Must-Read: Bill Emmott: The Great Emerging-Market Bubble

Must-Read: Bill Emmott: The Great Emerging-Market Bubble: “if convergence and outperformance were merely a matter of logic and destiny…

…that logic ought also to have applied during the decades before developing-country growth started to catch the eye. But it didn’t…. The main determinants of an emerging-economy’s ability actually to emerge, sustainably, are politics, policy and all that is meant by the institutions of governance…. Countries can ride waves of growth and exploit commodity cycles despite having dysfunctional political institutions, [but] the real test comes when… a country needs to change course. That is what Brazil has been finding so difficult…. Since 2010, got stuck not because of bad luck, or any loss of entrepreneurial spirit in its private sector, but because of… Brazil’s government… unwilling or unable to cut back its bloated public sector, has been mired in vast corruption scandals, and yet… Dilma Rousseff continues to evince a fondness for just the sort of state-led capitalism that leads to exactly these problems. The democracies of Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa are all currently failing to… mediate smoothly between competing interest groups and power blocs in order to permit a broader public interest to prevail… so that resources move from uses that have become unprofitable to ones that have a higher potential…

Must-Read: James Forder: Nine Views of the Phillips Curve: Eight Authentic and One Inauthentic

Must-Read: James Forder: Nine Views of the Phillips Curve: Eight Authentic and One Inauthentic: “There is a widely believed but entirely mythical story…

…to the effect that the discovery of ‘the Phillips curve’ was, in the 1960s and perhaps later, an inspiration to inflationist policy. The point that this is a myth is argued in Forder, Macroeconomics and the Phillips curve myth, OUP 2014. One aspect of the explanation of how that myth came to be widely believed is considered in this paper. It is noted that the expression ‘Phillips curve’ was applied in a number of quite distinct and inconsistent ways, and as a result there was, by about 1980, an enormous confusion as to what that label meant. This confusion, as well as the multiplicity of possible meanings, it is suggested, made the acceptance of the myth much easier, and is therefore part, although only part, of the story of its acceptance.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Eternal Greece

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Eternal Greece: “Matt O’Brien directs us to a Heritage Foundation economist [Romina Boccia] presenting what is portrayed as a startling idea…

…America could become Greece!… There probably haven’t been more than a few thousand articles issuing the same warning in the five (5) years since Alan Greenspan published ‘US Debt and the Greek Analogy‘, with this immortal complaint:

Despite the surge in federal debt to the public during the past 18 months—to $8.6 trillion from $5.5 trillion—inflation and long-term interest rates, the typical symptoms of fiscal excess, have remained remarkably subdued. This is regrettable, because it is fostering a sense of complacency that can have dire consequences.

But Matt misses the truly wonderful part about the latest from Heritage…. You might think that debt worriers would try to put the whole 90-percent debacle behind them…. [As] I’ve noted in other contexts that the right never gives up an argument…. They add new arguments, but the old ones never go away no matter how ludicrously wrong they’ve proved.

The situation is actually worse than Paul says…

The deficit hawks never give the natural answer–that the bond market will tell us when it is time to worry about the debt. In my inbox, from CQ:

Where Is the Tipping Point for U.S. Debt?: “Depending on who is speaking, the United States will either become the
next Greece…

…or for years to come remain the unchallenged, undisputed financial champion. But even nonpartisan experts can’t say for sure. That raises the questions: Where is the panic point for the U.S. government on debt and deficits? And would there be enough warning to alter course before reaching the fiscal abyss?

Bob Sunshine, deputy director of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, says the United States “is not Greece.” That’s promising, right? Not so fast. He followed that up with this qualifier Monday during a Center for a Responsible Federal Budget-sponsored event: “Yet.” Given his organization’s projected levels of federal government spending and revenue, and the resulting debt and deficits, Sunshine says “over time, there is an increased risk of a fiscal crisis.” CBO projects federal deficits to remain around 3 percent of the gross domestic product for the next few years, then rise starting at the end of this decade. Deficits refer to the difference between the amount the government spends and the amount it takes in; debt refers to the money borrowed by the government to pay its bills when running a deficit.

What’s more, the organization estimates government spending growth will outpace revenue growth between today and 2030, which “pushes debt up a lot.” How much is a lot? CBO projects the U.S. by 2030 could have debt levels comparable to those right after World War II. After the war, U.S. debt levels peaked at just over 100 percent of GDP. Before that, there was only other one time in U.S. history when levels were as high as the office’s estimates: the late 1700s. Come 2040, under current laws and policies, the office estimates America’s debt will hit 107 percent of GDP. (The current debt level is around 70 percent of gross domestic product.) Major health care programs and Social Security are major factors in spending growth, CBO says.

Experts say a big driver of the Greek meltdown was global financial markets losing confidence in the government’s ability to service its debts. “We still aren’t being pressed by markets,” Maya MacGuineas, CRFB president, said of the U.S. “But Greece does show what happens when you don’t get out in front of markets.” But at what level of debt would markets get jittery enough to trigger an American crisis? “No one knows,” Sunshine said. “There’s no clear tipping point for any country.

“Members of Congress ask us, ‘At what point should we be concerned?’” Sunshine said. “And our answer is, ‘We don’t know.’” Asked if the United States might be safe from a Greece-like crisis — no matter how high its debt level climbs — Sunshine replied: “We haven’t found any basis for saying yes or no to that.” The CBO deputy director noted it might be acceptable for the country’s debt to remain steady around 70 percent of GDP. But what happens if an emergency like the 2008 financial slowdown drives it above 100 percent for years? MacGuineas offered a colorful, if jolting, answer, comparing that scenario to this question: How does it feel when a dog’s invisible fence collar shocks a human? “Nobody knows,” she quipped, “but we don’t want to find out.”

Must-Read: Robert Solow (1979): Summary and Evaluation

Must-Read: Solow back in 1979 sets out three possibilities: (1) that the New Classicals are right (although he really does not think so); (2) that changing economic structure means that–even though the New Classicals are wrong–there is next to nothing to be salvaged from the Neoclassical synthesis project; or (3) that only minor tweaks–adaptive expectations in the Phillips Curve, supply shocks–are needed to existing approaches.

And, of course, it is important to register that Solow’s (3) was right. With minor tweaks, the models continued to track in useful ways. The next substantial miss in the models after the 1970s came after 2009, when inflation expectations failed to fall…

Robert Solow (1979): Summary and Evaluation (1979): “I have to confess that I haven’t had any blinding revelations in the last two mornings…

…but I have learned some useful things. What really brings us here is Steve McNees’ picture of the 1960s and the 1970s…. McNees documented the radical break between the 1960s and 1970s. The question is: what are the possible responses that economists and economics can make to those events?

One possible response is that of Professors Lucas and Sargent. They describe what happened in the 1970s in a very strong way with a polemical vocabulary reminiscent of Spiro Agnew. Let me quote some phrases that I culled from their paper: “wildly incorrect,” “fundamentally flawed,” “wreckage,” “failure,” “fatal,” “of no value,” “dire implications,” “failure on a grand scale,” “spectacular recent failure,” “no hope.” Now if they were doing that just to attract attention, for effect, so that people don’t say “yes, dear, yes, dear,” then I would really be on their side. Every orthodoxy, including my own, needs to have a kick in the pants frequently, to prevent it from getting self-indulgent, and applying very lax standards ds to itself.

But I think that Professors Lucas and
Sargent really seem to be serious in what they say, and in turn they have a proposal for constructive research that I find hard to talk about sympathetically. They call it equilibrium business cycle theory, and they say very firmly that it is based on two terribly important postulates–optimizing behavior and perpetual market clearing. When you read closely, they seem to regard the postulate of optimizing behavior as self-evident and the postulate of market-clearing behavior as essentially meaningless. I think they are too optimistic, since the one that they think is self-evident I regard as meaningless and the one that they think is meaningless, I regard as false.

The assumption that everyone optimizes implies only weak and uninteresting consistency conditions on their behavior. Anything useful has to come from knowing what they optimize, and what constraints they perceive. Lucas and Sargent’s casual assumptions have no special claim to attention. Even apart from all that, I share Franco Modigliani’s view that the alarmism, the very strong language that I read to you, simply doesn’t square with what in fact actually happened. If you give grades to all the standard models, some will get a B and some a B minus on occasion, especially for wage equations, but I don’t see anything in that record that suggests suicide….

A second possibility is not to go so far as Lucas and Sargent in crying catastrophe, but to suppose that the underlying socio-economic structure has changed. Of course it is always possible, and I believe that this is what Lucas and Sargent would do, to define the structure of the economy as what doesn’t change. I think that tactic is futile because it asks more of economics than economics can ever possibly deliver…. Another possible response to the events of the 1970s is to suppose that the doctrines of the 1960s were right for the 1960s, and that the situation has changed…. It is possible that what happened between the 1960s and the 1970s is a kind of loss of virginity with respect to inflationary expectations. That doesn’t mean that it cannot ever be regained. It may be that, if we could only get back to stable conditions for a while, the 1960s might come around again. Needless to say, I am not very confident about that. I also suspect that Lucas and Sargent have a good point about the game between the government and the private sector…. It is not a wholly unreasonable story to tell, that the theories and doctrines of the 1960s were right for the 1960s, only, as in the old television program, they were bound to self-destruct after some interval of time.

There is still another, even less cataclysmic, line of thought…. Macroeconomics had devoted almost all of its efforts to refining its understanding of the components of aggregate demand… [and] had utterly neglected to elaborate the supply side of the models. Not surprisingly, then, the sequence of supply shocks in the 1970s from the side of food, oil, nonfuel minerals, and the depreciation of the dollar caught the macroeconomics community by surprise…. It is possible to rebuild the supply side of macro-models so that they do tell a consistent story…. So fast does the economics profession move now that there are already text books that do the supply side quite adequately…. The fact that you can reconstruct macro models by paying a little more attention to the supply side… is certainly better news… than if that could not be done. But I do want to caution you that it is not very good news, because you can almost always patch up a model after the fact. The question really is whether it will hold up into the next decade when the next unexpected event comes along. I think it might…

Must-Read: Joe Romm: Hottest July On Record Keeps 2015 On Track To Crush 2014 For Hottest Year

Must-Read: Joe Romm: Hottest July On Record Keeps 2015 On Track To Crush 2014 For Hottest Year: “NASA reports this was the hottest July on record…

…So we are now in ‘bet the mortgage’ territory that 2015 will be the hottest year in NASA’s 125-year temperature record. In fact, 2015 is likely to crush the previous record–2014–probably by a wide margin, especially since one of the strongest El Niños in 50 years is adding to the strong underlying global warming trend…. Soaring ocean temperatures in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific, which are characteristic of an El Niño, just keep climbing.

Hottest July On Record Keeps 2015 On Track To Crush 2014 For Hottest Year ThinkProgress Hottest July On Record Keeps 2015 On Track To Crush 2014 For Hottest Year ThinkProgress

Things to Read at Lunchtime on August 17, 2015

Noted for Your Nighttime Procrastination for August 16, 2015##

Screenshot 10 3 14 6 17 PM

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy

Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: The Promise and Peril of Macroprudential Policy: “Central bankers continue to fret about frothy asset markets–as well they should…

…What, if anything, should be done to minimize the risks of a rapid and sharp asset-price reversal? For many years, this question was framed according to… ‘lean versus clean’…. Should central banks ‘lean’ against bubbles… or just clean up the mess after bubbles burst?… 2008-2009… demonstrated [that] merely cleaning up after the bubbles burst is very costly…. So what should central bankers do instead?… Specially tailored financial tools… raising banks’ capital requirements when credit is booming… [to] restrain lending and strengthen banks’ cushion… setting ceilings on loan-to-value ratios…. Unlike such tools, interest-rate policy is a blunt instrument… [and] interfere[s] with the central bank’s primary objective of keeping inflation near target. Unfortunately, the development and use of macroprudential tools faces considerable economic and political obstacles…. Once a mania gets underway, the temptation to join is simply too strong…. [Where] homeownership [becomes] virtually an entitlement, measures making it more difficult would whip up a political firestorm…. Policymakers should respond to these challenges by working hard not only to develop effective macroprudential tools, but also to demonstrate that they can be deployed evenhandedly… the process will take time. In the meantime, situations may arise in which the interest rate is the only instrument available…

Must-Read: George Anders: What [Jodi Kantor and David Streitfeld of] the NY Times Didn’t Tell You In Its Amazon Workplace Expose

Must-Read: George Anders: What [Jodi Kantor and David Streitfeld of] the NY Times Didn’t Tell You In Its Amazon Workplace Expose: “Amazon.com can be a tough place to work. In this 2012 Forbes cover story…

…I alluded to the online retailer’s stressful, low-perks culture, driven by founder Jeff Bezos’s nonstop ambitions. Now The New York Times has published a 5,700-word expose…. It’s a powerful read. You won’t forget the details…. Each anecdote feels complete…. But there’s one key anecdote in which the Times plays by different rules. Let’s take a closer look.

Early in the piece… the Times shares a story of Bezos at age 10: “He wanted his grandmother to stop smoking, he recalled in a 2010 graduation speech at Princeton. He didn’t beg or appeal to sentiment. He just did the math, calculating that every puff cost her a few minutes. “You’ve taken nine years off your life!” he told her. She burst into tears.”… The Times doesn’t tell us what happened next. It’s all in the Princeton commencement talk…. Bezos’s grandfather stopped the car. The old man signaled for his 10-year-old grandson to step outside. Once they were standing together, the old man said: “Jeff, one day you’ll understand that it’s harder to be kind than clever.”

That encounter has haunted Bezos for a long time. At the close of his Princeton talk, Bezos posed a series of rhetorical questions to graduates, including: “Will you bluff it out when you’re wrong, or will you apologize?” and “Will you be clever at the expense of others, or will you be kind?” Let the anecdote run its course, and we get a sense of Bezos as a relentless doer, periodically wrestling with his conscience. Cut the story short, and Bezos can be invoked as an emotionless cyborg, casting a shadow over everything else that follows…. Journalists enjoy the right to be selective…. I’ve talked to a lot of Amazon alumni over the years, and my sense is that the Times piece captures something fundamentally true about the Seattle company’s breakneck pace. All the same, there’s something worrisome when the discard pile tells a very different story than what makes it into print.

Over at Grasping Reality: Social Insurance: Veronica Pollack Responds to an internet Heckler

Over at Grasping Reality: Weekend Reading: Social Insurance: Veronica Pollack Responds to an internet Heckler: Apropos of Social Insurance, Harold Pollack, and His Brother-in-Law Vincent……

Harold Pollack: Veronica Pollack responds to an internet heckler: “I wrote an op-ed in Thursday’s Chicago’s Sun Times about the impact of Illinois’s budget crisis on services to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities…

…A gentleman with initials ‘J.K.’ read it, and sent me the below email:

Veronica Pollack responds to an internet heckler

My wife Veronica happened to see it, and composed the below response, which I am posting below. READ MOAR

Over at Grasping Reality: Douglas Harris on Dwight Eisenhower and the New Deal

Over at Grasping Reality: Douglas Harris on Dwight Eisenhower and the New Deal: NewImage

Douglas Harris: Dwight Eisenhower and the New Deal: The Politics of Preemption: “Skowronek… [sees] four types of presidential politics: the politics of reconstruction, the politics of articulation, the politics of disjunction, and the politics of preemption….

Presidents practicing the politics of preemption are opposed to resilient regimes, but in the difficult position of searching for reconstructive opportunities where reconstruction is neither warranted by mandate nor sufficiently supported by segments of society…. Skowronek… gives little attention to the politics of preemption… [even though] the politics of preemption represents ‘the most curious of all leadership situations.’… READ MOAR