Should-Read: Will Wilkinson: The DACA and immigration debates are about whether Latinos are “real Americans”

Should-Read: Will Wilkinson: The DACA and immigration debates are about whether Latinos are “real Americans”: “Challenging the idea that Latino Americans can be truly American undercuts the very idea of America…

…The fact that there’s any question about affording legal status to a class of rooted young immigrants who grew up American among Americans is shameful. It’s a reflection of the disgraceful fact that so many of us are doggedly ignorant of the country we claim to revere, and deny the plain historical truth that America has always been multicultural…. It makes no more sense, culturally or ethnically, to call into question the Americanness of a young woman whose mom brought her from Hermosillo to Tucson at the age of 6 than it does to doubt that a white guy raised in Syracuse but born in Toronto can ever really belong there. Threatening to hang DREAMers out to dry—to arrest them, to uproot them, to jail them, to rip them from their families, to sever their bonds of loyalty and love, and to cast them into exile—threatens the equality and security of tens of millions of American citizens who are ethnically and culturally identical to them. And a threat to any subset of Americans is a threat to America—to us.

Trump’s unilateral act of political hostage-taking was, from the beginning, an act of violent division, an assault on the integrity of the actual, existing, real-world American people. The ethnically purified fantasy of the populist imagination is a seditious force that obscures our higher loyalties, shatters the peace of liberal equality, and splits Americans into warring tribes ready to abuse people whom patriotic decency would otherwise compel us to defend…

Should-Read: Dahlia K. Remler et al.: Estimating The Effects Of Health Insurance And Other Social Programs On Poverty Under The Affordable Care Act

Should-Read: Dahlia K. Remler et al.: Estimating The Effects Of Health Insurance And Other Social Programs On Poverty Under The Affordable Care Act: “The effects of health insurance on poverty have been difficult to ascertain…

…We estimated the direct effects of health insurance benefits on health-inclusive poverty for people younger than age sixty-five, comparing the impacts of different health insurance programs and of nonhealth means-tested cash and in-kind benefits, refundable tax credits, and nonhealth social insurance programs. Private health insurance benefits reduced poverty by 3.7 percentage points. Public health insurance benefits (from Medicare, Medicaid, and Affordable Care Act premium subsidies) accounted for nearly one-third of the overall poverty reduction from public benefits. Poor adults with neither children nor a disability experienced little poverty relief from public programs, and what relief they did receive came mostly from premium subsidies and other public health insurance benefits. Medicaid had a larger effect on child poverty than all nonhealth means-tested benefits combined…

Should-Read: Robert Shackleton: Estimating and Projecting Potential Output Using CBO’s Forecasting Growth Model

Should-Read: Robert Shackleton: Estimating and Projecting Potential Output Using CBO’s Forecasting Growth Model: “CBO regularly produces estimates and projections of potential output…

…The projection… serves as a key input to CBO’s macroeconomic forecasts and budget projections, helping the agency maintain consistency between its projections of labor supply and capital accumulation and its projections of taxes on income from labor and capital, of federal expenditures, and of the accumulation of public debt. This paper updates the agency’s description of the data sources, analytic methods, and modeling framework that it uses both to estimate historical values of the components of potential output and to project those values into the future. It describes the major changes that CBO has introduced in its approach since it last published a methodological description in 2001, outlines the linkages between its analysis of potential output and other elements of its economic and policy analysis, and discusses some of the major challenges associated with understanding and projecting recent trends in fundamental components of the economy…

Should-Read: Robert Waldmann: A Comment on the Return of “It’s Baaaack”

Should-Read: Very sharp from Robert Waldmann on many things, one of them the difference between “credible” in a game-theoretic sense and “credited” in an economic-actor sense—and on the smoking ruin left of macroeconomics for a generation by economists who devoted their careers to fuzzing the distinction. And Ima gonna start using “it is a relephant” for “it is irrelevant” all the time. Just saying: Robert Waldmann: A Comment on the Return of “It’s Baaaack”: “Twenty years ago, Paul Krugman warned that the liquidity trap was not just an issue in the economic history of the 30s…

… Extremely excellent and very much worth reading…. [A] claim was that if the price level fell enough, the real value of money holdings (real balances) would be a significant part of wealth and this would cause high consumption (this is called the Pigou effect)…. Krugman notes that formal math says if real balances are huge because of a liquidity trap, people know that their apparent wealth will be consumed by inflation tax (or by taxes needed to retire money if the monetary authority doesn’t accept inflation)….

My first point… is actually Larry Summers’s point. In 1998, Krugman assumed that Japan would, sooner or later, exit the liquidity trap…. 20 years later, it seems that the trap might be permanent. This would invalidate Krugman’s argument that… a credible (that is credited — believed) promise to cause high inflation when the economy is out of the liquidity trap will be effective. What if this is a promise about policy on the 8th of never?…

…I claim a second problem is the abuse of “credible” which is used to mean “sincerely and honestly asserted” and “believed by others, that is credited”. The rational expectations assumption sneaks in and asserts that if people should believe, then they will believe. It makes private agents beliefs seem to be part of the policy…. Non-standard monetary policy works by changing expectations, and it is assumed policy makers can do that (or rather the implications of the assumption are studied by people who regularly warn that they don’t know if this will happen & say therefore fiscal stimulus should be used). There is also an equivocation in “regime shift” which is used to refer to a major permanent change in policy and the belief that a change in policy is major and permanent. With the equivocal definitions, unconventional monetary policy can’t fail, it can only be failed.

And (finally) I get to the bit of Krugman’s post with which I disagree. He assesses the effects of unconventional policy (as proposed by Krugman) and says the evidence is mixed. I actually became almost known as a skeptic of unconventional monetary policy and I think the evidence strongly suggests it doesn’t work…. The regime shift (if any) was Kuroda’s promise to do whatever it took to get to 2%. From November 2916 to November 2017 (the most recent 12 month period on FRED) Japanese consumer prices increased 0.5%. I conclude that it can’t be done (I don’t think anyone could use the communications channel much more vigorously that Kuroda)….

The evidence of monetary regime shifts (as the phrase is used which includes the assumption that people believe the policy has changed and that this matters a lot) is, I think, reduced to countries going off the gold standard in the 1930s. I’m going to focus on 1933 and not just FDR (YOU KNOW WHO else went off the gold standard in 1933?). Here in two big cases there were other “regime shifts”: either a major partisan realignment or, uh, you know, a literal regime shift.

I now have returned to thinking that “credibly promising to be irresponsible” that is “achieving a monetery policy regime shift” can’t be done (which doesn’t mean it isn’t worth trying if the economy is in a liquidity trap and fiscal policy makers are austerian)…

Should-Read: David E. Broockman et al.: The Political Behavior of Wealthy Americans: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Should-Read: David E. Broockman et al.: The Political Behavior of Wealthy Americans: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs: “American politics overrepresents the wealthy. But what policies do the wealthy support?…

…Many accounts implicitly assume the wealthy are monolithically conservative and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. Instead, we argue there is substantial heterogeneity by industry, wherein the wealthy from an industry can share a distinctive set of political preferences. Consequently, how increases in the wealthy’s influence affect inequality depends on which industries’ rich are gaining influence and which issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with three original surveys, including the two largest surveys of wealthy Americans to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—a burgeoning wealthy demographic— and another of political campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other wealthy individuals. Consistent with our theoretical argument, we also present evidence that suggests these differences arise from their distinctive predispositions…

Should-Read: Thomas Piketty (2015): Putting Distribution Back at the Center of Economics: Reflections on Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Should-Read: Thomas Piketty (2015): Putting Distribution Back at the Center of Economics: Reflections on Capital in the Twenty-First Century: “until 1914, the French elite often justified its strong opposition to the creation of a progressive income tax by referring to the principles of the French Revolution…

…France had become equal after 1789 thanks to the end of aristocratic privileges and the development of well-protected property rights for the entire population. Because everybody had been made equal in their ability to hold property, there was no need for progressive taxation (which would be suitable for aristocratic Britain, the story went, but not for republican France). What I find particularly striking in this pre-1914 debate is the combination of strong beliefs in property-rights-centered institutions and an equally strong denial of high inequality. In my book, I try to understand what we can learn from the fact that wealth inequality was as large in France in 1914 as in 1789, and also from the fact that much of the elite was trying to deny this. I believe there are important implications for the current rise in wealth and income inequality and the current attempts to minimize or deny that they are occurring…

Should-Read: Cory Doctorow: Let’s Get Better at Demanding Better from Tech

Should-Read: Cory Doctorow: Let’s Get Better at Demanding Better from Tech: “In 2018, companies from John Deere to GM to Johnson & Johnson use digital locks and abusive license agreements to force you to submit to surveillance and control how you use their products…

…It’s true that if you don’t pay for the product, you’re the product–but if you’re a farmer who’s just shelled out $500,000 for a new tractor, you’re still the product. The “original sin of advertising” story says that if only microtransactions had been technologically viable and commercially attractive, we could have had an attention-respecting, artist-compensating online world, but in a world of mass inequality, financializing culture and discourse means excluding huge swaths of the population from the modern public sphere. If the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision has you convinced that money has had a corrupting influence on who gets to speak, imagine how corrupting the situation would be if you also had to pay to listen…. I’ve argued before that the reason we’re still talking about decades-old SF movies like The Matrix and The Terminator–the reason smart people keep issuing foolish warnings about our primitive AIs making great leaps and becoming our overlords–is that these AI-apocalypses resonate with our current corporate situation. Corporations–artificial persons under the law–are colony life-forms that use us like gut-flora, maneuvering us to help them thrive and reproduce, jettisoning us or crushing us if we cease to serve their needs.

There is a key difference between the actual gut-flora that’s filling your non-metaphorical intestine right now and the metaphorical gut-flora that we humans constitute in the bowels of the Fortune 100: gut flora can’t be persuaded by moral argument, and people can. The long-delayed techlash…. Early “techno-utopians” were keenly aware of these risks. They founded organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Free Software Foundation, not because they were convinced that everything was going to be great–but because they were worried that everything could be terrible, and also because they saw the potential for things to be better. The motto of these pioneers wasn’t, “This is going to be so great.” It was, “This could be great–if we don’t screw it up.”…

Our technology can make our lives better, can give us more control, can give us more privacy–but only if we force it to live up to its promise. Any path to that better future will involve technologists, because no group of people on earth is better equipped to understand how important it is to get there…

Weekend reading: “labor share of income” edition

This is a weekly post we publish on Fridays with links to articles that touch on economic inequality and growth. The first section is a round-up of what Equitable Growth published this week and the second is the work we’re highlighting from elsewhere. We won’t be the first to share these articles, but we hope by taking a look back at the whole week, we can put them in context.

Equitable Growth round-up

Why hasn’t the Federal Reserve tried overshooting inflation or economic growth? Nick Bunker considers whether the hesitancy lies with the central bank’s target or believes about how quickly inflation might rise.

“Labor’s share of income” refers to the share of national economic output that workers get as compensation in exchange for their labor. It began to decline in the United States around the turn of the 21st Century and similar trends have been observed in multiple other countries, but we still don’t conclusively know why. One potential explanation comes from Princeton University economist and Equitable Growth-grantee Ezra Oberfield, who, in a recent submission to Equitable Growth’s Working Paper Series, argues that the decline in labor’s share of income could in fact be due to the slowdown in productivity growth that has also been observed in recent decades.

In a new column cross-posted from VoxEU, Oberfield and his co-authors break down their paper’s analysis and key findings.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released its latest U.S. labor market report for February this morning. Check out five key graphs from the new data compiled by Equitable Growth staff.

Links from around the web

Women’s participation in the labor force is enabled by care work, which is one of the lowest paid sectors in the U.S. economy and continues to be disproportionately provided by women of color. And care workers need to be able to spend time with their own families, too. These are all things that advocates for paid leave need to take into consideration when designing policy to ensure that everyone is able to take advantage and benefit from paid leave. [slate]

In a new bill introduced this week, Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) aims to ensure that workers share in the benefits when their companies do share buybacks. [vox]

Why are state tax dollars subsidizing corporations? University of Texas-Austin professor and Equitable Growth-grantee Nathan Jensen asks this question in an op-ed in The New York Times. [nyt]

Read more about Jensen’s work on government subsidies for economic development, including in his working paper on the subject for the Equitable Growth Working Paper Series.

Research into the effects of cash transfer programs in other countries finds that giving poor families money improves children’s chances of success later in life across a range of measures, including working more hours per week as adults than similarly poor children whose families didn’t receive the cash. [the atlantic]

In an op-ed for the The New York Times, Columbia University professor Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Brookings fellow Vanessa Williamson—both Equitable Growth grantees—explain the results of their new research into the impact of “right to work” laws on voter turnout and election results.

The Great Recession revealed the connection between household debt and the business cycle. Economists Atif Mian of Princeton University and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago—both Equitable Growth grantees—explain how expansions in credit supply interact with household demand to drive the business cycle and the implications of this for the relationship between inequality and the economy. [project syndicate]

You can also read more about Mian and Sufi’s working paper on the subject in this Value Added post by Equitable Growth’s Nick Bunker.

Friday figure

In honor of International Women’s Day, which was March 8:

Figure is from Equitable Growth’s, “Is the cost of childcare driving women out of the U.S. workforce?

Should-Read: Elise Gould: Strong employment growth and promising participation, but wage growth continues to fall short

Should-Read: Elise Gould: Strong employment growth and promising participation, but wage growth continues to fall short: The economy added a strong 313,000 jobs in February….

…The unemployment rate held steady at 4.1 percent, while the labor force participation rate (LFPR) and the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) saw sizeable gains, 0.3 percentage points each, restoring them to levels last seen in September 2017. At 79.3 percent, prime-age EPOP, meanwhile, is the highest it’s been since June 2008…. Despite these impressive gains in employment and participation… nominal hourly wage growth remains relatively disappointing at 2.6 percent year-over-year, so we clearly have a ways to go before reaching the 3.5 percent wage growth—at a minimum—that would be consistent with the Fed’s inflation target and estimates of potential productivity growth…