Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior

Must-Read: Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard: Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior: “We analyze how quits responded to arbitrary differences in own and peer wages…

…using an unusual feature of a pay raise at a large U.S. retailer. The firm’s use of discrete pay steps created discontinuities in raises, where workers earning within 1 cent of each other received new wages that differed by 10 cents. First, we estimate a regression discontinuity (RD) model based on own wages; we find large causal effects of wages on quits, with quit elasticities less than -10. Next, we address whether the overall quit response reflects the impact of comparisons to market wages or to the wages of in-store peers. Here we use a multi-dimensional RD design that includes both a sharp RD in the own wage and a fuzzy RD in the average peer wage. We find that the large quit response mostly reflects relative-pay concerns and not market comparisons. After accounting for peer effects, quits do not appear to be very sensitive to wages – consistent with the presence of significant search frictions. Finally, we find that the relative-pay effect is nonlinear and driven mainly by workers who are paid less than their peers – suggesting concerns about fairness or disadvantageous inequity.

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets

Must-Read: John Authers: Renminbi Shift Challenges Global Markets: “Commodity prices continue to fall…

…With US companies almost having completed announcing their profits for the second quarter, only one sector has disappointed the forecasts set for it two months ago. That is industrials, the most directly exposed to China…. According to Citi, the 48 largest developed market stocks that get at least 30 per cent of their sales from China have collectively fallen 10 per cent since June…. It is best to assume that the PBoC really means that it merely wants to bring market discipline to its currency and does not want to devalue; and instead to focus on the risk that problems in the Chinese economy end up forcing a devaluation anyway…

Must-Read: Matt Bruenig: The Success Sequence Is Extremely Misleading and Impossible to Code

Must-Read: Matt Bruenig: The Success Sequence Is Extremely Misleading and Impossible to Code: “The “Success Sequence” is explained most recently as…

…(1) Graduate from high school; (2) Maintain a full-time job or have a partner who does; and (3) Have children while married and after age 21, should they choose to become parents. Together, this is supposed to keep your risk of poverty very low. Last week I pointed out that rule (2) is doing basically all of the work in the 2007 dataset that Sawhill and Haskins used….

Efforts to replicate their norm groupings were a total failure…. Nonetheless, because I have isolated the overall population Sawhill/Haskins is working with, I am able to do some fun calculations of my own…. First, if you take… families whose head meets the full-time work definition… that alone gets you almost entirely to the low-poverty conclusion… a poverty rate of 4%…. [Add] high school education or greater (which is 2 of the norms), you get a poverty rate of 2.7%…. just 0.7 percentage points shy of the Sawhill/Haskins 3-norm poverty rate.

Full-time work gets you the vast majority of the way to the low-poverty conclusion and then high-school education gets you basically right up to it. Bringing in the marriage and child-delay stuff is totally unnecessary and then can’t even be properly identified in the data. Adding a condition that does basically no work for your conclusion that you can’t even identify is utterly baffling…

Must-Read: Ravi Kanbur and Joe Stiglitz: Wealth and Income Distribution: New theories Needed for a New Era

Must-Read: Ravi Kanbur and Joe Stiglitz: Wealth and Income Distribution: New theories Needed for a New Era: “Kaldor (1957) put forward a set of stylised facts on growth and distribution…

…for mature industrial economies… the constancy of the share of capital…. Kuznets (1955) put forward a second set… that while the interpersonal inequality of income distribution might increase in the early stages of development, it declines as industrialised economies mature. These empirical formulations brought forth a generation of growth and development theories whose object was to explain the stylised facts…. However, the Kaldor-Kuznets stylised facts no longer hold…. Bringing these facts centre stage has been the achievement of research leading up to Piketty (2014).

It stands to reason that theories developed to explain constancy of factor shares cannot explain a rising share of capital….Piketty… the empirical observation that the rate of return to capital, r, systematically exceeds the rate of growth, g…. What Piketty and others measure as wealth ‘W’ is a measure of control over resources, not a measure of capital K, in the sense that that is used in the context of a production function…. There is a fundamental distinction between capital K, thought of as physical inputs to production, and wealth W, thought of as including land and the capitalised value of other rents….

We need to break away from competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns and model mechanisms which generate rents with consequences for wealth inequality…. We need to focus on the interaction between income from physical and financial capital and income from human capital in determining snapshot inequality, but also in determining the intergenerational transmission of inequality…

Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Excess Supply

Hoisted from the Archives: Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Excess Supply: In our normal, microeconomic world it is not a big deal when excess demand emerges in one market and excess supply emerges in another–it is, in fact, a good thing, because it induces shifts in production that make the structure of what is made correspond more closely to what people want (or perhaps to what the people with money want).

There is excess demand in one industry. Sales exceed production, inventories fly off the shelves, and cupboards and supply chains become bare. Producers and entrepreneurs see large profit opportunities if they expand production to rebuild inventories and satisfy higher demand–and they do. They expand factories. They run more shifts. They offer workers more money for overtime, they offer workers more money to stay with their firm, and they offer workers not in the industry more money to come on over.

Where does the added supply of workers to swell the ranks of those in the industry whose products are in excess demand come from? From the industry whose products are in excess supply. There, producers see inventories piling up on their shelves. They are forced to liquidate products and lines of business at a loss. They are forced to lay off some workers, and lay off others lest they lose all their capital.

Overall unemployment may rise a bit or for a while as this process of adjustment takes place–it depends whether entrepreneurs and producers in the expanding industry where excess demand emerges are more or less on the ball, keen-eyed, and keen-witted than those in the industry where excess supply emerges and where businesses shrink. But the process of adjustment, even with frictional unemployment while it takes place, is a good thing–it makes us all richer. Attempts to stop it in its tracks or short-circuit its mechanisms are counterproductive and harmful. The end of the process comes and excess demand and supply are eliminated when there are more people making the things that are wanted more and fewer people making the things that are wanted less.

But in macroeconomics things are different. The excess supply is economy-wide–throughout all commodity markets, producing supply in excess of demand for goods, services, labor, and capacity. Producers and entrepreneurs respond to an aggregate demand shortfall just as individual producers respond to a particular shortfall of demand for their products: they hold sales to liquidate inventories, they cut prices, they cut wages to try to preserve margins, they fire workers. In the macroeconomic case, the dynamic process that leads to the elimination of excess supply and its counterbalancing excess demand in the microeconomic case gets underway–or, rather, half of it gets underway.

The problem is that the set of industries that are shrinking is made up of pretty-much-everybody. There are no industries that are expanding. The excess demand is not for the products of a goods-and-services producing industry that can rapidly ramp-up production by employing lots more labor. The excess demand is in finance: for means-of-payment, or safe high-quality assets, or for long-duration sales vehicles. There is a rise in unemployment from the flow out of goods-and-services producing industries where the excess supply has appeared. But there is no countervailing flow out of unemployment. How do you put large numbers of people to work making more Federal Reserve notes or increasing the supply of liquid assets that are means-of-payment that are the reserve deposits of banks? How do you shift the flow of production to instantaneously raise the stock of long-duration assets, of claims to wealth that are shares in companies with secure long-run prospects that are vehicles for moving purchasing power across time from the present to the future? You can’t.

Thus workers fall into unemployment from the excess supply in the goods and services industries. But no workers are pulled out of unemployment by expanding production in growing goods-and-services industries. Incomes fall as the unemployed sit idle. Asset prices jump in the financial markets until markets clear. But markets clear and excess demand in finance is eliminated with incomes reduced by the amount of the lost earnings of the unemployed. The excess supply in goods-and-services is also eliminated in this rationed-equilibrium situation: inventories are no longer growing–but that is because the unemployed are not making anything.

And there the economy sits.

Whether this is an ‘equilibrium’ or not is a matter of taste and definition.

Supply equals demand market by market in the markets for goods, services, and assets. There are no falling inventories or rising inventories to signal that any branch of production should be expanded or contracted.

There are, however, lots of unemployed workers who would like jobs. Their existence should aid employers in their bargaining with workers. Wages should then fall. And when wages fall higher profits should induce employers to expand production even without any increase in spending. Eventually wages should fall low enough that the economy returns to full employment and to normal levels of production and capacity utilization even without any increase in asset supplies.

Or will it? Falling wages means that households have even less money. Some of them will default on their loans. Some banks will find that their reserves are no longer large enough to provide an ample cushion because of these loan defaults. They will cut back the number of deposits they accept–and the money supply will shrink as a result, producing another round of excess demand for financial assets. Or if they are not deposit- but are themselves bond-financed their bonds will suddenly become shaky in quality, and we will see the emergence of an excess demand for safe, high-quality financial assets. In either case, Walras’s Law will kick in again and this excess demand will be reflected in another round of excess supply for goods, services, labor, and capacity. Relying on nominal deflation of wages to restore full employment runs the risk of creating yet another shock of excess demand in finance and excess supply in goods and services to deepen the depression. The hoped-for cure’s first effect is to worsen the disease.

We trust the market to take care of a microeconomic excess-demand excess-supply situation in a few industries in a productive way in a short period of time. Do we trust the market to do the same way to a macroeconomic imbalance, to quickly resolve a depression in a productive way without help? No, we do not. Rather than relying on economy-wide deflation to eventually restore balance, we should pursue other alternatives.

Noted for Lunchtime on August 18, 2015

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Must- and Should-Reads:

Might Like to Be Aware of:

Must-Read: Axel Weber: Reconstructing Macroeconomics

Must-Read: Axel Weber (2013): Reconstructing Macroeconomics: “In Davos, I was invited to a group of banks…

…Deutsche Bundesbank is frequently mixed up in invitations with Deutsche Bank. I was the only central banker sitting on the panel. It was all banks. It was about securitizations. I asked my people to prepare. I asked the typical macro question: who are the twenty biggest suppliers of securitization products, and who are the twenty biggest buyers. I got a paper, and they were both the same set of institutions…. I said: ‘It looks to me that since the buyers and the sellers are the same institutions, as a system they have not diversified’. That was one of the things that struck me: that the industry was not aware at the time that while its treasury department was reporting that it bought all these products its credit department was reporting that it had sold off all the risk because they had securitized them. What was missing… is that finance and banking was too-much viewed as a microeconomic issue that could be analyzed by writing a lot of books about the details of microeconomic banking…. The whole view of a systemic crisis was just basically locked out of the discussions and textbooks…

Must-Read: Noah Smith: Three Reasons the Fed Can Wait to Raise Rates

Must-Read: Noah Smith makes an extremely cogent case that any increases in interest rates by the Federal Reserve this September for this December or, indeed, next March are almost surely premature and inappropriate. So why is the Federal Reserve on track to do so? I think there are three reasons. First, Fed chair Janet Yellen thinks that a productivity growth slowdown is right now putting upward pressure on the natural rate of unemployment; second, too many of the regional bank presidents on the FOMC listen too much to commercial bankers who believe–wrongly, I think–that their businesses will be healthier in five years if the Fed treats its 2%/year inflation target as a ceiling rather than an average and raises rates whenever it has any excuse to do so; and, third, Fed Chair Janet Yellen may be less willing than she should to split the FOMC consensus and go her way with the support of the president-appointed and senate-confirmed governors, for whom Larry Meyer’s rule is “you vote with the Chair”:

Noah Smith: Three Reasons the Fed Can Wait to Raise Rates: “The U.S. economy is perceived [by the Fed] to be in recovery…

…this seems to be a very odd time to raise rates and there are at least three reasons for this: Inflation is very low… has been consistently below [the 2%] target for more than a year and a half…. China is crashing. Although the Chinese government insists that its economy is still expanding at a nice 7 percent clip, most people believe that growth… is spluttering…. The stock market just crashed, the real estate market is tumbling and government actions… look panicky…. U.S. labor markets have still not recovered fully from the Great Recession…. There have been some encouraging signs recently that these so-called discouraged workers are starting to return to the job market…. So there are big reasons for the Fed to delay increasing rates. Why, then, does it seem to be sticking with the September liftoff schedule?… Today, the U.S. finds itself in a strikingly similar situation to Japan in 2000–interest rates at zero, inflation below target, employment still soft and a major trading partner experiencing a crash. U.S policy makers shouldn’t be so focused on fear of zero interest rates that they end up tanking the economy. The Fed should exercise caution.

Must-Read: Paul Krugman: The Medicaid Two-Step

Must-Read: It was this very smart person who first clued me in in late 2009 to the fact that ObamaCare was a lobster with two claws–an Exchange claw and a Medicaid expansion claw–and that even though the energy and attention was all on the first, the second claw was likely to be the big claw:

Paul Krugman: The Medicaid Two-Step: “Aside from the facts that Medicaid is real insurance and Medicaid recipients are real people…

…the whole ‘but it’s just a Medicaid expansion’ claim is outrageous coming from people who insisted just the other day that expanding Medicaid wouldn’t work. So will the Medicaid-won’t work claim be dropped? Of course not. No anti-Obamacare argument ever is. These are people completely untroubled by cognitive dissonance.

Must-Read: Julie Verhage: The Two Big Economic Policy Failures That John Maynard Keynes Would Be Disappointed by Today

Must-Read: Robert Skidelsky is depressed because of (i) bad financial regulation before 2007; (ii) too weak a policy response to restore demand during 2007-2009 and after; and (iii) a policy response biased toward inducing investment in long-duration assets, which risks creating more systemic problems down the road:

Julie Verhage: The Two Big Economic Policy Failures That John Maynard Keynes Would Be Disappointed by Today: “Robert Skidelsky… prominent biographer of Keynes, shared his thoughts…

…First, [Keynes] would be frustrated with the lack of  precautions taken to prevent a huge financial crash like the one we saw in 2008. Secondly, Lord Skidelsky believes Keynes wouldn’t be happy with the policy measures taken after the crash. Keynes would have wanted a more ‘buoyant response’….

The recovery has been very very slow. We’ve been for many years in a state of semi-stagnation, and the recovery is still very very weak in the European Union…

[And third:]

The actual recovery measures we’ve taken, particularly quantitative easing, have actually skewed the recovery towards asset buying and real estate, thus threatening to recreate the circumstances that led to crash in the first place. I think he would have been disappointed by those policy failures.