JOLTS Day Graphs: April 2017 Report Edition

Every month the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases data on hiring, firing, and other labor market flows from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, better known as JOLTS. Today, the BLS released the latest data for April 2017. This report doesn’t get as much attention as the monthly Employment Situation Report, but it contains useful information about the state of the U.S. labor market. Below are a few key graphs using data from the report.

The quits rate declined slightly to 2.1 percent, but that’s familiar territory for the statistic. It’s been 2.1 percent in 10 of the past 12 months.

The number of unemployed workers per job opening declined in April to 1.17, the second lowest ratio on record.

The vacancy yield, a measure of how readily a job opening turns into a hire, fell quite a bit to 0.84 in April from 0.92 in March.

The relationship between job openings and the unemployment rate hasn’t returned to its pre-recession form, due to the shift in the relationship for long-term unemployed workers.

Must-Read: Sarah Kliff: Nevada’s legislature just passed a radical plan to let anybody sign up for Medicaid

Must-Read: Sarah Kliff: Nevada’s legislature just passed a radical plan to let anybody sign up for Medicaid: “Nevada’s bill… just four pages… would allow any state resident… to buy into the state Medicaid program… under the name the Nevada Care Plan… https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/6/15731622/nevada-medicaid-for-all

…Michael Sprinkle…. Under his bill, people who qualify for tax credits under the Affordable Care Act would be able to use those credits to buy Medicaid coverage instead. People who don’t qualify for anything would be able to use their own money to do the same. The plan would likely sell on Nevada’s health insurance marketplace, making it a public option to compete against the private health insurance plans also selling there. The buy-in coverage would be pretty much identical to the coverage traditional Medicaid provides…. Democrats explored the possibility of a Medicare buy-in during the health care debate in 2009 and 2010. The buy-in option was relatively narrow, only allowing Americans over 55 to participate in the program. Those under the age threshold would still be limited to private health insurance plans. Early versions of the Affordable Care Act included the buy-in provision. But the Senate was forced to drop the Medicare buy-in from its bill when it couldn’t get the entire caucus behind the idea. Health industries fought aggressively against the idea, which could disadvantage insurers by cutting into their market share…

Should-Read: Olivia P. Judson: The energy expansions of evolution

Should-Read: Olivia P. Judson: The energy expansions of evolution: “The history of the life–Earth system can be divided into five ‘energetic’ epochs… https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-017-0138

…geochemical… sunlight, oxygen, flesh and fire…. Oxygen, flesh, and fire are all consequences of evolutionary events. Since no category of energy source has disappeared, this has, over time, resulted in an expanding realm of the sources of energy available to living organisms and a concomitant increase in the diversity and complexity of ecosystems. These energy expansions have also mediated the transformation of key aspects of the planetary environment…. Using energy as a lens… illuminates patterns in the entwined histories of life and Earth, and may also provide a framework for considering the potential trajectories of life–planet systems elsewhere…. These expansions are consequences of events in the evolution of life, and they have mediated the transformation of the planet from an anoxic world that could support only microbial life, to one that boasts the rich geology and diversity of life present today. Here, I review these energy expansions…

Should-Read: Henry Farrell: The Strange Death of Anglo-American Liberalism

Should-Read: Henry Farrell: The Strange Death of Anglo-American Liberalism: “The Financial Times… committed to free markets, but with a undertone that they had to have decent outcomes… http://crookedtimber.org/2017/05/31/the-strange-death-of-anglo-american-liberalism/

…Pro concerted action to solve international problems such as global warming. Very much in favor of Europe’s role in helping to cement democracy in Eastern Europe and always ready to deplore backsliding and corruption. Broadly in favor of small-l liberalism with respect to… dubious authoritarian tendencies…. Economic inequality was always a dicey set of issues for a newspaper whose financial model depended in part on the “How to Spend It” supplement…. But… a reasonably well-defined possibility-space of vaguely-left liberal to vaguely-right liberal positions, triangulating between European and UK perspectives, from which FT writers (and readers) could draw.

That has all changed…. Gideon Rachman[‘s]… anger shading into grief…. Not [his] attack on Trump… or… the terms of… Brexit deal, which FT writers have been banging on about for all the obvious reasons since the vote happened. It’s Merkel’s “unfair” suggestion that Trump’s America and May’s Britain are the same kind of problem, states that Europe simply can’t rely on any more. Dealing with the Brexit whiplash is bad enough, without the Germans rubbing salt and grit into the wounds…. Europhile British liberals don’t have much of a place to go these days, apart from the Liberal Democrats (but I repeat myself). It’s hard to see how the UK will return to liberalism in the foreseeable future…. The current standard bearers of liberalism have French names–Macron and Trudeau–and run second or third ranked powers…. Unless things change again, there won’t be much space left for… ‘decent’ market liberalism…. I suspect that the newspaper will gradual change to reflect this. If I’m right in this prediction, and if, as I suspect, it will be replaced by worse things, I’ll be sorry to see it go…

Should-Read: Laura Panza and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Australian Squatters, Convicts, and Capitalists: Dividing Up a Fast-Growing Frontier Pie 1821-1871

Should-Read: Laura Panza and Jeffrey G. Williamson: Australian Squatters, Convicts, and Capitalists: Dividing Up a Fast-Growing Frontier Pie 1821-1871: “Compared with its nineteenth century competitors, Australian GDP per worker grew exceptionally fast… http://www.nber.org/papers/w23416

…about twice that of the US and three times that of Britain…. Using a novel data set we offer new evidence supporting unambiguously the view that, in sharp contrast with US, Australia underwent a revolutionary levelling in incomes between the 1820s and the 1870s. This assessment is based on our annual estimates of functional shares in the form of land rents, convict incomes, free unskilled incomes, free skill premiums, British imperial transfers and a capitalist residual…

Should-Read: Brad DeLong (1995Trade Policy and America’s Standard of Living: An Historical Perspective

Should-Read: Brad DeLong (1995): Trade Policy and America’s Standard of Living: An Historical Perspective http://pages.ucsd.edu/~jlbroz/Courses/POLI142B/syllabus/delong.pdf: Before the Great Depression, the U.S. went through waves of protection and liberalization…

…as the federal government’s demands for revenue and industry pressure for protection waxed and waned. Some advocates of protection then as now argued that it would enhance economic development: translated into the language of modern economics, they argued that protection shifted American economic activity toward manufacturing, and that increasing returns to scale and externalities made specialization in manufacturing uniquely valuable for economic development.

But even if protection generated endogenous productivity growth by increasing economic activity in the externality-generating manufacturing sector, it slowed the rate of growth of wages because high tariffs on imported capital goods retarded capital deepening and delayed the development of capital-intensive infrastructure and industry. For plausible magnitudes, this second effect dominates: whatever Americans gained in faster mastery of technology as a result of protection in the late 19th century, they lost more because the higher price of—imported—capital goods made it more difficult and costly to build America’s transportation network and industrial base.

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: The More Trump Fails, the Better Off We’ll Be

Must-Read: Mark Thoma: The More Trump Fails, the Better Off We’ll Be: “The Trump administration has gone to war against independent sources of information that pose a challenge to its policy goals and the narratives… http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2017/06/05/More-Trump-Fails-Better-We-ll-Be

…One of the most recent targets is the Congressional Budget Office…. Trump’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, criticized the CBO’s estimate that 23 million people would lose health insurance if the Republican health care plan were to be enacted: “If the same person is doing the score of undoing Obamacare who did the scoring of Obamacare in the first place, my guess is that there is probably some sort of bias in favor of a government mandate.” He went on to claim that the CBO is a partisan organization, and other Republicans defended him by arguing that the CBO’s estimates of insurance coverage under Obamacare were overly optimistic and biased in favor of the Obama administration. In responding to this, it’s useful to remember why Congress created the CBO in the first place. As Peter Suderman explains, the problem Congress was trying to solve was “a powerful executive branch with incentives to offer conveniently misleading, overly rosy projections about the costs and budgetary impacts of major federal expenses like war and entitlements. Congressional frustration boiled over during the Nixon administration… and the Congressional Budget Office was born.” Suderman goes on to conclude, “Basically, the CBO was created as a budgetary power center that could check the influence of the administration’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB).”

It’s telling that Mulvaney is the Director of the OMB, and the administration’s budget is a prime example of “overly rosy” projections–with double-counting thrown in for good measure…

Must-Read: Financial Times: The needless urge for higher borrowing costs

Must-Read: The Financial Times is woke: it has joined the Left Central bank Opposition:

Financial Times: The needless urge for higher borrowing costs: “Talk of ‘normalising’ interest rates betrays a mistaken belief… https://www.ft.com/content/b752f7dc-4782-11e7-8d27-59b4dd6296b8

…Central banks are supposed to be targeting inflation, which remains stubbornly low, its relationship with the apparent tightness in the economy showing few signs of replicating its historic pattern. On the Fed’s preferred “core” measure… annual inflation was 1.5 per cent in April…. In the eurozone… the ECB’s own projections show the core rate at 1.1 per cent this year. In this context, the apparent determination of the Fed in particular to press on with interest rate rises looks a little peculiar. Having created expectations that it was likely to tighten policy with three quarter-point increases over the course of 2017, the Fed is acting more like a party to a contract that feels the need to honour its terms, than a central bank that takes the data as it finds them. Fortunately, there appears to be more resistance to the danger of premature tightening at the ECB….

There are two mistaken ideas at the heart of the urge to tighten policy too quickly. The first is that interest rates need “normalising”, as though there were an eternal and fixed level of equilibrium real rates. The evidence that the real rate has substantially lowered, even before the global financial crisis, is strong. The second is the belief that the output capacity of the economy, measured by the unemployment rate or by other metrics, is sufficiently well known that a central bank can safely raise rates on the basis of gross domestic product growth or increases in employment before it sees inflation start to rise. The history of the past few years, where inflation has continually undershot expectations despite recoveries in the major economies, suggests otherwise….

The Fed… the ECB… both betray, at least in some quarters of those institutions, a misguided approach to monetary policy that ignores recent experience in favour of a default expectation that the future will be like the past.

Must- and Should-Reads: June 5, 2017


Interesting Reads:

Monetary policy via income redistribution

Customers wait in line to make their purchases at Walmart in Arkansas.

Traditionally, central bankers haven’t considered income and wealth inequality much when they conduct monetary policy. Perhaps some of them think about the impact of monetary policy on the levels of economic inequality, but inequality as a factor affecting the impact of monetary policy isn’t something most of them ever discuss. Recently, however, researchers are beginning to give central bankers better points of reference by looking at how inequality and heterogeneity among households affects the transmission of monetary policy.

Adding to this line of analysis is a new paper that finds part of the way monetary policy increases consumption is by redistributing income among households. That paper, by Stanford University economist Adrien Auclert—based on part of his dissertation—shows how the redistribution of income and wealth play a role in monetary policy. Specifically, he finds that the simulative effect of monetary policy is amplified when it shifts income toward individuals who are more likely to spend it. Auclert’s paper adds three new possible policy transmission channels to the traditional set that central bankers consider, including the substitution effect (where lower interest rates increase consumption today) and the aggregate income effect (where higher incomes lead to more consumption).

The key to the effectiveness of the three new channels, Auclert argues, is that they interact with the variation in the marginal propensity to consume. The spending habits of households and individuals vary, as some will immediately spend an additional dollar of income while others will save it. The larger a person’s marginal propensity to consume, the more that individual will spend of the additional dollar he or she receives. Auclert identifies three ways that monetary policy can shift money away from individuals with low marginal propensities to consume and toward those with high propensities to consume.

The first channel is the earnings heterogeneity channel. The relevant inequality here is inequality of income, as the marginal propensity to consume tends to decrease as incomes increase. In other words, individuals with low incomes are more likely to spend another dollar of income. Monetary policy boosts consumption through this channel if, in boosting total income, it pushes income more toward lower-income individuals. This channel seems plausible given research on the effect of monetary policy on income inequality.

The second channel deals with inequality of wealth and debt. This so-called Fisher effect—named after the economist Irving Fisher—works through high inflation shifting income away from net asset holders and toward net debtors. An unexpectedly higher inflation rate, for example, reduces the amount of money debtors have to pay back to creditors. The value of debt declines, and debtors have more money to potentially spend. And as debtors have a higher marginal propensity to consumer than creditors, this shift of income helps boost consumption.

The redistribution work in the third channel identified by Auclert is related to the amount of exposure to changes in inflation-adjusted interest rates. This channel also involves inequality in asset ownership but focuses more on the timing of when individuals receive income from assets and when they have to pay off liabilities. At a given point in time, the more income a person has coming in from assets relative to their liabilities, the more a decrease in inflation-adjusted interest rates would reduce their income, which would be redistributed toward people with more money due to liabilities at that time. Think of homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages. A reduction in inflation-adjusted interest rates reduces the amount of money they need to pay toward that liability (their mortgages) at that moment. These homeowners and other individuals with liabilities to pay off soon have a higher marginal propensity to consume, on average, and a redistribution toward them would result in a boost to consumption.

Combining these three redistribution channels, Auclert finds that shifting incomes among households and individuals may be about as important to boosting total consumption as the well-known substitution effect. If that’s true, then it certainly would put a new spin on how researchers and policymakers think about what factors, including inequality, are going to make monetary policy more effective. Auclert says that his work is “very much a first pass.” Given the potential implications of this research, other passes as this line of research would be welcome.