Must-Read: Erik Eyster, Matthew Rabin, and Dimitri Vayanos: Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices

Must-Read: Erik Eyster, Matthew Rabin, and Dimitri Vayanos: Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices: “We present a model of a financial market where some traders are ‘cursed’…

…when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others’ private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But because they neglect that the price encodes other traders’ information, prices depend less on private signals and more on public signals than rational-expectation-equilibrium (REE) prices. Markets comprised entirely of cursed traders generate more trade than those comprised entirely of rationals; mixed markets can generate even more trade, as rationals employ momentum-trading strategies to exploit cursed traders. We contrast our results to other models of departures from REE and show that per-trader volume with cursed traders increases when the market becomes large, while natural forms of overconfidence predict that volume should converge to zero.

Must-Read: Joseph Stiglitz: The Origins of Inequality, and Policies to Contain It

Must-Read: Joseph E. Stiglitz: The Origins of Inequality, and Policies to Contain It: “This paper critiques the notion that unfettered inequality is an inevitable consequence of contemporary capitalism…

…and provides an alternative, new framework for analyzing changes in income and wealth distribution. By thinking of these distributions as the result of changing centrifugal and centripetal economics and political forces, we can identify changes in our economics and social structure that may have played a central role in the creation of today’s high level of inequality, and we can analyze the potential impacts of alternative policies. Specifically, I suggest that much of the increase in inequality is associated with the growth in rents — including land and exploitation rents (e.g., arising from monopoly power and political influence).

Fair housing, mortgages, and the U.S. Supreme Court

Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project. In the case, the state government asserts that a decades-old component of the Fair Housing Act of 1968— the law that prohibits all types of discrimination in housing, intentional and unintentional—is unconstitutional. The section of the law in dispute relates to unintentional discrimination because housing tax credits that were given to property developers to build affordable housing resulted in housing being constructed in mostly high-poverty minority neighborhoods.

Regardless of the constitutional merits of the case, there is little question that unintentional discrimination in housing persists in the United States. Recent economics research suggests that policymakers ought to examine the ways in which access to homeownership differs for different racial and ethnic groups—especially given the importance of homeownership as a wealth-building tool for Americans of all backgrounds. One of the more recent and telling studies is “Race, Ethnicity, and the High Cost Mortgage Lending,” by economists Patrick Bayer of Duke University, Fernando Ferreira of University of Pennsylvania, and Stephen L. Ross of University of Connecticut, They find that even when controlling for common lending risk factors, African American and Hispanic borrowers face higher cost mortgages than borrowers overall.

In the 2014 report, the researchers link data gathered under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act on home purchases and refinancing between 2004 and 2008 with public records data and credit reporting data. This allows them to include variables such as credit worthiness and the ages of the borrowers, while also examining the effects of mortgage-and-refinancing lending by geography, by the various lending units of financial institutions, and by market-wide disparities such as the prevalence of sub-prime lenders in certain housing markets.

The three economists examine seven metropolitan housing markets and find that racial and ethnic differences in the incidence of high-cost loans persist even when controlling for a number of factors, among them credit scores, the ratio of loan amounts to housing prices, the presence of subordinate liens, and mortgage and other debt levels relative to income. African American borrowers have a 7.7 percentage point higher likelihood of obtaining a high-cost loan, and Hispanic borrowers a 6.2 percentage point higher likelihood, relative to an overall incidence of 14.8 percent for high-cost loans among home purchase mortgages. This means these black and Hispanic families are spending more money to stay in their homes and have less left over for other needs.

No doubt the higher incidence of high-cost loans among African American and Hispanic borrowers has important implications for the families affected. But it can also be a barrier to homeownership—the higher the cost of an original mortgage the less likely some borrowers will be able to obtain one—leading to growing wealth disparities and a less stable economy.

Bayer, Ferreira, and Ross also find that some of the difference in the higher mortgage rates offered to minority borrowers can be attributed to their neighborhoods. Minorities in high-poverty neighborhoods and African Americans in communities that are majority African Americans with lower levels of education all experienced higher mortgage rates. But the key factor in the higher borrowing costs is the type of lender these borrowers use or have access to. The three economists suggest that the segmenting of the mortgage finance market into prime and subprime lenders played a large role in the differential treatment of similar borrowers applying for mortgages during their period of study.

This points to a challenge for policymakers—they have to figure out how to ensure fair access to responsible borrowers that does not limit their potential to build wealth and contribute to society while achieving what many still think of as the American dream of homeownership.

Things to Read on the Evening of June 11, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Jonathan Portes: Right to reply–Jonathan Portes on Niall Ferguson

Must-Read: Jonathan Portes: Right to reply–Jonathan Portes on Niall Ferguson: “Two weeks ago I was too ‘obscure to bother with‘ for Professor Niall Ferguson…

…He’s changed his mind, dedicating an entire article in The Spectator to me. In particular, he is very upset that, after I complained, the FT was obliged to correct his recent article about the UK economy. Professor Ferguson’s article contained one undisputed factual error (about UK business confidence) and one statement which the FT’s independent complaints commissioner found to be misleading, but which Professor Ferguson argues is composed of two ‘true statements’. This was:

Weekly earnings are up by more than 8 per cent; in the private sector, the figure is above 10 per cent. Inflation is below 2 per cent and falling.

As anyone familiar with the UK economy will know, the statements are only true if they are taken as referring to entirely different time periods. The 8 and 10 percent figures refer to [total cumulative] earnings growth between 2010 and 2015. The inflation figure refers to the [annual rate] rise in prices between 2014 and 2015. In fact, [cumulative] inflation between 2010 and 2015 (that is, the inflation figure to which it would be accurate and relevant to compare the 8 percent or the 10 percent figures) was approximately 11 percent, not ‘below 2 percent’.

And, of course, if one were calculating real wage growth between 2010 and 2015, one would get not the +6% or +8% or +10% that Ferguson invites his readers to fix in their minds, but rather -5% or -3%.

Portes continues:

None of this is in dispute. However, Professor Ferguson continues to claim that there is nothing misleading about his original statement: indeed, when challenged he restated his position:

Weekly earnings are up by more than 8 per cent… Inflation is below 2 per cent and falling. Correct your disingenuous self.

I leave it to Spectator readers to judge for themselves whether Professor Ferguson’s statement, and subsequent ‘clarification’, is misleading, and if so deliberately or inadvertently. They can also judge for themselves whether this statement, and the other factual error the FT was obliged to correct, undermine his credibility and the arguments in his article.

Professor Ferguson then goes on to ask ‘has Jonathan Portes ever erred?’ He points out that a paper I wrote in 2008 concluded that there was ‘little hard evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant unemployment’; and that in 2013, I wrote that the evidence was ‘mixed on wages, with some evidence of downward pressure for the lower paid’. He argues that the latter statement contradicts the former. In the intervening five years, we’ve had new evidence and the UK labour market has changed, so it wouldn’t be surprising if economists thought that the impacts in 2013 weren’t necessarily the same as in 2008. But, in fact, as a recent summary of the evidence (by Jonathan Wadsworth, of the LSE and a member of the government’s independent Migration Advisory Committee) put it:

There is still no evidence of an overall negative impact of immigration on jobs & wages… any negative impacts on wages of less skilled groups are small…

That is, the evidence (which includes my paper, cited by Professor Wadsworth) is mixed; there is no evidence of an overall negative impact; and there may be some, small negative impact for the lower paid. It’s difficult to understand what point Professor Ferguson is making here, or what contradiction he sees. Of course, despite Professor Ferguson’s failure to come up with an example, I’ve made plenty of mistakes. However, since I value my credibility, when I make a mistake I try to correct it in a timely and accurate fashion, rather than attacking the character of the person who pointed it out.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Why Am I A Keynesian?

Must-Read: I must say, it is becoming increasingly clear to me what it is that they are doing when a Robert Lucas says that Christina Romer is only in favor of expansionary fiscal policy because it is what her political master wants, and when a Russ Roberts says that Paul Krugman is in favor of expansionary fiscal policy because he is a big government socialist. What they are doing is looking into the mirror at themselves. What they are then doing is projecting. They are thinking that we have their morals and their thought processes, and so are as ideologically-blinded, as loyally-partisan, and as short-sighted as they are.

But we are not like them.

We are for effective government works, not a big government for its own sake: private where private belongs; government where it is needed; circumstances alter cases. We are for an informed public sphere, not one that thinks a bigger or more active government is always better: we want to see voters who understand the technocratic pluses and minuses support politicians who recognize them.

And we are for marking our beliefs to market: for a ruthless criticism of the existing order of things–including the order of ideas–that shrinks neither from its own intellectual discoveries nor from conflict with the political powers that be. We are therefore not in favor of our hoisting a dogmatic banner. Quite the reverse. We try to help the dogmatists to clarify their ideas–and mark them to market: Why do we (or you) believe that? Is it true? And what is to be done?

Paul Krugman: Why Am I a Keynesian?: “[I] make a regular practice of asking myself whether I’m letting that kind of bias slip in…

…In fact, I lean against studies that seem too much in tune with my political preferences. For example, I’ve been aggressively skeptical of studies that seem to show a negative relationship between inequality and growth…. So, am I a Keynesian because I want bigger government? If I were, shouldn’t I be advocating permanent expansion rather than temporary measures? Shouldn’t I be for stimulus all the time, not only when we’re at the zero lower bound?… I’ve always argued for temporary fiscal expansion, and only when monetary policy is constrained. Meanwhile, my advocacy of an expanded welfare state has always been made on its own grounds, not in terms of alleged business cycle benefits. In other words, I’ve been making policy arguments the way one would if one sincerely believed that fiscal policy helps fight unemployment under certain conditions, and not at all in the way one would if trying to use the slump as an excuse for permanently bigger government. But in that case, why am I a Keynesian? Maybe because of convincing evidence?

$15 too High for a Local Minimum Wage?

The very sharp Jared Bernstein wrote:

Jared Bernstein: Going Bold in Los Angeles: “The city council of Los Angeles has voted near-unanimously…

…in support of a gradual increase in the city minimum wage, from $9 today to $15 in 2020… thereafter, indexed to inflation…. What its impact might be is a harder question….

Even under pessimistic estimates of job-loss impacts, the number of those low-wage workers we expect to benefit from an increase will be much larger than the number who lose jobs or hours…. The recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of a national increase…. For every one displaced worker, 49 got a raise. And given all the churn in the low-wage sector, those workers who lose jobs will likely get a new, better job before too long…. A bump up to $15 is somewhat ‘out-of-sample,’ so we’ll have to see. But what we know is that smaller increases have had their intended effects of raising the pay of low-wage workers without much in the way of unintended consequences. That doesn’t mean bolder increases will cause problems. It just means we’ll have to carefully monitor the outcomes. In the meantime, it’s great to see local democracy at work on behalf of low-wage workers.

I find myself a little bit less optimistic than Jared because of the parcellized sovereignty of the Los Angeles basin. I would have few worries that a $15 national minimum wage would be higher than optimal–that the disemployment effects would be large enough even at the margin to offset the income transfer rectangle. But with the parcellized sovereignty in the Swiss cheese geography of the Los Angeles basin you may get a lot of pointless location-churning as sub minimum wage jobs move outside the pale. These effects are usually small. But they can be large. Look at Las Vegas: las Vegas is nothing but one giant regulatory and tax arbitrage scheme, as convenient as it can get to Los Angeles without coming under the California tax and regulatory umbrella.

Must-Read: Martin Sandbu: Free Lunch: Iron Rule from No 11?

Must-Read: Does Britain’s Tory government listen to no advice from technocratic economists at all?

Martin Sandbu: Free Lunch: Iron Rule from No 11?: “George Osborne announced… not satisfied with outlawing higher tax rates…

…he now promises to make the government legally obliged to run absolute budget surpluses…. We must distinguish between two questions: are rules in general a good idea and is Osborne’s proposed rule the right one? Neither question can easily be answered with a Yes…. If the politics favour short-term gains without due regard to long-term costs, policy makers acting without constraints are tempted to pursue policies everyone agrees are bad…. At the same time… fiscal rules unjustifiably constrain the range of political alternatives that should be on the democratic menu. Whether they do depends on the precise content of the rule.

What about Osborne’s?… There is an illuminating logical flaw in Osborne’s own argument. He said: ‘Without sound public finances, there is no economic security for working people … the people who suffer when governments run unsustainable deficits are not the richest but the poorest… therefore, in normal times, governments of the left as well as the right should run a budget surplus to bear down on debt and prepare for an uncertain future.’ One can agree with both premises–but the conclusion depends on whether sound public finances and sustainable deficits require running a budget surplus and bearing down on the debt. And there are good reasons to think otherwise. In a normal economy, the government can run moderate deficits permanently while keeping debt a constant share of GDP–surely the very definition of sustainability. As for the level of the debt, how much is ‘sound’? Surely soundness is related to the net wealth of the government and not simply the gross financial debt…

Must-Read: Matt Bruenig: Nordic Zombie Arguments

Must-Read: The very sharp Matt Bruenig really dislikes the data underlying Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verthier:

Matt Bruenig: Nordic Zombie Arguments: “There are two amazing things about watching the American Right struggle mightily…

…to contend with the smashing success of the Nordic social democracies. The first is that their arguments about the Nordics seem to shift daily and often in contradictory ways. The second is that they glom on to zombie arguments that really appeal to the straining-to-be-clever crowd long after they’ve been eviscerated. The current zombie argument… is about innovation…. Actual measurable economic indicators show the Nordics, for at least 50+ years now, ripping through the convenient story US right-wingers like to tell about growth… defiantly grow[ing] as fast as the US, and this is true even for the Nordics that aren’t called Norway…. The right-wing… can’t say these policies kill growth even though that’s what they’ve been predicting all along because, well, they don’t. So instead, they have changed to saying that, though the Nordic model destroys growth-boosting innovation, they manage to grow despite that by stealing all the innovations of the magnificent United States of America.

Jim Pethokoukis made this move last week despite literally writing a post just a few months ago about how the proof for this argument is garbage. Now it’s Megan McArdle…. I cannot put this more bluntly: this [Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier] paper is literally trash…. The authors’ empirical evidence… is … that the US has way more patent trolls…. That’s it. There is nothing else going on…. And while the US certainly has innovated patent trolling like no other, it’s not exactly a strong point in favor of the US model. But the great thing about ‘innovation’ here is that the term is so imprecise and vague that the Right has an endless refuge in it….

You can show… that the Nordics have higher start-up rates… higher business R&D… higher levels of venture capital… higher numbers of international triadic patents…. You can go through global innovation indexes that rank them at the same level as the US…. You can point at innovation indicator after innovation indicator after innovation indicator, and it just doesn’t matter because there was once a non-reviewed working paper that relied solely on US patent trolling levels to prove the US is a super-duper innovator…. Given this, I am at a loss about what to do here…. How many little stories would I need to dust on top of hard economic indicators to convince people that the Nordics do come out with new innovative stuff that seriously affects the entire world, and in fact probably overall punches well above its weight?

The answer of course is that no amount of anecdotes or even aggregate data will convince the naysayers otherwise. They are first and foremost ideologically opposed to egalitarian economic systems, even when they are constructed in ways that facilitate high-growth and high-innovation…. Because ‘innovation’ is just a vague placeholder without any precise meaning, they have found that thing they can say about why our horrifically brutal system truly is better and necessary for the world. Their intellectual dishonesty has a suitable zombie bedmate and they will hold on to it for dear life.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Decade Behind

Must-Read: Paul Krugman attempts to keep his score. I detect no minimization of errors, and no ex post moving of goalposts in a convenient direction:

Paul Krugman: The Decade Behind: “Almost 10 years…. It began with the diagnosis of a housing bubble, whose bursting I knew would be bad but had no idea would be this bad…

…I find myself thinking about what I got right and what I got wrong…. Dean Baker, in particular, was both much earlier and much more forceful. Still… my first crisis article did, I think, add value by pointing out the huge difference in price behavior between building-constrained states and others…. Since then, what have I been right about and what have I been wrong about? Things I got right: 1. The housing bubble: It’s very much worth remembering just how much bubble denial there was, and how much it was politically driven…. 2. Inflation, or the lack thereof…. 3. Interest rates: No crowding out…. 4. Austerity hurts: A lot of people who should have known better bought into the confidence fairy, or at least accepted the notion that multipliers were fairly small…. 5. Inadequate stimulus: I warned, early and often, that the ARRA was hugely inadequate…. 6. Internal devaluation is nasty, brutish, and long…. 7. Obamacare is workable….

Things I got wrong: 1. The scale of the disaster…. 2. Deflation: I thought that Japanese-style deflation was an imminent risk in all depressed economies…. 3. Euro crackup…. I vastly overestimated the risk of breakup, because I got the political economy wrong…. 4. Liquidity effects on sovereign debt: Finally, I’m sorry to say that I completely missed the important of liquidity and cash shortages in driving bond prices in the euro area…. Although I have definitely been fallible, I think I did OK — mainly because I never let fashionable worries divert me from basic macroeconomics, and always tried to apply the lessons of history.