Must-read: David Glasner: “The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet”

Must-Read: If you think that there is one chance in ten that the sky is falling with respect to the development of deflationary expectations, then you conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish that chance.

If you also think that there is one chance in two that in two years an inflationary spiral will have clearly begun… then you also conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish the chance of deflation, for there is plenty of policy time and policy space, plenty of sea room, to curb aggregate demand in the future should it attempt to blow us out to sea.

But there is next to no sea room and next to no policy space to boost aggregate demand if needed, for we are on a lea shore right now.

I am kinda thinking these days that only yachtsmen and yachtswomen should be allowed to hold central-banking policy jobs…

David Glasner: The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet: “The 2008 crisis. was caused by an FOMC that was so focused on the threat of inflation…

…that they ignored ample and obvious signs of a rapidly deteriorating economy and falling inflation expectations, foolishly interpreting the plunge in TIPS spreads and the appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies as an expression by the markets of confidence in Fed policy rather than as a cry for help. In 2008 the Fed at least had the excuse of rising energy prices and headline inflation….

This time, despite failing for over three years to meet its now official 2% inflation target, Dr. Yellen and her FOMC colleagues show no sign of thinking about anything other than when they can show their mettle as central bankers by raising interest rates again…. [But] Dr. Yellen’s problem is now to show that her top–indeed her only–priority is to ensure that the Fed’s 2% inflation target will be met, or, if need be, exceeded, in 2016 and that the growth in nominal income in 2016 will be at least as large as it was in 2015. Those are goals that are eminently achievable, and if the FOMC has any credibility left after its recent failures, providing such assurance will prevent another unnecessary and destructive financial crisis…

Must-read: Lars Svensson: “Two serious mistakes in the Goodfriend and King review of Riksbank monetary policy”

Must-Read: Is it really the case that Goodfriend and King never asked Svensson whether his dissents and calls for lower rates were statements about the direction in which policy tools should move or statements about what the optimal value of policy tools should be? If they never asked him, that seems to me to be quite unprofessional. If they did ask him, then it seems there was, somewhere along the way, a major failure to communicate:

Lars E.O. Svensson: Two serious mistakes in the Goodfriend and King review of Riksbank monetary policy: “Marvin Goodfriend and Mervyn King presented their review of the Riksbank’s monetary policy 2010-2015 on January 19….

…They unfortunately start their evaluation by making two serious mistakes…. When finding the Riskbanks response… ‘not unreasonable’, Goodfriend and King… confuse rates of change and levels…. GDP and exports had started to grow in 2010 (although the year-over-year growth rates in quarter 1 of 2010 were not exceptionally high, 2.9% for GDP and 4.2% for export). However, the more important levels were not high but quite low…. The unemployment rate, a more reliable indicator of slack in the economy, was about 9%… making the unemployment gap about 2.5%. To start a rate hike from 0.25% to 2% in such a situation, with large slack in the economy and inflation not far from its target, is definitely not reasonable…. Just stating that the Riksbank rate hike was ‘not unreasonable,’ ignoring the actual GDP and export level data as well as the unemployment rate known at the time, and not providing a thorough evaluation of the hike, is a first serious mistake….

A second serious mistake of Goodfriend and King [is] to state that the rate hikes were ‘broadly accepted by all members’…. I know for sure that I did not share the view, and this is evidenced in my November 2010 speech and repeatedly in the minutes…. I instead advocated a major redirection of policy. One may also note the headline ‘Disaster path’ (‘Katastrofbana’) on the front page of the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet on September 27, 2010. This referred to my warning about the dire consequences of the majority’s high policy-rate path in an interview (in Swedish) in the newspaper that day. The headline and interview hardly indicates that I ‘broadly accepted’ the rate hikes. As evidence supporting their conclusion, Goodfriend and King state….

The dissenters on the Executive Board never voted for a level of the current repo rate more than one quarter of a percentage point below that actually set by the majority….

A vote for a slightly lower rate than that adopted by the majority cannot subsequently be used as evidence that a dissenter did not believe that a very different repo rate was optimal…. The repo rate… I voted for was only the first step in the right direction towards an approximately optimal rate and path; it was not a complete step to such a rate and path…. I advocated a stepwise procedure towards a rate and path that would eventually make the corresponding forecasts for inflation and unemployment ‘look good’. Unfortunately, I never gained a majority for even the first step…. Voting for a rate of 1.25% or 2% didn’t mean that it was the best rate, but that it was better than 1.5% and 2.25%, and a first step to a much lower rate…

Must-read: John Plender: “Capitalists Excel at Giving Themselves a Bad Name”

Must-Read: (1) Cecil Rhodes stole a lot of stuff. (2) Cecil Rhodes got a lot of people dead. (3) Cecil Rhodes built a lot of stuff. (4) Cecil Rhodes tried hard to spend his money to create a peaceful, united, trading world in which people of different countries understood each other–and (5) understood that people of British culture and British race were boss.

It’s fine to celebrate (4). And it’s good to actually spend the pile of money that derives from Cecil Rhodes on (4). But if you want to have a big statue of Rhodes hanging around, shouldn’t it be part of an exhibit that also notes his role in (1), (2), (3), and (5), and puts it all in its proper place?

Monticello these days, I think, does that, and does that properly. Can Oriel College say that it does that? Does Plender have any constructive ideas as to how to do that? And is he willing to head up a fund-raising campaign?

John Plender: Capitalists Excel at Giving Themselves a Bad Name: “Oxford’s dilemma is indicative of how the system can create wealth but often in ways that offend…

…Cecil Rhodes, alas. Or so the governing body of Oriel College, Oxford, must feel as it confronts demands from the student-led Rhodes Must Fall movement…. Rhodes was, of course, a rampant colonialist, unprincipled mining entrepreneur and conspicuous racist. He also happened to establish the Rhodes scholarships to facilitate the celebrated international study programme at Oxford…. Back then I took for granted that the kind of people who endowed Oxbridge colleges were likely to be rich but noxious. Today I rationalise it less casually. Rhodes epitomises the paradoxical nature of capitalism. The genius of the system is that it has an extraordinary capacity for creating wealth and raising living standards. Yet it often does so in ways that many find morally offensive. The difficulty concerns the centrality of the money motive — greed, in a word — in driving economic growth….

There is, in the moral economy of entrepreneurship, a spectrum. At one extreme are those like the robber barons of the American gilded age, such as John D Rockefeller, JP Morgan and Henry Clay Frick…. These were exceptionally nasty men. Their career model consisted of a no holds barred, preferably monopolistic, money grab until old age when they atoned for their misdeeds through spectacular philanthropic largesse…. At the other end of the spectrum were such high-minded model employers as Matthew Boulton, the nonconformist steam entrepreneur who, among other things, pioneered workers’ insurance at the start of the industrial revolution…. The distinctive feature of the assault on Rhodes is that the outrage is retrospective. The question is where such retrospection leads. Should we now spurn the sculptures of Periclean Athens on the basis that its democracy was supported by slavery? And what to do about statues of Thomas Jefferson, owner of numerous slaves?…

Must-reads: January 25, 2016


The corporate savings glut and the economic possibilities of the future

For decades, non-financial corporations were net borrowers from the financial system. If they wanted to hire more workers, expand investment, or acquire another company, they’d have to borrow funds from savers elsewhere in the economy via the financial system. Since 2000, however, the corporate sector has moved from borrowing funds from the rest of the economy to being a net saver. This dramatic transformation, sometimes called the “corporate savings glut,” is something economists and policymakers are still getting a handle on. But if one interpretation of these events is correct, it’s a sign for concern about future economic growth.

In a column last week for The New York Times Magazine, Adam Davidson—also a co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money”—wrote about the tremendous amount of savings U.S. corporations have these days. In total, U.S. corporations are sitting on $1.9 trillion worth of cash. And some of the largest and most-famous companies (Davidson highlights Google, Apple, and General Motors in particular) are holding on to colossal amounts of cash.

This immediately raises the question: “Why?” Davidson runs through a number of potential reasons—such as tax avoidance—and finds pretty much all of them lacking. But looking at specific industries that are rewarded by the stock market for holding onto cash, he finds an optimistic message. He thinks that companies are holding on to more cash as a precautionary measure in order to leap onto the next big idea.

There’s evidence, however, that exactly the opposite is happening. Think about the other side of the increase in net savings by corporations: the slowdown in investment growth. Since the turn of the century, investment has declined as a share of GDP across the advanced economies of the world. So as firms have held onto more cash, they’ve pulled back on investment.

In a working paper, economists Joseph W. Gruber and Steven B. Kamin of the Federal Reserve try to understand what caused this investment pullback. One interpretation of increased corporate savings is that companies are becoming more risk averse—they’re stocking up on cash because they want to strengthen their balance sheets in case a bad time hits. But Gruber and Kamin rule out that explanation: At the same time that firms were pulling back on investment, they were also increasing their payouts to shareholders in the form of share buybacks and dividends. Firms that are concerned about their balance sheets aren’t going to give money away.

Instead, the two economists think the corporate savings glut is a sign that companies are quite pessimistic about the future. They don’t see any feasible investment opportunities around, so they are passing money out to shareholders.

Of course, the increased payouts could also be part of the structure of a financial system that prioritizes immediate payouts over long-term investment. That’s the argument John Jay College economist J.W. Mason makes in his “disgorge the cash” paper. But that’s not an optimistic story either. Regardless of the amount of possible investment opportunities, corporations aren’t seizing them.

A third narrative, and one that doesn’t necessarily conflict with the last two, is that the increasing concentration of industries into oligopolies is increasing the amount of profits corporations can earn these days. Not only are companies sending more money to shareholders, but they are also increasingly using money for mergers and acquisitions. “M&A” activity is up 40 percent from its 2007 pre-recession level, according to analysis by Macquarie reported on by Bloomberg’s Luke Kawa.

So, unfortunately, the corporate savings glut in the United States and abroad may not be a positive sign for the future of the economy. Rather, it may be a sign of decreasing potential economic growth, a finance sector misallocating resources, or the rise of market power among a few corporations. Or some combination of the three. Not exactly a bright vision of the future.

(AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)

Must-read: Diane Coyle (2013): “Learning Economic Lessons from Asia”

Must-Read: Diane Coyle (2013): Learning Economic Lessons from Asia: “Studwell… conclude[s]… successful economic development… follow[s]…

…(1) An initial land reform… family-based labour on small farms has proven a far better footing than greater use of capital equipment at large scale for improving productivity…. In addition, the increased incomes of largely rural populations are vital for growing the domestic market for manufactures…. Land reform is politically difficult… needs to be accompanied by… extension support, rural credit and infrastructure investment.

(2) The next stage is to grow domestic manufacturing… [via] ‘industrial policy’… much subtler than the [mere] use of trade barriers… (i) a willingness to use government funding to support domestic manufacturers until they reached a scale that would make them globally competitive… (ii) opening domestic markets to imports of key inputs for exporters….

(3) The third stage extending the role of financial services, while keeping finance on a short leash…. Any economist who thought globalisation was a turbulent but broadly good thing (this includes me) surely has to accept that there was too much liberalisation of cross-border portfolio flows, and that emerging economies should keep the ability to control these flows in their policy armoury….

It’s a model of tying together historical knowledge, empirical evidence and analysis. It is also a good complement to Justin Yifu Lin’s The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off, which sets out a Chinese policy maker’s perspective…

Must-read: Cardiff Garcia: “China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough”

Cardiff Garcia: China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough: “[My] reaction was to be startled by [Justin Yifu Lin’s] comparison of China’s current position…

…to that of Japan in 1951 and South Korea in 1977…. Japan and Korea started rebalancing and liberalising their economies much later in the process than China did. Distortions… continued to linger for a long time after the rebalancing… the eventual opening is also challenging both in terms of timing and execution…. Japan and Korea are nonetheless held up as success stories of fast catchup growth in living standards. The best account… is Joe Studwell’s How Asia Works — check out Diane Coyle’s summary. Why were Japan and Korea able to pursue this model until per capita living standards were closer to those of rich countries, while China is undergoing this wrenching process so much sooner?…

A note by Credit Suisse economists offers a convincing explanation….

[A]fter growing at a steady pace of around 11% over the decade up until 2001, the pace of real Chinese export growth more than doubled in the period up to the Great Recession…. The problem with an increase in market share is that the adjustment is likely to be a one-off…. For China, this ‘adjustment’ back to a more normal growth model has been made much more difficult by external events and by the sheer size of the Chinese economy…. Despite GDP per capita only increasing to a still-modest 25% of that seen in the US, China now accounts for fully a third of global industrial production (up from only 5% as recently as the 1990s)….When you are that big, it becomes increasingly difficult to grow exports and production at a pace materially faster than growth in final global demand….

Finally… the Great Recession was a tremendous setback to the ultimate objective of more balanced growth…. The main policy mechanism for fighting the slowdown in 2008 and 2009 was a massive increase in investment, which we now know occurred at just the time that the export-driven growth model was breaking down….

The issue is complicated…. Automation… raises the prospect that premature de-industrialisation will be forced on countries who try this strategy anew…. Demographic changes surely also matter…. Still, what I take from the note is that China was just too big (or the world ex-China too small, if you prefer) for the model to ever work as well as it did in Japan and Korea…. That’s not to suggest that China was either right or wrong to follow this particular approach to catchup growth. Given this development strategy’s record in the case of Japan and Korea, maybe it made sense to try. Who can say what a counterfactual approach would have yielded?…

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard et al.: “Inflation and Activity–Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications”

Must-Read: Olivier Blanchard, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence Summers: Inflation and Activity–Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications: “Since the mid-1970s, short-run inflation expectations have become more stable…

…(λ has increased), and… the slope of the Phillips curve (θ) has flattened over time, with nearly all of the decline taking place from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s…. For most countries, the coefficient θ today is not only small, but also statistically insignificant…

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Must-read: David Warsh: “Whose ‘Rules?'”

David Warsh (1998): Whose `Rules?’: “For the last year, hardly a week has passed without…

…some bright new book fetching up on my desk promising to explain some aspect of the business dynamics of the new age of information…. In all this stack of books on managing knowledge, intellectual capital, the ecology of information and the like, the single volume most worth reading — and, for many persons having, for it bears consulting again and again — is ‘Information Rules.’…

Shapiro and Varian are professors at the University of California at Berkeley. Shapiro served for a time in Washington, D.C., as deputy assistant attorney general for economics. Varian is dean of Berkeley’s School of Information Management and Systems, an expert on Internet economics and the author of a leading microeconomics text as well.

As they increasingly were drawn into the policy battles of the information age, Shapiro and Varian heard the constant refrain from entrepreneurs, consultants, and journalists: the old rules had been broken; a new set of principles was required to guide business strategy and public policy.

They write in their introduction:

But wait, we said. Have you read the literature on differential pricing, bundling, signalling, licensing, lock-in, or network economics? Have you studied the history of the telephone system or the battles between IBM and the Justice Department?

Our claim: You don’t need a brand-new economics. You just need to see the really cool stuff, the material they didn’t get to when you studied economics.’

And so they wrote their book.

The battle over incompatible standards, for example, is as old as North vs. South in railroad track gauges; between Edison and Westinghouse in electricity. True, the old story had been given some new twists, by Sony vs. Matsushita in videotape players, or 3Com vs. Rockwell and Lucent in modems. The jury is still out on DVD and Divx (both of which play CDs). But same as it ever was, standards wars may end in truce, as with modems; in duopoly, as with video games; or in annihilation of one of the parties, as with videotape players.

The keys to the analysis of networks are the twin concepts of positive feedback and network externalities, the authors say. Neither one is a recent arrival. Network externalities — when the value of a product to one user depends on how many other users there are — have long been recognized as keys to transportation and communications industries.

For example, a handful of telephones will have only limited value. Then positive feedback sets in: as the installed base of telephones grows, more and more users find it worthwhile to tap into the network. Eventually growth levels off, but only after a successful technology has taken over the market. Railroads, highways, electricity grids, television, e-mail: all obey the same basic principles.

‘Information Rules’ has something to say about nearly every aspect of today’s business terrain; it is hard to exaggerate how pervasive is the logic of positive feedback. Among the most interesting chapters are those on recognizing and managing ‘lock-in,’ the widespread situation in which choices today are hemmed in by selections made in the past. The cost of abandoning your Toyota for a Ford may not be great, but just try switching from a Macintosh to a Windows PC.

Savvy marketers, moreover, are trying to raise the switching costs to their customer base, and not just through tricks of engineering, training, and design. Frequent-flier miles are an especially successful device for increasing lock-in, a subtle form of volume discount. Consumer loyalty programs are proliferating everyday as computation power creates ‘synthetic frictions,’ little barriers designed to influence your choice. Those supermarket cards, for example, that gain you sale prices, in return for the windfall of information about your tastes that store owners receive, are a prime example.

The overriding virtue of ‘Information Rules’ is that it is clearly written but deeply grounded in a sense-making discipline that has evolved over a couple hundred years. If you want to know more about the whys and wherefores of ‘Goldilocks’ pricing — if your market doesn’t segment naturally, choose three versions, just like Goldilocks — you are referred to a paper by Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversy (and to the three sizes of peanut butter in your supermarket!). Got a question about the virtues of standardization through committees vs. the market? See the recent work by Joe Farrell and Garth Saloner.

Economics isn’t perfect — far from it. But it has raced ahead in the last 25 years in topics of the greatest concern in industrial organization. This book is the best available introduction to the nuts and bolts of new learning.