Must-Read: Nick Bunker: Shifting Implications of the Beveridge Curve

Shifting through the implications of the Beveridge Curve Washington Center for Equitable Growth

Must-Read: Nick Bunker: Shifting Implications of the Beveridge Curve: “Sketching out the Beveridge Curve… confirms this notion that most of the shift…

…is driven by long-term unemployment…. Kory Kroft [et al.]… posits… [this] is because many unemployed workers who otherwise would drop out of the labor force have stayed in due to extended unemployment insurance…. There’s also evidence that the job-openings rate portrays employers’ search for workers as higher than it actually is…. Davis… Faberman… Haltiwanger… finds a decline in ‘recruiting intensity.’… But… the JOLTS database only goes back to December 2000…. If we think there might be a structural shift in the labor market, then we should look at data that covers a much longer period…. Diamond… and… Şahin of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did. They constructed a data set that spans back to 1951. They show that the Beveridge Curve has shifted out several times over the past six decades, but these shifts weren’t indicative of major structural changes in the labor market or a rise in structural unemployment…. Shifts in the Beveridge Curve should be interpreted with caution…

Things to Read on the Morning of May 18, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Matthew Yglesias: Obama’s Real Problem on Trade Is Way Bigger than Elizabeth Warren

Must-Read: The real problem that Barack Obama has with the Trans-Pacific Partnership is that the intellectual property interests–Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and Pharma–are for it only to the extent that it strengthens their property rights, that the Democratic caucus is against it unless it contains meaningful steps to reduce inequality and increase positive-sum regulatory oversight, and that the Republican caucus is against it if it contains meaningful steps to reduce inequality and increase positive-sum regulatory oversight. Thus from a perspective that is technocrat-utilitarian, legislative-process, and coalition-assembly oriented, the obvious path is to appoint a senior free-trade Republican–a Romney figure–to negotiate TPP, and then to withhold presidential approval of its implementing legislation unless inequality-reducing Democratic legislative priorities are attached to the bill. Yet, once again, this kind of Legislative Process 101 move–to make the situation not “I’m in here with you” but “you’re in here with me”–was not undertaken by the Obama White House…

Matthew Yglesias: Obama’s Real Problem on Trade Is Way Bigger than Elizabeth Warren: “The coalition against TPP is very broad…

…The Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council both say the deal would be bad for the environment. Doctors Without Borders says it’s bad for global public health. The AIDS research group amFAR agrees. Consumers Union says it will raise prescription drug prices. The Electronic Frontier Foundation says TPP ‘raises significant concerns about citizens’ freedom of expression, due process, innovation, the future of the Internet’s global infrastructure, and the right of sovereign nations to develop policies and laws that best meet their domestic priorities.’ The Alliance for Justice… released a letter signed by 100 legal scholars arguing against Investor State Dispute Settlement provisions. When Vox asked a development expert if TPP’s opening of US markets to more imports from Vietnam would help fight global poverty, she told us no.

Must-Read: John Quiggin: The Political Is Personal

Must-Read: I have often wondered and never manage to get completely straight in my mind how economics lost its utilitarian roots–how it went from saying “this is a good policy because it advances the greater good of the greater number” to “competitive free-market allocations are good because they are Pareto-optimal, and we do not prefer any particular Pareto-optimal allocation because that would be a question not of science but of values and politics, and non-Pareto-optimal allocations are bad.” It has puzzled me particularly because the claim that we cannot say X is better than Y because they are not Pareto-ranked is not, in general, raised when the policy at issue issue is a GDP-increasing and either distributionally-neutral or inequality-increasing policy like tariff reductions or cuts in capital taxation…

John Quiggin: The Political Is Personal: “Pareto’s larger body of anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian thought… culminated…

…at the end of his life, in his embrace of Mussolini’s fascism. This led me to… Renato Cirillo, in 1983, defending Pareto against the charge of being a precursor of fascism… [because] Pareto:

manifested consistently a strong attachment to a type of liberalism not dissimilar to the one later attributed to Mises and Hayek…

These are rather unfortunate examples, in view of Mises writings in praise of fascism and work for the Dollfuss regime, and (even more), Hayek’s embrace of Pinochet, at the very time Cirillo was writing…. I’ve come to two conclusions…. First, for serious writers on political theory, political engagement is and ought to be the rule rather than the exception…. Someone whose political theory doesn’t lead them to have and express views on the great political issues of their day probably doesn’t much of interest to say about theory either…. Second, it makes no sense to look at the theoretical writings and ignore the political commitments…. It is easy to construct readings of Pareto, Mises and Hayek in ways that make them appear either as friends or as enemies of political liberalism. Their (remarkably similar) actions make it clear which reading is correct…. Their brand of liberalism is hostile to democracy and indifferent to political liberty, making them natural allies of any fascist regime which adheres to free-market orthodoxy in economics.

Eventually, of course, ideas outgrow their creators to the point where original intentions…. But… as long as a writer is regarded as having any personal authority, the weight of that authority must be assessed in the light of their actions as well as their words.

Nicholas Gruen: “Nice post John…

…As an admirer of Hayek’s basic insight… his lack of sympathy for the weak and powerless has always saddened me. The opposite is true of Adam Smith….

John Quiggin: “Read Hayek, but with Chile in mind at all times. That’s where his ideas ended up…

…so, whatever merit they may have, either (a) they were wrong in crucial respects; or (b) he didn’t understand and act on his own ideas. I think (a) is clearly correct. Everything he wrote, from Road to Serfdom onwards presents socialism and social democracy as an existential threat, to which a man on horseback is preferable. And his version of liberalism is one in which political liberalism is subordinated to the preservation of property rights. Applied to Chile, this implies support for Pinochet.

Shifting through the implications of the Beveridge Curve

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics last week released new data from its Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. The data set gives us information on the amount of movement in the labor market: how many workers left a job, how many were hired, and how many jobs are employers offering. One way to digest this data is by charting a relationship known as the Beveridge Curve.

Named after British economist William Beveridge, the curve shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and the jobs vacancy rate, or the number of job openings as a share of the labor force. If the curve shifts right and upwards, like we’ve seen during the economic recovery in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 (See Figure 1),  most conclude  that employers are posting more job openings but don’t like what they see among possible new employees.

Figure 1

disaggregated-beveridge-01

But is that interpretation of the shift correct? Well, the increase in unemployment during and the high levels after the Great Recession is uniquely affected by high levels of long-term unemployment, so that might have something to do with the shift. The Heritage Foundation’s Salim Furth points out that may indeed be the case. And sketching out the Beveridge Curve with the long-term unemployment rate– instead of the overall rate—confirms this notion that most of the shift is driven by long-term unemployment (See Figure 2.)

disaggregated-beveridge-02

What might be behind this somewhat surprising relationship? A working paper by economists Kory Kroft of the University of Toronto, Fabian Lange of Yale University, Matthew Notowidigdo of Northwestern University, and Lawrence Katz of Harvard University posits that most of the increase in the long-term unemployed is because many unemployed workers who otherwise would drop out of the labor force have stayed in due to extended unemployment insurance. As a result, the unemployment rate remains high because workers keep looking for jobs.

There’s also evidence that the job-openings rate portrays employers’ search for workers as higher than it actually is. A paper by economists Steven J. Davis and R. Jason Faberman at the University of Chicago, alongside John C. Haltiwanger at the University of Maryland looks at the jobs opening rate and finds a decline in “recruiting intensity.” This means that employers are increasing postings but that they aren’t super interested in hiring yet. So again, the shift might be overstated.

But let’s pull back a bit here and look at the historical record. The JOLTS database only goes back to December 2000. Looking at the shift of a curve with 15 year-old data can be problematic. If we think there might be a structural shift in the labor market, then we should look at data that covers a much longer period.

That’s just what a report published last year by Peter Diamond, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist and a Nobel laureate, and Ayşegül Şahin of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did. They constructed a data set that spans back to 1951. They show that the Beveridge Curve has shifted out several times over the past six decades, but these shifts weren’t indicative of major structural changes in the labor market or a rise in structural unemployment.

What’s the lesson here? Shifts in the Beveridge Curve should be interpreted with caution. A shift out of the curve isn’t necessarily a sign of a rise in structural unemployment. Simple curves and graphs can be clarifying and instructive, but they aren’t the end of the analysis—particularly when the underlying data is constrained to a narrow time frame. Taking the time to dig in more is a worthwhile investment.

Must-Read: Simon Wren-Lewis: Paul Romer and Microfoundations

Must-Read: There are, I think, six things that Paul Romer is objecting to, all gathered together under the portmanteau of “mathiness”:

  1. Claiming that, as a matter of methodology, “good science” requires assumptions that bake my politics into the cake.
  2. Claiming that a theory is in some sense “confirmed” when in fact it makes no claims about anything observable.
  3. Hiding your reasoning in a blizzard of irrelevant algebra.
  4. Uncritically applying to the real world conclusions based on dubious assumptions.
  5. Focusing on internal consistency rather than external relevance.
  6. Foundations that are fake–that assume agents and markets that are not in the appropriate sense like the real agents and markets.

The problem with his paper, I think, is that while these six are correlated things, they are six different an distinct things.

Simon Wren-Lewis: Paul Romer and Microfoundations: “A distinction between scientific consensus and political discourse…

…a divide… between… perfect competition and… imperfect competition… the distinction between appropriate mathematical theory and what he calls ‘mathiness’…. Theory is denigrated… because of the policy implications that may follow…. The microfoundations methodology… can place… a low weight on… evidence…. (Ask not whether price stickiness has empirical support, but whether it has solid microfoundations.)… Paul Pfleiderer… ‘A model becomes a chameleon when it is built on assumptions with dubious connections to the real world but nevertheless has conclusions that are uncritically (or not critically enough) applied to understanding our economy’… defending a particular political view or sectional interest…

Noah Smith, Paul Romer, “Mathiness”, and Baking the Politics into the Microfoundations…

I see that over on the Twitter machine Noah Smith is engaging Paul Romer, in an attempt to get Paul to elucidate his “Mathiness” paper. I think Noah Smith misunderstands Paul Romer.

As I see it, Paul Romer believes that George Stigler laid down the methodological principal that one should always assume perfect competition in one’s microfoundations, and in so doing Stigler was acting as an ideologue rather than a technocrat, and that this is harmful.

It seems to me that Paul is more right than wrong.

It seems likely to me that Paul Romer has properly classified George Stigler in his beastiary. As I see it, George Stigler thought we did not need to evaluate whether Chamberlinian and other models of imperfect competition were true because we already knew that they were intellectually dangerous: not good to think with. Why? Because they gave an intellectual opening to “planners”–who were completely unaware of thie magnitudes of potential government failure–to argue for their interventionist “planning”.

A sound analysis, I think Stigler thought, would take account of the magnitudes of potential government failures. It would lead to the correct conclusion that, even if Chamberlinian features were true, and even if they were included in the model, anything other then letting the market rip would be a bad policy mistake. However, Chamberlinian models that ignored government failure could be used to argue for all kinds of destructive interventionist policies–antitrust policies, Keynesian policies, you name it. In this context, requiring that models assume perfect competition in their microfoundations as a methodological principle was a “Noble Lie”, a proper esoteric teaching. It led those who could not grasp the true esoteric teaching about the magnitude of government failure to the right and true conclusions. And one could teach those who could handle it the esoteric teaching–including the point that perfect competition was the proper microeconomic foundation to assume in the course of teaching gentlemen, and was a proper part of the methodology of positive and normative economics.

The problem is that Paul Romer wants to analyze issues in which perfect competition is not an assumption that leads one to anything like the True Knowledge about appropriate policies for economic growth. And yet Lucas and company are insisting that he make it. And it is to this, I think, that Paul Romer objects–most strongly.

And I think Noah misses this. Paul objects not to simplified microfoundations, and not to math, but rather to “mathiness”, which is restricting your microfoundations in advance to guarantee a particular political result and hiding what you are doing in a blizzard of irrelevant and ungrounded algebra.

Noah writes:

Noah Smith: Paul Romer on Mathiness: “Paul Romer… comes down harshly ‘mathiness’ in growth theory…

…us[ing] math in a sloppy way, to support their preferred theories. Romer warns direly that the culture of econ theory has become a lot more tolerant of mathiness…. Romer has now joined the chorus of old famous guys–Krugman, Solow, Stiglitz, Farmer–who are very vocally mad about the way mainstream economics theory is done…. Interestingly, although he’s talking only about growth theory… most of the people he’s mad at are the same guys that the Keynesians are mad at – Robert Lucas, Ed Prescott, and David K. Levine…. Prescott and McGrattan…. Boldrin and Levine…. Moll….

I think Romer is on to something about the culture of econ theory… [where] people seem to view math more as a tool for stylized description of ideas than as a tool for quantitative prediction of observables…. But… [even in] earlier models, I don’t really see much more tight connection of variables to observables…. [The] Solow model… tie[s] capital K to observable things like structures and machines and vehicles. But you’ll be left with a big residual, A. Then you can break A down and extract another term for human capital, H. Can you really measure human capital?… I don’t really see a huge difference between that and the ‘location’ used by Prescott and McGrattan (2010)…. Mathiness isn’t anything new, it’s just the way these econ fields work…

What Noah misses, I think, is what Bob Solow wrote the Solow model down do. The first point of the Solow model is that you cannot account for the coming of modern economic growth via any increase in the savings rate–in the accumulation of buildings and machines–as long as you think factors of production are paid their marginal product. The second point of the Solow model is that, properly calibrated, if factors are paid their marginal products, accumulation accounts for only a small part of per-capita growth at the frontier over any time period as long as a decade or so. The third point is that with the ancillary assumption that ideas can be learned by looking at the successful one would expect swift convergence to the frontier. The fourth point is that human capital–number of years of schooling–does not do much to resolve the modern economic growth puzzle.

Romer’s point is that good theory seeks strong correlations between observables that it then tries to explain as emergent properties resulting from some usefully-modeled market-structure foundations. Good theory does not theorize about unobservables. From this perspective, the Solow model is (mostly) a demonstration of approaches that do not work, and is useful because it rules things out–and it is thus the exact opposite of explaining modern economic growth via unobservables.

Must Read: Joshua Gans: [Paul Romer and] Mathiness: A Guide for the Perplexed

Must-Read: As I often say, you win the game of economic theory working in the Chicago tradition if you come up with a theoretical reason why a situation that appears rife with externalities and market failures is in fact one in which the bare-market allocation is in some sense Pareto Optimal. People who start out from the belief the governments are incompetent by necessity and that private property as always the greatest thing–even greater than sliced bread–should not work in the Chicago tradition, as what they produce is lousy. (conversely, you win the game of economic theory working in the Berkeley tradition if you come up with a theoretical reason why a situation in which it looks like the market works is actually rife with market failures and externalities. People who start out from the belief the government failure does not exist do not do good work in the Berkeley tradition.)

Now comes Paul Romer to say the Chicago tradition has become hopelessly corrupt: that they are no longer trying to win the game via argument and insight, but just pointlessly going through the motions with mathiness:

Joshua Gans: [Paul Romer and] Mathiness: A Guide for the Perplexed: “Paul Romer [has] levelled an attack on many macroeconomic [growth] theorists…

…including his advisor Bob Lucas…. Romer… thinks that economic theory, mainly macroeconomic [growth] theory, is itself in a bad equilibrium…. Theory… has become [mere] entertainment… a relatively sloppy thing… at best, a sideshow to some other game… [and] a device being used by academics to further a political agenda…. Here his thinking is murkier…. [For example,] Lucas and Moll… a model where… knowledge [can] be created under perfect competition…. When you can demonstrate that something occurs under perfect competition, there is a belief that you are somewhat absolved from saying that there is a policy problem….

How to accelerate knowledge creation is a hard problem…. There is more, much more, to it than that, and mathiness and its tendency to direct people towards the wrong questions (can this work even under perfect competition?) and away from the right (what is the mechanism driving knowledge creation and diffusion?) is the proverbial drunk search for keys under a lamp post. Nonetheless, outside of macroeconomics, I am not sure that it is politics as much as some narrow thinking driving theorists to produce big papers with big empirical implications…. The organization of our knowledge in economics leaves a lot to be desired and is distorting the way that knowledge is being created…

I think Paul is right. I think his targets are going down the road that the Austrians went down long ago–the road of saying that if my theories are inconsistent with the facts and cannot be marked-to-market, so much the worse for the fact and for the idea of marking one’s beliefs to market…

Things to Read on the Evening of May 15, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Fraternity of Failure

Must-Read: I understand that voters have short memories, And thus the politicians who predict that, say, the 1993 Clinton tax increase would crater the economy may evade the consequences of having recommended bad policies and remain in office. But they do want to enact policies that will work. So you would think that a Paul Ryan would be thinking twice right now about palling around with a John Cochrane, a Stephen Moore, a Cliff Asness, or an Arthur Laffer. Yet somehow…

I do not understand it:

Paul Krugman: Fraternity of Failure: “Jeb Bush wants to stop talking about past controversies….

…And you can see why…. Bush’s response… [was] ‘going back in time’ is a ‘disservice’ to those who served in the war…. Take a moment to savor the cowardice and vileness of that last remark. And, no, that’s not hyperbole. Mr. Bush is trying to hide behind the troops…. Wait, there’s more… Bush resorted to the old passive-voice dodge… ‘mistakes were made.’ Indeed. By whom?…. Bush released[‘s]… chief advisers on foreign policy… [is] a who’s-who of mistake-makers…. In Bushworld… a record of being disastrously wrong on national security issues seems to be a required credential….

[And] in economic policy… economists who appear to have significant influence on Republican leaders… nearly all… agreed… there was no housing bubble… the American economic future was bright… the Federal Reserve’s efforts to fight the economic crisis… would lead to severe inflation… Obamacare… would be a huge job-killer…. You might think that there would be some room in the G.O.P. for economists who didn’t get everything wrong. But there isn’t. Having been completely wrong… seems… a required credential….

Extreme tribalism… [means] anyone who questioned whether the Federal Reserve was really debasing the currency was surely an enemy of capitalism and freedom…. Simply raising questions about the orthodoxies of the moment leads to excommunication…. So the only ‘experts’ left standing are those who made all the approved mistakes… a fraternity of failure… united by a shared history of getting everything wrong, and refusing to admit it…

Duncan Black: And Their Enablers): “Krgthulu:

So the only ‘experts’ left standing are those who made all the approved mistakes. It’s kind of a fraternity of failure: men and women united by a shared history of getting everything wrong, and refusing to admit it. Will they get the chance to add more chapters to their reign of error?

But the ‘approved mistakes’ aren’t simply approved by Fox News and The Right, they’re also generally approved by the Washington Elite Consensus. Maybe we’re at the point where the Iraq war was a wee mistake, bygones, but all the people who supported it supported it for the right reasons and the hippies were still wrong. Inflation didn’t happen, but it’s still around the corner, etc. The Right still rules our discourse.