Should-Read: Chris Isidore: Carrier to Ultimately Cut

Should-Read: Chris Isidore: Carrier to Ultimately Cut: “Union boss on Trump feud: I called him out…

…It sounded like great news when Carrier said last week that it would invest millions in the Indiana plant it decided to keep in the U.S… a $16 million investment in the facility. But… most of that money will be invested in automation…. “We’re going to…automate to drive the cost down so that we can continue to be competitive,” he said on an interview on CNBC earlier this week. “Is it as cheap as moving to Mexico with lower cost labor? No. But we will make that plant competitive just because we’ll make the capital investments there. But what that ultimately means is there will be fewer jobs.”

The decision to keep Carrier’s furnace manufacturing operations in the U.S. instead of moving them to Mexico will save about 800 jobs out of the 1,400 at the plant, at least in the near term. The company declined to say how many of the plants 800 remaining jobs could be lost to automation, or when…

The Phrase “Structural Reform” Considered Harmful

Preview of Fiscal Policy in the New Normal IMF Panel

The worst possible “structural reform” program is one that moves a worker from a low productivity job into unemployment, where they then lose their weak tie social network that allows them to get new jobs. They then get used to sitting in their sisters’ basement splaying video games and surfing the internet all day. “Structural reforms” are extremely dangerous unless you have a high-pressure economy to pull resources out of low productivity into high productivity sectors.

The view in the high councils of Europe is that, when there is a high-pressure economy, politicians will not press for “structural reform”: there is no obvious need, and so why rock the boat? Politicians kick every can they can down the road, and you can only try “structural reform” when unemployment is high–and thus when it is likely to be ineffective if not destructive.

I don’t think this view is correct. But this is the view–in Europe. This creates a very difficult political economy puzzle for Europe. I really do not have any sort of solution.

Quite possibly we should simply drop “structural reform”. Most of the time, “structural reform” means policies that reduce the size of unproductive sectors and in the process create significant numbers of substantial losers. That is why people call it “structural reform” rather than some other, more properly descriptive phase.

We can (almost) all get behind “reduce product market monopoly power”. We can (almost) all get behind “reduce NIMBYist constraints on land development”–provided, that is, we can agree which restraints are and which are not NIMBYist. Calling those part of the suspicious portmanteau of “structural reform” does not materially aid their cause. We should drop the phrase “structural reform” in the interest of clarity about just what we are planning to do.

Cf: http://www.bradford-delong.com/2016/08/must-read-very-nice-to-see-very-good-but-four-brief-whimpers-1-structural-reform-is-a-very-dangerous-thing-to-do.html

Should-Read: Nick Bunker: What Could Boost U.S. Business Investment?

Should-Read: Where a high Tobin’s Q–ratio of stock market value to replacement cost–is driven by market power, we would not expect high Q to carry high investment with it. But how much has market power increased? And how much shadow market power is driven by common ownership by financiers of all the firms in any particular industry? Or do financiers simply prefer low-investment firms because they are high-payout firms, and thus firms’ cash flows are of relatively short duration?

Nick Bunker: What Could Boost U.S. Business Investment?: “German Gutierrez and Thomas Philippon… why business investment… has been so lackluster since the turn of the 21st century…

…The Q [ratio of stock market value to replacement cost] for overall business investment in the United States is, on average, signaling that business investment should be much higher…. They don’t find any evidence that firms lack… financing…. The biggest explanatory factors… is the increasing concentration of companies within industries and increased “common ownership” of companies by large investment firms. These “commonly owned” companies… use these their funds to finance share buybacks and other shareholder payouts… http://www.nber.org/papers/w22897.pdf

Should-Read: Brad DeLong (2013): Who Are the Foes of Expansionary Fiscal Policy? And Why?

Should-Read: Brad DeLong (2009): Who Are the Foes of Expansionary Fiscal Policy? And Why?: “I am finding it difficult to make progress because it is not clear to me who the audience… who we should be trying to convince of what…

…So let me… spend tonight telling you… what I think others think… [for] I am having trouble in wrapping my mind around the thinking of the intellectual adversaries of my little band, my Light Brigade of believers that fiscal policy right now is not expansionary enough. I am having a hard time figuring out not who our intellectual adversaries are–we know who they are–but how and why they think. What is the case they want to make against the aggressive use of expansionary fiscal policy right now, given the very sad state that the OECD economies are in?…

Must- and Should-Reads: December 13, 2016


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Noah Smith: A Job Is More Than a Paycheck

Should-Read: Noah Smith: A Job Is More Than a Paycheck: “I’ve believed that what mattered most for economic well-being was money…

…I’ve supported lots of policies aimed at boosting the amount of money in the average person’s pocket. I’ve called for Japan to liberalize its markets, and for the U.S. to encourage workers to move to places with better opportunities. And I’ve often assumed that a dollar of government redistribution is just as good as a dollar of wages. I’m starting to think I… ignore[d] a big, important source of economic well-being:  jobs…. Most people probably care not just about the amount of money they get, but how they get it. If they see themselves as having earned their daily bread, they feel better about themselves than if they got a handout. A job also probably has an important symbolic value–it sends a message that society cares about you and has a place for you….

What kind of concrete plans would address Americans’ hunger for jobs? An easy step is to promote demand-based policies that keep employment high, like fiscal stimulus. A more drastic measure would be a federal job guarantee…. It’s probably better to have unemployed people doing something marginally useful…. Perhaps the deepest change would be to tweak U.S. corporate culture, restoring the value of long-term employment…. Tax incentives for long-term labor contracts, or for labor hoarding during recessions, could put the government’s thumb on the scale in favor of employment over pure dollars. Whatever policies are appropriate, it’s clear that economics pundits and policy wonks need to shift our thinking a bit…

Should-Read: Paul Samuelson (1962): On Karl Marx

Should-Read: Paul Samuelson (1962): On Karl Marx: “Marx, like any man of keen intellect, liked a good problem; but he did not labor over a labor theory of value in order to give us moderns scope to use matrix theory on the “transformation” problem…

…He wanted to have a theory of exploitation, and a basis for his prediction that capitalism would in some sense impoverish the workers and pave the way for revolution into a new stage of society. As the optimism of the American economist Henry Carey shows, a labor theory of value when combined with technological change is, on all but the most extreme assumptions, going to lead to a great increase in real wages and standards of living. So the element of exploitation had to be worked hard…. Marx might have emphasized the monopoly elements of distribution…. Marx might have kept wages dismal by virtue of biological conditions of labor supply…. [But he] tried to demonstrate the same dramatic minimum character of real wages by means of his concept of the “reserve army of the unemployed”

Here is the real Achilles’ heel of the Marxian theory of distribution and its implied prophecies of immiserization of the working classes. Under perfect competition, technical change will raise real wages unless the changes are so labor-saving as to raise the rate of maintainable profit immensely; Joan Robinson and others have pointed out how contradictory is Marx’s notion that both profit rates and real wages can fall once Marx jettisons Ricardo’s emphasis on the scarcity of land and the law of diminishing returns…

What could boost U.S. business investment?

Traders work in a booth on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.

Is everything alright with the state of business investment in the United States? Weak investment growth in the years since the Great Recession—both here and abroad—raises questions. Is it because expected growth is low and investment will pick up once overall economic growth does? (This is the so called “accelerator” view of what determines business investment.) Yet weak growth predates the Great Recession, when expectations of growth were higher and amid a period of high profits—a sign that investment should have been booming. Is something else going on? A new paper argues that the increased concentration of companies and changes to corporate governance are behind more than a decade of “investment-less growth,” a threat not just to short-term growth but long-term prosperity as well.

The paper, released as a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper last week, is by economists German Gutierrez and Thomas Philippon of New York University. The two authors try to uncover why business investment, measured as a share of a firm’s operating returns, has been so lackluster since the turn of the 21st century. Gutierrez and Philippon try to understand the change in this behavior by using a model of investment called “Tobin’s Q.”

Briefly, Tobin’s Q tries to understand how companies change their investments based on the ratio of an individual company’s market value to the cost of buying all the capital stock of that company, with this ratio being called “Q.” If Q is higher than 1 then the market thinks the firm is worth more than its constituent parts, implying the company should invest more. If Q is less than 1 then it implies the market doesn’t think the firm is worth the capital investment put into it and should shrink.

The Q for overall business investment in the United States is, on average, signaling that business investment should be much higher than it has been so far this century. Gutierrez and Philippon show that investment has been weak since 2000 and note the trend can’t be explained by higher rates of depreciation as they haven’t increased much since 2000.  The authors then go through several hypotheses for their breakdown of trends that may be contributing to higher Q ratios, using data on investments from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data and the Compustat dataset of public corporations. They don’t find any evidence that firms lack of access financing is prohibiting them from using their profits to invest, though they do find some evidence that Q is higher because of the greater economic importance of “intangible assets” such as intellectual property.

But the biggest explanatory factors—accounting for roughly 80 percent of the difference between actual business investment and predicted investment—is the increasing concentration of companies within industries and increased “common ownership” of companies by large investment firms. These “commonly owned” companies not only don’t invest as much as we might expect given their Qs but instead use these their funds to finance share buybacks and other shareholder payouts. The high profitability of these companies isn’t reinvested in these firms but instead flows to predominantly wealthy shareholders.

If this research holds up, then policymakers will need to question whether institutional financial factors are holding back higher and more productive business investment. If Gutierrez and Philippon are right, higher overall economic growth doesn’t necessarily lead to more business investment. Their results also indicate that letting firms gain access to overseas profits at a low tax rate for investment in the United States wouldn’t boost investment, but instead shareholders’ bank accounts. Of course, previous experience shows that as well.

Policymakers interested in boosting business investment growth should perhaps spend less time focusing on taxes and more time on the increasing concentration of businesses within industries.

Should-Reads: Brad DeLong: This Time, It Is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial Macroeconomics

Should-Reads: Brad DeLong: This Time, It Is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial Macroeconomics: “When the Financial Times’s Martin Wolf asked former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers…

…what in economics had proved useful in understanding the financial crisis and the recession, Summers answered: “There is a lot about the recent financial crisis in Bagehot…”. “Bagehot” here is Walter Bagehot’s 1873 book, Lombard Street. How is it that a book written 150 years ago is still state-of-the- art in economists’ analysis of episodes like the one that we hope is just about to end? There are three reasons. The first is that modern academic economics has long possessed drives toward analyzing empirical issues that can be successfully treated statistically and theoretical issues that can be successfully modeled on the foundation of individual rationality. But those drives are disabilities in analyzing episodes like major financial crises that come too rarely for statistical tools to have much bite, and for which a major ex post question asked of wealth holders and their portfolios is: “just what were they thinking?”. The second is that even though the causes of financial collapses like the one we saw in 2007-9 are diverse, the transmission mechanism in the form of the flight to liquidity and/or safety in asset holdings and the consequences for the real economy in the freezing-up of the spending flow and its implications have always been very similar since at least the first proper industrial business cycle in 1825. Thus a nineteenth-century author like Walter Bagehot is in no wise at a disadvantage in analyzing the downward financial spiral. The third is that the proposed cures for current financial crises still bear a remarkable family resemblance to those proposed by Walter Bagehot. And so he is remarkably close to the best we can do, even today.

Must- and Should-Reads: December 12, 2016

  • Tony Yates: The Perceived-Grievance-Wrong-Headed Sop Vortex: “A desire to respond to the perceived grievances of those who voted to give incumbent governments a kick…
  • Miriam Burstein: Two Cheers for Academic Blogging?: “The most important changes, it seems to me, have taken place outside individual university folds, not within…
  • Tony Judt (1994): The New Old Nationalism: “Québecois today have few of the grievances expressed thirty years ago, when the region was economically depressed and its language and culture in decline…

Interesting Reads: