Must-Read: Mohamed A. El-Erian: Toxic Politics Versus Better Economics

Must-Read: More and more, it is sounding as though we are all Polanyiists now…

Mohamed A. El-Erian: Toxic Politics Versus Better Economics: “Advanced-country politicians are locked in bizarre, often toxic, conflicts…

…instead of acting on a growing economic consensus about how to escape a protracted period of low and unequal growth. This trend must be reversed, before it structurally cripples the advanced world and sweeps up the emerging economies, too…. Political infighting is nothing new. But, until recently, the expectation was that if professional economists achieved a technocratic consensus… political leaders would listen…. Incoming governments – particularly those led by non-traditional movements, which had risen to power on the back of domestic unease and frustration with mainstream parties – sometimes disagreed with the appropriateness and relevance…. But, as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrated with his famous policy pivot in 2002, that consensus tended largely to prevail….

But after years of unusually sluggish and strikingly non-inclusive growth, the consensus is breaking down. Advanced-country citizens are frustrated with an “establishment” – including economic “experts,” mainstream political leaders, and dominant multinational companies – which they increasingly blame…. [The] Brexit vote… directly defied the broad economic consensus that remaining within the European Union was in Britain’s best interest…. At the recent Conservative Party annual conference, speeches by Prime Minister Theresa May and members of her cabinet revealed an intention to pursue a “hard Brexit,” thereby dismantling trading arrangements that have served the economy well. They also included attacks on “international elites” and criticism of Bank of England policies that were instrumental in stabilizing the British economy in the referendum’s immediate aftermath – thus giving May’s new government time to formulate a coherent Brexit strategy….

Make no mistake: solid and credible policy options are available…. As IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde put it, “central banks cannot be the only game in town.” And yet they have been…. Countries need a more comprehensive policy approach, involving pro-growth structural reforms, more balanced demand management (including higher fiscal spending on infrastructure), and better cross-border policy coordination and architecture…. The emergence of a new consensus on these points is good news. But, in the current political environment, translating that consensus into action is likely to happen too slowly, at best…

Must-Watch: Brown University Janus Forum: Inequality: Is America Becoming a Two-Tiered Society?

Must-Watch: Well, I thought that went very well…

Brown University Janus Forum: Inequality: Is America Becoming a Two-Tiered Society?: Monday, October 17 @ 5:30pm :: Brown Faculty Club Hunter Room…

…James Bradford DeLong at University of California, Berkley, and Nicholas Gregory Mankiw, the Robert M. Beren Professor of Economics at Harvard University, will share their alternative readings and reactions to the recent top selling book “Capital in the Twenty-first Century” by Thomas Piketty. Is income inequality on the rise? What does the evidence say? How significantly does income inequality shape human welfare? Does economic growth help the poor?

Must-Read: Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, and Andrei Shleifer: Securing Property Rights

Must-Read: Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, and Andrei Shleifer: Securing Property Rights: “A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice…

…through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.

Must-Reads: October 18, 2016


Should Reads:

Inequality: Brown University Janus Forum

Brown University Janus Forum Lecture: Inequality: Is America Becoming a Two-Tiered Society?

N. Gregory Mankiw and J. Bradford DeLong

Faculty Club at Brown University :: 5:30 PM – 8:00 PM :: October 17, 2016


My Presentation:

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This presentation file: https://www.icloud.com/keynote/0gIuwcJ_jAF0MtGozXgE7_95Q#2016-10-17_Brown_Janus

Economic insecurity rises around childbirth, explained in four charts

Between the sleepless nights, routine doctors visits, endless baby supplies, and childcare arrangements, having a child, to put it mildly, is a mammoth investment. Parents put a significant amount of time and money into preparing for and rearing a newborn, which has tremendous pay-offs for a child’s development in the longrun. Despite the well-understood temporal and pecuniary chaos that is pregnancy and early parenthood, there is relatively little quantitative documentation on just how much a new child affects household finances.

 

In a new working paper, Alexandra Stanczyk, a postdoctoral scholar at University of California-Berkeley’s School of Social Welfare, contributes to this literature, exploring how U.S. household economic well-being changes in the year leading up to and following the birth of a child. Harnessing the monthly longitudinal panel data in the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Stanczyk tracks three different measures of economic security, all of which demonstrate that there are substantial decreases in household economic well-being around the birth of a child.

1.

The data show U.S. household income dramatically falls around childbirth

About four months before birth, gross household income—one of Stanczyk’s economic well-being indicators that includes a household’s total income, public program cash transfers, refundable tax credits, and income from other unrelated household adults—declines sharply. In fact, by the time of birth, gross household income is, on average, 10.4 percent below its value just 12 months prior.

2. & 3.

The results hold for different demographic groups

Stanczyk charts that these income shocks around a birth of a child are visible across different demographic groups, too. Take educational attainment: Regardless of a mother’s education level, gross income drops around a birth, but households that have either very high or very low levels of education are hit the hardest.

 

In households where mothers have a bachelor’s degree or more, income does not fall substantially, but it takes a significant amount of time for it to return to its original levels. The slow recovery may be because better-educated women are more likely to have access to policies that support leave around childbirth or have enough of a financial buffer to remain out of work for extended periods of time. For households where the mother hasn’t completed high school, gross incomes reach as low as 13.7 percent below its initially observed value at the birth month, but quickly return to pre-birth levels. This is in line with other research that shows less-educated women often return to work soon after giving birth because of financial strains and a lack of paid leave policies.

When looking at household structure, Stanczyk finds that households with only a single mother experience the greatest income volatility around a birth.

Shortly after conception, single-mother households see a steep deterioration in their gross income; on average, these households experience a 41.8 percent decrease in their starting income. Similar to households with less-educated mothers, income rapidly increases for these single-mother homes in the months after a birth.

4.

The composition of household income changes around birth, exacerbating the gender wage gap

To better explain this financial volatility that families face around childbirth, Stanczyk decomposes gross income into six parts: father’s earnings, mother’s earnings, other household adult’s earnings, income from public programs, income from child support, and other sources of income. It turns out that in the year leading up to birth, the mother’s share of household income sees the largest decreases, while the father’s share of household income increases. In other words, pregnancy and childbirth widens the gender wage gap.

These results may be somewhat unsurprising given that most women in the United States take time off of work around childbirth, and to mitigate these losses to household income, fathers may increase their earnings if they are present. But Stanczyk also shows that families also become more reliant on income from public programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for Women, Infants, and Children, the Earned Income Tax Credit, or the Child Tax Credit.

Public programs help economic security for new families, but not nearly enough

As vital as these programs already are for household economic well-being around a birth, Stanczyk argues that social safety net programs need to be strengthened.

On one hand, improving the generosity of the programs can reduce sharp changes in household income during the period surrounding childbirth. On the other hand, the effectiveness of these programs may be hampered by when benefits are received. Stanczyk recommends adopting a child benefit policy—a social security cash transfer given to families with children—and implementing paid family leave and childcare subsidies. Altogether, these policies, if enacted equitably, can improve the economic security of households during a critical, and exciting, time.

(Early) Monday DeLong Smackdown: Labor Force Participation Trends

Prime age male for brad pdf

Has the Longer Depression accelerated the trend of “losing” prime-age males, crowding what would have been a generation of the trend into a decade, as I suggested at the FRBB Conference and here in contradiction to what Alan Krueger and Gabriel Chodorow-Reich were saying? No. Or, rather, you could say it looked like that as of 2013 if you thought recovery was then substantially complete. You really cannot say that anymore.

The extremely sharp Gabriel Chodorow-Reich in Email:

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich: Prime age male by 5 year age bin: “Here is a figure and a table related to our back-and-forth…

…The figure shows the LFPR over time for 25-54 year-old men split into 5 year age bins. (The data are the published BLS data with no adjustments for population controls,  I have smoothed and deseasonalized by taking a trailing 12 month moving average.) The dashed lines are the OLS trends estimated using data from 1976-2007.

What I take from the figure is that except for the 25-29 and 30-34 groups, the 1976-2007 trend fits the 2016 value pretty well.  As I said in my discussion, I’m not a huge fan of blindly taking trends and extrapolating.  But for the question of whether 2007-16 is unusual this seems a reasonable approach.  

There is a large deviation from the prior trend for the 25-29 and 30-34 male age groups.  The table, which was in my discussion slides, focuses on this group.  The plurality of the decline in participation is due to increased schooling. This seems benign.  The increase in those reporting disability is less so.  Using 2000 as a benchmark, the transition rates back into employment for this group also seem more elastic to a tighter labor market, which is consistent with other evidence.

Prime age male for brad pdf

Cf.: My earlier post:

Note to Self from Boston Harborside: Alan Krueger and Gabriel Chodorow-Reich both assure me that, to them, it does not look like the decline in prime-age male employment was materially accelerated by what I now call the Longer Depression. I don’t see it here. Are the changes in the age distribution within the category of 25-54 year olds over the past 40 years large enough to make this chart misleading? I cannot see it. I know that one disputes labor numbers with Alan Krueger (or Gabriel Chodorow-Reich) at one’s peril. But it looks to me like we were losing 1.25%/decade as far as prime-age male employment was concerned. And that in the past decade we have lost 3.25%–25 years’ worth of the trend in 10…

Employment Rate Aged 25 54 Males for the United States© FRED St Louis Fed

Did the Pace at Which We Lose Males 25-54 Accelerate?

Note to Self from Boston Harborside: Alan Krueger and Gabriel Chodorow-Reich both assure me that, to them, it does not look like the decline in prime-age male employment was materially accelerated by what I now call the Longer Depression. I don’t see it here:

Employment Rate Aged 25 54 Males for the United States© FRED St Louis Fed

Are the changes in the age distribution within the category of 25-54 year olds over the past 40 years large enough to make this chart misleading? I cannot see it. I know that one disputes labor numbers with Alan Krueger (or Gabriel Chodorow-Reich) at one’s peril. But it looks to me like we were losing 1.25%/decade as far as prime-age male employment was concerned. And that in the past decade we have lost 3.25%–25 years’ worth of the trend in 10…

The Prime-Age Men Missing from the Labor Force…

Two comments:

First, on non-participation of prime-age males:

  • We lost 22% of 55-64 male labor force participation 1958-1995…
  • Since 1995 we have gained 4% in 55-64 male labor force participation…
  • We were losing 1.2%-points of 25-54 prime-age male employment and labor force participation every decade….
  • Then we lost 7%-points of prime-age male employment in two years…
  • Now, seven years into the recovery, nearly a decade later we have gotten back to normal as far as the unemployment rate is concerned, but we are still 1.8%-points low of trend as far as prime-age male employment and participation is concerned…
  • We have crowded a generation’s worth of this shedding prime-age male participation process into a decade…
  • Is not the natural reading that the labor market shock of 2008-9 made a lot of people permanently sick, disabled, depressed, disconnected?
  • If not the psychological and sociological consequences of the Great Recession and Elusive Recovery, what else could have caused the speed-up of this process?
  • If anyone has an alternative candidate for the speedup, I would like to hear it…

Second, on video games:

  • There was a time when I had to decide whether I would win regularly at God level on the computer game Civilization or be an affective Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury…
  • Back then I microwaved my CD-ROM…
  • But I am up to about one aleve every three days, so the lesson I take away from Alan is: I need to watch out…

Justin Fox: Not Working Makes People Sick: “Overall, men are less likely to be taking pain medication than women…

…But men who have dropped out of the labor force are much more likely to be taking pain meds than either other men or the women who’ve dropped out…. Most women who aren’t in the labor force are still working, just not for pay. Most men… simply aren’t working…. Half of the men not in the labor force… reporting that they were ill…. The ill-or-disabled percentage of the overall prime-age population wasn’t all that much higher for men (5.6 percent) than for women (5.4 percent).

Back in the 1950s and 1960s, about 97 percent of prime-age men either had jobs or were actively looking for them. Work has gotten less hazardous and physically demanding since then, not more. So how can it be that 5.6 percent of prime-age men report being out of the labor force now because of illness or disability, while only 3 percent were out of the labor force for any reason in the early 1960s?… A lot of it… is because long-term unemployment and inactivity make people sick…. Men who aren’t in the labor force spent an average of five and a half hours a day watching television and movies in 2014, compared with about two hours a day for working men and three and a half for unemployed men. That’s not exactly healthy.

It seems like vicious cycle. Men who drop out of the labor force–maybe initially for health reasons, maybe not–fall into lifestyles that render them ever less capable of rejoining it. (This may be true of a lot of women, too, but their characteristics are harder to nail down because of the split between those who are truly out of work and those with home responsibilities.) Getting them back into the labor force seems like it ought to be a national priority. But it’s not going to be easy.

Alan Krueger: Where Have All the Workers Gone?: “The Great Recession was accompanied by a noticeable decline in labor force participation, even among the prime working-age population…

…How much of this decline can be expected to reverse? Is a further tightening of the labor market a precondition for a much stronger rebound in participation? Is the lack of participation the consequence of a rise in the reservation wage or a fall in the market wage? Does it reflect a mismatch of skills? Would retraining programs be an effective tool to bring more people back into the labor force?

Alan B Krueger pdf Alan B Krueger pdf

Must-Read: Andrew Gelman: That controversial claim that high genetic diversity, or low genetic diversity, is bad for the economy

Must-Read: Andrew Gelman (2013): That controversial claim that high genetic diversity, or low genetic diversity, is bad for the economy:

Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor, wrote a paper… [that] is pretty silly and I’m surprised it was accepted in such a top journal…

Economists can be credulous but I’d expect better from them when considering economic development, which is one of their central topics. Ashraf and Galor have, however, been somewhat lucky in their enemies, in that they’ve been attacked by a bunch of anthropologists who have criticized them on political as well as scientific grounds. This gives the pair of economists the scientific and even moral high ground, in that they can feel that, unlike their antagonists, they are the true scholars, the ones pursuing truth wherever it leads them, letting the chips fall where they may…. [But] the chips aren’t quite falling the way Ashraf and Galor think they are….

What went wrong, and how could Ashraf and Galor have done better? I think the way to go is to start with the big pattern they noticed: the most genetically diverse countries (according to their measure) are in east Africa, and they’re poor. The least genetically diverse countries are remote undeveloped places like Bolivia and are pretty poor. Industrialized countries are not so remote (thus they have some diversity) but they’re not filled with east Africans (thus they’re not extremely genetically diverse). From there, you can look at various subsets of the data and perform various side analysis….

Exploration won’t get you published in the American Economic Review. Instead of the explore-and-study paradigm, Ashraf and Galor are going with assert-and-defend. They make a very strong claim and keep banging on it…. I don’t think this lets you off the hook of having to think carefully about causal claims…. High-profile social science research aims for proof, not for understanding—and that’s a problem…. Incentives… favor silly causal claims…