Must- and Should-Reads: January 12, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Repealing the Affordable Care Act could exacerbate U.S. income and health inequality

This week, Congress is beginning to take steps to repeal the Affordable Care Act. New research shows that repeal could have significant consequences for U.S. income and health inequality. The research estimates that 22.5 million people could be uninsured by 2019, swiftly reversing the gains in health equity over the past three years, while those at the tippy top of the income ladder would reap hundreds of thousands of dollars in income gains.

Let’s first examine the U.S. income inequality projections. According to recent microsimulation model calculations produced by the Tax Policy Center, repealing all of the Affordable Care Act’s tax provisions would, on average, reduce households’ taxes by $180, increasing after-tax income by 0.3 percent in 2017. A longer-term forecast to 2025 estimates that the average household would save $530 in taxes and see 0.6 percent gains in their after-tax income.

Looking across the entire income spectrum, though, reveals more detail about who really benefits from these tax cuts. (See Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1

Figure 2

In 2017, U.S. households in the bottom three income quintiles—those earning less than $24,800, between $24,800 and $48,000, and between $48,000 and $83,300—would, on average, actually owe $90, $320, and $80, respectively, more in taxes. In other terms, these low- and middle-income households would lose 0.6 percent, 1.0 percent, and 0.1 percent, respectively, of their after-tax incomes. These projected changes can largely be attributed to the potential elimination of the Premium Tax Credit provision, which is designed to help low- and middle-income families pay health insurance premiums for plans purchased on the Marketplace.

Further up the income ladder, richer households would disproportionately benefit from a repeal of the Affordable Care Act. This is because any repeal of the Affordable Care Act is expected to include the removal of the 0.9 percent Additional Medicare Tax and the 3.8 percent Net Investment Income Tax, both of which apply only to individuals with an income above $200,000 or couples with an income above $250,000. In 2017, households in the top income quintile—those making more than $143,100—would see an average tax cut of $2,000 (or a 0.8 percent increase in post-tax income). At the top one percent of the income ladder, households earning more than $699,000 would save $32,820 in taxes, while those multimillionaires earning more than $3,749,600 (the top 0.1 percent) would save a whopping $197,340 in taxes. This equates to a 2.1 percent and a 2.6 percent after-tax income increase for the top one and top 0.1 percent, respectively.

The Tax Policy Center’s analysis of repealing the Affordable Care Act raises even more concerns about widening disparities between low- and middle-income families and those at the very top, especially given what we know about income inequality. Recent research by University of California-Berkeley’s Emmanuel Saez, for example, demonstrates that while the incomes for the bottom 99 percent of families grew since the Great Recession—and increase of 3.9 percent—the top one percent of families experienced a 7.7 percent increase in their income. Another working paper by Saez, Paris School of Economics’ Thomas Piketty, and UC-Berkeley’s Gabriel Zucman finds that there has been a surge in pre-tax income inequality. And repealing the Affordable Care Act would cause serious ramifications for post-tax income inequality, too. The three economists’ working paper highlights that the top one percent’s share of national income has been rising whether you are looking at before- or after-tax income levels while the share for the bottom 50 percent has experienced significant declines.

Then there are the projections of rising health inequality. The repeal of the Affordable Care Act would place the individual- and employer-sponsored insurance mandates and the expansion of Medicaid in jeopardy. In a new report, Linda Blumberg, Matthew Buettgens, and John Holahan of the Urban Institute find that between erasing the individual insurance mandate, Medicaid expansions, and the Premium Tax Credit, 22.5 million people would become uninsured by 2019. Uninsurance could mean more out-of-pocket expenditures and could lead to larger disparities in health outcomes, particularly for the low- and middle-income families and other vulnerable groups most at risk of losing their health insurance through a repeal.

There are still many uncertainties about how the process of repealing the Affordable Care Act will play out in Congress and how many of its provisions will be replaced, discarded, or reformed. The Affordable Care Act is unlikely to be repealed in full because Congress plans to use a process known as budget reconciliation that will only allow for changes to be made to the components of legislation that have direct implications for tax, spending, revenues, or the federal debt limit.

Within the Affordable Care Act, there are only a handful of items that are connected to the federal budget. This means elements such as protections for individuals with preexisting conditions and essential health benefit requirements could stay intact. But the easiest targets for repeal through budget reconciliation include the tax and spending provisions that, if removed, would end up exacerbating income and health inequalities in the United States. Without a replacement option for the Affordable Care Act lined up to address the gaps left by these key provisions, ensuring equity in economic and health outcomes for all Americans will be challenging.

Should-Read: Olivier Blanchard: The US Phillips Curve: Back to the 60s?

Should-Read: Olivier Blanchard: The US Phillips Curve: Back to the 60s?: “Low unemployment still pushes in ation up; high unemployment pushes it down….

…Put another way, the US Phillips curve is alive. (I wish I could say “alive and well,” but it would be an overstatement: the relation has never been very tight.) Inflation In ation expectations, however, have become steadily more anchored…. The slope of the Phillips curve… has substantially declined…. [since] the 1980s… The standard error of the residual in the relation is large…

Must-Read: Jared Bernstein: More on the non-mystery of non-work

Must-Read: Jared Bernstein: More on the non-mystery of non-work: “Employment rates of prime-age workers…

…What’s important… is that the German labor market has been hit with the same two factors typically raised to explain the increase in non-work: globalization and technology. Why have German prime-age men and women fared so much better than those in the US?

  • Much more union coverage, and German unions work with both management and government to support employment through apprenticeships, training programs, and export-oriented manufacturing policies.

  • This last bit is supported by their undervalued currency; as the strong man in the eurozone, the German currency would rise if it could float. As it is, their current account surplus is a whopping 8% of GDP, meaning they’re essentially importing labor demand from weaker eurozone economies.

  • They’re just more “we’re-in-this-together” when it comes to labor market policies…. In the recession… broad swaths of workers took reduced hours with part of their lost earnings replaced through gov’t support….

  • Don’t assume that accelerating, labor-saving technology–faster productivity growth, robotics–in manufacturing is what’s dinging these guys long-term….

Conservative Nick Eberstadt, according to the NYT would:

like to intensify social pressure on the cadre of men who have stopped looking for work. “Why haven’t we had the same sort of conversation about stigmatizing or shaming unworking men that we had 20 years ago about mothers on welfare?

he said. “They were not idle; they had little kids.”

I say before we go to the shaming place, let’s get the policy right…. A clear cyclical response… around the negative trend… the cyclical responsiveness has increased over time…. CEA… assigned less than 10% of the decline in prime-age male work to the disability rolls…. The evidence of jobs leaving workers is more persuasive than that of workers leaving jobs.

Should-Read: Dani Rodrik: Trump’s Defective Industrial Policy

Should-Read: Dani Rodrik: Trump’s Defective Industrial Policy: “Sociologists Fred Block and Matthew Keller have provided perhaps the best analysis of the US “developmental state”…

…a reality that they say the reigning market-fundamentalist ideology has obscured…. A “decentralized network of publicly funded laboratories” and an “alphabet soup” of financing initiatives, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, work with private firms and help them commercialize their products… the extensive role of both federal and state governments in supporting the collaborative networks on which innovation rests…. Such industrial policies, based on close collaboration and coordination between the public and private sectors, have of course been the hallmark of East Asian economic policymaking….

Unlike China, of course, the US purports to be a democracy. And industrial policy in a democracy requires transparency, accountability, and institutionalization…. Government agencies need to be close enough to private enterprises to elicit the requisite information about the technological and market realities on the ground…. But they cannot get so close to private firms that they end up in companies’ pocket, or, at the other extreme, simply order them around. And that is where industrial policy à la Trump fails to pass the test….

We can expect the Trump administration’s industrial policy to vacillate between cronyism and bullying. That may benefit some; but it will do little good for the overwhelming majority of American workers or the economy as a whole.

Must- and Should-Reads: January 11, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Should-Read: Noah Smith: Sometimes It’s Hard to Explain Market Failures

Should-Read: Noah Smith: Sometimes It’s Hard to Explain Market Failures:

I propose we minimize our use of the show-me-the-market-failure argument. Sometimes there are policies that people have tried in the past, which seem to work even though it’s hard to tell exactly why. Public education is a great example. It seems to make economies more prosperous, and most economists support it, but no one can point to just why the free market doesn’t educate enough people on its own. Road-building is another — there are essentially no countries with mostly private high-quality road systems, and economists struggle to explain why.

We know these government interventions work; figuring out why they work is a task for the future. Like the people who chewed tree bark to relieve pain long before the discovery of aspirin, or the engineers who used lithium-ion batteries without quite understanding the physics, sometimes it pays to go with evidence even before you have a theory in hand.

Can we make growth more inclusive? A trans-Atlantic perspective

Heather Boushey, Executive Director and Chief Economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, delivered remarks at the 13th Annual Raymond Aron Lecture on December 20, 2016, hosted by the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings. She was joined by Philippe Aghion, Professor of Economics at Collège de France, as well as Brookings Vice President Bruce Jones, Visiting Fellow Philippe Le Corre, and Senior Fellow in Economic Studies David Wessel. The Raymond Aron lecture series, named after the renowned scholar of post-war France, annually features leading French and American personalities speaking on current issues affecting the trans-Atlantic relationship.

View the full transcript and video.

Rising U.S. business concentration and the decline in labor’s share of income

A paper presented this past weekend at the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations in Chicago offers a new take on an increasingly important economic policy question: What’s behind the decline in the U.S. share of income going to labor? The new research is by economists David Autor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, David Dorn of the University of Zurich, Lawrence Katz of Harvard University, and Christina Patterson and John Van Reenen of MIT.

The paper reveals an important fact about the labor share’s decline—if it were due to an overall change in the price of capital or labor then economists would expect to see workers’ share of income decline across all firms, but the five researchers find the average labor share of income for all firms has actually been constant since the early 1980s. This means that something must have changed with the distribution of income among the firms or within at least some of them to result in a decline in the aggregate labor share of income in the United States.

The economists look at firm-level data on the labor share of income to see what’s happening. Using firm-level data on sales and employee compensation, they find a strong correlation between increasing concentration of sales among firms and a lower share of income accruing to workers in the same industry. The five economists argue that competition within these industries is shifting income toward successful, less labor-intensive firms “superstar firms.”

Note that it’s not a lack of competition resulting in higher price markups that’s causing the decline in the labor share of income in these industries, as some other research has argued. Rather, this new paper emphasizes the role of competition in shifting sales toward firms with a lower share of income going to workers. The analysis of the data by the five authors shows that most of the decline is due to the shift in higher sales toward firms with low labor shares.

But as MIT economist Daron Acemoglu pointed out at the ASSA session where the research was discussed, the decomposition of the labor share’s decline that the authors used lump declines due to reallocation toward firms with declining labor shares in with declines due to reallocation to firms with low labor shares. In other words, concentration could be pushing income toward firms that already had low labor shares and/or pushing income toward firms with declining labor shares. This could mean that part of this reallocation is due to business concentrating among firms with rising markups. A determination of how much of a role this factor plays compared to just a movement toward superstar firms is something to look out for.