Historical Nonfarm Unemployment Statistics

An updated graph that Claudia Goldin had me make two and a half decades ago. The nonfarm unemployment rate since 1890:

2016 04 05 Historical Nonfarm Unemployment Estimates numbers

Then it was 1890-1990, now it is 1869-2015, thanks to:

The assumption–debateable–is that “unemployment” is not a farm thing–that in the rural south or in the midwest or on the prairie you can always find a place of some sort as a hired hand, and that “unemployment” is a town- and city-based nonfarm phenomenon.

I confess I do not understand how anyone can look at this series and think that calculating stable and unchanging autocorrelations and innovation variances is a reasonable first-cut thing to do…

Our second set of Equitable Growth working papers

Today, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth released our second set of working papers. Equitable Growth working papers aim to promote the work of our grantees, our in-house research team, and other scholars in and out of our network who are doing research on the connection between inequality and economic growth.

This latest release features two papers by Equitable Growth grantees. One is written by Stephanie Chapman, who is about to receive her Ph.D. in economics from Northwestern University. Chapman’s working paper examines the impact of student loans on recipients’ subsequent performance in the job market.

The other grantee whose research is included in today’s release is Jacob Mortenson, whose work is also related to his Ph.D. dissertation at Georgetown University. Mortenson’s paper, co-authored with Jeff Larrimore of the Federal Reserve Board and David Splinter of the Joint Committee on Taxation, uses federal income tax data to look at earnings volatility in the 2000s.

Today’s third paper is by Kim Clausing, an economist at Reed College who specializes in tax issues. Her paper analyzes whether international profit shifting by corporations reduces the size of the U.S. corporate tax base.

The final paper is by Equitable Growth Research Advisory Board member David Autor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and two co-authors, David Dorn of the University of Zurich and Gordon Hanson of the University of California at San Diego. They study the adjustment costs and distributional consequences in the United States of the expansion of manufacturing imports from China.

The research contained in Equitable Growth working papers is work-in-progress. We hope that the series will encourage broader discussion and generate valuable feedback as researchers prepare their work for final publication.

The China shock: Learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in trade

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China-shock-working-paper

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Authors:

David H. Autor, Department of Economics, MIT
David Dorn, Department of Economics, University of Zurich
Gordon H. Hanson, University of California, San Diego


Abstract:

China’s emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor
markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize. Better understanding when and where trade is costly, and how and why it may be beneficial, are key items on the research agenda for trade and labor economists.

The effect of profit shifting on the corporate tax base in the U.S. and beyond

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Effects-profit-sharing-corp-tax-base-working-paper

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Authors:

Kimberly A. Clausing, Thormund A. Miller and Walter Mintz Professor of Economics, Reed College


Abstract:

This paper estimates the effect of profit shifting on corporate tax base erosion
for the United States. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis survey data on U.S.
multinational corporations over the period 1983 to 2012, the analysis estimates the sensitivity of foreign incomes to tax burdens for major foreign direct investment destinations. Controlling for a host of other variables as well as country fixed effects, I find that taxable income is very sensitive to corporate tax rates. Estimates of tax sensitivity are used together with data on reported foreign income to calculate how much “extra” income is booked in low-tax countries due to profit shifting; I then estimate what the tax base would be in the United States without profit shifting. I find that profit shifting is likely costing the U.S. government between $77 and $111 billion in corporate tax revenue by 2012, and these revenue losses have increased substantially in recent years. These findings are consistent with the stylized facts about large quantities of income booked in tax havens. I also undertake a speculative extension of this analysis to other countries, finding that corporate tax base erosion is likely a large problem in countries that do not have low tax rates. The paper concludes with a discussion of suggested reforms.

Student loans and the labor market: Evidence from merit aid programs

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Authors:

Stephanie Chapman, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Economics, Northwestern University


Abstract:

Student loans are a growing part of the college funding equation in the US, while merit aid scholarship programs have become a popular avenue for states to subsidize higher education. I use merit aid program eligibility in the thirteen states that have sharp test score cuto ffs for eligibility to evaluate the e ffects of college funding on the early labor market outcomes of college graduates. I examine the heterogeneity of the e ffects with respect to both ability and family income. I demonstrate that qualifying for a merit aid program lowers the loan burden of students by $7200, and has little impact on other outcomes while in school. However, employed students who qualify for merit aid programs have $6400 lower annual income one year after graduation, and a di fferent occupational pro file four years after graduation than those who just missed qualifying for the programs. Because merit aid eligibility changes little of the college experience other than the funding package, it functions as an instrument for loans. This implies that exogenously increasing the loan burden of a college graduate by $1000 increases her annual income by $600-$800 one year after graduation. Examining the heterogeneity of these results by both ability and family income suggests that these e ffects stem from credit constraints when individuals leave school. Together these results demonstrate that while merit aid scholarships may provide students with more flexibility to seek out jobs with non-pecuniary rewards, there is no detrimental financial impact of instead financing college with loans.

Income and earnings mobility in U.S. tax data

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Income-earnings-mobility-tax-data-working-paper

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Authors:

Jeff Larrimore, Federal Reserve Board
Jacob Mortenson, Georgetown University and the Joint Committee on Taxation
David Splinter, Joint Committee on Taxation


Abstract:

This paper uses a large panel of federal income tax data to investigate intragenerational income mobility in the United States and to explore the determinants of two-year changes in individual labor earnings and family incomes, such as job or industry changes, marriage, divorce, and geographic mobility. Further, it evaluates how federal income taxes stabilize or destabilize post-tax income changes relative to pre-tax changes. The data reveal a relatively high degree of income mobility, with almost half of workers exhibiting earnings changes – increases or decreases – of at least 25 percent, and two-fifths of tax units experiencing income changes of this magnitude. Male and female labor income mobility patterns are remarkably similar, though marriage is associated with earnings gains among men, but is associated with modest earnings declines among women. Large income gains are most likely among families that add workers—either through marriage or through a second family member entering the workforce.

Panama and the opacity of global capital

A marquee of the Arango Orillac Building lists the Mossack Fonseca law firm in Panama City, Monday, April 4, 2016. Leaked data from the Panama-based law firm revealed how political and financial elites across the world have used shell corporations to illegally hide their money.

Earlier this week, a consortium of investigative journalists released a trove of leaked data and research on the use of shell corporations to move money abroad. All of the data come from one law firm—Mossack Fonseca, based in Panama—that helped set up shell corporations based in the Central American country for more than 40 years. The data show that political and financial elites across the world have used these shell corporations in a number of illegal ways to help them hide their money.

Such illegal activities are and likely will be the focus of reporting on the leaks. But it’s also worthwhile to look at the broader system that allows for the legal shifting of income abroad.

As Matt Yglesias points out at Vox, there’s a difference between tax evasion, which is illegal, and tax avoidance, which is legal. The international tax system is full of loopholes that allow elites and major corporations to shift their incomes abroad—or, more accurately, to make it appear that their incomes were earned abroad.

Research by economist Gabriel Zucman of the University of California, Berkeley shows how large the “hidden wealth of the world” really is. According to his estimates, about 8 percent of the world’s financial wealth resides in tax havens such as Bermuda and the Caymans. Recent international agreements have taken actions on some of the loopholes that allow wealth to hide, but Zucman argues that these changes are minor, as they build upon a system that will continue to let money remain in the shadows.

The problem is that companies have become quite adept at making it seem that money has been earned in these tax-haven countries. Think, for example, of the technology company that transfers its intellectual property to a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction. The earnings from that intellectual property get booked to the low-tax subsidiary even if the sales actually happen in a higher-tax jurisdiction. Zucman’s solution would be to change the basis of taxation to the location of the sale, which is much harder to manipulate.

And there’s other evidence that capital income has become more hidden and obscure: Recent research details how U.S. business income since 1980 has shifted away from traditional corporations toward “pass-through” entities like partnerships. This kind of business income is not only more unequally distributed and taxed less than corporate income, but it’s more opaque. The researchers looking at these tax data noted that the source or ultimate ownership of 30 percent of the partnership income couldn’t be determined.

Clearly the extent of offshore wealth and the opacity of capital income were known before the data leak. But it’s a good reminder of how the international tax system is built to allow these kinds of transactions to occur. Capital has a way of flowing to places where it’s taxed less, despite evidence that low tax rates don’t necessarily spur more investment and wage growth. The issue, it seems, is actually taxing the capital.

Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “The internet and the Productivity Slump”

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: The internet and the Productivity Slump: “How much would an average American, whose annual disposable income is $42,300…

…need to be paid in order to be persuaded to give up their mobile phone and access to the internet, for a full year? Would it be more, or less, than $8,400 for the year?… Chad Syverson… calculates that the productivity slowdown in the US is equivalent to about $2.7 trillion of lost output per annum by 2015. Even on the most generous method that he can find to calculate the extent of the underestimated consumer surplus from the digital economy, he reckons that only about one third of the productivity gap can be explained in this way…. He suggests, on prima facie grounds, that few people would value their access to the digital economy at one fifth of their disposable income. Maybe, but… most people are now extremely reliant upon, or addicted to, the internet, especially via their smartphones. Faced with the choice, I doubt whether they would be prepared to be transported back to the obsolete technology of a decade ago in exchange for an annual payment of less than, say, a few thousand dollars a year–i.e. far less than than the value currently accorded to digital activity in GDP…

Monday Smackdown: Robert Waldmann Marks Brad DeLong’s Beliefs about “The Return of Depression Economics” to Market

Robert Waldmann: Brad DeLong Marks His Beliefs about “The Return of Depression Economics” to Market: “Brad DeLong…reposted his review of Krugman’s ‘The Return of Depression Economics’ from 1999…

…’Just in case I get a swelled-head and think I am right more often than I am …’ Way back in the last century, Brad thought he had a valid criticism of Paul Krugman’s argument that Japan (and more generally countries in a liquidity trap) need higher expected inflation. I think the re-post is not just admirable as a self criticism session, but also shows us something about the power of Macroeconomic orthodoxy. Brad is just about as unorthodox as an economist can be without being banished from the profession, but even he was more influenced by Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas than he should have been…. Japan had slack aggregate demand at a safe nominal interest rate of 0–that i,s it was in the liquidity trap. Krugman argued that higher expected inflation would cause negative expected real interest rates and higher aggregate demand and solve the problem. Brad was unconvinced (way back then):

But at this point Krugman doesn’t have all the answers. For while the fact of regular, moderate inflation would certainly boost aggregate demand for products made in Japan, the expectation of inflation would cause an adverse shift in aggregate supply: firms and workers would demand higher prices and wages in anticipation of the inflation they expected would occur, and this increase in costs would diminish how much real production and employment would be generated by any particular level of aggregate demand.

Would the benefits on the demand side from the fact of regular moderate inflation outweigh the costs on the supply side of a general expectation that Japan is about to resort to deliberate inflationary finance? Probably. I’m with Krugman on this one. But it is just a guess–it is not my field of expertise–I would want to spend a year examining the macroeconomic structure of the Japanese economy in detail before I would be willing to claim even that my guess was an informed guess.

And there is another problem. Suppose that investors do not see the fact of inflation–suppose that Japan does not adopt inflationary finance–but that a drumbeat of advocates claiming that inflation is necessary causes firms and workers to mark up prices and wages. Then we have the supply-side costs but not the demand-side benefits, and so we are worse off than before.

As Brad now notes, this argument makes no sense. I think it might be hard for people who learned about macro in the age of the liquidity trap to understand what he had in mind. I also think the passage might risk being convincing to people who haven’t read enough Krugman or Keynes. The key problems in the first paragraphs are ‘adverse’ and ‘any particular level of aggregate demand’. Brad assumed that an increase in wage and price demands is an adverse shift. The argument that it is depends on the assumption that he can consider a fixed level of nominal aggregate demand (and yet he didn’t feel the need to put in the word ‘nominal’). The butchered sentence ‘would diminish how much real production and employment would be generated by any particular level of [real] aggregate demand.’ clearly makes no sense.

During the 80s, new Keynesian macroeconomists got into the habit of considering a fixed level of nominal aggregate demand when focusing on aggregate supply. Because it wasn’t the focus, they used the simplest existing model of aggregate demand the rigid quantity theory of money in which nominal aggregate demand is a constant times the money supply (which is assumed to be set by the monetary authority). This means that the aggregate demand curve (price level on the y axis and real gdp on the x axis) slopes down. This in turn means that an upward shift in the aggregate supply curve is an adverse shift.

More generally, the way in which a higher price level causes lower real aggregate demand is by reducing the real value of the money supply, but if the economy is in the liquidity trap the reduction in the real money supply has no effect on aggregate demand. In the case considered by Krugman, the aggregate demand curve is vertical. This means that he can discuss the effect of policy on real GDP without considering the aggregate supply curve. The second paragraph just repeats the assumption that higher expected inflation causes ‘costs’. There are no such costs (at least according to current and then existing theory) if the economy is in a liquidity trap. The third paragraph shows confusion about the cause of the ‘demand side benefits’. They are caused by higher expected inflation not by higher actual inflation. If there were higher expected inflation not followed by higher actual inflation, Japan would enjoy the benefits anyway. Those benefits would outweigh the non-existent costs.

Krugman actually did consider a model of aggregate supply, but it is so simple it is easy to miss. As usual (well as became usual as Krugman did this again and again) the model has two periods–the present and the long run. In the present, it is assumed that wages and prices are fixed. In the long run it is assumed that there is full employment and constant inflation. Krugman’s point is that all of the important differences between old Keynesian models and models with rational forward looking agents can be understood with just two periods and very simple math. The problem is that the math is so simple that it is easy to not notice it is there and to assume that he ignored the supply side.

I am going to be dumb (I am not playing dumb–I just worked through each step) and consider different less elegant models of aggregate supply. The following will be extremely boring and pointless:

  1. Fixed nominal wages, flexible prices and profit maximization (this is Keynes’s implicit model of aggregate supply). In this case, the supply curve gives increasing real output as a function of the price level. An ‘adverse’ shift of this curve would be a shift up. It would not affect real output in the liquidity trap since the aggregate demand curve is vertical. it would not impose any costs as the increased price level would reduce the real money supply from plenty of liquidity to still plenty of liquidity. This model of aggregate supply is no good (it doesn’t fit the facts). It is easy to fear that Krugman implicitly assumed it was valid when in a rush (at least this is easy if one hasn’t been reading Krugman every day for years–he doesn’t do things like that).

  2. A fixed expectations-unaugmented Phillips curve which gives inflation as an increasing function of output. An ‘adverse’ shift of he Phillips curve would imply higher inflation. This would have no costs.

  3. An expectations-augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is equal to lagged inflation–output becomes a function of the change in inflation. In a liquidity trap, there would be either accelerating inflation or accelerating deflation. For a fixed money supply accelerating inflation would reduce real balances until the economy would no longer be in a liquidity trap. The simple model would imply the possibility of accelerating deflation and ever decreasing output. This model is no good, because such a catastrophe has never occurred, Japan had constant mild deflation which did not accelerate, even during the great depression the periods of deflation ended.

  4. An expectations augmented Phillips curve with rational expectations–oh hell I’ll just assume perfect foresight. Here both the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves are vertical. If they are at different levels of output, there is no solution. The result is that a liquidity trap is impossible. This is basically a flexible price model. If there were aggregate demand greater than the fixed aggregate supply, the price level would jump up until the real value of money wasn’t enough to satiate liquidity preference. Krugman assumed that, in the long run, people don’t make systematic forecasting mistakes. So he assumed that the economy can’t stay in the liquidity trap for the long run. Ah yes, his model had everything new classical in the long run (this is the point on which Krugman has marked his beliefs to market).

The argument that Krugman would not have reached his conclusions about the economics of economies in liquidity traps if he had considered the supply side only makes sense if it includes the intermediate step that, if one considers the supply side, one must conclude that economies can never be in liquidity traps. This is no good as Japan was in the liquidity trap as are all developed countries at present.

I think the only promising effort here was (3)–a Phillips curve with autoregressive expectations. The problem is: why hasn’t accelerating deflation ever occurred? Way back in 1999, Krugman clearly thought that the answer was just that we had been lucky so far. He warned of the risk of accelerating deflation. Now he thinks he was wrong. Like Krugman, I think the reason is that there is downward nominal rigidity — that it is very hard to get people to accept a lower nominal wage or sell for a lower price. This depends on the change in the wage or price and not in that change minus expected inflation.

Clearly this rigidity isn’t absolute (Japan has had deflation and there were episodes of deflation in the 30s). But it is possible to get write a model in which unemployment is above the non accelerating inflation rate, but nominal wages aren’t cut. In this case expected inflation remains constant–actual deflation doesn’t occur so expected deflation doesn’t occur. The math can work. See here.