Things to Read on the Afternoon of January 15, 2015

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Dani Rodrik:
    From Welfare State to Innovation State:
    “When the… industrial working class began to organize, governments defused the threat of revolution from below that Karl Marx had prophesied by expanding political and social rights, regulating markets, erecting a welfare state that provided extensive transfers and social insurance, and smoothing the ups and downs of the macroeconomy… reinvented capitalism to make it more inclusive…. Today’s technological revolutions call for a similarly comprehensive reinvention…. The trouble is that the bulk of [our] new technologies are labor-saving…. Few jobs are really protected from technological innovation…. A world in which robots and machines do the work of humans need not be a world of high unemployment. But it is certainly a world in which the lion’s share of productivity gains accrues to the owners of the new technologies and the machines that embody them. The bulk of the workforce is condemned either to joblessness or low wages.
    Indeed, something like this has been happening in the developed countries for at least four decades…. Imagine that a government established a number of professionally managed public venture funds, which would take equity stakes in a large cross-section of new technologies…. Central banks offer a model of how such funds might operate independently of day-to-day political pressure. Society, through its agent–the government–would then end up as co-owner…. The public venture funds’ share of profits from the commercialization of new technologies would be returned to ordinary citizens in the form of a ‘social innovation’ dividend…. The welfare state was the innovation that democratized–and thereby stabilized–capitalism in the twentieth century. The twenty-first century requires an analogous shift to the ‘innovation state’…”

  2. Barry Eichengreen:
    Secular Stagnation: The Long View:
    “Four explanations for secular stagnation… a rise in global saving, slow population growth that makes investment less attractive, averse trends in technology and productivity growth, and a decline in the relative price of investment goods. A long view from economic history is most supportive of the last of these…. I define secular stagnation as a downward tendency of the real interest rate, reflecting an excess of desired saving over desired investment, resulting in a persistent output gap and/or slow rate of economic growth…. A wide variety of connected activities and sectors, such as health care, education, industrial research and finance, are being disrupted by the latest wave of new technologies…. Again, this is not a prediction but a suggestion to look to the range of adaptation required in response to the current wave of innovations when seeking to interpret our slow rate of productivity growth and when pondering our future…

  3. Thomas Piketty:
    On the Elasticity of Capital-Labor Substitution:
    “I do not believe in the basic neoclassical model. But I think it is a language that is important to use in order to respond to those who believe that if the world worked that way everything would be fine. And one of the messages of my book is, first, it does not work that way, and second, even if it did, things would still be almost as bad…. My response to Summers and others is… what we observe… [is] a rise in the capital/income ratio and a rise in the capital share… [in] the standard neoclassical model… the only possible logical… expla[nation]… would be an elasticity of substitution somewhat bigger than 1… that there are more and more different uses for capital over time and maybe in the future robots will make substitution even more…. Now, does this mean that it is the right explanation for what we have seen in recent decades? Certainly not…. All I am saying to neoclassical economists is this: if you really want to stick to your standard model, very small departures from it like an elasticity of substitution slightly above 1 will be enough to generate what we observe in recent decades. But there are many other, and in my view more plausible, ways to explain it…. It is perfectly clear to me that the decline of labor unions, globalization, and the possibility of international investors to put different countries in competition… have contributed to the rise in the capital share…”

  4. Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji:
    Quantitative easing in the Eurozone: It’s possible without fiscal transfers:
    “The ECB has been struggling to implement a programme of quantitative easing (QE) that would successfully target deflation. The main difficulty is political, stemming from opposition from German institutions. Their argument against is that a government bond buying programme by the ECB would mix fiscal and monetary policy. This column argues the opposite – such a programme can be structured so that it does not mix fiscal and monetary policy. It, therefore, would not impose a risk on German taxpayers.”

  5. Robert Waldmann:
    Angry Bear » Secular Stagnation, The US Recovery, and Houses:
    “Larry Summers… responds to Marc Andreesen on secular stagnation. The post is rather brilliant (no surprise there)…. I like Summers’s list of possible causes of secular stagnation… it is appropriately long. A model-addicted economist would look at one possible explanation and assume away all the others…. The point (if any) of this post is to add another explanation–lower demand for housing…. First lower population growth causes much lower housing investment…. Second… maybe the housing bubble has lasted for decades and the generally-recognised housing bubble post 2000 was just more extreme…. There is a similar issue related to consumption and savings. The suspicion that inequality leads to secular stagnation is based on the idea that the super rich are satiated…”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Plato:
    The Republic: “Sok: One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature? Gla: Very true. Sok: And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics? Gla: Certainly. Sok: And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit? Gla: That is also true. Sok: Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort? Gla: Yes. Sok: Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness. Gla: Obviously. Sok: And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character? Gla: Very true. Sok: And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits? Gla: They ought. Sok: Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again. Gla: Certainly not…”

  2. Scott Lemieux:
    Eviscerating Chris Caldwell’s “Why History Will Eviscerate Obama”:
    “From the right, the argument should be even easier—most of what Obama has done will either result in the entrenchment of policies inconsistent with conservative values or fail to endure. Which makes Christopher Caldwell’s attempt to argue that historians will ‘eviscerate’ Obama such a remarkable achievement. It reads as if he had outtakes from some random Weekly Standard articles lying around, and given the assignment, hastily complied some sentences from them at random while pretending that his argument had something to do with Obama. Laden with falsehoods, remarkable feats of illogic, implausible predictions, non-sequiturs, and some ugly race-baiting, almost every sentence of the Caldwell’s argument makes a better case for Obama’s positive legacy than the most fawning hagiography could. Hence, we bring you the annotated Christopher Caldwell…”

  3. Yael Levine:
    Dollar Guilt in the Land of the Collapsing Ruble:
    “I’ve gotten a 100 percent raise. Not as a reward for hard work or long-term loyalty to my employer, but as a gift of timing. This windfall isn’t a one-off like a bonus, nor is it evenly spaced like paychecks after a promotion. I get richer at random. Almost every time I visit the ATM, what I take out is a smaller slice of what I make than it was the time before. I’m paid in dollars, but I live in Russia, where the currency is currently collapsing…. As the ruble falls, I think back on a night in late autumn of 2007…. Moscow had been named the world’s most expensive city for expatriates to live in…. My driver heard my foreignness…. ‘Americans, what do they think in America now that it’s 25 rubles to the dollar!’ he demanded…. When I first visited Russia seven years ago, Ziploc bags were commonly washed and hung to dry on a clothesline in the kitchen, and not out of environmentalism…. Russia was ‘rising from its knees’… but it hadn’t stood up quite yet…. But although the city felt, objectively, far from the most desirable place in the world to live, a personal-sized pizza with gluey cheese cost $30…. By the time I arrived for my gig in Moscow this June, the ruble was clocking in at around 35…. There is a giddy gambler’s thrill to watching your money gain value for reasons beyond your control…. Taxis no longer felt like an indulgence and on more than one occasion, I ordered an extra two entrees for dinner to meet the delivery minimum…. I walked in the cold among these masses and the thought went through my mind repeatedly: ‘I’m getting richer and richer, they’re getting poorer and poorer.’ That night I gave the woman who walks my dog while I’m at work a 60 percent raise…. After the ruble hit 80 to the dollar yesterday, I walked down Tverskaya Street toward the Kremlin. Every single pedestrian I passed averted their eyes from the neon displays that advertise currency exchange rates…”

Afternoon Must-Read: Dani Rodrik: From Welfare State to Innovation State

Dani Rodrik:
From Welfare State to Innovation State:
“When the… industrial working class began to organize…

…governments defused the threat of revolution from below that Karl Marx had prophesied by expanding political and social rights, regulating markets, erecting a welfare state that provided extensive transfers and social insurance, and smoothing the ups and downs of the macroeconomy… reinvented capitalism to make it more inclusive…. Today’s technological revolutions call for a similarly comprehensive reinvention…. The trouble is that the bulk of [our] new technologies are labor-saving…. Few jobs are really protected from technological innovation…. A world in which robots and machines do the work of humans need not be a world of high unemployment. But it is certainly a world in which the lion’s share of productivity gains accrues to the owners of the new technologies and the machines that embody them. The bulk of the workforce is condemned either to joblessness or low wages.
Indeed, something like this has been happening in the developed countries for at least four decades….

Imagine that a government established a number of professionally managed public venture funds, which would take equity stakes in a large cross-section of new technologies…. Central banks offer a model of how such funds might operate independently of day-to-day political pressure. Society, through its agent–the government–would then end up as co-owner…. The public venture funds’ share of profits from the commercialization of new technologies would be returned to ordinary citizens in the form of a ‘social innovation’ dividend…. The welfare state was the innovation that democratized–and thereby stabilized–capitalism in the twentieth century. The twenty-first century requires an analogous shift to the ‘innovation state’…

Afternoon Must-Read: Barry Eichengreen: Secular Stagnation: The Long View

Barry Eichengreen:
Secular Stagnation: The Long View:
“Four explanations for secular stagnation…

…a rise in global saving, slow population growth that makes investment less attractive, averse trends in technology and productivity growth, and a decline in the relative price of investment goods. A long view from economic history is most supportive of the last of these…. I define secular stagnation as a downward tendency of the real interest rate, reflecting an excess of desired saving over desired investment, resulting in a persistent output gap and/or slow rate of economic growth….

Figure 1 shows nominal and real interest rates for the United States over the last two centuries…. The figure points to an alternative interpretation, namely that the decline in real interest rates starting in the 1980s is mean reversion after the exceptional period of high interest rates and inflation that preceded it…. Figure 3 shows the estimates of Robert Gallman (1966)…. The U.S. in the 19th century displays the behavior familiar from 21st century emerging markets, with investment rates rising from 16 per cent in 1834-43 to 28 per cent in 1899-1908. Subsequently, U.S. savings rates headed back down. This… suggests that even if high global savings are a factor in current low real interest rates, they may not remain so indefinitely.

A second popular explanation… is a decline in the relative price of investment goods…. With less investment spending chasing the same savings, the result can be lower real interest rates and, potentially, a chronic excess of desired saving over desired investment….. Even if the post-1980 decline in the relative price of investment goods is part of the explanation for the concurrent decline in real interest rates, there is no ruling out that it may be reversed in the future.

A third possible explanation for secular stagnation, due originally to Alvin Hansen (1938), is that the rate of investment is being dragged down by a low rate of population growth…. My own work with Molly Fifer (2002) suggests that increases in old-age dependency ratios have approximately equal negative effects on savings and investment rates and minimal impact on real interest rates….

A fourth popular if controversial explanation for low interest rates and the slow growth with which they are evidently associated is a dearth of attractive investment opportunities…. Here some observers will point to the fact that productivity growth in the United States has been disappointing in recent years as having positive implications for the future. A wide variety of connected activities and sectors, such as health care, education, industrial research and finance, are being disrupted by the latest wave of new technologies…. Once a broad range of adaptations is complete, productivity growth will accelerate…. Again, this is not a prediction but a suggestion to look to the range of adaptation required in response to the current wave of innovations when seeking to interpret our slow rate of productivity growth and when pondering our future…

Afternoon Must-Read: Thomas Piketty: On the Elasticity of Capital-Labor Substitution

As I have said before in Very Rough: Exploding Wealth Inequality and Its Rent-Seeking Society Consequences (backed up by the numbers here) and elsewhere, in my view Thomas because he really needed a rent seeking society chapter in his Capital in the 21st Century. The underlying logic of his argument seems to be that wealth can take two forms: investments in capital-embodied technological wealth that boost wages in the economy, or investments in rent-seeking wealth that erode wages in the economy. And, I think, his argument is that we are headed for a society with a higher wealth-to-income ratio, and in such a society a greater share of wealth will find its way into the second channel.

Maybe that is not what Pikitty’s argument is. But I at least think that it is what Piketty’s argument should be–because I think it is highly likely to be true…

Thomas Piketty:
On the Elasticity of Capital-Labor Substitution:
“I do not believe in the basic neoclassical model…

…But I think it is a language that is important to use in order to respond to those who believe that if the world worked that way everything would be fine. And one of the messages of my book is, first, it does not work that way, and second, even if it did, things would still be almost as bad….

My response to Summers and others is… what we observe… [is] a rise in the capital/income ratio and a rise in the capital share… [in] the standard neoclassical model… the only possible logical… expla[nation]… would be an elasticity of substitution somewhat bigger than 1… that there are more and more different uses for capital over time and maybe in the future robots will make substitution even more…. Now, does this mean that it is the right explanation for what we have seen in recent decades? Certainly not….

All I am saying to neoclassical economists is this: if you really want to stick to your standard model, very small departures from it like an elasticity of substitution slightly above 1 will be enough to generate what we observe in recent decades. But there are many other, and in my view more plausible, ways to explain it…. It is perfectly clear to me that the decline of labor unions, globalization, and the possibility of international investors to put different countries in competition… have contributed to the rise in the capital share…

Cf.: Suresh Naidu:
Capital Eats the World, and The Slack Wire: Notes from Capital in the 21st Century Panel; and me: The Hourly Piketty: Paul Krugman, “Gattopardo Economics”, and Economic Modelling, and The Honest Broker: Mr. Piketty and the “Neoclassicists”: A Suggested Interpretation: For the Week of May 17, 2014.

Technology and the decline in the U.S. labor share of income

A well-known “stylized fact” in economics holds that the distribution of income between labor (wages and salaries) and capital (stocks and bonds) is fairly stable over time. Yet quite a number of researchers find that the share of income going to labor has been on the decline over the past several decades—the most famous, of course, being Thomas Piketty in his book “Capital in the 21st Century.”

Whether this change is as a result of changes in technology is hotly debated in economic circles. Last week, Dylan Matthews at Vox reviewed the research on the question of the labor share, noting that researchers posit a variety of hypotheses, among them the financialization of the U.S. economy, which benefits the owners of capital over wage earners, the downward pressure in U.S. wage brought about by globalization, the decline of labor unions, and the growing accumulation of capital.

But one hypothesis—what Matthews calls “robots”—now garners the most attention. Research by the University of Chicago’s Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman finds that the decline in the price of investment goods, such as computers or industrial robots, has led to the decline in the labor share of income. Firms have responded to this price decline by substituting capital for labor, meaning firms are investing more in technology and less in the size and remuneration of their workforces.

This result implies a high level of “elasticity of substitution,” or the ability to substitute one type of input for another in the making of a good or the delivery of a service. The two researchers calculate this elasticity between capital and labor at approximately 1.25, which is high compared to previous estimates of the elasticity. To put this number in context, when the elasticity is higher than 1, a decrease in the price of capital would reduce the labor share of income. And if it’s below one, the labor share would increase after a decrease in the price. The authors find that the elasticity results also hold after accounting for the depreciation of capital goods, which is important because the rate of depreciation has accelerated in recent years.

But labor’s share of income can decline without the elasticity of substitution being so high. Research by economists Ezra Oberfield of Princeton University and Devesh Raval at the Federal Trade Commission take a different approach and find a much smaller elasticity while still seeing a decline in labor’s share of income. In Oberfield and Raval’s model, there are two ways for labor’s share to decline. The first is for the price of a factor of production (labor or capital) to decline.  Karabarbounis and Neiman’s research finds that the price of capital has declined and that explains the decline in the labor share.

The other option is that technology has changed so much that capital is more productive now when invested in new technology so more firms are investing in technology at the expense of labor. Oberfield and Raval’s research finds this second option is more important. Whereas Karabarbounis and Neiman look at changes in labor’s share of income across the United States to find their elasticity of 1.25, Oberfield and Raval use data from individual firms to estimate an elasticity for the entire economy. They find a far lower elasticity of about 0.7.

So Oberfield and Ravel argue that what’s causing the decline in labor’s share of income isn’t cheaper capital or more capital accumulation but rather a technological shift toward using capital more. What’s interesting is they say the cause is technology, which they broadly define to include the offshoring of jobs. For these two authors, the technology required to offshore production is a form of capital substitution for labor in the United States, yet they also point out their results don’t point toward a simple offshoring story. What’s happening is quite nuanced, they argue, involving investments in new technology and new workers overseas.

Is this new research just a distinction without a difference? Not at all. Our understanding of how technology is changing our economy, the causes of rising inequality, and the proper policy responses are all influenced by the outcomes of this kind of research. So believe it or not, whether one economic variable is larger or smaller than 1 has quite a bit of impact.

Things to Read at Nighttime on January 14, 2015

Must- and Shall-Reads:

 

  1. Lawrence Summers:
    Response to Marc Andreessen on Secular Stagnation:
    “The essence of the secular stagnation issue is not whether technology has stopped advancing; but rather whether there is a mismatch between desired saving and investment opportunities that results in low equilibrium real interest rates, precipitates financial instability, and may inhibit economic growth…. For the roughly 30 years after World War II, the American economy generated consistent growth in living standards with business cycles of relatively low amplitude.  From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, the economy again preformed quite well…. We have plenty of experience with satisfactory economic performance to set as an aspiration…. Markets–in the form of 30-year indexed bonds–are now predicting that real rates well below 2 percent will prevail for more than a generation…. I think it is quite plausible and consistent with Marc’s picture that equilibrium real rates were roughly constant at around 2 percent until the mid-1990s and have trended downward since that time…. Marc and I agree that we are headed into a period of soft real interest rates, where there will be more money available than great deals.  This may, as he suggests, not be all bad; as it will make it easier for risky ideas to get funded. The danger… is that the zero lower bound on nominal rates will prevent the attainment of full employment as desired investment falls short of desired saving. A related danger is that the very low interest rates will encourage risk-taking and asset price inflation in ways that will ultimately give rise to financial instability…. The experience of the US economy in the 1930s demonstrates [that] even with rapid innovation it is possible for economic performance to be very poor when finances are not successfully managed…”

  2. Jean-Claude Trichet (June 2010):
    A Trip Down Euromemory Lane:
    “As regards the economy, the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect … In fact, in these circumstances, everything that helps to increase the confidence of households, firms and investors in the sustainability of public finances is good for the consolidation of growth and job creation. I firmly believe that in the current circumstances confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery, because confidence is the key factor today…”

  3. NewImage
    Kevin Drum:
    America’s Real Criminal Element: Lead:
    “Washington, DC, didn’t have either Giuliani or Bratton, but its violent crime rate has dropped 58 percent since its peak. Dallas’ has fallen 70 percent. Newark: 74 percent. Los Angeles: 78 percent…. Howard Mielke… Sammy Zahran… lead and crime… six US cities that had both good crime data and good lead data going back to the ’50s, and they found a good fit in every single one. In fact, Mielke has even studied lead concentrations at the neighborhood level in New Orleans and shared his maps with the local police. ‘When they overlay them with crime maps,’ he told me, ‘they realize they match up.’… We now have studies at the international level, the national level, the state level, the city level, and even the individual level. Groups of children have been followed from the womb to adulthood, and higher childhood blood lead levels are consistently associated with higher adult arrest rates for violent crimes. All of these studies tell the same story: Gasoline lead is responsible for a good share of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century…. The gasoline lead hypothesis helps explain some things we might not have realized even needed explaining…. Murder rates have always been higher in big cities than in towns… big cities have lots of cars in a small area, they also had high densities of atmospheric lead during the postwar era. But as lead levels in gasoline decreased, the differences between big and small cities largely went away. And guess what? The difference in murder rates went away too…”

Should Be Aware of:

 

  1. Alan Taylor:
    Surprising New Findings Point to “Perfect Storm” Brewing in Your Financial Future: “This basic aggregate measure of gearing or leverage is telling us that today’s advanced economies’ operating systems are more heavily dependent on private sector credit than anything we have ever seen before. Furthermore, this pattern is seen across all the advanced economies, and isn’t just a feature of some special subset (e.g. the Anglo-Saxons).”

Afternoon Must-Read: Lawrence Summers: Response to Marc Andreesen on Secular Stagnation

Lawrence Summers:
Response to Marc Andreessen on Secular Stagnation:
“The essence of the secular stagnation issue…

…is not whether technology has stopped advancing; but rather whether there is a mismatch between desired saving and investment opportunities that results in low equilibrium real interest rates, precipitates financial instability, and may inhibit economic growth…. For the roughly 30 years after World War II, the American economy generated consistent growth in living standards with business cycles of relatively low amplitude.  From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, the economy again preformed quite well…. We have plenty of experience with satisfactory economic performance to set as an aspiration….

Markets–in the form of 30-year indexed bonds–are now predicting that real rates well below 2 percent will prevail for more than a generation…. I think it is quite plausible and consistent with Marc’s picture that equilibrium real rates were roughly constant at around 2 percent until the mid-1990s and have trended downward since that time…. Marc and I agree that we are headed into a period of soft real interest rates, where there will be more money available than great deals.  This may, as he suggests, not be all bad; as it will make it easier for risky ideas to get funded.

The danger… is that the zero lower bound on nominal rates will prevent the attainment of full employment as desired investment falls short of desired saving. A related danger is that the very low interest rates will encourage risk-taking and asset price inflation in ways that will ultimately give rise to financial instability…. The experience of the US economy in the 1930s demonstrates [that] even with rapid innovation it is possible for economic performance to be very poor when finances are not successfully managed…

Afternoon Must-Read: Jean-Claude Trichet: A Trip Down Euromemory Lane

Via Paul Krugman, who says “Europe marched into this disaster with eyes wide shut”: Jean-Claude Trichet (June 2010):
A Trip Down Euromemory Lane:
“As regards the economy…

…the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect.… In fact, in these circumstances, everything that helps to increase the confidence of households, firms and investors in the sustainability of public finances is good for the consolidation of growth and job creation. I firmly believe that in the current circumstances confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery, because confidence is the key factor today…

Lunchtime Must-Read: Kevin Drum: America’s Real Criminal Element: Lead

NewImage

Kevin Drum:
America’s Real Criminal Element: Lead:
“Washington, DC, didn’t have either Giuliani or Bratton…

…but its violent crime rate has dropped 58 percent since its peak. Dallas’ has fallen 70 percent. Newark: 74 percent. Los Angeles: 78 percent…. Howard Mielke… Sammy Zahran… lead and crime… six US cities that had both good crime data and good lead data going back to the ’50s, and they found a good fit in every single one. In fact, Mielke has even studied lead concentrations at the neighborhood level in New Orleans and shared his maps with the local police. ‘When they overlay them with crime maps,’ he told me, ‘they realize they match up.’…

We now have studies at the international level, the national level, the state level, the city level, and even the individual level. Groups of children have been followed from the womb to adulthood, and higher childhood blood lead levels are consistently associated with higher adult arrest rates for violent crimes. All of these studies tell the same story: Gasoline lead is responsible for a good share of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century….

The gasoline lead hypothesis helps explain some things we might not have realized even needed explaining…. Murder rates have always been higher in big cities than in towns… big cities have lots of cars in a small area, they also had high densities of atmospheric lead during the postwar era. But as lead levels in gasoline decreased, the differences between big and small cities largely went away. And guess what? The difference in murder rates went away too…”

A welcome jolt to the labor market

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics yesterday released the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data for November 2014. This most recent set of data contains information on labor market dynamics, including data on hires, quits, layoffs, and job openings. While the data lag behind the well-covered jobs report by a month, the JOLTS report is another piece of evidence that the U.S. labor market recovery is continuing apace. And while several weaknesses are evident in the data, the overall picture is encouraging.

The new JOLTS data contain several good signs for the labor market. One is that labor market slack is on the decline. According to the data, the ratio of unemployed workers to job openings fell to 1.8 to 1. That means for every job opening, there are 1.8 unemployed workers potentially available to fill it. This ratio was fallen dramatically since the depths of the recession in July 2009 when the ratio was 6.8. Some of this decline is due to discouraged workers leaving the labor force and therefore not counting as unemployed, but the number of openings has also significantly increased recently.

At the same time, the hiring rate and the opening rate for the labor market are near their pre-recession levels. Employers are posting jobs at about the same rate they were before the Great Recession began in December 2007.

But the report isn’t all sunshine. Some shadows are still hanging over the labor market.

One problem is that workers aren’t quitting their jobs at a high rate. Large numbers of workers quitting their jobs can be a very good sign for the labor market. For the most part, workers do not quit their jobs unless they think they can get another job fairly quickly. So an increase in the number of workers quitting is a sign of confidence in the overall labor market. The quits rate in November was 1.9 percent, according to the JOLTS data, below the pre-recession level of about 2.2 percent. Yet the rate has been increasing recently and is up significantly from its recession-level low of 1.3 percent during 2009.

Given the new data, the other issue is movement in the so-called Beveridge Curve. This curve depicts the relationship between the job opening rate and the unemployment rate. After a recession, the labor market is supposed to move along the curve as more jobs are offered and the unemployment rate declines. But during this recovery the unemployed rate is still quite high given the jobs opening rate.

This lack of movement is most likely due to the historically high levels of long-term unemployment, as research by economists Rand Ghayad and William Dickens of Northeastern University shows. This is a problem in one of two ways: Either people are trapped out of the labor force forever or growth isn’t strong enough to get them back in just yet.

Of course, these JOLTS data only go up to November of last year. The December jobs data shows a fall in the unemployment rate so we may see some movement when the JOLTS data for December are released next month.

As these two issues show, problems still abound in the U.S. labor market. But looking at this data release in conjunction with other data, the labor market is healing. A year or so ago, anyone looking at the labor market couldn’t say that confidently. Now, while the labor market seems to have decidedly left that very shaky period, the next test will be to see if the pace of healing can actually accelerate.