Debt, equity, and differences among financial bubbles

Financial bubbles burst with varying effects depending on the kinds of assets that rose in value in the boom years. Macroeconomists, financial analysts, and policymakers alike are aware of these differences particularly when one compares the disastrous housing market bubble-and-burst that sparked the Great Recession of 2007-2009 compared to the less damaging 2001 “dot-com” stock market recession. But what exactly distinguishes the length and severity of a post-bubble recession?

New research by Oscar Jorda of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Moritz Schularick of the University of Bonn, and Alan M. Taylor of the University of California-Davis looks at historical data on economic growth, credit growth, and financial assets to understand the effects of bubbles. Their data set covers 17 countries since the 1870s, including the years directly after the Great Recession, among them the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United States, and Japan.

They find, unsurprisingly, that the bursting of asset bubbles lead to weaker recoveries on average compared to typical down swings in the business cycle. But there are substantial differences in the effects of different kinds of bubbles when they collapse. Not all bubbles inflate economies in the same way, and when they burst economies react differently.

Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor split bubbles into four groups, divided along two lines. The first broad way to categorize bubbles is by the kind of asset the bubble inflates. A bubble might be in equities, such as the high-tech stock bubble in the United States during the late 1990s. Or the bubble could be in housing, which of course took down the U.S. economy and then other leading economies around the world only eight years ago. The second way to categorize bubbles is to see if they happened concurrently with large increases in credit. In other words, were the bubbles financed with debt? So we end up with four kinds of bubbles: equity bubbles without credit bubbles, credit-fueled equity bubbles, housing bubbles with average credit growth, and leveraged housing bubbles.

The three economists find a hierarchy for the effects of bubbles. Bubbles in equity assets that aren’t financed by credit aren’t particularly virulent. In fact, Jorda, Schularcik, and Taylor find that these bubbles don’t make recessions any worse. Or at least, there is no statistical difference. Debt-fueled equity bubbles are more damaging, making recessions more severe and subsequent economic recoveries slower. Yet housing bubbles are even more damaging. Even in the absence of a large credit build up, housing bubbles are quite harmful to the broader economy.

But when mixed together with credit, leveraged housing bubbles become extremely powerful. The economists find that economies that experience these kinds of bubbles don’t fully recover from the recession until, on average, five years after the bursting of the bubble. Indeed, consider how weak the current U.S. recovery has been or the long depression in Japan after the collapse of a real estate bubble there. These results have obvious implications for macroeconomic policy, particularly when it comes to monetary policy. We should be on the look out for credit-fueled housing bubbles.

But there’s another interesting angle to these results. As economists Atif Mian at Princeton University and Amir Sufi at the University of Chicago point out in their recent research, the distribution of credit is very much about the distribution of wealth. Wealthy households who have more assets and a positive net worth put their savings into financial institutions that then increase credit to borrowers, most likely to more and more low-income individuals as debt-driven bubbles inflate. But debt is the opposite of insurance, making the overall economic system more fragile when too much debt builds up among those least able to repay it when economies over-inflate.

At the same time, assets are owned by very different segments of the population. Equity ownership is much more concentrated in the hands of the rich, while housing is more broadly owned. A bursting of a bubble in an asset more widely held will have a stronger impact on the economy. Mian and Sufi point out this difference as a key reason for why the recession following the bursting of the tech stock was less damaging than the 2002-2006 housing bubble.

This isn’t to say that wealth inequality is always at the heart of financial bubbles. But it appears that it could play an important role either in the inflation of asset bubbles or in determining the level of damages once they burst. Policymakers need to understand these differences and the underlying factors behind them when it comes to housing policy, credit policies more broadly, financial market supervision, and if we think wealth inequality plays a role, tax policy.

Must-Read: Tony Atkinson: After Piketty?

Must-Read: Tony Atkinson: After Piketty? : “First we need to clarify the objectives…

…Many people think in terms of achieving equality of opportunity. It is however important to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive equality of opportunity. The latter ensures that all have an equal chance to fulfill their – independent – life projects…. Competitive equality of opportunity means only that we all have an equal chance to take place in a race – a swimming competition – where there are unequal prizes. In this, more typical, case, there are ex post unequal rewards, and it is here that inequality of outcome enters the picture. The concern that I want to address in this paper is that, even if there were competitive equality of opportunity, the reward structure is too unequal and that ex post inequality needs to be reduced. Stating the objective in terms of reducing inequality is important, since there may be agreement on the desired direction of movement, but not on the ultimate destination…

Things to Read on the Morning of June 23, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Stimulus or Stymied?: The Macroeconomics of Recessions (January 2013): The Honest Broker

For the week of June 28, 2015: Playing with http://readfold.com. This is, I think, the best panel I have ever successfully moderated–even if I did lose it and take over the session in the last fifteen minutes:

Editing: Stimulus or Stymied?: The Macroeconomics of Recessions: January 2013 – FOLD: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/01/rough-transcript-stimulus-or-stymied-the-macroeconomics-of-recessions.html

Moderator: J. BRADFORD DELONG (University of California-Berkeley)

Panelists:

  • CARLO COTTARELLI (International Monetary Fund)
  • PAUL KRUGMAN (Princeton University)
  • VALERIE A. RAMEY (University of California-San Diego)
  • HARALD UHLIG (University of Chicago)”

Why Small Booms Can Cause Big Busts

Over at Project Syndicate: As bubbles go, it was not a very big one.

From 2002 to 2006, the share of the American economy devoted to residential construction rose by 1.2 percentage points of GDP above its previous trend value, before plunging as the United States entered the greatest economic crisis in nearly a century. According to my rough calculations, the excess investment in the housing sector during this period totaled some $500 billion – by any measure a tiny fraction of the world economy at the time of the crash.

The resulting damage, however, has been enormous.

The economies of Europe and North America are roughly 6% smaller than we would have expected them to be had there been no crisis. In other words, a relatively small amount of overinvestment is responsible for some $1.8 trillion in lost production every year. Given that the gap shows no signs of closing, and accounting for expected growth rates and equity returns, I estimate that the present value of the total loss to production will eventually reach nearly $60 trillion *unless we get a much stronger recovery than is currently in train* and *even if we put our thumb on the scale by raising the rate at which we discount the future far, far above current market interest rates.* For each dollar of overinvestment in the housing market, the world economy will have suffered $120 in losses. How can this be?

It is important to note that not all recessions cause so much pain. Financial blows in 1987, 1991, 1997, 1998, and 2001 (when some $4 trillion of excess investment was lost when the dot-com bubble burst) had little impact on the broader real economy. The reason why things were different this time can be found in a recently published paper by Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor. Large credit booms, the authors show, can greatly worsen the damage caused by the collapse of an asset bubble.

Historically, when a recession is caused by the collapse of an asset bubble that was not fueled by a credit boom, the economy is roughly 1-1.5% below what it otherwise would have been five years after the start of the downturn. When a credit boom is involved, however, the damage is significantly greater. When the bubble is in equity prices, the economy performs 4% below par, on average, after five years – and as much as 9% below par when the bubble is in the housing market. Given these findings, it is clear that the distress experienced since the beginning of the economic crisis is not far out of line with historical experience.

For many economists, recessions are an inevitable part of the business cycle – the bust that necessarily follows, like a hangover, from any boom. John Maynard Keynes, however, had little time for this view. “It seems an extraordinary imbecility that this wonderful outburst of productive energy should be the prelude to impoverishment and depression,” Keynes wrote in 1931, after the boom years of the 1920s had given way to the Great Depression:

I find the explanation of the current business losses, of the reduction in output, and of the unemployment which necessarily ensues on this not in the high level of investment which was proceeding up to the spring of 1929, but in the subsequent cessation of this investment.”

A few years later, Keynes proposed a fix to the problem. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes explained how booms are created when:

investments which will in fact yield, say, 2% in conditions of full employment are made in the expectation of a yield of, say, 6% and are valued accordingly.

In a recession, the problem is flipped. Investments that would yield 2% are “expected to yield less than nothing.”

The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which widespread unemployment does indeed drive the returns of those investments below zero. “We reach a condition where there is a shortage of houses,” Keynes wrote, “but where nevertheless no one can afford to live in the houses that there are.”

His solution was simple:

The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.” For Keynes, the underlying problem was a failure of the economy’s credit channels. The financial reaction to the collapse of a bubble and the resulting wave of bankruptcies drives the natural rate of interest below zero, even though there are still many ways to put people productively to work.

Today, we recognize that clogged credit channels can cause an economic downturn. There are three commonly proposed responses. The first is expansionary fiscal policies, with governments taking up the slack in the face of weak private investment. The second is a higher inflation target, giving central banks more room to respond to financial shocks. And the third is tight restrictions on debt and leverage, especially in the housing market, in order to prevent a credit-fueled price bubble from forming. To these solutions, Keynes would have added a fourth, one known to us today as the “Greenspan put” – using monetary policy to validate the asset prices reached at the height of the bubble.

Unfortunately, in a world in which fiscal austerity appears to exert a mesmerizing hold over politicians, and in which a 2% inflation target seems set in stone, our policy options are rather limited. And that, ultimately, is how a relatively small boom can lead to such a large bust.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-small-booms-cause-big-busts-by-j–bradford-delong-2015-06#1tGe3OvOlXPGPI2c.99

Must-Read: Invictus: Red State, Blue State: Kansas and Washington

Must-Read: Invictus: Red State, Blue State: Kansas & Washington: “We have interesting experiments going on in the state of Kansas and the city of Seattle…

…The state of Kansas, under Sam Brownback’s awesome tax cuts, recorded the third-worst jobs performance in the country over the past year…. It was almost three years ago… that Brownback touted the awesomeness of his economic plans via an op-ed…. ‘Our new pro-growth tax policy will be like a shot of adrenaline into the heart of the Kansas economy. It will pave the way to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs, bring tens of thousands of people to Kansas, and help make our state the best place in America to start and grow a small business. It will leave more than a billion dollars in the hands of Kansans. An expanding economy and growing population will directly benefit our schools and local governments.’… The beatings will continue until morale improves…. And yet, amazingly, supply-side trickle down is somehow still a thing. Where is John Oliver when you need him?

Moving on from Kansas to the Emerald City… their gradually stepped-up minimum wage… the first bump was enacted a few months ago…. The restaurant business in Seattle has continued to grow fairly briskly despite dire forecasts – and some outright lies – spread throughout the conservative media…. I don’t expect these facts to make any difference whatsoever in conservatives’ narrative – I wasn’t born yesterday – but they do need to be documented for the record time and again.

Must-Read: Barry Ritholtz: What Caused the Financial Crisis? The Big Lie Goes Viral

Barry Ritholtz (2011): What Caused the Financial Crisis? The Big Lie Goes Viral: “Rather than admit the error of their ways…

…people are engaged in an active campaign to rewrite history…. They prevent measures from being put into place to prevent another crisis. Here is the surprising takeaway: They are winning. Thanks to the endless repetition of the Big Lie…. so colossal that no one would believe that someone could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. There are many examples: Claims that Earth is not warming, or that evolution is not the best thesis we have for how humans developed… that the infrastructure of the United States is just fine, Grade A (not D, as the we discussed last month), and needs little repair. Wall Street has its own version… that banks and investment houses are merely victims of the crash… [which] was caused by misguided government policies… not irresponsible lending or derivative or excess leverage or misguided compensation packages…. The Big Lie made a surprise appearance Tuesday when New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, responding to a question about Occupy Wall Street, stunned observers by exonerating Wall Street: ‘It was not the banks that created the mortgage crisis. It was, plain and simple, Congress who forced everybody to go and give mortgages to people who were on the cusp.’…

What about… facts?… No single issue was the cause. Our economy is a complex and intricate system…. Fed Chair Alan Greenspan dropped rates to 1 percent — levels not seen for half a century — and kept them there for an unprecedentedly long period…. Low rates meant asset managers could no longer get decent yields from municipal bonds or Treasurys… turned to high-yield mortgage-backed securities… failed to do adequate due diligence… relied on the credit ratings agencies…. Derivatives had become a uniquely unregulated financial instrument…. The Securities and Exchange Commission changed the leverage rules for just five Wall Street banks in 2004… [which] ramped leverage to 20-, 30-, even 40-to-1…. Wall Street’s compensation system was skewed toward short-term performance…. Subprime mortgages… market… dominated by non-bank originators…. The Fed could have supervised them, but Greenspan did not… lend-to-sell-to-securitizers model… automated underwriting systems… Glass-Steagall… was repealed…. In 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency federally preempted state laws regulating mortgage credit and national banks….

Bloomberg was partially correct: Congress did radically deregulate the financial sector, doing away with many of the protections that had worked for decades. Congress allowed Wall Street to self-regulate, and the Fed the turned a blind eye to bank abuses. The previous Big Lie — the discredited belief that free markets require no adult supervision — is the reason people have created a new false narrative.

Must-Read: Jonathan Ostry et al.: Don’t Sweat the Debt If Fiscal Space Is Ample

Must-Read: Jonathan Ostry et al.: Don’t Sweat the Debt If Fiscal Space Is Ample: “High public debt ratios dominate today’s fiscal policy discussions…

…This column argues that paying down the debt involves a trade-off that balances the gains from the insurance value of low debt against the costs of an insurance premium – higher distortionary taxation. When countries have fiscal space and no real prospect of a sovereign crisis, the cost of bringing down the debt is likely to exceed the crisis-insurance benefit. The best policy might be to simply live with higher debt.

Must-Read: Richard Baldwin: VoxEU Told You So: Greek Crisis Columns since 2009

Must-Read: Richard Baldwin: VoxEU Told You So: Greek Crisis Columns since 2009: “Vox columnists have been analysing the situation with uncanny foresight right from the beginning…

…This column reviews a few of the contributions from 2009 and 2010 that predicted many of today’s challenges using nothing more than simple economic logic and a firm grasp of the facts…. The folly of the Eurozone’s choices on Greece was pointed out clearly in early analysis by Vox columnists right from the beginning. This is what Vox was set up to do…. A quote from Marco Pagano’s 15 May 2010 column on the Greek Crisis sums it up:

in emergencies such as the one we are currently experiencing, the way to escape the worst-case scenarios and find an exit strategy is to stick to clear-headed thinking.

The Greek Crisis is a classic case where research-based commentary by leading economists was greatly needed but little heeded…. Early warnings…. In 2008, Carmen Reinhart posted three warnings on Vox that history tells us clearly that severe banking crises are often followed by sovereign debt crises…. Barry Eichengreen added specificity to this in January 2009 with his insightful column ‘Was the euro a mistake?’… Six months before the first Greek bailout Charles Wyplosz and Paul De Grauwe also gave early warnings, both in December 2009….

After long claiming they would never bail out Greece, Eurozone leaders did exactly that in May 2010. The bailout package was a huge failure by any measure…. The first sentence in Wyplosz’s 3 May 2010 column, And now? A dark scenario, was: ‘The plan will not work.’… Barry Eichengreen (2010) provided another penetrating insight on 7 May 2010 – just before the Eurozone Finance Ministers agreed to set up the European Stabilisation Fund. ‘European leaders and the IMF have badly bungled their efforts to stabilise Europe’s financial markets. They have one last chance, but success will require a radical change in mindset.’… The rushed, emergency measures taken by Eurozone leaders in May 2010 were half measures, as many Vox writers pointed out. One of the first to lay out the economic logic of further steps was, once again, Charles Wyplosz…. In June 2010, Daniel Gros, Luc Laeven and I gathered a dozen world-renowned economists to contribute to a VoxEU.org eBook that was to answer the simple question: what more needs to be done?…

The drumbeat of a failed rescue continued in 2011. Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil in their column, Is the euro rescue succeeding?, argued that: ‘Until leaders deal with the core issues – the periphery’s lost competitiveness and misaligned economic structures – Europe’s rescue will ultimately fail.’ Zsolt Darvas, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir clearly set out what needed to be done in their February 2011 column…. In January 2011, EZ leaders setup the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) to do deal future crises…. As Daniel Gros wrote in the March 2011 column, Pact for the euro: Tough talk, soft conditions?: ‘…the package is merely the next step down the slippery slope of EU taxpayers sharing the burden with Greek taxpayers.’… Ramon Marimon put forth a similar judgement in his column….

By Spring of 2011 it was clear that half measures were making things worse. What had been obvious to many Vox columnists in 2010 was becoming obvious to policymakers in 2011. Greece’s debt was not sustainable – it would never be paid back in full. Paolo Manasse used clear economic logic and basic facts to show that restructuring was the only way forward and was, in any case, inevitable…. Jeffrey Frankel provided a post-mortem of the botched bailout…. Kai Konrad and Holger Zschäpitz pointed out more system failures…. Charles Wyposz, in 2013… [was] prescient… cast the Greek Crisis as a problem for both those who borrowed foolishly and those who lent foolishly…

Must-Read: Karl Whelan: Greece, The Euro and Gunboat Diplomacy

Must-Read: Karl Whelan: Greece, The Euro and Gunboat Diplomacy: “As for the euro, I fear that Europe’s leaders…

…have fallen back into smugness and complacency. The constant chant that the euro will be fine after Greece leaves the euro is based on nothing other than speculation. Nobody knows how a euro exit would work or how it would affect other member states. But it will mean, for sure, that the euro is not a ‘fixed and irrevocable’ currency union. And it will mean that there are unwritten rules that link membership of the euro with willingness to pay back official loans. Those who actually believe in European monetary union need to understand on Monday that pushing the Greek government further than their current position will generate infinitesimally small financial gains for European citizens while risking a Greek exit threatens unquantifiably large potential costs.