Must-Read: Josh Barro: Carly Fiorina Increased Hewlett-Packard’s Sales, but Not Its Profits

Must-Read: Josh Barro: Carly Fiorina Increased Hewlett-Packard’s Sales, but Not Its Profits: “Carly Fiorina… said… ‘despite those difficult times…

…we doubled the size of the company, we quadrupled its topline growth rate, we quadrupled its cash flow, we tripled its rate of innovation.’ The key undermining word in that statement is ‘topline.’… As Mr. Trump correctly pointed out… Fiorina’s strategy to quickly grow H.P.’s top line was to buy another large company, Compaq Computer. That deal was widely criticized at the time because it got H.P. a big increase in sales but little profit…. The idea behind H.P.’s purchase of Compaq was that, by getting a bigger slice of the P.C. market, the company could find economies of scale, get better prices on parts and raise its profit margins. Mrs. Fiorina pushed the acquisition through over objections from much of H.P.’s board and, most notably, the family foundations of the founders that held a large chunk of the shares…. The merger did not produce…. The Compaq merger brought a lot of growth to H.P. but not the sort that H.P.’s board or its shareholders found attractive. Hewlett-Packard’s profits in 2005 were $2.4 billion, a billion less than in the year Mrs. Fiorina started as C.E.O. That is a key reason she was fired.

Must-Read: Felix Salmon: Star Trek’s Utopia Is Already Here

Must-Read: It is just very unevenly distributed, and is here only in part:

Felix Salmon: Star Trek’s Utopia is already here: “The Replicator obviates the need for humans to work…

…and satisfies all the basic needs of 24th century consumers. It is Star Trek’s way of telling us that in the future, human labor can be entirely replaced by machines. Can be, but won’t be. Because humans have a need to work at something, and if they’re not working for money, they’ll work for something else. In the Federation, that something else is reputation…. There are billions of largely-unseen Federation citizens who aren’t all competing, aggressively, for highly prestigious jobs working as starship captains. Still, Star Trek is not Wall-E: if you give us everything we could ever want, we don’t devolve into a race of overweight couch potatoes…

Noted for the Morning of September 17, 2015

Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

  • Eric Liu: How to Be American: Why cultivating a shared cultural core is more important than ever—and why such a project serves progressive ends…
  • Kelly Dickerson: Why ‘The Martian’ Is the Best Space Sci-Fi Movie of My Time
  • Daniel Davies: “It’s not so much “marking your views to market”. It’s “closing all your positions because they’re so far out that you’re being ripped apart by margin calls”…
  • Nathan Pippenger: America’s Gun Problem and the Reassertion of Christian Leftism: Dan Hodges: “In retrospect Sandy Hook marked the end of the US gun control debate. Once America decided killing children was bearable, it was over…”
  • Ian Millhiser: Keep Fearing the Supreme Court: The real story of the Court’s recent term is… conservative overreach…. It’s unlikely that liberals will celebrate the 2015-16 term… poised to… kill affirmative action and throw public-sector unions into financial turmoil…

Must-Read: Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig: Lost Opportunity

**Must-Read: I am with ESB here as a matter of moral philosophy: divorced from the decrease in inequality or a rise in total production produced by a better use of our collective talents, more opportunity is not a good–unless you place a high weight on the continuation of the current social order, that is, and see avenues for upward mobility within the system as an important safety valve keeping those who would otherwise make serious trouble from doing so:

**Elizabeth Stoker Bruenig**: [Lost Opportunity](http://www.democracyjournal.org/38/lost-opportunity.php): “None of this is to assert that what Putnam observes about the inequality of opportunity…

>…is really wrong… though… data suggest that Putnam is mistaken to believe the problem is speedily worsening. The trouble… is rather that it critiques how people are coping with the reality… by working intensely to ensure their children’s success on the wealthy end, or failing to do so on the poor end[,]… instead of taking issue with inequality itself. A handful of Putnam’s solutions to the opportunity gap would potentially reduce inequality…. Others seem to be good ideas on their own merits…. But his gaze falls upon opportunity, not equality. And these are, in the end, two separate things…

Must-Read: John Cassidy: Jeb Bush and the Return of Voodoo Economics

**Must-Read:** Once again, if these GDP elasticities claimed by Cogan, Feldstein, Hubbard, and Warsh had much purchase in reality, we would have seen it in the macro performance: we would have seen a growth acceleration relative to the trend in the Reaganite 1980s, a growth deceleration relative to the trend in the Clintonite 1990s, another growth acceleration in the Bushit 2000s, and another growth decelleration now. That pattern is not what we have seen. And it would take an incredibly perverse act of Providence to produce additional masking fluctuations that give rise to the pattern we have seen:

**John Cassidy**: [Jeb Bush and the Return of Voodoo Economics](http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/jeb-bush-and-the-return-of-voodoo-economics): “[Would] the [Republican] Party… endorse… narrowly targeted… [tax cuts for] middle-income families…

>…what Marco Rubio and some others are recommending, or whether it would revert to the old Reaganite model of broad cuts… for virtually everyone, but especially the rich–and to heck with the deficit. Now we know part of the answer…. Jeb Bush… tax cuts would cost about $3.4 trillion over ten years… two per cent of… G.D.P…. Wouldn’t this plan inflate the deficit… and also amount to another enormous handout to the one per cent? Not in the make-believe world of ‘voodoo economics’–the term that Jeb’s father, George H. W. Bush, used in criticizing Ronald Reagan’s tax-cutting plans during their G.O.P. primary tussle, in 1980….

>By 1988, when Poppy Bush was running for President again, more than half a decade of gaping budget deficits had discredited the most extreme and foolhardy version of voodoo economics. However, some… if pressed… insisted [that] if tax cuts were combined with… making a bonfire of government regulations, the deficit problem would go away…. Jeb Bush… claim[ed]… the trick could be accomplished by combining the tax cuts with other measures, such as allowing major corporations to repatriate… profits… stashed overseas….

>The four conservative luminaries whom the Bush campaign rounded up to advise him on this program weren’t prepared to fully endorse this argument. (They are Glenn Hubbard, of Columbia University; Martin Feldstein, of Harvard; John Cogan, of Stanford; and Kevin Warsh, of the Hoover Institution)… said that Bush’s tax plan would raise the growth rate of the economy by 0.5 per cent a year, and that the regulatory changes he is proposing would add another 0.3 per cent to the annual growth rate. But because the annual growth rate over the past five years has been 2.2 per cent, that gets us to three per cent growth, not the four per cent that Bush is promising…. As for Bush’s claim that his plan will reduce the deficit, there isn’t any real support for it in the economists’ paper, either….

>Take households that earn at least ten million dollars a year, placing them in the top 0.01 per cent of earners…. Josh Barro, of the Times, calculates that, under the Bush plan, the effective federal tax rate these households pay would be reduced from twenty-six per cent to twenty-one per cent, and they would each save about one and a half million dollars a year, on average. You won’t see that figure, or anything like it, on Bush’s Web site, of course…. That’s how voodoo economics is always marketed. But, despite the welcome addition of a few populist touches, such as pledging to euthanize the carried-interest deduction, Bush is writing the same old tired script.

The Economist Gets It Wrong on Disability Insurance: Hoisted from the Archives from Two Years Ago

Kathy Ruffing: The Economist Gets It Wrong on Disability Insurance: “A recent article in the Economist took an uninformed–and unjustified–swipe at Disability Insurance…

…The Economist notes that the average disabled-worker benefit is about $1,130 a month, and its accompanying graph suggests that this figure has almost doubled since 1990.  That’s seriously misleading. When adjusted for inflation, the average benefit has barely grown…. The Economist also remarks that the number of DI recipients has roughly doubled since the mid-1990s.  But that’s largely due to the aging of the population (the baby boomers have aged squarely into their high-disability years), the growth of women’s labor-force participation (which means that more of them qualify for DI if they become disabled), and the rise in Social Security’s full retirement age from 65 to 66 (which delays beneficiaries’ switch from disability to retirement benefits). As we’ve explained, adjusting for these factors reveals that the disability rolls have grown only modestly.

My view is that Kathy Ruffing is correct, for my spirit guide on these issues is Michigan’s John Bound:

John Bound et al.: The Welfare Implications of Increasing DI Benefit Generosity: “The empirical literature on DI has primarily focused on the impact of program parameters on caseload growth…

…or reduced labor force attachment. The focus on the efficiency costs of DI provides a misleading view of the social desirability of the program itself and of the adequacy of benefit levels. In order to provide a more comprehensive view, we develop a framework that allows us to simulate the benefits as well as the costs associated with a marginal increase in benefit generosity using a representative cross-sectional sample of the population.

Using the 1991 March CPS, we estimate the total cost of providing an additional $1 of income to current DI recipients to be $1.42. While the load factor due to moral hazard is fairly high, we demonstrate that it is moderate enough that representative workers should be willing to ‘buy’ additional insurance through reduced take-home pay at this price…. [Note that] due to the redistributive nature of the program… [such a] reform leads to a net welfare loss for… more highly-educated groups…. The expected utility gain also turns negative for high school dropouts under high levels of risk aversion… [if] individuals with income below the floor provided to current DI recipients help to finance the benefit increase… http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50596

Translated into English, what John Bound et al. are saying is:

  • If purged of adverse selection–which is what bringing disability insurance from the private marketplace into the social insurance system does–representative workers seeking to maximize their utility would be happy to vote for such a program because the social insurance provides value to them.
  • The top of the income distribution, however, would not like it because of its redistributive effect.
  • And the bottom of the income distribution would not like it because it is for them not utility-increasing insurance but rather a utility-decreasing lottery: they are better off if they get SSDI.

This last seems to me to be wrong (sorry, spirit guide). Somebody who becomes disabled thereby transitions to a much lower utility level, and I cannot make the numbers work to see it as a lottery rather than as insurance for the poor.

Must-Read: Robert F. Stambaugh and Yu Yuan: Mispricing Factors

Must-Read: it is, I think, worth stepping back to recognize how very little is left of the original efficient market hypothesis project, and how far the finance community has drifted–nay, galloped–away from it, all the while claiming that it has not done so.

The original EMH claim was this: You–if your von Neumann-Morgenstern psychological rate of time preference and your von Neumann-Morgenstern psychological rate of declining marginal utility of wealth are close to that of the average–cannot expect to beat the market. The best you can do is diversify, hold the market portfolio, and hunker down. You can expect to earn higher average returns, but only by taking on unwarranted systematic risks that place you at a lower expected utility.

But finance today has given up any pretense of a claim that the–widely fluctuating over time–risk-free rate at any horizon has anything to do with von-Neumann Morgenstern patience-or-impatience psychology. It is very possible for the average person to beat the market in a utility sense by trading on the difference between the average rate of time preference and that priced in by the market. Finance today has given up any preference that the–widely fluctuating over time–expected systematic risk premium has anything to do with von Neumann-Morgenstern declining marginal utility of wealth. It is very, very possible for the average person to beat the market in a utility sense and quite probably in a money sense by trading in systematic risk on the difference between their risk tolerance and the (usually abnormally low) risk tolerance priced in by the market. And now, in addition to the–mispriced from a von Neumann-Morgenstern psychological perspective–wrong risk-free rates and wrong systematic risk premium are joined by two additional “misplacing” factors that the market has not managed to arbitrage away.

So what is left? All that is left of the EMH project is the American question: If this deal is good for you, why is it good for me? All that is left is the insight that if you there is neither a difference-in-patience, a difference-in-risk-tolerance, a diversification, mor an alignment-of-incentives-for-agents reason for a trade to be win-win, at least one of the parties in it is making a mistake. That is a powerful insight–but a very limited one. And it is not what the EMH is–or, rather, it is not what the EMH was back before it was redefined to “save the hypothesis”:

Robert F. Stambaugh and Yu Yuan: Mispricing Factors: “A four-factor model with two ‘mispricing’ factors…

…in addition to market and size factors, accommodates a large set of anomalies better than notable four- and five-factor alternative models. Moreover, our size factor reveals a small-firm premium nearly twice usual estimates. The mispricing factors aggregate information across 11 prominent anomalies by averaging rankings within two clusters exhibiting the greatest co-movement in long-short returns. Investor sentiment predicts the mispricing factors, especially their short legs, consistent with a mispricing interpretation and the asymmetry in ease of buying versus shorting. Replacing book-to-market with a single composite mispricing factor produces a better-performing three-factor model.

What would a rate hike by the Federal Reserve mean?

The Federal Open Markets Committee, the policy-making arm of the Federal Reserve, finishes its September meeting later today. It’s been one of the most anticipated meetings in years as it could mark the first time the committee raises interest rates in more than nine years.

Such a decision would end the Fed’s almost seven-year-old experiment with zero percent interest rates. Many observers have tried to decipher if the committee will push up short-term rates at this meeting—but whether the hiking starts today or later in the year, it’s important to think about what it would signal for both inequality and economic growth.

The monetary policy mandate of the Federal Reserve requires that the central bank promote “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Most of the discussion around monetary policy, however, focuses on the Fed’s performance on the first two fronts: employment and inflation.

For many years, the Fed’s goal of stable prices was understood, but no one exactly knew what it considered a stable growth rate of prices. In 2012, however, under former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, the committee announced that it formally targeted an annual inflation rate of 2 percent over the long run. Many observers had long assumed a 2 percent target, but this made it official. The Fed was now explicitly telling the economy what inflation rate it wants to see.

So how has this target been going? Since the committee announced the target, the inflation rate—measured by the annual percent change in the personal consumption expenditure price index—has been on the decline. In fact, the last time inflation was above 2 percent was April 2012, well over three years ago. This decline might be due to temporary factors that aren’t indicative of the overall health of the U.S. economy. But the core personal consumption expenditure index, which doesn’t include the volatile prices of food and gasoline, has followed almost the exact same path.

With inflation below its target, the Fed doesn’t seem to have a 2 percent inflation target, but rather a 2 percent inflation ceiling. As always, actions speak louder than statements.

When it comes to employment, there has been quite a bit of progress in putting the labor market back on the right track. The official unemployment rate has dropped significantly from its peak of 10 percent in October 2009, sitting at 5.1 percent as of this August.

Of course, as is well known, the decline in the unemployment rate isn’t a perfectly sunny story. The decline in the labor force participation rate, some of which is due to the aging of the Baby Boom generation and discouraged workers leaving the labor force, has led to a drop in the unemployment rate that isn’t solely from more workers getting jobs. Looking at the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers (those ages 25 to 54) shows a recovering labor market, but one that is far from full employment. An economy even approaching full employment would show signs of accelerating wage growth, but there is no sign of that—annual nominal wage growth is still plugging away at 2 percent. Acceleration and the approach of maximum employment doesn’t seem to be around the corner.

Hiking short-term interest rates by 0.25 percentage points won’t derail the current recovery. But a hike now would send a powerful signal from the Federal Reserve—and the data on inflation and the signs from the labor market give no indication that a hike is required this month. Employment is not at its maximum level, and inflation is far from the Fed’s stated target. An unnecessary tilt against growth would not only slow down the pace of the overall economic recovery but also potentially exclude millions of workers from reaping the benefits of further growth.  Either wage gains would continue to be subpar or employment growth would slow down. Or likely both.

Central bankers are seemingly obsessed with their perceived credibility, especially when it comes to protecting against accelerating inflation. But in light of the current data, perhaps members of the FOMC should consider the effect of hiking too early on their credibility.

Must-Read: Elise Gould and Tanyell Cooke: By the Numbers: Income and Poverty, 2014

Must-Read: I must say, I am struck anew by how great a disaster the 5-4 2000 election was, in terms of changing the socio-economic trajectory of America from the generally-hopeful and positive 1990s:

Elise Gould and Tanyell Cooke: By the Numbers: Income and Poverty, 2014: “Median [real] earnings for men working full time fell 0.7 percent from 2000 to 2013…

…In 2014 men’s earnings fell 0.9 percent, to $50,383. Median earnings for women working full time rose 5.4 percent from 2000 to 2013. In 2014 women’s earnings rose 0.5 percent, to $39,621…. Median non-elderly household income fell 11.2 percent from 2000 to 2013. In 2014 household income fell 1.3 percent, to $60,462…. Median income for African American households fell 13.8 percent from 2000 to 2013. In 2014 it fell 1.4 percent, to $35,398…. The poverty rate rose 3.2 percentage points between 2000 and 2013. In 2014 it remained unchanged at 14.8 percent. The child poverty rate rose 3.7 percentage points between 2000 and 2013. In 2014 it fell 0.2 percentage points, to 21.1 percent…. The African American poverty rate rose 4.7 percentage points between 2000 and 2013. In 2014 it rose 1.0 percentage point, to 26.2 percent…. The number of people without health insurance fell 2.9 percentage points from 2013 to 2014. In 2014, 10.4 percent of the population was uninsured….

Social Security kept 25.9 million people out of poverty in 2014. Food stamps (SNAP) kept 4.7 million people out of poverty in 2014. Unemployment insurance kept just under 1 million people out of poverty in 2014.

Thank you–non-ironically–Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Barack Hussein Obama, and company.

Thank you–ironically–Ralph Nader, William Rehnquist, Nino Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony Kennedy.

Why U.S. tax credits and tax deductions for higher education don’t work

The ever-rising cost of a college education in the United States is causing policymakers across the United States to consider ways to reduce those costs. With good reason. The amount of student debt has ballooned in recent years while new research shows that the students struggling the most with student debt are those who attended for-profit schools and community colleges many of whom were on the edge of attending or not. The federal government tries to encourage students to pursue higher education by providing loans —a subject for another day—but it also offers a number of incentives through the tax code via credits and deductions to lower the perceived price of college.

But looking at the research on these programs, federal policymakers would do well to rethink them. Tax credits and deductions could plausibly increase attendance at college and universities by reducing the price individuals face when paying for college. Think of it this way: If college applicants find out they will receive a deduction for going to school then the price of tuition seems to be lower and should spark more prospective students to “buy” college.

Of course, there’s the possibility that prospective students treat the tax credits and deductions as an increase in their income that doesn’t affect their schooling decisions. Rather, the credit just acts as a tax cut for people who already were planning to attend college. This second reaction is what happens more often than not, according to a clutch of recent research.

A working paper published earlier this week by the National Bureau of Economic Research finds that the federal tax deduction for college tuition has essential no effect on college attendance or a variety of other metrics on investment in higher education. Economists Caroline Hoxby of Stanford University and George Bulman of the University of California-Santa Cruz use a technique called “regression discontinuity” to determine if the tax deduction has any causal effect by comparing the actions of taxpayers just above and just below the income cut-off for the deduction.

What they find is not encouraging for those policymakers who hope the deduction increases investments in human capital via higher college attendance. The two researchers find no causal effect on “attending college (at all), attending full- versus part-time, attending four- versus two-year college, the resources experienced in college, the amount paid for college, or student loans.” In other words, it’s hard to see how the tax deduction does anything but act as a tax cut for those already set on attending college. The tax deduction studied by Hoxby and Bulman also has important distributional element: It is most valuable to tax filers with higher tax rates, but these are not the students who need the most support. Research from earlier this year by Hoxby and Bulman show very similar results for tax credits as well. Credits also appear to have no causal effect on investment in higher education.

Perhaps these results shouldn’t be too surprising. In a variety of areas of public policy, tax credits and deductions are used as backdoor means to promote diverse ends, including efforts to increase homeownership and retirement savings. Of course, there are very successful tax credits, among them the earned income tax credit, though even in this case some economists argue employers capture a significant amount of the value of the credit.

The reflex among policymakers to reach for the tax code as a means of providing greater access to important goods and services is a behavior they might want to change.