Must-read: Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer: “Senator Sanders’s Proposed Policies and Economic Growth”

Must-Read: Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer: Senator Sanders’s Proposed Policies and Economic Growth: “According to an analysis by Gerald Friedman…

…Senator Sanders’s proposed policies would result in average annual output growth of 5.3% over the next decade, and average monthly job creation of close to 300,000. As a result, output in 2026 would be 37% higher than it would have been without the policies, and employment would be 16% higher. Although we share many of Senator Sanders’s values and enthusiastically support some of his goals, such as greater public investment in infrastructure and education, we also believe it is vitally important to be realistic about the impact of policies on the performance of the overall economy.

For this reason, it is worth examining Friedman’s analysis carefully. Moreover, Friedman has made available an extensive report describing his methodology and assumptions, allowing others to examine the specifics of his analysis. Unfortunately, careful examination of Friedman’s work confirms the old adage, “if something seems too good to be true, it probably is.” We identify three fundamental problems in Friedman’s analysis.

  1. All the effects of Senator Sanders’s policies that he identifies are assumed to come through their impact on demand. However, his estimates of those demand effects are far too large to be credible—even given Friedman’s own assumptions.
  2. In assuming that demand stimulus can raise output 37% over the next 10 years relative to the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline forecast, Friedman is implicitly assuming that the U.S. economy is (and will continue to be for a long time) dramatically below its productive capacity. However, while some output gap likely still exists, the plausible range for the output gap is much too small to accommodate demand effects nearly as large as Friedman finds. As a result, capacity constraints would likely lead to inflation and the Federal Reserve raising interest rates long before such high growth rates were realized.
  3. A realistic examination of the impact of the Sanders policies on the economy’s productive capacity suggests those effects are likely to be small at best, and possibly even negative…

Must-read: Willem Buiter: “Citi: Increasing chance that winter is indeed coming”

Must-Read: Willem Buiter: Citi: Increasing chance that winter is indeed coming: “The growing threat to the global outlook rests on poor fundamentals…

…which include the pre-existing fragilities related to the structural and cyclical slowdowns in China and its unsustainable currency regime, broken EM growth models, excessive leverage across many countries and sectors, and rising regional risks (Brexit) and geopolitical risks (including in Russia, Turkey and Syria, the South China Sea, and North Korea). These fundamental concerns are aggravated by a crisis of confidence that is in part fuelled by a growing worry that, should conditions deteriorate, they may not elicit an effective policy response. The main ‘game changers’ in our view are the emerging belief that even the US economy is no longer bullet-proof and that policymakers (in the US and elsewhere) may not be there to come to the rescue of their own economies, let alone the world economy, by propping up asset prices and aggregate demand…

David Keohane comments:

Obviously this is heavily caveated by Citi — and they lay out a US bull case — but the gist is that their forecast for ‘US growth in 2016 has meanwhile gone from 3.0% in January 2015 to 2.0% most recently’…. They emphasis that any material slowdown in the US economy would make it tough going for the rest of the world, and think that the barriers to Yellen in easing are higher than occasionally appreciated:

in part because it has just raised its policy rate for the first time since 2006 and in part because all of its easing options are perceived to be of limited effectiveness in boosting real economic activity or are associated with non-negligible costs (including political costs)….

Finally, they say, unshockingly, that the chances of a major fiscal stimulus are… not good…

Must-read: Philip Delves Broughton: “US voters rage against potholed roads and poisoned water”

Must-Read: Philip Delves Broughton: US voters rage against potholed roads and poisoned water: “Remember Thomas Piketty?…

…That Don Quixote of capitalism, the French economist who rode out of Paris in 2013 to assail rising inequality in the western world? The response among the Davos class was to look interested and raise vague doubts about his calculations. But this election season in the US is starting to look like Mr Piketty’s revenge. Inequality in all its guises has become the driving theme for the leading candidates of both parties, and it is confounding the Democratic and Republican establishments. When they hear Beyoncé’s ‘Formation’, with its strong message about racism in America, it is not that they do not recognise the tune. They do not even recognise it as music….

The sorry tale of the water supply in Flint, Michigan…. Prevention would have cost $100 a day, which seemed too much to those in power. As a result, hundreds of children were exposed to lead poisoning, with potentially life-long consequences. Would such a crisis have been allowed to happen in Greenwich, Connecticut, or Palo Alto, California? And if it had, would the response have been different? To borrow from Sarah Palin: you betcha…. What is fuelling the anger in this election season is a sense of social tragedy, of which decrepit bridges, potholed roads and poisoned water are the evidence. The word infrastructure causes panic among deficit hawks…. This is part of the reason why President Barack Obama’s latest efforts to raise money for infrastructure through a tax on crude oil are unlikely to succeed. But if you use America’s roads, airports or public transportation systems, you quickly see the problem….

Hillary Clinton has not made many great decisions in this campaign, but going to Flint was a good one. The candidate who makes the link between investing in American infrastructure and reducing inequality is going to win a lot of votes.

Must-read: Andy Harless: “Answering @rortybomb on why potential output has fallen”

Must-Read: Andy Harless: “Answering @rortybomb on why potential output has fallen…

https://t.co/rZHIRGaHt5: 1. Hysteresis. Theoretically reversible, but Fed won’t let US run well above capacity for a long time (unless Bernie appoints @mattyglesias). 2. Beveridge curve shift. Don’t know why it happened, but no reason to think Bernie’s policies would reverse it. 3. Guessed wrong on underlying productivity growth. 1995-2005 was a fluke. No way Bernie’s policies get us retroactively back to old guess. 4. Guessed wrong on demographics by ignoring interaction w business cycle & not realizing at the time that 2007 was a major peak. FWIW the hysteresis thing shows one reason to favor (in this case, retroactive) NGDPLT: allows maximum reversal w/o losing LR credibility…

Must-read: Justin Wolfers: On Twitter

Must-Read: I have only one critique of Justin Wolfers’s series of tweets here. He says that they are simple math errors. It is true that they are conceptually simple. But getting all this right is not easy–I have seen Alan Blinder get it wrong (in the context of a $12B surge in inventories in a single quarter, and its effect on real GDP growth rates) at a blackboard in his OEOB office during the Clinton administration[1].

This does explain a puzzle. As somebody-or-other said in the conversation, if you believe with Gerry Friedman that all of the shortfall in real spending growth since 2007 can be easily recaptured via demand channels alone, then Sanders’s proposals are at most one-third the size that they should be–and that is the critique that Friedman should be making of Sanders given Friedman’s beliefs about aggregate supply. (Since I do not share those beliefs, I think Sanders’s fiscal stimulus proposals are about right-sized):

Justin Wolfers: On Twitter: “Romer and Romer find what look like…

…simple math errors–confounding level effects and changes–in Gerry Friedman’s analysis: https://evaluationoffriedman.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/romer-and-romer-evaluation-of-friedman1.pdf

Here’s the problem: Fiscal stimulus raises spending: ↑ΔG today → ↑ΔY. But then [once the government purchase] stimulus ends: That’s a big ↓ΔG tomorrow → ↓ΔY. Long run effect ≈ 0. Or if redistribution leads to more spending: Big ↑Δspending today. But then no further Δspending. Long-run raises level of GDP but not growth…. (Their economics checks out, obviously):

Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer: Senator Sanders’s Proposed Policies and Economic Growth: “We have a conjecture about how Friedman may have incorrectly found such large effects…

…Suppose one is considering a permanent increase in government spending of 1% of GDP, and suppose one assumes that government spending raises output one-for-one. Then one might be tempted to think that the program would raise output growth each year by a percentage point, and so raise the level of output after a decade by about 10%. In fact, however, in this scenario there is no additional stimulus after the first year. As a result, each year the spending would raise the level of output by 1% relative to what it would have been otherwise, and so the impact on the level of output after a decade would be only 1%.

[1] Not, mind you, that I got it right back then–I had to go back to my Treasury office, think about it, and then do it three times. $12B was only 0.2% of what was then a nominal GDP level of $6000/year. But that $12B was four times as great a share of that quarter’s GDP: 0.8%. And if GDP jumps by 0.8% from one quarter to the next, that is a +3.2%/year jump in the growth rate of GDP. There is thus an amplification by a factor of 16 as we go from the raw change in inventory stocks in a quarter to the real GDP growth rate. But at the blackboard we were all saying it was either a factor of one or a factor of four…

Must-reads: February 25, 2016


Must-read: Thomas Piketty: “A New Deal for Europe”

Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: A New Deal for Europe: “Only a genuine social and democratic refounding of the eurozone…

…designed to encourage growth and employment, arrayed around a small core of countries willing to lead by example and develop their own new political institutions, will be sufficient to counter the hateful nationalistic impulses that now threaten all Europe. Last summer, in the aftermath of the Greek fiasco, French President François Hollande had begun to revive on his own initiative the idea of a new parliament for the eurozone. Now France must present a specific proposal for such a parliament to its leading partners and reach a compromise. Otherwise the agenda is going to be monopolized by the countries that have opted for national isolationism—the United Kingdom and Poland among them…

Must-read: David Glasner (2015): “Neo-Fisherism and All That”

Must-Read: David Glasner (2015): Neo-Fisherism and All That: “John Cochrane and Stephen Williamson [believe]… if the central bank wants 2% inflation… [and] if the Fisherian real rate is 2%…

…the central bank should set its interest-rate instrument (Fed Funds rate) at 4%, because, in equilibrium–and, under rational expectations, that is the only policy-relevant solution of the model–inflation expectations must satisfy the Fisher equation. The Neo-Fisherians believe… they have overturned at least two centuries of standard monetary theory… back… to Henry Thornton…. The way to reduce inflation is for the monetary authority to reduce the setting on its interest-rate instrument and the way to counter deflation is to raise the setting on the instrument…. Unwilling to junk more than 200 years of received doctrine on the basis, not of a behavioral relationship, but a reduced-form equilibrium condition containing no information about the direction of causality, few monetary economists and no policy makers have become devotees of the Neo-Fisherian Revolution….

Let Cochrane read Nick Rowe…. If he did, he might realize that if you do no more than compare alternative steady-state equilibria, ignoring the path leading from one equilibrium to the other, you miss just about everything that makes macroeconomics worth studying…. The very notion that you don’t have to worry about the path by which you get from one equilibrium to another is so bizarre that it would be merely laughable if it were not so dangerous…

Must-read: Tim Duy: “Lacker, Kaplan, Fischer”

Must-Read: The list of features of the current macroeconomic situation that the Federal Reserve’s communications strategy suggests that it does not grasp keeps growing. In the past we had:

  • The asymmetry of the loss function for undershooting vis-a-vis overshooting nominal GDP growth.
  • The weakness of monetary policy tools as stimulus in and near the liquidity trap vis-a-vis the strength of monetary policy tools to cool off the economy always.
  • The extraordinarily low precision of estimates of the Phillips Curve.

And now we have also:

  • The degree to which the slope of the Phillips Curve now is smaller than it was in the 1970s.
  • The degree to which the gearing between increases in inflation now and increases in future expected inflation has decreased since the 1970s.
  • The fact that lack of strong association between financial jitters and subsequent reduced growth is a reduced form that factors in a stimulative monetary response in response to such jitters.
  • The strong links between credit-channel disruptions and reduced spending growth.

And, above all, the fact that in the Greenspan and Volcker eras a lack of concern for downside risks was excusable because demand could always be swiftly and substantially boosted in an afternoon via large interest-rate reductions. Not so in the Bernanke-Yellen era.

It thus seems more and more to me as though the Federal Reserve is making macroeconomic policy in a world that simply does not exist. Tim Duy has comments:

Tim Duy: Lacker, Kaplan, Fischer: “Today Richmond Federal Reserve President Jeffrey Lacker argued that the case for rate hikes remains intact…

…On the opposite side of the table sits Dallas Federal Reserve President Robert Kaplan… very dovish…. Pure wait-and-see, risk management mode…. Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer remains less-moved by recent developments. Instead, low unemployment rates capture his attention…. Fischer sounds very uncomfortable with the prospect of the unemployment rate falling much below 4.7%. He is getting an itchy trigger finger.

I remain unmoved by this logic….

We have seen similar periods of volatility in recent years–including in the second half of 2011–that have left little visible imprint on the economy…. As Chair Yellen said in her testimony to the Congress two weeks ago, while ‘global financial developments could produce a slowing in the economy, I think we want to be careful not to jump to a premature conclusion about what is in store for the U.S. economy.’

This echoes the comments of… John Williams, and again misses the Fed’s response to financial turmoil. In 2011, it was Operation Twist…. I really do not understand how Fed officials can continue to dismiss market turmoil using comparisons to past episodes when those episodes triggered a monetary policy response. They don’t quite seem to understand the endogeneity in the system.

My sense is that there remains a nontrivial contingent within the Fed that really, truly believes they need to hike sooner than later for fear that overshooting the employment mandate will result in overshooting the inflation target. This contingent is attempting to look at the financial system as separate from the ‘real’ economy. That will not work. No matter how good the underlying fundamentals, if you let the financial system implode, it will take the economy down with it. I don’t know that the Fed needs to cut rates, or that they needed to cut rates as deeply as they did during the Asian Financial crisis, but I do know this: The monetary authority should not tighten into financial turmoil. Wait until you are out of the woods. That’s Central Banking 101…

Carbon inequities, climate change, and complementary solutions

Exhaust rises from smokestacks in front of piles of coal at NRG Energy’s W.A. Parish Electric Generating Station in Thompsons, Texas. (AP Photo/David J. Phillip)

Today, the earth’s atmosphere holds more than 400 parts per million of carbon dioxide. That’s roughly 40 percent more than carbon dioxide levels at the start of the Industrial Revolution, and it’s primarily due to our unruly combustion of fossil fuels. Considering that carbon dioxide emissions increase greenhouse gas levels and consequently exacerbate climate change, environmentalists in the United States have long been proposing a Pigovian tax on the carbon contents of goods and services.

But how does any of this relate to equity? Let’s backtrack.

It begins with the fact that the rich are one of the biggest agents of climate change. In a study released in 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau found that high-income households (those earning more than $75,000 a year) consume double the energy of the poorest households (those earning less than $10,000 a year) in the United States. As a result, the rich significantly contribute to carbon dioxide emissions, too. A recent report from Oxfam concluded that people in the top tenth of the world’s income distribution are to blame for 50 percent of global emissions, while those in the bottom half of the distribution account for only 10 percent of emissions.

What makes carbon inequality worse is that minorities and low-income communities are disproportionately harmed by climate change’s pernicious effects. The White House’s National Climate Assessment report found that these vulnerable groups in the United States are disparately buffeted by the onset of heat waves, worsening air quality, and extreme weather events, which has ramifications for physical and mental health and financial well-being.

By nature, the causes and consequences of climate change have distributional components. And so does a tax-based solution—well, in part.

In principle, a carbon tax is a fee that is placed on the carbon contents of different types of fossil fuels based on the amount of carbon dioxide each type of fuel emits when it is used, factoring in the long-term social costs of emissions as well. Coal—in comparison to oil and natural gas, for example—emits the most carbon dioxide per unit of energy, so it would likely have the highest tax rate. There are also several questions about how the tax would be implemented and who should be taxed: Should the energy producers (upstream), distributors and retailers (midstream), or the consumers (downstream) be the point of taxation? Regardless of who in the chain pays, the tax is the most efficient way to discourage high-carbon consumption behavior to ultimately reduce emissions.

The problem, however, is that a carbon tax may also increase the price of products like gasoline, utilities, and even food, which is what makes it regressive. Statistics show that poor families generally spend a higher portion of their incomes on these basic necessities compared to middle-class and rich households. So, if the prices on products increase, poor families will be hit the hardest. In fact, a 2009 study by environmental economists Corbett Grainger of the University of Wisconsin and Charles Kolstad of Stanford University documents the distributional effects of a hypothetical $15-per-ton tax. They find that the burden of a carbon tax on households at the bottom fifth of the income distribution would be at least 1.4 times to 4 times higher than for households at the top fifth. What’s more, Grainger and Kolstad note that if a tax is also applied to other types of greenhouse gases, this disproportionate burden would only increase.

Of course, there are a couple ways to soften a carbon tax’s potential impact on low-income families. One extremely efficient idea is to recycle the revenues from a carbon tax to cut another tax. This “tax swap” could work by providing tax credits to reduce the regressive burden of corporate income tax (capital recycling) or payroll income tax (payroll recycling). The second idea is to redistribute the revenues from a carbon tax through lump-sum rebates. Economist Chad Stone at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argues that these rebates could theoretically reach low-income households through refundable tax credits, a supplement to direct federal payments to eligible groups, or the electronic benefit transfer (EBT) system.

It’s easy to imagine that Congress might disagree on how to make a carbon tax more progressive or what to do with the revenues, which could prolong passing new or existing proposals. And, as it stands, carbon taxes might not fix resource inequalities at their root. The fact that low-income families spend a disproportionate amount of their income on carbon-rich essentials and don’t nearly contribute as much to emissions as the rich is still a signal that we must also think about other innovative ways to reduce energy costs for families while keeping carbon emissions down.

Given congressional gridlock, cities have been exploring ways to promote carbon equity. Improving the transit infrastructure and walkability of metro regions is certainly one option, especially because transportation and gasoline costs comprise the second-largest investment for low-income families and passenger cars account for more than 30 percent of transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions. In practice, these improvements could include planning strategies such as mixed-income transit-oriented development with mixed-use neighborhood design. Simply, this could help contain sprawl and reduce motor vehicle reliance, consequently reducing fuel consumption and carbon emissions for families across the income distribution.

Another community-based strategy is to adopt district energy systems. District energy is a highly efficient heating and cooling system that uses a central plant in typically a village- or neighborhood-sized part of a city to distribute energy to and from buildings within the district. Because the system is localized, it is able to balance energy demand between properties on the grid. Having a central plant also allows for integration of other renewable energy sources such as geothermal loops and solar cells. It is a significant investment upfront, but it boasts impressively lower carbon dioxide emissions than traditional systems while trimming home energy bills.

All this said, there are still several questions about the feasibility, costs, implementation timelines, and even carbon emissions abatement of these city-centric programs, especially in comparison to the efficiency of a carbon tax. That’s why, in the meantime, pursuing multiple, complementary solutions simultaneously can be the most effective approach to slowing climate change and dealing with its repercussions.

Whether we approach carbon use and emissions and climate change from the federal, state, or local levels, though, one thing is clear: Conversations about our environment, just like conversations about our economy, must include a vision to augment equity.