Must-Read: David Glasner: What’s Wrong with Econ 101?

Must-Read: David Glasner: What’s Wrong with Econ 101?: “The deeper problem… [with] Econ 101 is… fragility…

…Its essential propositions.. are deducible from the basic postulates of utility maximization and wealth maximization…. Not only are the propositions based on questionable psychological assumptions, the comparative-statics method imposes further restrictive assumptions designed to isolate a single purely theoretical relationship…. The bread and butter of Econ 101 is the microeconomic theory of market adjustment in which price and quantity adjust to equilibrate what consumers demand with what suppliers produce. This is the partial-equilibrium analysis derived from Alfred Marshall…. [But] all partial-equilibrium analysis relies on the–usually implicit–assumption that all markets but the single market under analysis are in equilibrium…. start[s] from an equilibrium state… [which] must be at least locally stable… restricted to markets that can be assumed to be very small relative to the entire system….

So the question naturally arises: If the logical basis of Econ 101 is as flimsy as I have been suggesting, should we stop teaching Econ 101? My answer is an emphatic, but qualified, no. Econ 101 is… still the most effective tool we have for systematically thinking about human conduct and its consequences, especially its unintended consequences. But we should be more forthright about its limitations and the nature of the assumptions that underlie the analysis…

Must-read: David Glasner: “What’s Wrong with Monetarism?”

Must-Read: An excellent read from the very sharp David Glasner. I, however, disagree with the conclusion: the standard reaction of most economists to empirical failure is to save the phenomena and add another epicycle. Why not do that in this case too? Why not, as someone claimed to me that John Taylor once said, stabilize nominal GDP by passing a law mandating the Federal Reserve keep velocity-adjusted money growing at a constant rate?

David Glasner: What’s Wrong with Monetarism?: “DeLong balanced his enthusiasm for Friedman with a bow toward Keynes…

…noting the influence of Keynes on both classic and political monetarism, arguing that, unlike earlier adherents of the quantity theory, Friedman believed that a passive monetary policy was not the appropriate policy stance during the Great Depression; Friedman famously held the Fed responsible for the depth and duration of what he called the Great Contraction… in sharp contrast to hard-core laissez-faire opponents of Fed policy, who regarded even the mild and largely ineffectual steps taken by the Fed… as illegitimate interventionism to obstruct the salutary liquidation of bad investments, thereby postponing the necessary reallocation of real resources to more valuable uses…. But both agreed that there was no structural reason why stimulus would necessarily counterproductive; both rejected the idea that only if the increased output generated during the recovery was of a particular composition would recovery be sustainable. Indeed, that’s why Friedman has always been regarded with suspicion by laissez-faire dogmatists who correctly judged him to be soft in his criticism of Keynesian doctrines….

Friedman parried such attacks… [saying that] the point of a gold standard… was that it makes it costly to increase the quantity of money. That might once have been true, but advances in banking technology eventually made it easy for banks to increase the quantity of money without any increase in the quantity of gold… True, eventuaally the inflation would have to be reversed to maintain the gold standard, but that simply made alternative periods of boom and bust inevitable…. If the point of a gold standard is to prevent the quantity of money from growing excessively, then, why not just eliminate the middleman, and simply establish a monetary rule constraining the growth in the quantity of money? That was why Friedman believed that his k-percent rule… trumped the gold standard….

For at least a decade and a half after his refutation of the structural Phillips Curve, demonstrating its dangers as a guide to policy making, Friedman continued treating the money multiplier as if it were a deep structural variable, leading to the Monetarist forecasting debacle of the 1980s…. So once the k-percent rule collapsed under an avalanche of contradictory evidence, the Monetarist alternative to the gold standard that Friedman had persuasively, though fallaciously, argued was, on strictly libertarian grounds, preferable to the gold standard, the gold standard once again became the default position of laissez faire dogmatists…. So while I agree with DeLong and Krugman (and for that matter with his many laissez-faire dogmatist critics) that Friedman had Keynesian inclinations which, depending on his audience, he sometimes emphasized, and sometimes suppressed, the most important reason that he was unable to retain his hold on right-wing monetary-economics thinking is that his key monetary-policy proposal–the k-percent rule–was empirically demolished in a failure even more embarrassing than the stagflation failure of Keynesian economics. With the k-percent rule no longer available as an alternative, what’s a right-wing ideologue to do? Anyone for nominal gross domestic product level targeting (or NGDPLT for short)?

Must-read: David Glasner: “Competitive Devaluation Plus Monetary Expansion Does Create a Free Lunch”

Must-Read: The very sharp David Glasner says–correctly–that currency war is different from war-war. War war is a negative sum game. Currency war is a positive-sum game:

David Glasner: Competitive Devaluation Plus Monetary Expansion Does Create a Free Lunch: “Hawtrey explained why competitive devaluation in the 1930s was–and in my view still is–not a problem…

…Because the value of gold was not stable after Britain left the gold standard and depreciated its currency, the deflationary effect in other countries was mistakenly attributed to the British depreciation. But Hawtrey points out that this reasoning was backwards. The fall in prices in the rest of the world was caused by deflationary measures that were increasing the demand for gold and causing prices in terms of gold to continue to fall, as they had been since 1929. It was the fall in prices in terms of gold that was causing the pound to depreciate, not the other way around….

Depreciating your currency cushions the fall in nominal income and aggregate demand. If aggregate demand is kept stable, then the increased output, income, and employment associated with a falling exchange rate will spill over into a demand for the exports of other countries and an increase in the home demand for exportable home products. So it’s a win-win situation.

However, the Fed has permitted passive monetary tightening over the last eighteen months, and in December 2015 embarked on active monetary tightening…. Passive tightening has reduced US demand for imports and for US exportable products, so passive tightening has negative indirect effects on aggregate demand in the rest of the world…

Must-read: David Glasner: “The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet”

Must-Read: If you think that there is one chance in ten that the sky is falling with respect to the development of deflationary expectations, then you conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish that chance.

If you also think that there is one chance in two that in two years an inflationary spiral will have clearly begun… then you also conclude that Federal Reserve policy is not appropriate–that they ought to be straining nerves to make policy looser to diminish the chance of deflation, for there is plenty of policy time and policy space, plenty of sea room, to curb aggregate demand in the future should it attempt to blow us out to sea.

But there is next to no sea room and next to no policy space to boost aggregate demand if needed, for we are on a lea shore right now.

I am kinda thinking these days that only yachtsmen and yachtswomen should be allowed to hold central-banking policy jobs…

David Glasner: The Sky Is Not Falling… Yet: “The 2008 crisis. was caused by an FOMC that was so focused on the threat of inflation…

…that they ignored ample and obvious signs of a rapidly deteriorating economy and falling inflation expectations, foolishly interpreting the plunge in TIPS spreads and the appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies as an expression by the markets of confidence in Fed policy rather than as a cry for help. In 2008 the Fed at least had the excuse of rising energy prices and headline inflation….

This time, despite failing for over three years to meet its now official 2% inflation target, Dr. Yellen and her FOMC colleagues show no sign of thinking about anything other than when they can show their mettle as central bankers by raising interest rates again…. [But] Dr. Yellen’s problem is now to show that her top–indeed her only–priority is to ensure that the Fed’s 2% inflation target will be met, or, if need be, exceeded, in 2016 and that the growth in nominal income in 2016 will be at least as large as it was in 2015. Those are goals that are eminently achievable, and if the FOMC has any credibility left after its recent failures, providing such assurance will prevent another unnecessary and destructive financial crisis…