Outsourcing and rising wage inequality in the United States and Germany

Ayesha Tully, left, responds to call while Larryll Emerson, 20, waits for information pertaining to his next work assignment at the Staffmark temp agency in Cypress, Calif.

Talking or writing about the outsourcing of jobs can conjure up images of jobs moving abroad. Increasingly, however, economists are demonstrating the importance of the domestic outsourcing of jobs in the U.S. labor market. A recent paper by Lawrence Katz of Harvard University and Alan Krueger of Princeton University highlights the importance of the “offline” gig economy, such as the rise of independent contractors in the years since 2005, rather than the more talked about role of the online gig economy (think Uber) in domestic outsourcing. A book by David Weil, the outgoing Department of Labor Wage and Hour Administrator, also documents the “fissuring” of the U.S workplace as more and more work is outsourced by firms within the United States.

But how much is the increased domestic outsourcing of jobs affecting the wages of workers?

A recent paper offers an answer, at least for German workers. Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmeider of Boston University look at how the increase in domestic outsourcing has affected wages and the wage distribution in Germany. The two economists take data that records not just information about workers (wages, education level, age) but also information about the employers they work for (by industry, the wages of other workers at the firm, and other factors) These data allow Goldschmidt and Schmeider to see what happens to the wages of workers after outsourcing occurs.

The data don’t directly show when an individual worker is moved to a contractor firm despite doing the same work, so the authors of the paper create measures that let them determine if a worker has been outsourced. They then compare the wages of a worker who has been outsourced to a similar worker who stayed inside the original firm. Goldschmidt and Schmeider find that domestic outsourcing leads to wage reductions of about 10 percent.

What’s behind this decline in wages? Well, workers who get outsourced are missing out on the “rent” (essentially excess profits) that the firm is sharing with the rest of the workers. Work on the rise of wage inequality in both Germany and the United States points to the importance of inequality within firms. By siphoning off “non-core” workers into contracted firms, management at the original firm is denying access to the wage benefits of working at the firm. Such a firm effect is a good sign that firms have the power to set wages—rather than the commonplace belief that wages are set by perfectly competitive labor markets.

Godlschmidt and Schmeider’s results are specific to the German experience and can’t directly speak to the U.S. labor market. But research on outsourcing in the United States also finds significant declines in wages for outsourced workers. An analysis similar to the German one could be done for the United States by accessing data from sources such as Longitudinal Employer-House Dynamics program or the Social Security Administration. Research on inequality in the United States using social security data points toward increasing “wage segregation” as a source of rising interfirm inequality. Yet given the rising attention toward outsourcing it would be good to have more concrete estimates of its impact on affected workers’ wages by tapping both data sets.

Failing to invest in young kids is damaging the U.S. economy

Eric Grant takes his three-year-old daughter Makayla to preschool in Philadelphia, Friday, Jan. 6, 2017.

Over the past 200 years, the federal government and individual states developed a slate of programs to improve the education and care for children. These investments, most notably Kindergarten-through-12th grade education as well as pre- and after-school care, nutrition, and health aimed at helping children, were designed not only to boost individual welfare but also create a higher-skilled workforce and thus a stronger economy. But historically, our spending has focused on older children. And this continues to be true: A new report put out late last month by the White House Council of Economic Advisors finds that national spending levels are lowest for children under the age of five. This is a major problem considering that a growing body of research clearly shows that children’s future contributions to the U.S. economy are largely shaped by their early environments.

Today, federal, state, and local governments combined spend a average of $14,000 annually per child on education, care, nutrition, and health, among other things. But that average masks the upward trajectory of spending as children get older. Government spending is about $16,600 annually for children ages 6 to 11 (and slightly less for kids ages 12 to 18), but only $10,220 for 3- to 5-year-olds, and a meager $8820 for 0- to 2-year-olds. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1

The lack of focus on early childhood education and care is due in part to an outdated system built on the assumption that mothers still stay home with a young child while fathers go to work—even though this post-WWII ideal was never the reality for many women, especially women of color. What’s more, other countries among the nation’s developed and rapidly developing peers have caught up. The United States today spends less than almost every other of these nations on early childhood education and care. In 2012, the United States ranked 33rd out of 36 nations in terms of investment in early childhood education relative to their overall income, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Unlike the United States, these other OECD countries are reaping the benefits shown by the large body of research showing the benefits of high-quality early childhood care and education programs. Studies show these programs are one of the best ways to reduce economic inequality and improve individual outcomes later in life. That’s because the brain is more “flexible” and responds to its environment more than that of older kids. When investment in younger children is implemented on a national scale, research shows that helps create a more productive workforce and provides a boost to the overall economy.

The lack of investment in young kids is compounded by the fact that it occurs at a time when most families lack the means to invest as heavily as they should in their young children’s education. Compared to parents of older children and teenagers, those who have young children in the United States tend to have lower-than-average salaries, savings levels, and less access to credit compared to European countries, where incomes actually go up at this period in families’ lives. On top of that, the financial burden of childcare and early-education programs in the United States is well documented, largely due to the need of younger kids for more attention. That means public funds in the United States that are available may not go as far in terms of hours in a care or a good educational setting.

The report by the Council of Economic Advisers finds that 47 percent of children under the age of five are in some kind of publicly financed program (compared to 89 percent of 12-year-old children), yet these programs only amount to about five hours a week, which means that working parents have to make other arrangements for the rest of the time. The report focuses on the longer-term economic effects of increasing investment in young children, but there also would be more immediate benefits. Investing more in early childhood programs could free up time for parents to work, increasing household income and also spurring demand.

Because of the short- and long-run effects of investing in young kids, there is a very good argument that early childcare and early education programs should be included in our definition of infrastructure. Just as investing in the bridges, roads, and ports that make up our physical infrastructure produces an economic return, so too does investing in a greater “care infrastructure,” as this report highlights.  As the debate over infrastructure comes before Congress as a new presidential administration comes to power, policymakers should keep this research in mind as they think about ways to best strengthen and grow the U.S. economy over the next few years and over the long term.

Should-Read: Equitable Growth: Third Annual Class of Grantees

Should-Read: Equitable Growth: Third Annual Class of Grantees: “Research on how economic inequality affects macroeconomic growth and stability…

…Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Mi Luo…. Gauti Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra…. Adriana Kugler and Ammar Farooq…. Further research on the macroeconomy: Alexander Bartik… John Coglianese… Andrew Elrod…. How economic inequality affects the development of human capital…. Christopher Jencks and Beth Truesdale…. Marta Murray-Close and Joya Misra…. Sydnee Caldwell… Mariana Zerpa…. Research on how economic inequality affects the quantity and quality of innovation…. Kyle Herkenhoff… Heidi Williams… Patrick Kline… Neviana Petkova… and Owen Zidar…. Two doctoral grants will support further research on innovation: Xavier Jaravel… Hannah Rubinton…. Research on how levels and trends in economic inequality affect the quality of social and political institutions…. Manasi Deshpande… Tal Gross… and Jialan Wang… Jane Waldfogel and Ann Bartel… Maya Rossin-Slater… and Christopher Ruhm…. Joan Williams… Susan Lambert… and Saravanan Kesavan…. One doctoral grant will support further research on governance and institutions: Ellora Derenoncourt…

Should-Read: JEC: The Next New Macro

Should-Read: JEC: The Next New Macro: “The seeds of disaster… lay…

…in how easily New Classical-style models could be tweaked to get Keynesian behavior…. The mess in macro did not come about because some economists committed to a modelling style which turns out to yield little insight. The mess is a consequence of the… macro-mono-culture…. The fact is that, right now, we do not know the way forward, and no approach, no matter how promising (or how congenial to our pre-conceptions and policy preferences) should be allowed to dominate the field until it has proven itself empirically successful…. Why, then, did the entire discipline latch on to the New Classical approach? In a word: panic. Whatever the flaws in the New Classicals’ positive program, their negative critique of existing econometric practice was both true and devastating…

Must- and Should-Reads: January 17, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Must-Read: Guido Alfani: Europe’s Rich since 1300

Must-Read: Guido Alfani: Europe’s Rich since 1300: “Throughout this time, the only significant declines in inequality were the result of the Black Death and the World Wars…

…EINITE http://www.dondena.unibocconi.it/EINITE… has collected, systematically and with a uniform methodology, information about long-term trends in wealth inequality, and in the share of the richest, for many ancient Italian states as well as for a few other areas of Europe… from around 1300 to 1800…. Figure 1 shows the share of wealth of the top 10% between 1300 and 2010, using Piketty (2014) for the post-1800 period…. Remarkably, Piketty’s series for 1810-1910 shows the share of the richest growing at almost exactly the same pace as the I calculated for the series between 1550 and 1800….

Europe s rich since 1300 VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

In the seven centuries… we find only two phases of significant inequality decline. Both were triggered by catastrophic events: The Black Death…. Shocks occurred between 1915 and 1945 related to the two World Wars, as argued by Piketty 2014, pp. 368-370)…. The share of the richest 10% today is about the same as that in Europe (or at least, Italy) immediately before the Black Death…. The long-term perspective of recent research requires us to move beyond the characterisation of inequality time dynamics provided by Kuznets….

During the early modern period (from around 1600) the prevalence of the rich grew almost continuously until the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The rich made up no more than 5% of the overall population during the Middle Ages and the first part of the early modern period…

Europe s rich since 1300 VOX CEPR s Policy Portal

Must-Read: Kenneth Arrow et al.: Are We Consuming Too Much?

Must-Read: Kenneth Arrow et a.: (2004): Are We Consuming Too Much?: “We consider two criteria for the possible excessiveness (or insufficiency) of current consumption…

…One is an intertemporal utility-maximization criterion: actual current consumption is deemed excessive if it is higher than the level of current consumption on the consumption path that maximizes the present discounted value of utility. The other is a sustainability criterion, which requires that current consumption be consistent with non-declining living standards over time. We extend previous theoretical approaches by offering a formula for the sustainability criterion that accounts for population growth and technological change. In applying this formula, we find that some poor regions of the world are failing to meet the sustainability criterion: in these regions, genuine wealth per capita is falling as investments in human and manufactured capital are not sufficient to offset the depletion of natural capital.

Should-Read: Christoph Lakner and Branko Milanovic: Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession

Should-Read: Christoph Lakner and Branko Milanovic (2013): Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession: “The paper presents a newly compiled and improved database of national household surveys between 1988 and 2008…

…In 2008, the global Gini index is around 70.5 percent having declined by approximately 2 Gini points over this twenty year period. When it is adjusted for the likely under-reporting of top incomes in surveys by using the gap between national accounts consumption and survey means in combination with a Pareto-type imputation of the upper tail, the estimate is a much higher global Gini of almost 76 percent. With such an adjustment the downward trend in the Gini almost disappears.

Tracking the evolution of individual country-deciles shows the underlying elements that drive the changes in the global distribution: China has graduated from the bottom ranks, modifying the overall shape of the global income distribution in the process and creating an important global “median” class that has transformed a twin-peaked 1988 global distribution into an almost single-peaked one now. e “winners” were country-deciles that in 1988 were around the median of the global income distribution, 90 percent of whom in terms of population are from Asia. e “losers” were the country-deciles that in 1988 were around the 85th percentile of the global income distribution, almost 90 percent of whom in terms of population are from mature economies.

Digesting Income Inequality Mind the Post

Should-Read: Ken Rogoff: Big Danger at the Lower Bound

Should-Read: This first from Ken Rogoff is very sensible. But IMHO it fits awkwardly with the “debt supercycle” view. We are now, after all, a decade into repair of the debt supercycle after the crash. Why then is this still a big problem? It seems to me an implicit admission that there is something much more going on than a standard debt supercycle:

Ken Rogoff: Big Danger at the Lower Bound: “Given that the Fed may struggle just to get its base interest rate up to 2% over the coming year, there will be very little room to cut if a recession hits…

…The two best ideas for dealing with the zero bound on interest rates seem off-limits for the moment. The optimal approach would be to implement all of the various legal, tax, and institutional changes needed to take interest rates significantly negative, thereby eliminating the zero bound. This requires preventing people from responding by hoarding paper currency…. The other approach… would be to raise the target inflation rate from 2% to 4%….

If ideas like negative interest rates and higher inflation targets sound dangerously radical, well, radical is relative. Unless central banks figure out a convincing way to address their paralysis at the zero bound, there is likely to be a continuing barrage of outside-the-box proposals that are far more radical…. Of course, there is always fiscal policy to provide economic stimulus. But it is extremely undesirable for government spending to have to be as volatile as it would be if it had to cover for the ineffectiveness of monetary policy.

There may not be enough time before the next deep recession to lay the groundwork for effective negative-interest-rate policy or to phase in a higher inflation target. But that is no excuse for not starting to look hard at these options, especially if the alternatives are likely to be far more problematic.


Much more dubious is Ken Rogoff’s belief that the U.S. government should be borrowing longer-term and thus not augmenting but using up the private sector’s (limited) risk bearing capacity:

Ken Rogoff: America’s Looming Debt Decision: “Should the US government lock in today’s ultra-low borrowing costs by issuing longer-term debt?…

…Until now, the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, acting in combination, have worked to keep down long-term government debt, in order to reduce interest rates for the private sector…. At this point, the average duration of US debt… is now under three years…. The tilt toward short-term borrowing as a way to try to stimulate the economy has made sense until now…. But the government should not operate like a bank or a hedge fund, loading up on short-term debt to fund long-term projects…. The potential fiscal costs of a fast upward shift in interest rates could be massive.

No one is saying that such a shift is likely or imminent, but the odds aren’t as trivial as some might like to believe…. A rise in borrowing rates could also come from self-inflicted damage. Suppose, for example, that US voters elect as their president an unpredictable and incompetent businessman, who views bankruptcy as just business as usual…. Mind you, lengthening borrowing maturities does not have to imply borrowing less…. There is a significant backlog of worthy projects, and real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates are low (though, properly measured, real rates may be significantly higher than official measures suggest, mainly because the government’s inability to account properly for the benefits of new goods causes it to overstate inflation). One hopes that the next president will create an infrastructure task force….

With control of the global reserve currency, the US has room to borrow; nonetheless, it should structure its borrowing wisely…. That is why the time has come for the US Treasury to consider borrowing at longer horizons than it has in recent years. Today, the longest maturity debt issued by the US government is the 30-year bond. Yet Spain has successfully issued 50-year debt at a very low rate, while Ireland, Belgium, and even Mexico have issued 100-year debt…

And one piece of this second seems to me to be incoherent: “Properly measured, real rates may be significantly higher than official measures suggest, mainly because the government’s inability to account properly for the benefits of new goods causes it to overstate inflation.” The right numeraire for economists to use in their calculations is not a unit of gold or a unit of commodities but a unit of marginal utility: the true real interest rate is the rate at which society can trade off utility today for utility in the future. Something like the commodity real interest rate minus the real income growth rate is the true appropriate measure of the societal cost of borrowing.

And that appropriate measure is unaffected by the kinds of measurement errors Rogoff is discussing.

The reach for negative interest rates or higher inflation targets suggests that the unwinding of the debt supercycle will take very long indeed–in which case how is it different from secular stagnation?