulations, its troubled insurance exchanges, or its website’s flawed launch… [but] on how ‘Obamacare’ encouraged a wave of innovation that gradually tamed the spiraling costs of a dysfunctional system, even as millions of previously excluded Americans gained access to health insurance…”

  5. Duncan Black:
    Eschaton: Um Because Even Proponents Never Had Any Explanation For How It Would Work?):
    “1) Destroy demand in the middle of a depression. 2) ??. 3) Cure depression!!! Nowhere have austerity policies been more aggressively tried — and generally failed to live up to results promised by advocates — than in Greece. After more than four years of belt tightening, patience is wearing thin, and tentative signs of improvement have not yet trickled down into the lives of average Greeks. At least US ‘trickle down’ isn’t completely implausible. Give money to rich people and maybe they’ll buy some stuff from the rest of us! I’m not sure how belt tightening is supposed to trickle down. Perhaps we should ask the Wookies on Endor.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Kaleberg:
    Liveblogging World War II: December 27, 1944: FDR Seizes Montgomery Ward:
    “I live in a former lumber town and the locals are angry that the timber business isn’t what it used to be. At one time, everyone worked cutting down trees and making wood products and was paid enough to buy a house and raise a family. Being a lumber man wasn’t always like that. In the late 19th century lumberjacks were poorly paid and the town was full of bars and whore houses. During WWI, the government seized the lumber business and imposed a labor contract to provide wood and wood products for the war effort. Employers rarely raise wages just because productivity is rising or business is good. It requires united labor action or government intervention, and usually both. P.S. The business is still here, but it is ever more automated. A logging truck with a loader turns two men into a whole crew. It’s also still dangerous. We lose one or two men, usually tree fellers, every year according to the local paper. The pay is still good, but you can’t run a whole town on it anymore.”

  2. Charles Murray (1979):
    Juvenile Corrections and the Chronic Delinquent:
    “The data do point unequivocally, we believe, to this: the grounds for debate about juvenile corrections must be shifted. The rhetoric that has guided national legislation and the policies of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is based on the premise that corrections “only makes kids worse.” That premise mayor may not be true on some dimensions. No one really knows. But in terms of delinquent behavior, corrections does not make kids worse. It makes them better. Much better, from the point of view of the community that must live with them.”

Afternoon Must-Read: William Barnett, ed.: Rational Expectations: A Panel Discussion

You know, before I read this I had not grasped the extent to which, for Robert Lucas and company, rational expectations is not a simplifying modeling assumptions that we hope will be good enough not to betray us retake our models to try to understand the data, but rather the *sine qua non* of any macroeconomic science. To Lucas, if it does not incorporate rational expectations, it can only be what he calls “schlock macroeconomics”. Hence the resort to calibration: rational expectations cannot fail econometric tests, instead it is econometrics that fails the rational expectations test…

William Barnett, ed.::
Rational Expectations: A Panel Discussion: “Kevin Hoover: ‘Kevin Hoover: Bob, did you want to comment on that? You’re looking unhappy, I thought.’

Robert Lucas: ‘No. I mean, you can’t read Muth’s paper as some recipe for cranking out true theories about everything under the sun…. My paper on expectations and the neutrality of money was an attempt to get a positive theory about what observations we call a Phillips curve. Basically it didn’t work…. I thought my model was going to explain price stickiness, and it didn’t. So we’re still working on it…. I don’t think we have a satisfactory solution… but I don’t think that’s a cloud over Muth’s work. If Jack [Muth] thinks it is, I don’t agree with him. Mike [Lovell] cites some data that Jack [Muth] couldn’t make sense out of using rational expectations…. There’re a lot of bad models out there. I authored my share, and I don’t see how that affects a lot of things we’ve been talking about earlier on about the value of Muth’s contribution…. You know, people had no trouble having financial meltdowns in their economies before all this stuff we’ve been talking about came on board. We didn’t help, though; there’s no question about that. We may have focused attention on the wrong things; I don’t know…’


Via Lars Syll:

William Barnett, ed.::
Rational expectations: A Panel Discussion:

Kevin Hoover: In 1986, Mike [Lovell], you… examined the empirical success of… rational expectations… adaptive expectations, structural expectations, and implicit expectations…. Rational expectations does not dominate…. You even cite a paper by Muth, which comes down more or less in favor of implicit expectations….

Michael Lovell: I wish Jack Muth could be here… but… he died just as Hurricane Wilma was zeroing in on his home…. I sent Jack my paper with some trepidation…. He wrote back… in October 1984….

I came up with some conclusions similar to some of yours on the basis of forecasts of business activity compiled by the Bureau of Business Research at Pitt….

Rational expectations model did not pass the empirical test. He went on to say:

It is a little surprising that serious alternatives to rational expectations have never really been proposed. My original paper was largely a reaction against very naıve expectations hypotheses juxtaposed with highly rational decision-making behavior and seems to have been rather widely misinterpreted. Two directions seem to be worth exploring:

  1. Explaining why smoothing rules work and their limitations.
  2. Incorporating well known cognitive biases into expectations theory (Kahneman and Tversky).

It was really incredible that so little has been done along these lines.

Muth also said that his results showed that expectations were not in accordance with the facts about forecasts of demand and production. He then advanced an alternative to rational expectations. That alternative he called an ‘errors-in-the- variables’ model. That is to say, it allowed the expectation error to be correlated with both the realization and the prediction. Muth found that his errors-in-variables model worked better than rational expectations or Mills’ implicit expectations, but it did not entirely pass the tests…. Muth thought that we should not only have rational expectations, but if we’re going to have rational behavioral equations, then consistency requires that our model include rational expectations. But he was also interested in the results of people who do behavioral economics, which at that time was a very undeveloped area.

Hoover: Does anyone else want to comment?…

Robert Shiller: What comes to my mind is that rational expectations models have to assume away the problem of regime change, and that makes them hard to apply….

Kevin Hoover: Bob, did you want to comment on that? You’re looking unhappy, I thought.

Robert Lucas: No. I mean, you can’t read Muth’s paper as some recipe for cranking out true theories about everything under the sun…. My paper on expectations and the neutrality of money was an attempt to get a positive theory about what observations we call a Phillips curve. Basically it didn’t work…. I thought my model was going to explain price stickiness, and it didn’t. So we’re still working on it…. I don’t think we have a satisfactory solution… but I don’t think that’s a cloud over Muth’s work. If Jack [Muth] thinks it is, I don’t agree with him. Mike [Lovell] cites some data that Jack [Muth] couldn’t make sense out of using rational expectations…. There’re a lot of bad models out there. I authored my share, and I don’t see how that affects a lot of things we’ve been talking about earlier on about the value of Muth’s contribution.

Warren Young: Just to wrap up…. Does behavioral economics or psychology in general provide a useful and viable alternative?…

Robert Shiller: Well… the criticism of behavioral economics [is] that it doesn’t provide elegant models…. My opinion is that behavioral economics has to be on the reading list…. Back at the turn of the century—around 1900—when utility-maximizing economic theory was being discovered, it was described as a psychological theory…. I don’t think that there’s a conflict between behavioral economics and classical economics. It’s all something that will evolve responding to each other—psychology and economics.

Robert Lucas: I totally disagree.

Kevin Hoover: The Great Recession and the recent financial crisis have been widely viewed in both popular and professional commentary as a challenge to rational expectations and to efficient markets. I really just want to get your comments on that strain of the popular debate that’s been active over the last couple years…

Robert Lucas: You know, people had no trouble having financial meltdowns in their economies before all this stuff we’ve been talking about came on board. We didn’t help, though; there’s no question about that. We may have focused attention on the wrong things; I don’t know…

Morning Must-Read: Duncan Black: Does Anybody Remember MOOCs?

Duncan Black:
Does Anybody Remember MOOCs?:
“They were all anybody who wrote about education…

…would talk about for awhile. Where did that all go? Apparently administrators finally figured out that a ‘course in a box’ actually costs a lot of money, that it doesn’t scale nearly as well as they hoped, that they are a substitute for ‘learning from a book’ not ‘learning from a person,’ and you can’t charge $50,000 per year tuition simply because your prestigious name will be on the online course degree. I knew all of this because I saw people experimenting with online courses… 15 years ago. The technology, except maybe easy use of video (you could use video, it was just a bit more of a pain), was all there then…

“A substitute for learning from a book” is not quite fair. What we want is an experience machine that is a good enough replica for learning 5-on-1 from a person or, if we cannot get that, a good enough replica of learning from a really good lecturer. For something like 1% of the population–which includes me–a simple book is a good enough replica experience machine. For something like 10% of the population a book is an OK-but-not-good-enough replica. But we now have much better technologies then books at our fingertips, eardrums, and eyeballs, and so we should be able to build experience machines that will push that 1% up to 20% or so and that 10% up to 70% or so. But we are not doing so well so far…

Nighttime Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Volcker Disinflation

Wingnuts gotta nut. And Krugmans gotta Krug. I score this for Krugman, 6-0, 6-0, 6-0:

Paul Krugman:
Keynesians and the Volcker Disinflation:
“Right-wing economists like Stephen Moore and John Cochrane–it’s becoming ever harder to tell the difference–have some curious beliefs….

… One… is that the experience of disinflation in the 1980s was a huge shock to Keynesians, refuting everything they believed. What makes this belief curious is that it’s the exact opposite of the truth. Keynesians came into the Volcker disinflation… with a standard… model…. And events matched…. Cutting inflation would require a temporary surge in unemployment. Eventually, however, unemployment could come back down to more or less its original level; this temporary surge in unemployment would deliver a permanent reduction in the inflation rate, because it would change expectations…. [That’s] what the Volcker disinflation actually looked like…. It was the other side of the macro divide that was left scrambling for answers. The models Chicago was promoting in the 1970s, based on the work of Robert Lucas and company, said that unemployment should have come down quickly…. Those models were unsustainable in the face of the data. But… most of those guys went into real business cycle theory–basically, denying that the Fed had anything to do with recessions. And from there they just kept digging ever deeper into the rabbit hole…

The lessons everyone serious who does forecasting drew from the Volcker Disinflation were three:

  1. Talk is cheap, and so credibility is hard to establish. Shifting expectations rapidly and substantially requires real policy régime change–which is much more than just announcing: “this time we really are serious!”

  2. As a consequence, expectations in the real world are going to be either anchored or adaptive in the absence of real policy régime change.

  3. The adaptive-expectations Phillips Curve is relatively flat: you need big shifts in unemployment to reliably generate small shifts in current inflation.

Lucas drew a different set of lessons from the Volcker Disinflation et sequelae:

The main finding that emerged from the research of the 1970s is that anticipated changes in money growth… are not associated with the kind of stimulus to employment and production that Hume described…. The importance of this distinction between anticipated and unanticipated monetary changes is an implication of every one of the many different models, all using rational expectations, that were developed during the 1970s to account for short-term trade-offs…. The discovery of the central role of the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated money shocks resulted from the attempts… to formulate mathematically explicit models… addressing the issues raised by Hume. But… none of the specific models… can now be viewed as a satisfactory theory of business cycles…. Much recent research has followed the lead of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and emphasized the effects of purely real forces on employment and production…

Whenever I read this, I can only think that Lucas uses “finding”, “are”, and “discovery” in a manner of which Inigo Montoya would disapprove.

Lucas seems to say that rational-expectations monetary models of the business cycle had their chance, failed, and so it is time to move on to rational-expectations real models of the business cycle in which recessions come about because of engineers’ losses of knowledge how to produce things efficiently–the Great Forgetting theory–of workers’ reduced desire to work–the Great Vacation theory–or of a sudden increase in the depreciation rate on capital–the Great Rusting theory.

Moving backward, and dropping the straitjacket of the rational-expectations representative-agent framework was just not considered.