Must-Read: Lawrence Summers (2014): U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound

Lawrence Summers (2014): U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound:
“The nature of macroeconomics has changed dramatically in the last seven years…

…Now, instead of being concerned with minor adjustments to stabilize about a given trend, concern is focused on avoiding secular stagnation. Much of this concern arises from the long- run effects of short-run developments and the inability of monetary policy to accomplish much more when interest rates have already reached their lower bound. This address analyzes contemporary macroeconomic problems and proposes solutions to put the U.S. econ- omy back on a path toward healthy growth.

Lawrence Summers (2014): U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound, Business Economics 49, pp. 65–73 http://larrysummers.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NABE-speech-Lawrence-H.-Summers1.pdf

Must-Read: David Glasner: Romer vs. Lucas

Must-Read: David Glasner: Romer v. Lucas: “In… 1959… Arrow noted that the theory of competitive equilibrium has no explanation of how equilibrium prices are actually set…

…All agents in a general equilibrium being… price takers, how is it that a new equilibrium price is ever arrived at following any disturbance?… Arrow… offered the suggestion that… agents are not price takers, but price searchers, possessing some measure of market power…. But the upshot of Arrow’s discussion was that the problem and the paradox awaited solution. Almost sixty years on, some of us are still waiting, but for Lucas and the Lucasians, there is neither problem nor paradox…. If the social functions of science were being efficiently discharged, this rather obvious replacement of problem solving by question begging would not have escaped effective challenge and opposition. But Lucas was able to provide cover for this substitution…. While Romer considers the conquest of MIT by the rational-expectations revolution, despite the opposition of Robert Solow, shows the advance of economic science, I regard it as a sign of the social failure of science to discipline a regressive development driven by the elevation of technique over substance.

But For Wales?…

I would say that Ramesh Ponnuru needs to decide whether he is going to be part of a reality-based technocratic conversation about the future of our social-insurance system, or a booster of individual politicians who evanescently catch his current fancy.

But that choice has already been made, hasn’t it?

Kevin Drum:

Kevin Drum: A Conversation About Scott Walker’s Health Care Plan: “A Conversation About Scott Walker’s Health Care PlanRamesh Ponnuru thinks I got Scott Walker’s health care plan wrong…

…I complained that Walker’s plan would cost a lot but he doesn’t tell us how he’s going to pay for it without raising taxes. Ponnuru:

Walker says he is going to reform the tax break for employer-provided plans and get savings out of Medicaid….There’s no reason to doubt that some such mix could be made to work.

I tentatively doubt it. My back-of-the-envelope guess… Walker… [has a] hole… [of] $150 billion [a year] or so, since Walker would also repeal all of Obamacare’s taxes. The only proposal he offers to raise money for this is… the Obamacare Cadillac tax… [that] even in the far future it won’t generate anything close to [that]….
 
I complained that if you don’t have continuous coverage and you get sick or have a pre-existing condition, you’re screwed. Ponnuru: ‘At that point you’d have to go to a high-risk pool.’… High-risk pools aren’t a part of Walker’s plan. He just mentions them as a possibility that states might pursue if they want to. And anyway, high-risk pools are infamous for working poorly because they’re always underfunded. Would Walker really be willing to fund them at levels high enough to actually work?
 
I complained that Walker doesn’t tell us how he’ll prevent insurance companies from raising rates on people with expensive pre-existing conditions. Ponnuru: ‘A protection for people in the group market who have maintained continuous coverage has been law since 1996. Walker’s plan would just expand and strengthen that approach in the individual market.’ That’s possible, but Walker’s plan doesn’t say this. I can only respond to things Walker actually says. What’s more, the individual market is fundamentally different from the group market…. This is tricky stuff… [that] requires more than ‘just’ expanding and strengthening HIPAA…..

Nickel summary: Ponnuru is right about the Cadillac tax pushing costs down. But I don’t think his other criticisms really hold water…. Aside from illegal immigrants, Obamacare really does try to give everyone a chance to buy decent coverage…. Walker’s plan, by contrast, doesn’t even try to cover everyone… by design. Maybe you prefer this. I don’t.

How Well-Structured Is Our Federal Reserve, Anyway?

The highly-estimable Tim Duy is doing what he does best once again: worrying about the Federal Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy:

Tim Duy: Some Thoughts On Productivity And The Fed: “Yellen is leaning in the direction of taking the productivity numbers at face value…

…and seeing low wage growth as consistent with the view that the productivity slowdown is real…. The unobserved component approach suggests that productivity growth decelerated to an annualized pace of just 0.82 percent by the second quarter of this year… [in line with] Fed staff estimates of potential GDP growth range from roughly 1.6 to 1.8 percent through 2020…. Yellen might think back to the 1990’s, when a surprise rise in productivity growth temporarily lowered the natural rate of unemployment… [and] reverse that logic now and think that the arguments for tighter policy are stronger….

The bond market, with ten-year Treasury yields hovering between 2 and 2.5 percent, appears to be fiercely discounting the lower-for-longer story consistent with low productivity growth. Furthermore, low TIPS-based inflation expectations and a modest expected path for short rates also suggest little need for the Fed to tighten policy to avoid a 1970’s style inflation. The FOMC, however, has a more hawkish view…. San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams argued the Fed needs to engineer a substantial slowdown in growth next year. But the FOMC has yet to act on that relative hawkishness…

Let me step back and try to think through the issues from the very beginning:

When we think about what the Federal Reserve is doing right now, we need to consider four questions, only one of which which Tim Duy addresses here:

  1. Is the Federal Reserve properly implementing the monetary policy strategy the FOMC has decided upon?

  2. Is the monetary policy strategy the FOMC has decided upon the right strategy given the beliefs and values of the committee and the baton the Congress has given to it?

  3. Has the Congress given the Federal Reserve the right baton–that is, is the mandate calling for price stability, maximum feasible employment, moderate long-term interest rates, and financial stability the right mandate?

  4. Has Congress created the right institutional structure–that is, given the FOMC the proper membership and orientation?

I would argue that the answers to all four of these questions are: “No.”

It is true that over the past three decades the U.S. Federal Reserve has been the best-performing central bank of any in the North Atlantic. And it is likely that the U.S. Federal Reserve is the best-structured central bank in the North Atlantic. But, may I say: “that is a low bar”? I believe we ought to be doing considerably better.

Take my four questions in reverse order, briefly:

  • The Federal Reserve was supposed to be a people’s central bank–controlled not, like other central banks, by New York money-center bankers and financiers, but by a combination of president-appointed and senate-confirmed regulators in Washington, and with some banker voice but outnumbered by representatives of “agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers” in the twelve regional Federal Reserve Bank cities, only one of which was New York. Its Rube Goldbergian institutional structure is a Progressive-Era and New-Deal attempt to keep it from being the victim of regulatory capture by money-center banking and financial interests. But success has been, at best, very partial.

  • The Congress has handed the Federal Reserve a mandate that overweights the importance of price stability. The Fed recognizes this–it was Republican Mandate Alan Greenspan who declared and made stick that the general welfare calls not for price stability but for an average inflation rate of 2%/year. But as Larry Summers and I argued upstairs back in 1992, the balance of evidence is that the economy works better for America with a 4%/year than with a 0%/year average inflation rate. And as IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard has noted, history since is pretty clear that at least 4%/year is better than 2%/year.

  • The Federal Reserve is not living up to even Alan Greenspan’s redefinition of its mandate. As former Obama Chief Economist Christina Romer said to me as I left Berkeley for here: “Tell them that even Greenspan said 2%/year thinking it was the right inflation rate on average, but the current Federal Reserve is treating it as a ceiling”.

  • It is more likely than not that the current Federal Reserve policy path will not even get the inflation rate up to 2%/year. In the past year inflation was 0.2%. It is true that we expect it to climb up toward the 1.8%/year current core inflation rate–but not all the way, only about 3/4 of the way. And both the prime-age employment rate and manufacturing capacity utilization have been drifting down since last fall. Add on economic turmoil in Europe and approaching economic turmoil in China, and this does not seem to be a good time to start raising interest rates. Or, rather, it seems like a good time only if you think the official unemployment rate is the only reliable source of information about the real state of the economy.

Remember: the last four times the Federal Reserve has started raising interest rates, it has had no clue where the economic vulnerabilities lie:

  • In 2005-2007, neither Greenspan nor Bernanke had any idea how fragile mis- and un-regulation had left housing finance and the New York money-center universal banks.

  • In 1993-1994, Alan Greenspan had no clue how much of an impact what he saw as small policy moves would have on long-run financing terms–but fortunately he shifted policy and stopped raising interest rates in midstream (over the protests of many on his committee).

  • In 1988-1990, Alan Greenspan had no clue how much of an impact it would have on the balance sheets of southwestern S&Ls. The federal government had to give three months of total Texas state income to Texas S&Ls and their depositors who had been chasing high yields in order to clean that up.

  • In 1979-1982, Paul Volcker did not realize that raising interest rates would bankrupt not only Latin America but also leave Citibank and others as zombies–things that were bankrupt, and that ought to have been shut down, but that were allowed via promises of government rescue if necessary to earn their way out of bankruptcy over the next five years.

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Reform and Revolution in Macroeconomics

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: Reform and Revolution in Macroeconomics): “With respect to the failure… to ask the right questions prior to the crisis…

…There was no shortage of tools…. The problem was that we had been told by the eminent thought leader(s) within the profession that the problem of deep recessions had been solved (if not by policy, then by the improvement in the operation of the economy brought about by modern technology… especially financial markets with their digital technology and physics brains). Thus, theoretical questions about deep recessions induced by financial panics were ignored or shunted off to the side…. It was a combination of the belief that the questions were unimportant combined with sociology within the profession that placed a lower value on pursuits that might have allowed us to be better prepared when the recession hit…

Trekonomics Teaser Clip: 95% of the Way to Replicator for Basic Foodstuffs

Manu Saadia, the author of the forthcoming book, Trekonomics, discusses the economic theories behind the creation of the Star Trek with J. Bradford DeLong, professor of Economics at UC Berkeley and former Deputy Assistant Secretary at the US Treasury. Inkshares’ Adam Gomolin is the moderator:

We have already gone 95% of the way to the replicator for basic foodstuffs…:

Things to Read on the Afternoon of August 19, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Musings on the Incidence of ObamaCare

The scarily-sharp Josh Barro tweets:

And he sends me to an interesting, but I think largely-wrong, piece from Megan McArdle:

Megan McArdle: Republicans’ Obamacare Alternative, Finally: “Republicans have been saying ‘repeal and replace’…

…[but] the party has conspicuously failed to… [offer] a plausible replacement… giv[ing] these words the hollow sound of a Southern matron greeting a mortal enemy over mint juleps…. [Now] both Walker and Rubio are endorsing… converting Obamacare to a simpler, flatter tax credit… Obamacare is now setting the terms of the debate. And that debate will ultimately be fought over who Obamacare is for…. Obamacare promised that it was for the middle class. In practice, it has overwhelmingly been a program for the poor and near-poor… Medicaid… exchange policies… popular among… [the] heavily subsidized, but… with anyone who has to pay a significant chunk of the bill…. Republicans [will] become the party of universal, but lean, benefits that won’t be enough to lift people out of poverty, while Democrats become the party of generous benefits for the poor…. Who wins that debate will tell us a lot about what kind of government we’ll have in 50 years.

First of all, I think McArdle is somewhat off on the incidence of Medicaid. As best as I can tell, Medicaid dollars ultimately stick with one-third benefitting the disabled, one-third benefitting the non-disabled poor, and one third going to hospitals and practices.

The one-third of Medicaid dollars that wind up ultimately sticking to the disabled wind up making the lives of the disabled–both young and old–much better. The disabled are poor. But the disabled are not the poor. This part of Medicaid expansion is, as we tend to think of things, largely distributionally neutral. Only the truly rich can afford to pay for any prolonged period of disability out of their own resources. The rest–poor, working class, and middle class; young and old–become poor when they become disabled.

The one-third of Medicaid money that flows to the disabled makes their lives less harsh, and makes the risk of future disability less catastrophic for everybody. This is of big benefit to those current members of the middle class who are the future disabled, but do not know it yet. To say “Medicaid = the poor” is simply not right.

As best I can tell, a second third of Medicaid dollars wind up in the hands of nurses, doctors, and hospitals. They will be made richer as a result. The hope is that this money flow will diminish the amount of financial three-card-monte the medical system has to engage in. It is thus supposed to lead to a system of medical finance which is less of a cost-covering and more of a market-seeking-efficiency process.

We will see.

This shift from cost-covering to market-seeking-efficiency in health-care finance has, however, been a big–I would say the big–right-wing priority in health-finance reform for decades. And either something like Medicaid expansion–or pushing the sick poor to die in ditches–is a necessary prerequisite for it. To claim that you want a market-driven health care system while being opposed to both Medicaid expansion and pushing the sick poor to die in ditches is, at best, confused and incoherent.

It is only the third third of Medicaid dollars that winds up truly sticking to those whom McArdle’s readers think of when they think of the poor that would ever count as a redistribution. And it is not really a boost to your income–you do not, after all, spend your Medicaid benefit on riotous living. Your Medicaid benefit means that if you are poor and become sick you have a good chance of not dying, or of being poor and sick for a shorter time, or of being poor and less sick. McArdle writes of how generous health benefits that “lift people out of poverty”. This doesn’t lift anyone out of poverty the way we usually think of poverty: people in ICUs are receiving huge amounts of medical care, and if they are on the government’s dime they are the beneficiaries of enormous social-insurance transfers. But they are not thereby “lifted out of poverty”–at least, not the way most people understand “lifted out of poverty” to mean. They get more and better health care when sick. Full stop.

But that is not all!

McArdle also, I think, somewhat misses the mark when she talks about how exchanges are only attractive to the subsidized.

Who are those who would not be subsidized if they purchased on the exchanges? They are, predominantly, those who have the option of buying employer-sponsored insurance. And employer-sponsored insurance comes with its own big honking subsidy through the tax code–a subsidy that is not conditioned upon their being low- or moderate-income.

No subsidy if you purchase through the exchange.

A big subsidy if you pick up benefits through your employer.

Is it any surprise that exchange policies and pick-up among those with incomes too high to be eligible for exchange subsidies has been low? The middle class has already gotten its big health-care insurance subsidy via the combination of employer-sponsored coverage and the tax code. The exchanges simply equalize the social insurance benefit to some degree.

Moreover, the availability of the exchanges is of massive benefit to the middle class in terms of the extra freedom it provides. Families, especially families with some members subject to a pre-existing condition or that suffer some serious health problem, now know that losing your employer-sponsored insurance job no longer leaves you exposed to catastrophe. A serious medical problem is still a crisis–but not a catastrophe. This is social insurance doing what it is supposed to do. And this is of immense benefit to the middle-class right now.

Moreover as Obamacare implementation rolls forward, the balance of benefits may shift more towards the middle class. We will see choice-of-system operating at two margins: At one margin, people and employers will be choosing to take up and offer employer-sponsored coverage or resort to the exchanges. If projections that employers will continue to drop employer-sponsored health insurance are accurate, the availability of the exchanges will turn out in the long run to be of massive benefit to the middle class as employer-sponsored insurance ebbs away.

At the other margin, states and the federal government will be trying to figure out where to set the Medicaid-exchange line.

We are unlikely to wind up with employer-sponsored insurance for nearly everyone. But it could be that the exchanges will prove more attractive than Medicaid. And it could be that Medicaid will prove more attractive than the exchanges. We could, ultimately, wind up with single-payer under guise of Medicaid, with universal exchanges, or with some stable division of systems. The ObamaCare structure is very flexible. It is much more a structure to provide options for the future evolution of social insurance and private payment in health financing than in any once-and-for-all-time distribution of benefits.

Stepping back, the major argument against a relatively-generous social insurance system is always that it encourages featherbedding and idleness. But slimmer health benefit packages will not solicit greater market labor supply. It is only to a small degree that we control whether we get sick, and how sick we get–and when we do make decisions that are bad for us anyway, making those decisions even worse for us is unlikely to have much impact on behavior unless the nudges are very carefully and expertly designed.

Thus slimming down the benefits package for those who get sick seems an extraordinarily bizarre place to concentrate your energy on, if you are indeed worried about promoting featherbedding or idleness.

The only benefit for slimming down the benefits package for those who get sick is that they will allow for lower taxes on the upper middle-class (who if they get sick will then find themselves caught by the slimmer benefits package), and on the rich (who have the resources to insulate themselves from threadbare social insurance).

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior: “We analyze how quits responded to arbitrary differences in own and peer wages…

…using an unusual feature of a pay raise at a large U.S. retailer. The firm’s use of discrete pay steps created discontinuities in raises, where workers earning within 1 cent of each other received new wages that differed by 10 cents. First, we estimate a regression discontinuity (RD) model based on own wages; we find large causal effects of wages on quits, with quit elasticities less than -10. Next, we address whether the overall quit response reflects the impact of comparisons to market wages or to the wages of in-store peers. Here we use a multi-dimensional RD design that includes both a sharp RD in the own wage and a fuzzy RD in the average peer wage. We find that the large quit response mostly reflects relative-pay concerns and not market comparisons. After accounting for peer effects, quits do not appear to be very sensitive to wages – consistent with the presence of significant search frictions. Finally, we find that the relative-pay effect is nonlinear and driven mainly by workers who are paid less than their peers – suggesting concerns about fairness or disadvantageous inequity.

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets: “Commodity prices continue to fall…

…With US companies almost having completed announcing their profits for the second quarter, only one sector has disappointed the forecasts set for it two months ago. That is industrials, the most directly exposed to China…. According to Citi, the 48 largest developed market stocks that get at least 30 per cent of their sales from China have collectively fallen 10 per cent since June…. It is best to assume that the PBoC really means that it merely wants to bring market discipline to its currency and does not want to devalue; and instead to focus on the risk that problems in the Chinese economy end up forcing a devaluation anyway…