Covering the Rollout of This Year’s Burr-Hatch-[Coburn/Upton] ObamaCare Replacement Proposal Properly: Focus

I think, yet again, that this New York Times story on the Burr-Hatch-Upton ObamaCare replacement proposal would have been much better if it had been assigned to David Leonhard’s The Upshot rather than to the New York Times’s national news desk. The indispensable link that should be in Robert Pear’s story but isn’t is here. And it should have been compared to last year’s equivalent

Robert Pear’s article:

Robert Pear: G.O.P. Lawmakers Propose Alternative to Obamacare: “Three influential Republican members of Congress unveiled a comprehensive proposal on Wednesday to replace President Obama’s health care overhaul with an alternative that would halt the expansion of Medicaid and scale back subsidies for middle-income people to buy private insurance…. States would have more authority to specify the ‘essential health benefits’… the federal government would no longer require insurance policies to include coverage for maternity care. The proposal was devised by… Hatch of Utah… Upton of Michigan… and… Burr of North Carolina…”

Robert Pear does not provide a link to any piece of paper about the plan, not even to Burr, Hatch, and Upton’s own op-ed.

Over at the Washington Post’s Wonkblog, Jason Millman writes, much more usefully, that:

The GOP plan outlined by congressional aides Wednesday is similar to one that the senators offered last year, which the GOP never united around… no actual timetable yet for… writ[ing] a bill or hold[ing] hearings…

Indeed. Last year’s plan and this year’s plan are the same, save for three moderate substantive differences. Comparing:

reveals that:

  • This year, the regulation of malpractice insurance is no longer left to the states.
  • This year, the plan no longer promises to “blunt the worse” of ObamaCare’s Medicare cuts
  • This year Cadillac Tax replacement is
    • no longer a modest cap of the employer-sponsored insurance tax break that begins at 65% of the cost of the current average high-option plan;
    • rather a generous exclusion from taxation of $12,000/year for an individual and $30,000 for a family.

Otherwise the documents are, substantively, the same.

There are a number of rhetorical changes from last year’s document:

  • The subtitle of the document has been changed from “A Legislative Proposal” to “Lower Costs, More Choices”.
  • In the first paragraph: “patient-centered” has been changed to “patient-focused”; “patients and taxpayers” has been changed to “patients, families, small businesses, and taxpayers”.
  • A footnote has been deleted. The deleted footnote is: “We believe it was unfair and wrong that Obamacare effectively treated Medicare as a piggybank to pay for new programs. Certainly, Medicare is in dire need of structural reforms that will put the program on a sustainable path and prevent its insolvency. That’s why we each have supported a range of proposals that would help shore up Medicare’s financing. We believe these reforms should be adopted–as soon as possible–as part of blunting the worst of Obamacare’s cuts to providers and plans. Over the longer-term, we believe that broader changes to Medicare should be addressed in the context of larger bipartisan Medicare reforms that not only put Medicare on a sustainable path, but modernize the Medicare benefit for seniors.”
  • The change of “patient-centered” to “patient-focused” appears to have been made throughout.
  • In the second paragraph, “common-sense patient protections” has been changed to “patient protections”; “mandates which drive up health-care costs” has been changed to “mandates”.
  • In the bullets below the second paragraph:
    • “NO ONE can be denied coverage” has been changed to “no one can be denied coverage”;
    • “‘continuous coverage protection’ that rewards individuals moving from one health market to another” has been changed to “‘continuous coverage protection’ for individuals moving from one health plan to another”.
    • An added sentence: “An individual could not be medically underwritten, denied health coverage, or be forced to pay a higher premium solely because of a pre- existing condition if they were continuously enrolled in a health plan without a significant break in coverage.”
  • In the third paragraph: “Empowering Small Business and Individuals” has been changed to “Empowering Small Businesses and Individuals”.
  • In the bullets below the third paragraph:
    • “States would be allowed to use” has been changed to “States could elect”;
    • “auto-enrollment to design sustainable insurance” has been changed to “auto-enroll into insurance plans”;
    • “tax credits for individuals who have a health tax credit” has been changed to “individual’s tax credit”;
    • “high-risk pools will help patients who are otherwise without health insurance” has been changed to “high-risk pools could help patients”;
    • “balancing the cost impact” has been changed to “reducing premiums”.
  • In paragraph four: a typo–“patients'” where it should not be possessive–has been corrected; “long-term care insurance and COBRA” has been changed to “COBRA”; “on bipartisan proposals of the past” has been changed to “upon bipartisan proposals”.
  • In paragraph five: “The Patient CARE Act envisions adopting or incentivizing states to adopt a range of solutions to tackle the problem of junk lawsuits and defensive medicine” has been changed to “The Patient CARE Act adopts common-sense reforms to tackle the problem of junk lawsuits and defensive medicine”.
  • Paragraph six has been deleted, rewritten, and replaced:
    • The old: “While recognizing the role of the employer sponsored system in our health care system, it is also important to address the unfair tax treatment of individuals and families who do not receive the same tax preference as those with employer-sponsored health insurance. This proposal repeals the employer mandate in Obamacare, a major reason for employers dropping coverage, and leaves the employer deduction untouched. To help lower the cost of health coverage, the Patient CARE Act reduces a distortion in the tax code—the unlimited exclusion from a worker’s taxes of employer- provided health coverage. This proposal institutes a modest cap on the exclusion for the most generous high-cost plans; specifically, a cap at 65 percent of the average market price for a high-option plan. The cap would be indexed to grow at an annual rate of CPI +1.”
    • The new: “We recognize that employer-sponsored insurance is an important feature of our health care system that provides coverage to nearly 150 million Americans, so we scrap the job-killing employer mandate and preserve the employer deduction. However, the open-ended tax preference encourages higher costs and increased spending. Our proposal maintains the employer deduction, so employers continue to have incentive to provide quality coverage to their employees. At the same time, we institute a cap on the exclusion for employees’ health coverage valued at a generous $12,000 for an individual and $30,000 for a family and index it at CPI+1 for perpetuity. Unlike the punitive Cadillac Plan Tax in current law which imposes an onerous excise tax of 40 percent on cost of coverage of health plans that exceed the annual limit, our proposal treats every additional dollar after the generous threshold at the individual’s tax rate–a more balanced approach for middle class Americans.”

UPDATE:
In email, Harold Pollack summarizes the provisions he knows of. The expansion of Medicaid is reversed, the individual and employer mandates to acquire and provide coverage dropped, and:

  • Subsides would go up to 300% of FPL [rather than 400%]… [adversely effecting] middle-class people even more.
  • Their own version of the Cadillac tax [on high-cost health plans]….
  • Ban on lifetime and annual insurance payment caps remains.
  • Young adult provision [for their remaining on their parents’ insurance] kept, but states could opt-out.
  • HIPAA-type back-door individual mandate for those with continuous coverage, “a one-time open enrollment period in which individuals would be able to purchase coverage regardless of their health status or pre-existing conditions.”
  • lock-granted Medicaid,
  • Letting age gap to to 5:1 [rather than 3:1]
  • Various taxes in ACA repealed or reduced.

Another observer writes:

A non-shocking CBO score… [would] be because of cuts to Medicad–not the expansion, but cuts on pre-ACA Medicaid. Overall, just eyeballing it, it looks like 1/5 tax increase on the middle class, 4/5 benefit cuts for the poor, in exchange for no guarantee of health coverage at all…

The effects of taxation on entrepreneurship and innovation

Innovation and entrepreneurship play a pivotal role in sustained U.S. economic growth and improved standards of living through lower prices, higher wages, and advances in healthcare. There are many factors involved in bringing an idea to the market, but we know surprisingly little about the role of government, and taxation specifically, in attracting foreign entrepreneurs and spurring or repressing U.S. innovation. Stefanie Stantcheva, an Equitable Growth grantee and Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows (and future assistant professor at Harvard’s Department of Economics), together with co-authors Ufuk Akcigit an Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania and Salome Baslandze, a Graduate Student at the University of Pennsylvania, seeks to understand how tax systems affect international mobility and the activity of innovators and entrepreneurs.

To do so, Stantcheva will combine international data on inventors and their patents, and tax policies across developed economies in order to understand how income taxes, a country’s immigration policies, and companies influences the activity and mobility of inventors as well as the quality of innovative activity. The focus is on “superstar’’ inventors, those inventors with the most valuable patents, who play a key role in economic growth. She will use the results to build a more complete taxation model, which takes entrepreneurship and innovation into account.

Stantcheva posits that a progressive tax code can reduce the profits from any given innovation, thus encouraging inventors and entrepreneurs to move to a lower-tax country. Her preliminary results find that, broadly speaking, this prediction holds true. Yet she also finds these results can be mitigated by a country’s investment in a strong basic research infrastructure, allowing for an active community of innovators whose contributions to growth are shared equally instead of just among the top earners.

Stantcheva suggests that progressive tax systems may also safeguard against the high possibility of failure inherent to any start up, allowing smart individuals without an abundance of wealth to act on their good ideas. Her hypothesis is supported by some emerging literature, which contends that some government social insurance programs can actually spur entrepreneurship by encouraging people to take risks.

Her final results, due out later this year, will be timely for U.S. policymakers, many of whom are under pressure to cut U.S. research & development funding. To the untrained eye, spending millions of dollars on, for example, fruit fly research may seem wasteful. In fact, this research not only serves as the basis for understanding the entire human genome and many genetic diseases but also produced massive economic returns relative to the original public investment. Despite such evidence, R&D spending by the federal government as a percent of GDP has dropped from 1.7 percent in the 1970s, to 0.7 percent in the 2000s, a phenomenon that may, in the long run, reduce the long-term growth of our economy.

Furthermore, with foreigners comprising 40 percent of all science and engineering Ph.D. graduates in the United States—many of whom are not permitted to stay because of our current immigration laws—there is ample reason to consider reforms to these laws in order to attract and retain more of the talent that creates jobs and drives our economic prosperity. Congress is beginning to take notice, with the recent introduction of the bipartisan Startup Act, which would create a new “entrepreneur” visa category for foreign students who graduate in STEM fields.

Too little is known about how taxes interact with innovation and entrepreneurship, despite invention being a cornerstone of growth. Many immediately conclude that a progressive tax system reduces the returns to innovation, and thus discourages entrepreneurship, which intuitively makes sense. Stantcheva’s research, however, allows us to consider whether this assumption is just one of many considerations we must take into account when designing optimal tax systems and policies to boost innovation and spur economic growth.

Evening Must-Read: Gregory Clark: Social Mobility Barely Exists, But Let’s Not Give Up on Equality

I keep on thinking that we are going to uncover some subtle and accidental bias in the construction of the data that Greg Clark uses. Thus, I keep on thinking, we are eventually going to conclude his results are overstated. But there is no doubt that social mobility across generations is extraordinarily low–much slower than any reasonable assessment of the obvious channels for the intergenerational transmission of status advantage would lead one to expect. This suggests to me, and to Greg, that the “right to rise” in the form of formal meritocratic equality of opportunity is worth remarkably little to all except the children of immigrants. I therefore share Greg’s conclusion that compression rather than churning should be our goal to maximize any utilitarian conception of societal welfare:

Gregory Clark: Social Mobility Barely Exists, But Let’s Not Give Up on Equality: “We live surrounded by inequality….

…The Conservative reaction, personified by David Cameron, is to promote social mobility and meritocracy. History shows… that social mobility rates are immutable, [thus] it is better to reduce the gains people make from having high status, and the penalties from low status. The Swedish model of compressed inequality is a realistic option, the American dream of rapid mobility an illusion…. An illustration of the power of lineage even in modern England comes even from the first names children receive at birth. Naming your daughter Jade means she has one hundredth the chance of attending Oxford as a girl whose parents chose for her Eleanor. Similarly for Bradley versus Peter. Is this just the survival of sclerotic olde England, where the dead hand of the past exercises an especially powerful grip? No….

Why is social mobility so resistant to change? The reason is the strong transmission within families of the attributes that lead to social success… policy can do no more than nibble at the fringes of status persistence. Marriage is highly assortative…. Create labour market institutions that compress wages and salaries…. Structure educational systems to narrow the social rewards to those at the top…. We cannot change the winners in the social lottery, but we can change the value of their prizes.

Things to Read on the Afternoon of February 4, 2015

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Scott Lemieux: What Happens if the Court Goes ACA Troofer?: “Just as some Democrats took a hit for passing the ACA (and were right to do so, because the point of winning elections is to do stuff), Republicans who are opposed to the idea of helping people without medical insurance will be willing to take some political risk to severely damage the ACA…. That said, I’m not sure how much political risk there will be. At the federal level… Obama is likely to take the primary blame for the failure of ‘Obamacare’ no matter who’s really responsible…. At the state level… it will… be Republican governments that are unwilling to set up exchanges, and this will hurt some middle class people. But I’m still not sure what the political hit will be… [if] low-information voters… correctly assess blame for a problem that still only affects a minority of voters…. I think Republicans would be able to stand by and do nothing as a Republicans in black robes wreck the exchanges and largely get away with it.”

  2. NewImageCardiff Garcia: US Treasury Yields and Shrinkage, Sovereign Bond Availability Edition: “Sometimes the simplest explanation is the only one needed, and in economics it doesn’t get much simpler than supply and demand. Competing reasons have been offered for the sustained, vigorous decline in 10-year and long-dated US Treasury yields…. Stories about the factors that influence the demand for safe debt…. The supply of safe sovereign debt is a more straightforward story…. Thanks to the anticipated debt purchases by the ECB and the continuing purchases by the Bank of Japan, net issuance of sovereign debt from advanced economies that’s available to the private sector will turn sharply negative this year and next…. Net issuance of US Treasuries will grow… but not by enough to offset the collective decline of European and Japanese sovereign debt. And the US is still the prettiest pig in the global barnyard…. Will the weakness in long yields and how it affects inflation expectations alter the expected trajectory of US monetary policy? Possibly not. Members of the Fed are increasingly comfortable scoffing at market-based measures of inflation expectations…”

  3. Diane Coyle: How Technology Will Disrupt Education–and How It Won’t: “The Khan Academy is one impressive online resource…. MOOCs have not yet lived up to their original expectations…. Yet, having observed the capacity of the web to torpedo the existing structure and distribution of profits in one industry after another since the mid-1990s, it’s certain education will not remain unchanged. But if not MOOCs, what?… Reputation [is] an important selling point in the higher education market. Excellent courses contribute to an institution’s reputation, but do not define it. The quality and profile of the research… social status and success of its students matter at least as much…. Does this mean higher education will be immune from digital disruption? Of course not…. Work out which tasks performed by universities can be substituted for by online technologies, and which are complements to them…”

  4. Morris Kleiner: Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies: “Occupational licensing has been among the fastest growing labor market institutions in the United States since World War II. The evidence from the economics literature suggests that licensing has had an important influence on wage determination, benefits, employment, and prices in ways that impose net costs on society with little improvement to service quality, health, and safety. To improve occupational licensing practices, Kleiner proposes four specific reforms. First, state agencies would make use of cost-benefit analysis to determine whether requests for additional occupational licensing requirements are warranted. Second, the federal government would promote the determination and adoption of best-practice models through financial incentives and better information. Third, state licensing standards would allow workers to move across state lines with a minimal cost for retraining or residency requirements. Fourth, where politically feasible, certain occupations that are licensed would be reclassified to a system of certification or no regulation. If federal, state, and local governments were to undertake these proposals, evidence suggests that employment in these regulated occupations would grow, consumer access to goods and services would expand, and prices would fall.”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Kevin Drum: Here’s the Big Problem With Liberals’ “Middle Class” Agenda: “President Obama recently advanced two proposals designed to help the middle class… a mortgage plan available to anyone who bought a home…. a college tuition plan that would have helped middle-income workers with money saved by eliminating 529 college savings plans. The mortgage plan has met with considerable enthusiasm. The tuition plan, by contrast, flamed out…. In theory, universal programs like Obama’s mortgage plan are designed to help the middle class, and this is what makes them both popular and politically palatable. In practice, though, the bulk of their benefits usually go to the well off, and this is what really makes them politically palatable. That’s why the tuition program met an instant death. It really did help the middle class—and only the middle class—and this meant it lacked the all-important political support of the well off. In fact, since the well off would be losing a benefit to pay for it, it attracted their instant opposition. And that was that…”

  2. Jeff Spross: Obama’s middle-out economics is good. Bottom-up economics is better.: “The Democrats’ new proposals to boost the middle class feature a number of design aspects that render them almost useless to the lower class. More broadly, the Democrats have spent the last few decades turning away from a commitment to a broad and generous social safety net, and towards shrinking government and mandating work requirements. (Though ObamaCare was a welcome exception to this trend)…”

  3. Elias Asquith: America’s vaccination nightmare: “[Chris] Christie went against the vast majority of medical professionals…. ‘It’s more important what you think as a parent than what you think as a public official,’ said Christie, who claims his own children were vaccinated… ‘parents need to have some measure of choice in things as well’…. You should not be surprised to hear that Christie’s comments were not well-received…. He earned finger-wagging and derision from ostensibly nonpartisan media figures and GOP operatives… criticism became so vociferous and widespread that the National Review was moved to publish not one but two posts that halfheartedly defended Christie…. Christie… seemed to tacitly endorse the conspiratorial belief that the science on vaccinations is up for debate… yet another sign that Christie will do absolutely anything whatsoever to be the Republican Party’s presidential nominee…. Rand Paul’s mistake… was an inverse of Christie’s…. Paul told Evans that he didn’t believe there was ‘anything extraordinary about resorting to freedom’… cite[d] unspecified, secondhand anecdotal evidence ‘of many tragic cases of walking, talking normal children who wound up with profound mental disorders after vaccines.’… Paul comes off quite poorly in the CNBC exchange, sounding patronizing and defensive… seemed to confirm a lingering suspicion about Paul: specifically, that his name is far from the only way you can tell that he’s the son of conspiracy theorist, ex-congressman and two-time Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul…”

  4. Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig: Rand Paul, Libertarians Have Horrifying Views on Parenting: “Confronted with the question of whether or not discouraging vaccination is a threat to children’s health, Paul launched into a meandering consideration of public health and liberty that concluded with the assertion that ‘the state doesn’t own your children, parents own the children.’ Paul’s bizarre rendering of the parent-child relationship as unilateral ownership is not the most unhinged thing a well-regarded libertarian has ever said about children. In fact, libertarians exhibit a historical inability to adequately explain how parents should relate to their children, why parents are obligated (if at all) to care for their children, and whether or not moral nations should require that parents feed, clothe, and shelter their children within a libertarian frame. Consider Lew Rockwell… a professed fan of child labor…. Murray Rothbard… imagined that laws against child labor were passed in order to artificially inflate the wages of adults… [said] a parent… ‘should have the legal right not to feed the child, i.e., to allow it to die.’… Such dark fantasies are not restricted to the weird world of libertarian academia…. Libertarianism rests on the whimsical notion that all people are isolated, entirely free agents with no claims on others except those that they can negotiate through consensual contracts…. To avoid a hellish death spiral of infectious disease and neglect, we would all do well to reject Paul and his cohort on the subject of child rearing.”

Afternoon Must-Read: Scott Lemieux: What Happens if the Court Goes ACA Troofer?

The disconnect between who takes actions in Washington and who receives political responsibility whenever anything goes wrong continues to be a big problem with our modern system of governance. Another possible example for Norm Ornstein and company to chew over:

Scott Lemieux: What Happens if the Court Goes ACA Troofer?: “Just as some Democrats took a hit for passing the ACA…

…(and were right to do so, because the point of winning elections is to do stuff), Republicans who are opposed to the idea of helping people without medical insurance will be willing to take some political risk to severely damage the ACA…. That said, I’m not sure how much political risk there will be. At the federal level… Obama is likely to take the primary blame for the failure of ‘Obamacare’ no matter who’s really responsible….

At the state level… it will… be Republican governments that are unwilling to set up exchanges, and this will hurt some middle class people. But I’m still not sure what the political hit will be… [if] low-information voters… correctly assess blame for a problem that still only affects a minority of voters…. I think Republicans would be able to stand by and do nothing as a Republicans in black robes wreck the exchanges and largely get away with it.

ICYMI: Milanović on why wealth is not income and income is not consumption

Branko Milanović: – Repeat after me: Wealth is not income and income is not consumption:

Among the advanced economies, wealth-poverty is not limited to the United States. In Germany 27% of households (as of 2013) have negative or zero net wealth (paper by Markus Grabka and Christian Westermeier). So these people would be also included among the wealth-poorest people in the world.

Is this an anomaly? Does it make the study of wealth inequality meaningless? According to the critics of the Oxfam report it does, because the wealth-poor people from the rich countries do not necessarily lead a life of poverty. Thanks to deep financial systems that exist in rich countries they can borrow and keep their consumption relatively high all the while driving their net wealth down to zero. In effect, borrowing is simultaneously a way to keep consumption high (above your income which may be also high by global standards) and driving your net wealth down to zero. Thus, we have people who are absolutely poor by wealth standards while their income or consumption may place them around the 60th, 70th or even higher global percentile.

But the “anomaly” is solely in the minds of the critics. Distribution of net wealth is not the same thing as distribution of consumption or income. Each of these aggregates has its own uses. If one wants to look at people whose real consumption is minimal, who live at the edge of subsistence, one should look at the global distribution of consumption with its famous poverty line of $1 (now $1.25) international dollars per capita per day. This is what the World Bank has been doing since 1990. There are no people from the rich countries among the consumption-poor. Even the poorest people from the advanced economies have a much higher level of consumption (at least around $12-$15 international dollars per day).

It is a wrong belief that there should be one and only one measure that would give us the answer who is poor and who is rich. The three welfare aggregates (wealth, income and consumption) are related but they are not the same. (And I leave out other “details” like the distinction between net income, that is, after-fisc income, and market income or income before any government transfers and taxes.) There are people who are poor or middle class according to one measure but rich according to another. Wealth is not income nor is income consumption.

Confessions of a Financial Deregulator: Hoisted from the Archives from 2008 Over at Project Syndicate

People have been asking me about this recently, and I keep thinking it is a set of issues I should revisit, reconsider, expand, and write about at length. But I have failed to do so.

So here it is again, hoisted from the archives:

J. Bradford DeLong: Confessions of a Financial Deregulator: Back in the late 1990’s, in America at least, two schools of thought pushed for more financial deregulation–that is, for repealing the legal separation of investment banking from commercial banking, relaxing banks’ capital requirements, and encouraging more aggressive creation and use of derivatives.

The first school of thought, broadly that of the United States’ Republican Party, was that financial regulation was bad because all regulation was bad. The second, broadly that of the Democratic Party, was somewhat more complicated, and was based on four observations:

  1. In the global economy’s industrial core, at least, it had then been more than 60 years since financial disruption had had more than a minor impact on overall levels of production and employment. While modern central banks had difficulty in dealing with inflationary shocks, it had been generations since they had seen a deflationary shock that they could not handle.
  2. The profits of the investment-banking oligarchy (the handful of investment banks, with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley preeminent) were far in excess of what any competitive market ought to deliver, owing to these banks’ deep pockets and ability to maneuver through thickets of regulations.
  3. The long-run market-return gradient–by which those with deep pockets and the patience to take on real-estate, equity, derivative, and other risks reaped outsize returns – seemed to indicate that financial markets were awful at mobilizing society’s risk-bearing capacity.
  4. The poorer two-thirds of America’s population appeared to be shut out of the opportunities to borrow at reasonable interest rates and to invest at high returns that the top third–especially the rich–enjoyed.

These four observations suggested that some institutional experimentation was in order. Depression-era restrictions on risk seemed less urgent, given the US Federal Reserve’s proven ability to build firewalls between financial distress and aggregate demand. New ways to borrow and to spread risk seemed to have little downside. More competition for investment-banking oligarchs from commercial bankers and insurance companies with deep pockets seemed likely to reduce the investment banking industry’s unconscionable profits.

It seemed worth trying. It wasn’t.

Analytically, we are still picking through the wreckage of this experiment. Why were the risk controls at highly-leveraged money-center universal banks so lousy? Why weren’t central banks and governments willing and able to step up and maintain the flow of aggregate demand as the financial crisis and its aftermath choked off private investment and consumption spending?

More questions arise from the policy response to the subsequent recession. Why, once the magnitude of the downturn became clear, weren’t governments eager to step in to return unemployment to normal levels, especially in the absence of higher inflation expectations, upward pressure on prices, or even interest-rate increases that would crowd out private investment spending? And how has the financial industry managed to retain so much political power to block regulatory reform?

Moreover, how to restructure the financial system remains unclear. The Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of investment from commercial banking greatly benefited the established oligarchy of investment banks, but somehow the entry of competitors from commercial banks and insurers increased financial companies’ profits further.

There were significant profit opportunities for financial intermediaries that could find spare risk-bearing capacity, carve out securities to take advantage of it, and thus take a middleman’s cut from matching risks with investors who could gain from bearing them. But the advent of derivatives concentrated risk rather than dispersing it, for there was even more money to be made by selling risk to people who did not know how to value it–or, indeed, what risks they were bearing.

And central banks’ failure to regard their primary job to be the stabilization of nominal income–their failure not only to be good Keynesians, but even good monetarists–raises the question of whether central banking itself needs drastic reform. Back in 1825, the Bank of England’s Governor Cornelius Buller understood that when the private sector had a sudden panic-driven spike in demand for safe and liquid financial assets, it was the Bank’s responsibility to meet that demand and so keep bankruptcy and depression at bay. How can his successors know less than he did?

It may even be the case that we ought to return to the much more tightly regulated financial system of the first post-World War II generation. That system served the industrial core well, at least as far as we can tell from the macroeconomic aggregates. We know for certain that our more recent system has not.”

Debate: J. Bradford DeLong and R. Glenn Hubbard: Income and Wealth Inequality in the United States: Evidence, Causes and Solutions

Event – Income and Wealth Inequality in the United States: Evidence, Causes and Solutions | Rice University’s Baker Institute:

  • WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION: John W. Diamond, Ph.D., Edward A. and Hermena Hancock Kelly Fellow in Public Finance, Baker Institute
  • PANELIST: R. Glenn Hubbard, Ph.D., Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia Business School
  • PANELIST: J. Bradford DeLong, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
  • MODERATOR: George R. Zodrow, Ph.D., Allyn R. and Gladys M. Cline Chair of Economics; and Baker Institute Rice Faculty Scholar

Morning Must-Read: Cardiff Garcia: [US Treasury Yields and Shrinkage, Sovereign Bond Availability Edition

NewImage

Cardiff Garcia: US Treasury Yields and Shrinkage, Sovereign Bond Availability Edition: “Sometimes the simplest explanation…

…is the only one needed, and in economics it doesn’t get much simpler than supply and demand. Competing reasons have been offered for the sustained, vigorous decline in 10-year and long-dated US Treasury yields…. Stories about the factors that influence the demand for safe debt…. The supply of safe sovereign debt is a more straightforward story….

Thanks to the anticipated debt purchases by the ECB and the continuing purchases by the Bank of Japan, net issuance of sovereign debt from advanced economies that’s available to the private sector will turn sharply negative this year and next…. Net issuance of US Treasuries will grow… but not by enough to offset the collective decline of European and Japanese sovereign debt. And the US is still the prettiest pig in the global barnyard…. Will the weakness in long yields and how it affects inflation expectations alter the expected trajectory of US monetary policy? Possibly not. Members of the Fed are increasingly comfortable scoffing at market-based measures of inflation expectations…

Morning Must-Read: Diane Coyle: How Technology Will Disrupt Education–and How It Won’t

Diane Coyle: How Technology Will Disrupt Education–and How It Won’t: “The Khan Academy is one impressive online resource….

…MOOCs have not yet lived up to their original expectations…. Yet, having observed the capacity of the web to torpedo the existing structure and distribution of profits in one industry after another since the mid-1990s, it’s certain education will not remain unchanged. But if not MOOCs, what?…

Reputation [is] an important selling point in the higher education market. Excellent courses contribute to an institution’s reputation, but do not define it. The quality and profile of the research… social status and success of its students matter at least as much…. Does this mean higher education will be immune from digital disruption? Of course not…. Work out which tasks performed by universities can be substituted for by online technologies, and which are complements to them…