Monday DeLong Smackdown: Olivier Blanchard on How the Eurozone Can Be Strengthened After Brexit

A high-quality DeLong smackdown! Keep ’em coming, please…

Olivier Blanchard: How the Eurozone Can Be Strengthened After Brexit: “Brexit raises fundamental questions…. Meanwhile, Europe must continue to function…

…In this context that a large number of prominent economists from different European countries, ranging from those who desire more political integration to those who are more skeptical, have written what they see as the essential next steps to reinforce the architecture of the eurozone…. The purpose of the project, which started long before Brexit, was twofold. First, assess the nature of the challenges and the progress to date…. Second, assess the degree of agreement among ‘experts’ about the remaining challenges and solutions. If you look at the diversity of people on the list, the answer to the second question is that, in contrast to the often strident disagreements in the press, there is, indeed, surprisingly large agreement among experts….

The basic architecture is largely in place. Some strengthening is needed but does not require dramatic political steps. The most important set of measures to take is a strengthening of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)…. The banking union is largely in place, and with it better tools to monitor and reduce financial risks…. More progress can be made without requiring much more political integration…. [In] public finances… fiscal rules have become too many, too messy, with too many loopholes…. In many countries, the issue is not so much deficits than the high level of expenditure, which in turn makes it difficult to balance budgets without resorting to excessive taxation…. Even under the best fiscal rules, current levels of debt together with low growth imply that sovereign debt default is not impossible. Defining responsibilities and the process for sovereign default is essential. This should and can be the role of the ESM…. States have to be willing to give up some control. Otherwise the ESM will not be able to do its job…. We have learned… that liquidity runs can… be very destructive. The European Central Bank (ECB) now has the tools to provide liquidity to banks…. It would be good if it could do the same to states….

Many would like to see more ambitious steps taken, from a common fiscal policy, to euro bonds, to euro-level deposit insurance, etc. And indeed, the line taken by some US commentators today (e.g., Bradford DeLong and Paul Krugman is that this is what our manifesto should have asked for…. Our goal was less ambitious and more realistic. It was to see if the eurozone could function and handle shocks without further political integration if political realities made it impossible for the time being. Our answer is a qualified yes, but it is surely not an endorsement of a do-nothing strategy.

Must-Reads: June 27, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Danny Yagan: Enduring Employment Losses from the Great Recession?: Longitudinal Worker-Level Evidence

Must-Read: Danny Yagan: Enduring Employment Losses from the Great Recession?: Longitudinal Worker-Level Evidence: “The severity of the Great Recession varied across U.S. local areas…

…Comparing two million workers within firms across space, I find that starting the recession in a below-median 2007-2009-employment-shock area caused workers to be 1.0 percentage points less likely to be employed in 2014, relative to starting elsewhere. These enduring employment losses hold even when controlling for current local unemployment rates, which have converged across space. The results demonstrate limits to U.S. local labor market integration and suggest hysteresis effects culminating in labor force exit.

Must-Read: Cardiff Garcia: Alan Taylor on financialisation, business cycles, and crises

Must-Read: Cardiff Garcia: Alphachat: Alan Taylor on financialisation, business cycles, and crises: “With collaborators Oscar Jorda and Moritz Schularick, the authors summarise their decades-long work on financialisation, which we discussed with Alan…

…From the paper:

Our previous research uncovered a key stylized fact of modern macroeconomic history: the “financial hockey stick.” The ratio of aggregate private credit to income in advanced economies has surged to unprecedented levels over the second half of the 20th century. The goal of this paper is to show that with this “great leveraging” key business cycle moments have become increasingly correlated with financial variables. Our long-run data show that business cycles in high-debt economies may not be especially volatile, but are more negatively skewed. Higher debt goes hand in hand with worse tail events.

A great deal of modern macroeconomic thought has relied on the small sample of US post-WW2 experience to formulate, calibrate, and test models of the business cycle, to calculate the welfare costs of fluctuations, and to analyze the benefits of stabilization policies. Yet the historical macroeconomic cross country experience is richer. An important contribution of this paper is to introduce a new comprehensive macro-financial historical database covering 17 advanced economies over the last 150 years. This considerable data collection effort that has occupied the better part of a decade, and involved a small army of research assistants.

Must-Read: Laura Tyson and Eric Labaye: Jumpstarting Europe’s Economy

Must-Read: Laura Tyson and Eric Labaye: Jumpstarting Europe’s Economy: “Not so long ago… ‘helicopter money’… seemed outlandish…

…But today a surprising number of mainstream economists and centrist politicians are endorsing the idea of monetary financing of stimulus measures in different forms…. After years of stagnant growth and debilitating unemployment, all options, no matter how unconventional, should be on the table…. The United Kingdom’s referendum decision to leave the European Union only strengthens the case for more stimulus and unconventional measures in Europe. If a large majority of EU citizens is to support continued political integration, strong economic growth is critical…. The wave of corporate investment that was supposed to be unleashed by a combination of fiscal restraint (to rein in government debt) and monetary easing (to generate ultra-low interest rates) has never materialized. Instead, European companies slashed annual investment by more than €100 billion ($113 billion) a year from 2008 to 2015, and have stockpiled some €700 billion of cash on their balance sheets.
This is not surprising–businesses invest when they are confident about future demand and output growth….

Proponents of helicopter money… rightly argue that it has the advantage of putting money directly into the hands of those who will spend it…. The boost to demand might give central banks the opening they need to move interest rates back toward historical norms. This could take the air out of incipient asset bubbles that might be forming…. A less risky and time-tested route for stimulating demand would be a significant increase in public infrastructure investment funded by government debt…. Yet governments across Europe have clamped down on infrastructure spending for years, giving precedence to fiscal austerity and debt reduction in the misguided belief that government borrowing crowds out private investment and reduces growth. But the crowding-out logic applies only to conditions of full employment, conditions that clearly do not exist in most of Europe today…

Must-Reads: June 26, 2016


Should Reads:

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Against Eurotimidity

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: Against Eurotimidity: “The authors really are the best and brightest…. So I’d really like to say nice things…

…Unfortunately… is this really all they can offer? I understand that in the effort to reach consensus one must trim back the more intellectually daring and politically difficult parts of what an individual economist might propose. But in this case the search for consensus seems to have leached out practically all the substance…. They’re calling for liquidity support in times of crisis, and I think debt relief if necessary. But that’s sort of how Europe is already trying to muddle through. They don’t call for fiscal integration; they don’t even call for a euro-wide system of deposit insurance. I’m really not sure what they are proposing, beyond neatening up the organization chart. They allude to the possibility of secular stagnation, which some of us consider a clear argument for fiscal stimulus and higher inflation targets. But all they suggest is… structural reform, the universal elixir of elites.

The only really new thing I thought I saw was the declaration that “the level of expenditure – rather than the deficit – is the main problem” coupled with a call for expenditure rules. But where is that coming from? There is no correlation between economic performance in the euro crisis and the level of government spending as a share of GDP — Austria has a big government, Ireland and Spain small ones by European standards. And absent some clear evidence that big G was the problem, why declare that national sovereignty on the size of the public sector must be reduced?… From a macro perspective, Europe is a depressed economy with inflation well below a reasonable target, desperately in need of more demand, with this aggregate problem exacerbated by the problems of adjustment within a single currency. And here we have a manifesto calling for smaller government and structural reform. The authors of the manifesto aren’t neoliberal ideologues. So what happened?

Ten Current-Situation Questions for Brad DeLong

(1) Recession Chances?: The chances of recession are smmall, but not very small. Robert Solow likes to quote Damon Runyon that nothing between humans is more than 3 to 1. We have a very hard time imagining how fat the tails are–and so even when things look clear there are always dangers surprisingly close

That said, expansions do not die of natural causes. It is true that the unwinding of malinvestment balances is a fraught moment. But we climbed down from the dot-com bubble successfully. And we almost climbed down from the housing bubble successfully—I confess that even in July 2008 I thought we were going to make it. And so I think, today, that we are going to make it without a recession in our near future. (Britain and Texas, on the other hand…)

(2) Secular Stagnation?: If what we call “secular stagnation” were predominantly on the supply side, we would be seeing many more signs of demand exceeding supply and of upward pressure on prices in individual sectors with bottlenecks than we are. As it is, we see only one bottleneck and one sector of significant pressure: housing prices in world cities where NIMBYism rules.

(3) The Equilibrium Level of the Interest Rate?: The case for a lower equilibrium safe real interest rate is the market’s: that is what the market is telling us. The big remaining question his whether this Is because of a shortage of profitable investment opportunities—that we have had a breakdown in that those investments that would promote societal utility cannot be also jiggered to create private profits—or whether it is because it is a shortage of global risk-bearing capacity. And both theories have evidence supporting them.

(4) Should the Fed Have Increased Rates in December?: No. There was no upside I could see. There was some downside that I could see. Now the downside has come to roost and is sitting on the telephone wire. With no possible upside and possible downsides, how could it not have been a mistake ex ante? And with the downside as it has materialized, it does look like a moderate mistake ex post.

(5) A Higher Inflation Target?: Put yourself back in the mid-1990s. There is no way that anybody who foresaw any reasonable possibility of 2008-2016 would have thought that a 2.5%/year CPI-inflation target was a reasonable thing. It would have been 4%/year. And in the long run there is nothing to be gained by desperately trying to hold onto a policy that was and remains unwise. For getting a credible reputation for unwisdom is not the kind of credibility you want.

(6) Fed Performance?: Both Bernanke and Yellen were world-class in their preparation for the job, are world-class in their intelligence and competence, and have done better then any of the other first-world central bankers since 1995. We are lucky. They have avoided repeating previous mistakes. They are making and will continue to make their own mistakes. But what we think we identify in real-time and will identify in retrospect as their policy failures speaks not that they should not have had their jobs but rather of the difficulty of the dive. We are very lucky that GWB and Obama made those appointments, and Senators who did not advise and consent should be deeply ashamed of themselves.

(7) Trump?: The hoped-for scenario if Trump wins is Trump = Schwarzenegger—a Hollywood celebrity who would try to make Hollywood-style deals in politics and, like Schwarzenegger, fail. The feared scenario if Trump wins is Trump = Berlusconi–or, worse, Mussolini. More broadly, if Trump wins and turns out to be less abnormal than his campaign persona–or if Clinton wins–there are then three other scenarios:

  1. There is the total gridlock scenario.
  2. There is the people-realize-that-they-are-“Washington”-and-that-making-“Washington”-disfunctional-is-bad-for-their-long-run-careers scenario, in which case what we used to think of as normal—pre-1993 dealmaking rather than rigid ideological posturing—resumes.
  3. There is the Trump has negative coattails that destroy Republican congressional power scenario.

(8) China?: We do not know if Xi Jinping’s desire to return to “democratic centralism” is at all compatible with a prosperous modern economy. The experience of 19th and 20th Century Europe says no—that authoritarian rule by a caste without a plausible economic role is unstable in the industrial and even more so in the post-industrial age. But maybe Europe is a bad guide. We do not know why the Middle Income Trap is a Thing, or even whether it is really a Thing. But maybe that is a Latin American phenomenon only. China’s long history tells us that the way to bet is that China’s natural condition is to be at the lead as one of the world’s most prosperous and most peaceful regions containing about one-fifth of humanity. If we can take a 200-year perspective, that is probably right. But in a 50-year perspective? Be afraid. Be very afraid.

But it is not a thing I would worry about if either the Federal Reserve or the rest of the U.S. government had both the will and the tools to stabilize aggregate demand in response to what can be, at most, only a moderate adverse shock from China. Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve has the will but may not have the tools. And the rest of the government has the tools but not the will…

(9) Brexit?: Brexit may well not happen. Buyer’s remorse may be very high, and none of the Brexiteers seem to have read the legal documents to figure out which parliaments have to approve Brexit for it to happen or if indeed there can be an Engxit if Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland wish their people to retain their EU passports. It is a disaster: investment in England is right now dropping like a stone as everyone decides to wait and see.

Whatever happens–Engxit, Brexit, Morexit, or nothing–Europe will continue to be a very rich part of the world. Profits from investing and producing in Europe will continue to be high. The political economy of Europe will continue to make Germany an export powerhouse. And that means that as long as the world as a whole has slack demand—which looks like a long time—being in a currency union with Germany and being subject to German demands for fiscal policy will inflict considerable drag on the rest of Europe. But it is the strangling of rapid growth and the fumbling of opportunities for economic convergence that is at issue here, not a meltdown or any harder landing then we have already had.

(10) Risks to Emerging Markets?: The conventional economic models that I was taught told me that monetary tightening in the United States was expansionary for emerging markets as long as they allowed the market to value their currencies. That seems to be wrong. But we are confused about why that is wrong. Some say that it is because emerging markets must borrow inflation-fighting credibility from abroad and so cannot afford to let their currencies undergo a clean float. Others say that international capital flows carry not just financing capacity but risk-bearing and entrepreneurship along with them. Therefore: be afraid, be very afraid of the current Fed tightening cycle, although our models of why we should be afraid are pretty-much crap.

As to why growth keeps disappointing, it has always been thus. We tend to focus on the Western European convergence during the 30 glorious years, on the Asian Tigers, on Japan’s Meiji and Showa eras, on China today, and, earlier, on Wilhelmine Germany. But those are the exceptions. The rule is that this is very hard.

Now on some level it makes no sense that this is very hard.

Both Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill around 1850 were certain that the next 50 years would see industrial structure and productivity levels in India converge to the British standard. Mill expected it to be because of world trade, the inculcation of British market-friendly institutions, and good government by himself and all his friends in the India Office. Marx expected it to be because the British Millocracy were throwing a net of railroads across India for their own profit that would, unintentionally, allow the global markets and the world bourgeoisie to do their wonderful, horrible thing that would make the communist revolution to create a free society of associated producers possible, necessary, and very desirable. Both were wrong.

Right now we can ship anything non-spoilable across the world for pennies, talk to anyone, and access any piece of engineering knowledge less than a generation old for free. Yet the world has very steep valleys and peaks. And one billion of our fellow human beings who could do just as well as we do in our pitch and our board meetings if they were properly briefed still live lives barely distinguishable from those of our pre-industrial agrarian age ancestors.