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A Meta-Analysis**

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Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis ^{*}

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Abstract

When jobs offered by different employers are not perfect substitutes, employers gain wage-setting power; the extent of this power can be captured by the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. We collect 1320 estimates of this parameter from 53 studies. We find a prominent discrepancy between estimates of “direct” elasticity of labor supply to changes in wage (smaller) and the estimates converted from inverse elasticities (larger). This gap remains after we control for 22 additional variables, and use Bayesian Model Averaging and LASSO to address model uncertainty; however, it is less pronounced for studies employing an identification strategy. Furthermore, we find strong evidence implying that the literature on “direct” estimates is prone to selective reporting: negative estimates tend to be discarded, pulling up the mean reported estimate. Additionally, we point out several socioeconomic factors that seem to affect the degree of monopsony power.

Keywords: Monopsony, Labor Supply, Meta-Analysis, Bayesian Model Averaging

JEL Codes: *J42, C83*

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Economic intuition tells us that when employers cut wages, workers should respond by cutting their labor supply, or possibly leaving their employer in pursuit of better options. As appealing as it is in its simplicity, this argument omits a number of important considerations that could prevent the workers from following this path, such as non-compete agreements, geographic isolation, moving costs, or simply the fact that workers may prefer their employer for non-monetary reasons. In such an environment, where workers are reluctant to explore their outside options, firms possess wage-setting power (or monopsony power), the extent of which depends on the elasticity of labor supply that the firm faces.

Knowing the exact degree of firms' wage-setting power is important: recent studies point out that significant monopsony power can explain a number of empirical puzzles, such as bunching in wages (Dube et al. 2019), or wage dispersion (Card et al. 2018a). Furthermore, high degrees of monopsony power have profound implications for how labor market policies affect workers and firms: most notably, employment levels become much less sensitive to changes in the minimum wage. From the regulatory perspective, it is also important to identify conditions under which firms possess a high degree of monopsony power, thus making workers especially vulnerable. Yet, the findings reported by different strands of empirical literature on monopsony remain very diverse as studies document different values of supply elasticities and, as a consequence, firm wage-setting power. There does not seem to be a consensus on the value of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, nor on the extent to which socioeconomic factors affect its magnitude.

We conduct the first meta-analysis of the literature estimating the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. Reported elasticity estimates may vary on account of differences in the 'true' value of the elasticity parameter across data sets that feature different demographics, occupations or geographical regions. They may also vary with the estimation strategies that researchers employ, or preferences of the profession which give some estimated values a higher probability of being reported. We use meta-regressions to examine these and other sources of variation in elasticity estimates, and to construct our best guess of what the underlying 'true' value might be.

We collect 1320 estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm reported in 53 studies. First, we investigate whether certain results have higher likelihood of being reported—in other words, we try to determine whether there is publication bias in the monopsony literature that would skew the distribution of reported estimates and bias the observed mean. Second, we model the variation in elasticity estimates using meta-regressions in which we control for 23 aspects that govern studies' design. We also explore how supply elasticity estimates vary based on relevant economic and institutional factors, such as labor and product market characteristics. Finally, we provide estimates of the average elasticity of labor supply to the firm conditional on studies employing 'best practices': for example, studies having large and fairly fresh data sets, being published in high-ranked journals, not being engaged in selective reporting, etc. In doing so, we offer a measure of how far, on average, labor markets deviate from the perfectly competitive behavior, based on all of the existing empirical evidence produced by the literature on monopsony.

1 Estimating the Elasticity of Labor Supply to the Firm

During the 20th century, the labor literature largely focused on the pure monopsony model in which a single firm comprised the entirety of demand for labor in a market (e.g. in a company town).¹ As a consequence, relatively little attention was paid to the more general case of imperfect competition, where several competing firms exercise wage-setting power. The foundation for this broader way of thinking about imperfect competition, however, was laid over 85 years ago. Robinson (1933) described three specific reasons why the perfectly competitive model of the labor market may fail, even when there are many firms in the market competing for labor. She argued that a firm may end up facing an upward-sloping labor supply curve because of geographical isolation and differences in commuting distances to a worksite, because workers may prefer their employer for reasons other than compensation, or because workers may not be fully aware of opportunities existing at other firms. Such labor markets, in which a firm faces upward sloping supply despite the presence of many competitors, are termed monopsonistic (or oligopsonistic).

The Manning (2003) book *Monopsony in Motion* inspired a conceptual shift in the literature by applying the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model to formalize the notion of a monopsonistic labor market, in which firms possess wage-setting power due to labor market frictions. His work also provided a relatively straightforward estimation framework, which paved the way for a new empirical literature on monopsony. In addition to papers estimating the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, recent work has begun to revisit possible causes of market power, focusing on issues such as legal restrictions to mobility (Naidu 2010, Naidu and Yuchtman 2013, Balasubramanian et al. 2018 and Krueger and Ashenfelter 2018), differentiated jobs (Card et al. 2018a), moving costs (Ransom 2018), and input market concentration (Brummund 2011, Webber 2015, Azar et al. 2017, Benmelech et al. 2018 and Rinz et al. 2018).² Broadly, these causes of market power can be categorized into factors related to concentration, differentiated jobs, or frictions to mobility. Concentration relates to oligopsonistic labor markets, while job differentiation or frictions relates to monopsonistically competitive markets. Berger et al. (2019) provides a discussion of different welfare and practical implications of these market structures, and Naidu and Posner (2019) and Gibbons et al. (Forthcoming) present empirical work that decomposes market power into oligopsonistic and monopsonistically competitive components in specific labor markets.

Here, we provide some background on the monopsony market structure and the key way to quantify firms' wage-setting power. Consider a firm that faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve and chooses the number of workers to solve the maximization problem

$$\Pi = \max_L [p \times f(L) - w(L) \times L], \quad (1)$$

¹Manning (2003) demonstrates this by examining the contents of contemporary labor economics textbooks. In the meantime, other fields moved on to adopt models in which markets failed to yield perfectly competitive outcomes despite the presence of many firms in the market, on account of factors such as differentiated products (e.g. Berry et al. 1995, Krugman 1980 and Melitz 2003).

²Azar et al. (2017) find evidence of increasing concentration over time, while Rinz et al. (2018) does not.

where p is the price, L is the labor input, $f(\cdot)$ is the production function, and $w(L)$ is the wage that the firm pays its workers, depending on how many workers are hired. This problem yields a solution that links the wage paid by the firm, the marginal revenue product of labor and the elasticity of labor supply:

$$w = MRP_L \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta}, \quad (2)$$

where MRP_L is the marginal revenue product of labor and η is the elasticity of labor supply to an individual firm with respect to the wage, $\eta \equiv \frac{\partial L}{\partial w} \frac{w}{L}$. If supply is perfectly elastic (and $\eta = \infty$), then the last worker hired is paid her worth to the firm: equation (2) implies $w = MRP_L$. By contrast, the worker is paid 90% of her worth to the firm if $\eta = 9$, and half of her worth if $\eta = 1$. It is, however, unclear that firms are able to exercise all of their monopsony power, as factors such as minimum wages, union contracts, social norms or worker responses to perceptions of fairness (see Dube et al. Forthcoming) may also affect wage outcomes. Nevertheless, this simple model does provide important insight into how monopsony power may affect wages, and η , the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, provides important insights into the degree of wage-setting power that firms possess.

In this section we will discuss different ways in which the estimates of η can be obtained. Perhaps the most straightforward approach for estimating the elasticity of labor supply involves a direct regression of the number of workers employed at a given firm on the wage paid to those workers:

$$\ln(L_i) = \eta \cdot \ln(w_i) + \xi_i \quad (3)$$

where L_i is labor employed by the firm, and w_i denotes wages payed. This approach is used by Bodah et al. (2003), Staiger et al. (2010), Falch (2010) and others. Authors that employ this method typically come up with estimates of elasticity $\hat{\eta}$ that do not exceed two, implying that workers are paid less than two thirds of their value to the firm.

An alternative approach that also uses the stock of workers employed by a firm at a given time reverses the left- and right-hand sides of the regression in equation (3) to estimate:

$$\ln(w_i) = \chi \cdot \ln(L_i) + \xi_i, \quad (4)$$

where $\hat{\chi}$ is the inverse elasticity of labor supply. This approach is employed in Fakhfakh and FitzRoy (2006), Sulis (2011), Matsudaira (2014) and others. A reader may expect that the estimates $\hat{\eta}$ and $\hat{\chi}$ would be linked through an inverse relationship, $\hat{\eta} = \frac{1}{\hat{\chi}}$, and therefore the estimates of $\hat{\chi}$ should cluster somewhere above 1/2. This, however, is not what this literature typically reports: the most common estimates $\hat{\chi}$ lie below 1/2, with only a small fraction exceeding this mark. This suggest some inconsistency and possible structural differences between the two estimation methods, a pattern previously pointed out by Manning (2003).

Manning (2003) provides an alternative framework that is not a stock-based, but a turnover-based approach. Motivated by the idea that perfect competition in labor markets fails due to several sources of frictions, this approach stems from the results of a simplified Burdett and Mortensen (1998) search model, in which firms face search costs, and frictions inhibit the

mobility of workers between jobs. Workers choose to separate from jobs that pay lower wages, and the overall job separation rate is a function of the wage.³ Card and Krueger (1995a) point out the relationship between the elasticity of separation with respect to wage and the labor supply elasticity

$$\eta = \eta_R - \eta_S. \quad (5)$$

In (5), $\eta_S \equiv \frac{\partial s(w)}{\partial w} \frac{w}{s(w)}$ is the elasticity of separations where $s(w)$ is the separation rate, and $\eta_R \equiv \frac{\partial R(w)}{\partial w} \frac{w}{R(w)}$ is the elasticity of new recruitment where $R(w)$ is the recruitment function. Equation (5) states that the elasticity of labor supply to the firm can be characterized by how the wage affects worker inflows (through the recruitment elasticity) and how it affects worker outflows (through the separation elasticity). It is rare that a researcher would have reliable data to competently estimate both η_R and η_S . A useful practical solution was suggested by Manning (2003): in a steady-state, the elasticities of separation and recruitment should be linked through $\eta_S = -\eta_R$. Under this assumption, two additional ways of estimating η naturally arise:

$$\eta = -2\eta_S, \quad (6)$$

$$\eta = 2\eta_R. \quad (7)$$

Estimating the recruitment elasticity requires not only information about the employees of a firm, but also on how many qualified applicants a position received. This kind of data is hard to come by, so very few papers have estimated η_R . Using high quality administrative data on Norwegian teachers, a field experiment in Mexico, and field data from Amazon Turk, Falch (2017), Dal Bó et al. (2013) and Dube et al. (2018b), respectively, provide estimates of the elasticity of recruitments with respect to the wage.

Estimating the separation elasticity requires the use of payroll data which contains information on the length of an employee's tenure at a firm and their wage. Measuring how tenure and wage covary identifies the separation elasticity. This approach is much more common, it was adopted, for example, in Ransom and Sims (2010), Booth and Katic (2011), Depew and Sørensen (2013) and others. Econometric models employed to estimate this relationship include linear probability models, probits, logits and hazard models. Studies estimating separation elasticities typically come up with numbers that imply supply elasticities less than two; at the same time, there are some studies that estimate it to be higher. Estimates obtained using recruitment elasticities appear to be slightly higher. An important research question is whether the assumption of $\eta_S = -\eta_R$ is in fact justified—this will be one of the questions we will attempt to address in Section 4 of this paper.

Finally, some researchers employ techniques that impose more structural assumptions than the papers estimating either the straightforward correlation between wages and labor supply or wages and turnover, i.e. Fleisher and Wang (2004); Naidu et al. (2016); Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013); Ogloblin and Brock (2005).

An important caveat is the potential endogeneity problem that exists when modeling the

³Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of this model may refer to Manning (2003) Chapter 4.4.

relationship between wages and employment; understanding the effect of employing an identification strategy is therefore of crucial importance. Studies estimating η via the regression model in (3) can use firm-specific shocks to the wage to identify the supply slope. This approach is taken by Falch (2010) who uses wage premiums paid to teachers in schools facing teacher shortages in Norway. On the other hand, studies that estimate χ with the regression model in (4) require labor demand shifters to identify the supply slope. For example, Matsudaira (2014) exploits increases in demand for nurses at the hospital level on account of a new staffing regulation. Studies that use data on separations to estimate η_S can instrument for worker wages to purge unobserved individual heterogeneity, as is done in Ransom and Sims (2010) who use wages based upon union contracts as an instrument. For the estimate of η_R based on recruitment rates, Dal Bó et al. (2013) run a field experiment to generate exogenous variation in wages.

2 Data

We employed Google Scholar to search for studies in the field; we prefer Google Scholar over other search engines because of its ability to search through the full text versions of the papers rather than only the abstract and keywords. We selected search parameters based on the following criteria: 1) the search would return papers related to monopsony and 2) it would return papers that *estimate* parameters of monopsony power.⁴ After screening the returned papers from Google Scholar, in order to verify that this list was indeed comprehensive, we also studied the references of the returned papers to include any potential candidates that we missed.⁵

We adopted the following inclusion criteria. First, the study needed to present estimates that allow for computing the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. We therefore eliminated papers that examine the relationship between measures of labor market concentration and wages. Even though these studies can provide useful evidence of monopsony power on labor markets, they do not allow for a straightforward computation of the value of the supply elasticity. We also exclude papers estimating the firm size wage effect, unless such an effect was claimed by the authors to be an estimate of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. Finally, we excluded papers that report estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to an entire labor market, rather than to an individual firm.

Our second inclusion criterion is that the study must report a standard error or present

⁴We first ran the search on November 12th 2017, saved the .html files for the first 100 pages listed and downloaded the .pdf files, when available, for the first 50 pages covering 500 papers. After receiving a request for revisions from this journal, we updated our search by repeating the Google scholar queries on May 12th 2019, focusing on papers from 2017, 2018 and 2019. We downloaded the first 100 papers from each year's search. In addition, we also attempted to find relevant unpublished papers searching the NBER and IZA working paper series websites. For NBER, we used our Google Scholar approach and screened 70 papers posted over the last three years. As IZA's Discussion Papers were not feasibly searchable using our search terms approach, we instead screened using JEL codes, focusing on the J42 code for monopsony, screening the first 100 hits and again studying the references of relevant papers.

⁵Specifically, we checked references in both Boal and Ransom (1997) and Manning (2011), which survey the monopsony literature.

information from which the standard error can be computed, as we would like to investigate whether this literature is prone to publication bias.⁶

We found 53 studies that comply with these criteria that together provide 1320 estimates complete with standard errors.⁷ The search query and the list of studies are available in Appendix F. The oldest study in our data set was published in 1977, the newest—in 2019; our data set also includes a number of working papers that are not published yet. Typically, each paper reports several estimates, and the authors do not explicitly state their preference over the reported results. We therefore do not discriminate between reported estimates and collect all results presented in each study.

We would like to investigate how different aspects of study design affect the reported estimate of the supply elasticity. To this end, for each of the 1320 estimates we also collect information on 23 features related to data, methodology and publication characteristics. The description and summary statistics of these variables are available in Table A1; we also discuss them in detail in Section 4. The final data set is available upon request from the authors.

As discussed in Section 1, estimates of the supply elasticity seem to vary depending on specifications used by researchers. On the one hand, many papers estimate effects that can, through linear transformations (and under assumptions discussed in Section 1), be converted to measures of the supply elasticity (e.g. studies that estimate η with the model in (3), or report η_S or η_R). For convenience, we will refer to these estimates as ‘direct’.⁸ These estimates comprise 1140 out of 1320 estimates in our sample. They are depicted in Figure 1(a), with the median estimate around 1.4 implying that workers are payed 58% of their marginal product—strong evidence for monopsony. The distribution of these estimates appears to be relatively close to a bell-shaped curve, but, importantly, it is skewed: the right tail seems much more prominent than the left tail, with many estimates clustering below the median and close to zero, signaling even more monopsony power than the median estimate suggests.

Figure 1: **Figure 1 About Here**

The remaining 180 estimates in our data set come from studies estimating the inverse elasticity of labor supply (parameter χ in the model in 4); we depict their distribution in Figure 1(b). The median inverse elasticity is around 0.07, corresponding to a supply elasticity around 14 and a wage markdown of only 7%.⁹ This immediately points to an inconsistency between two sets of results, suggesting that there may be deep structural differences between the two approaches.

⁶We use the delta method to approximate standard errors when the exact estimate is not available, assuming independence of parameters; this strategy is common in meta-analyses literature, see, for example, Cavlovic et al. (2000), Havranek (2015), Havranek and Sokolova (2019); it was also employed in a labor meta-analysis context close to ours, see Evers et al. (2006).

⁷We obtained 797 from 38 studies during our first search, and 523 estimates from 15 studies in our second search.

⁸Importantly, this notation is different from the terminology of Manning (2003), who uses the term ‘direct regression’ to exclusively refer to ‘stock’-based regressions of the wage on the stock of labor (see the model in 4).

⁹Note that the median of an inverse is not equal to the inverse of a median on account of an inversion being a non-linear transformation. If we take the inverse of our median estimate for the inverse method shown in Table 1, we obtain an estimate of $1/5.24$, or $.19$, a similarly small number.

Table 1: Supply elasticity estimates by data and methods

	Unweighted				Weighted				N
	Mean	Median	5%	95%	Mean	Median	5%	95%	
All	10.58	1.68	-0.15	31.32	7.07	1.69	-0.27	19.96	1320
Europe	6.96	1.49	0.24	19.49	10.42	2.10	0.34	21.98	347
Other advanced	5.93	1.73	-0.26	25.92	2.33	1.59	-0.39	16.65	837
Developing	48.48	2.15	-0.30	275.48	19.74	1.25	-0.35	126.42	136
Nurses	0.95	1.38	-4.38	4.10	-2.65	0.77	-27.36	3.79	78
Teachers	3.08	2.95	1.04	5.44	5.07	3.65	1.06	17.06	102
Inverse	47.39	5.24	-6.10	232.99	29.65	4.50	-27.17	165.84	180
Direct	4.77	1.41	-0.14	24.69	2.55	1.47	-0.05	8.56	1140
Separations	5.85	1.73	-0.24	25.87	3.05	1.74	0.21	16.21	868
Recruitments	2.06	2.53	-0.03	4.73	1.43	0.77	-0.03	4.07	92
L on w	0.86	0.96	0.05	1.63	0.75	0.84	0.05	1.51	67
Structural	1.05	0.33	0.13	5.54	1.98	0.38	-0.35	8.56	113
Top Journal	12.24	11.34	0.18	30.78	4.51	1.92	0.18	19.18	343

Notes: 5% and 95% denote corresponding percentiles. ‘Weighted’ refers to summary statistics based upon weighting of observations by the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study, thereby giving each study equal weight.

However, there may be other explanations as well. For example, papers estimating inverse elasticities could, by chance, be studying less monopsonistic markets or using techniques that yield larger estimates.

Figure 1(c) plots all estimates of η together, combining those obtained using ‘direct’ approaches and the converted results from the inverse regression (i.e. model 4). Again, we note striking differences between these sets of results as they do not appear to come from the same distribution. Table 1 reports sample statistics for the full sample, as well as the subsamples of estimates obtained through ‘direct’ and inverse methods. For the overall sample, the mean estimate of the supply elasticity is at 10.58, while the median is much lower—only 1.68; we also observe similar patterns when we weight estimates by the inverse of the number of estimates per study, thereby giving equal weight to each study, regardless of how many estimates it reports. The sample means for ‘direct’ estimates appear to be lower (4.77), while the means for inverse estimates are substantially higher (47.39), and very different from the median of 5.24.

Elasticity estimates vary across other dimensions as well. First, we document variance across geographic regions. The means and medians for estimates coming from developing countries are larger than those from other advanced economies and Europe. This could potentially imply that labor markets of developing countries are more competitive. Alternatively, this result could also arise from the fact that a portion of the estimates of the inverse elasticity were obtained using data from developing countries—if structural differences between inverse and direct estimations are in fact important. Indeed, when the estimates converted from inverse elasticities are excluded, the mean elasticity estimate for developing countries drops from 48.48 to only 1.14. We also observe that estimates obtained on European data are somewhat higher compared to those coming from other advanced economies—although, as in the case of the developing countries, when conditioning on estimates being obtained using ‘direct’ methods

the difference becomes much more modest. It is therefore too early to conclude that the labor markets of Europe and developing countries are more competitive, as we do not know what other features of the study designs are contributing to this result. We will attempt to disentangle the potential explanations in Section 4.

Aside from geography, we also observe some differences across occupations. A large portion of the literature exclusively focuses on markets for medical workers and teachers, on the grounds of higher potential for monopsony in these markets due to higher employer concentration. There are 180 estimates in our sample exclusively related to either of these markets. From the sample statistics, it would appear that the market for nurses is less competitive compared to the market for teachers and the results coming from other occupations.

Out of the 1140 ‘direct’ estimates in our sample, the majority of about 870 estimates comes from studies that use separation rates. The remaining (approximately 270) estimates are derived from studies using recruitment rates, regressing labor supply on wage, or using some type of structural estimation. There seems to be some, albeit much smaller, variation across these dimensions as well. Finally, 343 of the estimates in our data set come from papers published in either one of the top five general interest journals, or the top field Journal of Labor Economics (labeled ‘Top Journal’ in Table 1). These estimates appear quite close to the sample mean of the ‘direct’ estimates. Overall, there is relatively low variation in ‘direct’ estimates of the supply elasticity. At the same time, the skewed distribution of ‘direct’ estimates appearing in Figure 1(a) may indicate publication bias in the literature, with negative estimates receiving lower probability of being reported. We investigate these concerns in the next section.

Before proceeding with the estimations, we need to make provisions to improve comparability between inverse and non-inverse estimates. All estimates of supply elasticity obtained via ‘direct’ methods lie between -3 and 41 . At the same time, some of the studies estimating the inverse elasticity come up with estimates of $\hat{\chi}$ that lie very close to zero; these estimates become enormous when converted to $\hat{\eta}$. Our full sample of 1320 estimates includes estimates converted from inverse elasticity estimates that do not compare with the rest, such as 999.9 with a standard error of 6666.6; 649.4 with a standard error of 1319.8, -571.4 with a standard error of 1106.93, etc. In order to ensure that we are working with comparable data, we cut the outliers by 2.5% from each tail. This leaves us with a sample of 1254 estimates among which 136 are converted from the inverse elasticity, enough to estimate the contribution of this methodology to the magnitude of supply elasticity estimates. Table A1 compares sample statistics of our control variables for the full sample and the subsample of the 95% of estimates without outliers; it shows no notable difference between the two samples in terms of the sample properties of key controls. In the next two sections we will focus on this subsample; we will, however, also report results for alternative outlier treatments.

3 Publication Bias

Estimates of the supply elasticity that are based on ‘direct’ methods seem to cluster relatively close to zero, implying that the underlying parameter is close to zero as well. When estimated

on random data using standard techniques, a model with a small positive underlying parameter would sometimes yield estimates that lie quite far from the true value and are associated with large standard errors. Some of these estimates would be large and positive, while others, given the small ‘true’ value, would end up in the negative territory. If all estimates of the supply elasticity are reported, then averaging across different results should nevertheless yield a mean close to the underlying effect. If, however, some (e.g. negative) estimates are under-reported, then the mean of this truncated distribution would likely be far from the ‘true’ effect. What we will investigate here is whether the literature is prone to such ‘selective reporting’ of the results.¹⁰

Selective reporting seems to be present in many fields of economics. Ashenfelter et al. (1999) find publication bias in the literature estimating returns to schooling; Card and Krueger (1995b) and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) document this for studies of the effect of minimum wage regulation on employment. Rose and Stanley (2005) and Havranek (2010) examine literature on the effects of currency unions on trade and find that negative estimates have lower probability of being reported. Similarly, Havranek and Sokolova (2019) find evidence of ‘selection for the right sign’ in the literature estimating the degree of excess sensitivity in consumption to predictable changes in income.

Figure 2: **Figure 2 About Here**

Positive values of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, however large, can easily be interpreted by researchers: a large elasticity indicates that the labor market is close to perfect competition, while an estimate close to zero implies high firm wage-setting power. The same cannot be said for negative values of the supply elasticity, as they imply a downward-sloping supply curve and are therefore much harder to make sense of. It is possible that researchers obtaining negative results would see them as an indication of something being wrong with their model, and would therefore engage in further specification searches. These patterns, albeit unintentional, would lead to a lower probability of reporting for negative estimates which in turn implies that, when averaging results across studies, the mean estimate produced by the literature would exaggerate the ‘true’ underlying effect.

Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of estimates reported by studies of the ‘direct’ elasticity. The values of estimates obtained are plotted against their precision. We observe that the most precise estimates seem to cluster close to zero; this seems to imply that the underlying ‘true’ elasticity parameters should be rather small. In the absence of selection for the ‘right sign’, the funnel should appear symmetrical, with less precise estimates being distributed around the ‘true’ effect (see Egger et al. 1997). The funnel on Figure 2 is skewed: the right tail is much more prominent compared to the left tail. It appears that a substantial portion of negative

¹⁰‘Selective reporting’ might be a better, more general description compared to ‘publication bias’, as the observed under-reporting of the results may not actually be related to the publication process. Nevertheless, the literature has converged on the term ‘publication bias’ (e.g. Card and Krueger 1995b, Ashenfelter et al. 1999, Stanley 2001, Efendic et al. 2011, Havranek 2015, Rusnak et al. 2013). Here, we also use it for consistency.

estimates is missing from the funnel plot, which seems to point towards publication bias in the form of selection for a positive sign.

To further investigate possible publication bias, we conduct a formal funnel asymmetry test used by Card and Krueger (1995b) and others. Common estimation methods rely on the assumption that the ratio of the estimate to its standard error is t -distributed. Under this assumption (or assuming any other symmetrical distribution), the estimate and the standard error should not be correlated. Therefore, in a regression of the estimate on its standard error, the coefficient λ on the standard error should be zero:

$$\hat{\eta}_{ij} = \eta_0 + \lambda \cdot SE(\hat{\eta}_{ij}) + u_{ij}, \quad (8)$$

where $\hat{\eta}_{ij}$ is the i -th estimate from the j -th study, $SE(\hat{\eta}_{ij})$ is its standard error, and u_{ij} is the disturbance term. By contrast, systematic under-reporting of negative estimates would result in a positive relationship between the estimate and the standard error, and a positive coefficient λ in the regression (8)—see Stanley (2005) for a detailed discussion. The coefficient λ can thus be viewed as a measure of the severity of publication bias, while the constant term η_0 gives an approximate value of the unbiased effect.¹¹

We estimate model (8) and report the results in *Panel A* of Table 2. It is likely that estimates are correlated within studies; we therefore cluster the standard errors at the study level. As our number of clusters is relatively small (46), standard errors from clustered inference may exhibit downward bias. We therefore additionally compute wild bootstrapped clustered p -values, as recommended by Cameron et al. (2008). The first column of Table 2 shows the results of OLS estimation of model (8). The coefficient λ appears to be large, positive and significant. In the second column we control for study-level fixed effects, accounting for unobserved study-level characteristics. The estimate of the effect of publication bias here is again positive and significant, albeit smaller in magnitude compared to the OLS. In the third column we only use variation between studies and again find evidence for publication bias, although the number of observations used drops dramatically.

We also apply two alternative weighting strategies to further check robustness of these results. We first weight all estimates by their precision, effectively multiplying equation (8) by the inverse of the standard error. This approach remedies the apparent heteroskedasticity, while at the same time giving more weight to the more precise estimates (see Stanley and Doucouliagos 2015 for a discussion). For our data, precision weighting yields strong evidence for publication bias that is very similar to the OLS results. It is worth noting that this technique is not without some caveats. It is possible that some estimation methods would produce standard errors that are systematically smaller in magnitude: for example, we expect studies that do not use instrumental variable techniques to report lower standard errors than studies with instruments, other things equal. Weighting by precision would then assign lower importance

¹¹The interpretation of η_0 should be done with caution as the estimate is unbiased only when publication selection is proportional to the standard error. Nevertheless, this linear approximation was documented to work reasonably well in Monte Carlo simulations (e.g. Stanley 2008).

Table 2: Testing for publication bias

<i>Panel A: All estimates</i>					
	OLS	FE	BE	Precision	Study
SE	1.443 (0.000) [0.000]	0.400 (0.001) [0.000]	1.258 (0.000) [0.000]	1.986 (0.000) [0.000]	0.562 (0.072) [0.000]
Constant	1.733 (0.004) [0.000]	4.009 (0.000) .	2.175 (0.055) [0.000]	0.550 (0.003) [0.012]	1.837 (0.000) [0.000]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1118	1118	46	1118	1118
<i>Panel B: Published estimates only</i>					
	OLS	FE	BE	Precision	Study
SE	1.800 (0.000) [0.000]	0.491 (0.000) [0.000]	2.125 (0.000) [0.000]	2.135 (0.000) [0.015]	1.832 (0.000) [0.000]
Constant	1.322 (0.004) [0.000]	4.231 (0.000) .	1.272 (0.016) [0.000]	0.578 (0.007) [0.039]	1.083 (0.000) [0.000]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	995	995	38	995	995

Notes: The table presents results from the following regression: $\hat{\eta}_{ij} = \eta_0 + \lambda \cdot SE(\hat{\eta}_{ij}) + u_{ij}$, where $\hat{\eta}_{ij}$ is the i -th estimate from the j -th study, $SE(\hat{\eta}_{ij})$ is the standard error of the estimate, and u_{ij} captures the unobservables in the regression. Standard errors from the regression are clustered at the study level and p -values are shown in parenthesis. We also report p -values from wild bootstrap clustering in square brackets. This is implemented via the `boottest` command in `Stata` (see Roodman 2018). We use Rademacher weights and 9999 replications. The package does not allow for computation of a bootstrapped p -value for the constant term in the fixed effects specification. ‘OLS’ denotes ordinary least squares, ‘FE’ is study-level fixed effects, ‘BE’ is study-level between effects, ‘Precision’ is a specification with precision weights, and ‘Study’ is a specification with weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study. *Panel A* reports results for the sample of ‘direct’ estimates, both published and unpublished. Here, we use only 1118 observations, rather than 1140, as our preferred data trimming procedure discussed and implemented in Section 2 eliminates 22 ‘direct’ estimates; these results remain robust under alternative outlier treatments (including no outlier treatment), see Table D1 of Online Appendix D. *Panel B* reports results for the sub-sample of ‘direct’ estimates that are published. Again, outliers dropped in Section 2 are not included in this sample. Nevertheless, these results are robust to different outlier treatments—see Table D2 of Online Appendix D.

to studies that use IV. Furthermore, Lewis and Linzer (2005) show that for models with an estimated dependent variable, a simple OLS would often outperform the weighted estimation.¹²

Studies in our sample typically report several estimates of the supply elasticity, and we collect all of the estimates reported in each study and explore both within- and between-study variation. However, some studies report many more estimates than others—those studies would then effectively have greater weight in the estimation strategies discussed above. To correct for this potential bias, we weight our data by the inverse of the number of estimates per study and report the results in column five. This strategy also produces results that favor publication bias, though the effect is less pronounced compared to precision weights.

Our sample includes estimates from studies that have been published as well as estimates reported in working papers that have not yet gone through the peer review process. We now investigate how the patterns of selective reporting would change if we restrict our analysis to a

¹²For additional discussion of precision weights, see section 4.1 of Card et al. (2018b).

sub-sample of published estimates. We repeat our exercise using the published estimates only, and report the results in *Panel B* of Table 2. The positive association between estimates and their standard errors remains significant, while becoming more pronounced in magnitude across all specifications—compared to the results obtained using the full sample. This indicates that selective reporting is a prominent issue for this literature that is not alleviated by the journal refereeing process.

The results discussed so far provide strong evidence for the presence of publication bias in the literature on monopsony; however, they do not allow one to distinguish between different forms of selectivity. In a recent paper, Andrews and Kasy (2019) develop an alternative strategy for detecting publication bias: the authors explicitly model the process governing selectivity and estimate relative probabilities of the results being reported. In their setup, the results produced by latent studies are reported with a probability that may depend on their sign and significance. The authors normalize to one the reporting probability of positive results significant at the 5% level; they then estimate the reporting probabilities for negative significant, negative insignificant and positive insignificant results—relative to the probability of reporting for results that are positive and significant.

We apply this technique to our sample of ‘direct’ estimates. The results are reported in Table B1 of Appendix B in which we also provide a more detailed discussion of the technique itself. Relative to the probability of reporting of results with Z -scores over 1.96, results with negative Z -scores are dramatically less likely to be reported (over 20 times less). Positive results significant at 5% are about nine times more likely to be reported compared to results with Z -scores between 0 and 1.96. These magnitudes increase when we restrict the analysis to a sub-sample of published ‘direct’ estimates.

In addition, the Andrews and Kasy (2019) method provides an estimate of the unbiased mean of the ‘true’ effect, that we previously attempted to approximate with the constant term in the funnel asymmetry regression. These estimates end up being very close to zero: 0.157 for the full sample with a standard error of 0.001 and -0.269 for the sub-sample of published results with a standard error of 0.295. These corrected estimates are lower compared to the estimates of the constant terms reported in Table 2, which suggests that for our data, the constant term in the funnel asymmetry regression may not fully correct for the effects of selectivity. We will therefore loosely interpret the bias correction in the regression model as an upper bound estimate of the ‘true’ parameter.

One potential problem with both the funnel asymmetry test and the Andrews and Kasy (2019) approach is that they rely on an assumption of independence between the estimates produced by latent studies and their standard errors; at the same time, there may be aspects of study design that influence the estimate and the standard error in the same direction. For example, estimates converted from inverse elasticities shown in Figure 1 are systematically larger than the direct estimates, and so are their standard errors. Therefore, when we perform publication bias tests of Table 2 on the full sample without excluding the inverses, the evidence for publication bias becomes stronger due to this spurious correlation. We therefore limited our

focus here to studies that produce ‘direct’ estimates that seem to be much more homogenous.¹³ It is possible, however, that there are other aspects of methodology that could create similar biases within this group. One possible solution to this problem would be to find an instrument for the standard error that is uncorrelated with other aspects of study design. One such instrument could be the number of observations used to produce the results. For this data we find the number of observations to perform poorly in predicting the standard error, which undermines the credibility of the results based on that approach.¹⁴ We nevertheless report them in Table D1 and Table D2 of Online Appendix D.

The next section presents an alternative solution to this endogeneity problem. In an effort to explain variation across estimates, we will attempt to control for all aspects of study design that we deem most likely to influence the estimation results. We find strong evidence for publication bias in this context as well.

¹³We also explored modeling publication bias for the inverse elasticity estimates and found much less economically significant evidence of publication bias. We did not pursue this further on account of 1) very small sample size and 2) the fact that these estimates and their standard errors were obtained via a non-linear transformation of their original values.

¹⁴The first stage coefficient on the instrument is not significant at conventional levels and fails weak identification tests.

4 Why do Estimates of Supply Elasticity Vary?

4.1 Explanatory Variables

So far we have noted a few methodological aspects that are likely to have systematic effects on the estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. Most importantly, it seems that the estimates are much higher for studies that measure the inverse supply elasticity, and lower for those employing ‘direct’ methods. There are, however, other aspects of study design that could be affecting the estimates. We will now attempt to control for a subset of these features that a) we believe are important and b) vary sufficiently across studies. Our goal is to understand the effects that the researcher’s data and method choices have on their inference about firms’ monopsony power. To this end, we come up with a set of 23 controls that, we believe, capture the most crucial features of the studies, such as data used and overall study quality, and the most common decisions that researchers make, such as choosing specification and estimation technique. We group these controls into five categories and discuss them below. We also present a full list of controls, their definitions and summary statistics in Table A1.

Data characteristics. It is likely that the monopsony power of the firms has changed over the years; we therefore control for the age of the data set by including the midpoint of the data. Next, we include the logarithm of the number of observations used to obtain each estimate, as we believe that results obtained from large data sets may be more reliable. Ashenfelter et al. (1999) shows that failing to control for publication bias in the context of meta-regression can result in exaggerated effects attributed to different estimation methods. We therefore include an interaction between the standard error of the estimate and an indicator variable that equals one for estimates obtained through ‘direct’ methods—to capture publication bias discussed in Section 3.

We also expect that markdown could differ across demographic groups. For example, Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) find the labor supply of female employees more elastic compared to males. Fifteen papers in our sample examine gender differences in the supply elasticity, e.g. Galizzi (2001) and Hirsch et al. (2010). Some studies in our sample report estimates for males and females separately, whereas others report the female share in the sample they use. We capture this information in a control *female share*. Unfortunately, for a substantial portion of the estimates, the information on the demographic structure is not reported. We set *female share* = 0.5 for these cases.

Country & Occupation. Strength of institutions varies across countries; it is reasonable to expect that monopsony power of firms would vary as well. To our knowledge, no cross-country studies exist to examine these differences in labor supply elasticity—we are the first study attempting to gather systematic evidence on this topic. Our sample spans data coming from sixteen countries, and the papers on gender alone cover eight (Australia, Canada, Russia, Norway, Brazil, Italy, Germany, US). We group the country data into three categories: *Developing* (6 countries), *Europe* (7 countries) and *Other Advanced* (3 countries). The last category is our reference

group, it describes the data coming from the US, Canada and Australia and covers 63% of our data set.

Prior to the work of Manning (2003), research on monopsony mostly focused on labor market concentration rather than labor market frictions. Accordingly, much of the literature turned its attention to studying firm market power over nurses and teachers, as these workers are often employed in firms that are large relative to their labor market. In our sample, 14% of estimates are from studies of nurses or teachers. We construct controls that reflect whether the estimate relates exclusively to one of these occupations.

Method & Identification. As discussed in Section 1 and Section 2, one major distinction among the results produced by the literature is between estimates obtained from inverse supply elasticities and those obtained via other methods (that we term ‘direct’). The former is a ‘stock-based’ estimation approach that uses correlation between the wage and the overall number of workers employed by the firm (see model 4 in Section 2). Manning (2003) argues that estimates obtained with this method may be biased on account of unobserved labor supply shocks ‘making the slope of the supply curve seem less positive than it really is’. This argument implies that estimates converted from inverse elasticities would exhibit upward bias, a conclusion that so far seems to be in line with sample statistics presented in Section 2. Biases could also arise due to unobserved worker quality, rent sharing, and compensating wage differentials. A firm-specific labor demand shifter could identify the (inverse) elasticity of labor supply in such contexts, reducing the bias. There could therefore arise a systematic difference between estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place and those produced without one. We create controls for identified and unidentified estimates converted from inverse elasticities.

In a stock-based regression of employment on wages (i.e. model 3), a bias in the opposite direction may arise—see Manning (2003). Again, firm-specific shocks (this time to wages) would provide clean identification. In our sample, all estimates obtained via this method are identified through either an IV or a randomized wage strategy. We therefore cannot distinguish between identified and unidentified estimates, and only include a control for the identified estimates obtained with this method.

Compared to the stock-based methods, turnover-based methodologies that use either separation or recruitment rates employ individual-level data and therefore are subject to much less simultaneity. Nevertheless, threats to identification may still exist. For example, workers with unobservable characteristics which increase their productivity may be rewarded with higher wages as well as more outside job offers, resulting in higher separation rates. We distinguish between separation-based and recruitment-based estimates obtained with and without an identification strategy. Finally, we control for estimates obtained in models that impose additional structural assumptions (e.g. models with production), with and without an identification strategy; we investigate how they compare with the rest of the literature.

Estimation technique. As noted above, there is more than one way to estimate the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, even for a given method such as the separation-based approach. For

example, a researcher may run a linear probability model, where a binary outcome of separation from employment depends on the wage, and calculate the separation elasticity (e.g. Depew and Sørensen 2013). Alternatively, a researcher may choose a binary non-linear model, such as probit or logit (e.g. Ransom and Oaxaca 2010). Finally, a number of recent studies have used survival analysis in order to estimate the hazard of separation from employment as a function of the wage (e.g. Hirsch et al. 2018). We assess the impact of these estimation techniques by including corresponding controls. Other estimation technique choices (i.e. OLS versus IV) are largely dictated by whether the study employs an identification strategy and are partially captured by our method-identification controls.

Publication characteristics. Supply elasticity estimates could also vary with unobserved features of the papers related to quality. We control for publication characteristics in an effort to capture some of this variation. We have 343 estimates coming from papers published in either one of the top five general interest journals, or the top ranked field *Journal of Labor Economics*, and we include a corresponding control to account for outlet quality.¹⁵ For the unpublished working papers, we distinguish between working papers that came out as part of the NBER or IZA working paper series, and the rest.

Next, we constructed a control that records the number of citations listed on Google Scholar, divided by the number of years since the paper first appeared on Google Scholar. This control could potentially capture some additional aspects of study quality: even though we used a detailed system of controls to characterize empirical methodology and data, there may be some studies that employ unique data sets of outstanding quality (for example, allowing to construct unique instruments) that other authors remark on and cite for this reason. Alternatively, a strong association between the estimates and reported citation count could indicate that the profession tends to favor certain results over others, and provide additional evidence for publication bias within the field.¹⁶

Finally, for each paper we record its publication year.¹⁷ On the one hand, this control could capture advances in methodologies and empirical practices that occurred over time within the method groups (e.g. using better instruments) as the field developed. On the other hand, the focus of journals and researchers may have shifted over time resulting in stronger preferences for studies producing more/less evidence for monopsony; if that was the case, then the direction of publication bias may have changed over time; adding publication year to the set of controls could help detect this shift. For other studies that consider publication year see, among others, Koetse et al. (2009), Egger and Lassmann (2012), Valickova et al. (2015), Havranek et al.

¹⁵We also considered including the impact factors of the journals, but were forced to exclude this control because of multicollinearity.

¹⁶The choice to include a control based on Google Scholar citations in a meta-regression is common for the meta-analyses literature, see, for example, Havranek (2015), Havranek et al. (2016), Card et al. (2018b), Havranek and Sokolova (2019).

¹⁷Because we have both published and unpublished studies in our sample, we count as ‘publication year’ the year the paper first appeared on Google Scholar—for consistency across the two groups.

(2017).¹⁸

4.2 Estimation and Results

We would like to pin down the sources of observed variation in supply elasticity estimates—in the previous section we presented our best guess as to what the key sources might be. The effects of some of these factors can be explored within a framework of a single study dealing with labor market data. For example, a researcher could estimate the supply elasticity via different methods using a single data set, and compare results. This is the approach taken by Manning (2003) who draws comparisons between different methods of estimating the labor supply elasticity. A researcher could also examine differences in pay of male and female workers within a single firm, as is the case in Ransom and Oaxaca (2010). This within-study comparison approach can shed light on the importance of some features of methodology and data, and the previous section of the current paper builds on the insights coming from the respective studies. At the same time, if the task set by a researcher is to explain overall variation in estimates reported by the literature, this approach would have serious shortcomings.

Estimates of the supply elasticity can differ for a variety of reasons: there could be variation in the ‘true’ underlying parameter across markets and regions that affects estimation results; there could be certain combinations of methodology, identification strategies and data features that produce evidence of very strong or very weak monopsony power. Finally, there could be variation in the quality of published research papers. All of these features could contribute to observed variation in estimates, and drawing full and consistent comparisons within a framework of a single study of labor market data may be an impossible task. We therefore resort to a more feasible method that, rather than estimating elasticities for each plausible choice of study design and data, utilizes *estimates* obtained by previous studies to perform a meta-regression analysis. We consider the following regression model:

$$\hat{\eta}_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{l=1}^{23} \beta_l X_{l,ij} + u_{ij}, \quad (9)$$

where $\hat{\eta}_{ij}$ is estimate i of the supply elasticity reported in study j , $X_{l,ij}$ are values of controls reflecting study design and quality discussed in subsection 4.1 and summarized in Table A1, and u_{ij} is the disturbance term. The model in equation (9) attempts to capture key features of the process governing how researchers obtain estimates of the supply elasticity.

There are several important points to consider when estimating (9). First, our dependent variable is an *estimate* of the ‘true’ parameter. This implies that the disturbance term on the right-hand side incorporates a sampling error, which may depend on the number of observations and the complexity of the empirical design used to obtain the estimates. A common method of addressing the presence of the sampling error in a meta-analysis is to use precision weights,

¹⁸While there is some correlation between average year of data and publication year, here it does not result in severe multicollinearity. This is intuitive, as a number of studies in our sample examine historical data.

effectively assigning higher weight to estimates that are more precise (potentially because they were obtained using more observations). This method would be efficient if the sampling error was the only component of the term u_{ij} . However, aside from errors coming from limitations in the estimation process, there may also be disturbance in the ‘true’ parameter itself—the unobserved heterogeneity in the monopsony power. In other words, the term u_{ij} may be a sum of the sampling error and the shock to the ‘true’ parameter η . When there are reasons to believe that this latter component of the disturbance term is relatively important, an unweighted OLS may perform better than the WLS approach.¹⁹

In a recent meta-analysis of the effects of active labor market programs, Card et al. (2018b) argue that unobserved heterogeneity is quite prominent for their application. They also point out that for their data, higher numbers of observations with which the estimates were obtained do not necessarily mean more precision in estimates: large-scale studies often employ complex techniques, and the loss of precision due to an increased complexity of the analysis may not be offset by the precision gain due to more observations.²⁰

For our application, there are two concerns that echo the discussion above. First, as we already noted in Section 3, it is likely that estimates obtained with more complex methods (such as an identification strategy) would be relatively less precise—not because these estimates are inferior, but due to the overall complexity of the research design. We are therefore concerned that precision weights may assign lower weight to estimates produced with more sophisticated techniques. Second, it appears quite likely that the unobserved heterogeneity in the ‘true’ monopsony power is prominent for our application: different firms may cultivate unique work environments that affect workers’ responsiveness to changes in wage. Due to these two considerations we choose to follow Card et al. (2018b) and use an unweighted specification as our baseline. We do not claim that our methodology can explain the evolution of the ‘true’ supply elasticity parameter—but we argue that we employ the second best, feasible option that, nevertheless, allows us to explore the variation in estimates reported by the existing literature—that is, in **our sample**.

We will start our analysis with a sample that pools together both identified and unidentified estimates; for this sample, we will not use precision weights as we are concerned about downweighting information coming from studies with an identification strategy in place. We will then repeat our analysis using a subsample of identified estimates; for this exercise we will perform precision weighting and compare the results with those from the unweighted specification: even though we suspect unobserved heterogeneity would be prominent in this subsample as well, we think that our concern about downweighting estimates obtained with more complex designs would be less pronounced in this context, making weighting more justified.

¹⁹See Lewis and Linzer (2005). As the authors point out on p.350, attributing all of the residual to the sampling error (and none to noise in ‘true’ parameter) is equivalent to assuming that if one could directly observe the ‘true’ parameter (e.g. the ‘true’ η), then the R^2 of the regression of the ‘true’ parameter on explanatory variables would be 1. Additionally, see Solon et al. (2015) for an excellent discussion of weighting in economics.

²⁰Card et al. (2018b) report that for their sample, there is almost no correlation between the number of observations used by a study and the estimates’ precision (footnote 21 on p.913). This is also the case for our data: in our sample, the correlation is -0.0342 (very similar to -0.02 reported in Card et al. 2018b).

Finally, another point to consider is that, because studies in our sample report different numbers of estimates, our inference may end up being dominated by studies that report many estimates, while the studies that only report a few estimates would receive a lower relative weight. In an attempt to equalize impacts of different studies, we will also report robustness checks in which we weight each data point by an inverse number of estimates that the associated study reports. We will then compare these results with our baseline, to gain insight into the extent to which the baseline results may be driven by the overrepresented studies.²¹

We start by estimate (9) on the full sample using two approaches: an unweighted OLS estimation and a specification in which we weight data by the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study, to give roughly equal weight to studies reporting many estimates and those that report only a few. Table 3 presents estimation results. First, we note that the positive association between the direct estimates and their standard errors discussed in Section 3 remains intact in both specifications even after we control for various aspects of study design. This is consistent with our previous conclusion about the presence of selective reporting in the literature on monopsony. We also find that top journals seem to publish higher estimates of the supply elasticity compared to other journals—at least according to the unweighted specification which detects an economically meaningful effect of about 3.55. At the same time, we do not find statistically significant effects associated with unpublished work or the outlet in which the working paper is presented to the public.

Table 3: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>								
SE non-inverse	0.984	0.307	0.001	0.003	0.730	0.297	0.014	0.092
No obs (log)	0.332	0.258	0.199	0.413	0.305	0.236	0.197	0.343
Midyear of data	-0.027	0.017	0.126	0.318	-0.033	0.025	0.187	0.371
Female share	-2.365	1.788	0.186	0.452	-2.220	1.551	0.153	0.284
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	14.477	.	0.006	.	7.541	.	0.110	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>								
Developing	2.440	3.074	0.427	0.593	4.992	4.264	0.242	0.494
Europe	0.594	1.141	0.603	0.710	2.057	1.186	0.083	0.144
Nurses	-8.252	5.449	0.130	0.248	-0.871	2.632	0.741	0.803
Teachers	-3.651	2.071	0.078	0.122	-0.598	1.584	0.706	0.702
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	3.330	.	0.504	.	3.106	.	0.540	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>								
Separations, id.	3.481	3.350	0.299	0.462	3.893	2.270	0.086	0.182
Inverse, id.	15.677	6.097	0.010	0.074	11.274	3.467	0.001	0.029
Inverse, not id.	17.542	3.695	0.000	0.008	12.301	3.972	0.002	0.012
Recruitment, id.	3.267	1.719	0.057	0.071	-1.231	1.913	0.520	0.584
Recruitment, not id.	0.209	2.217	0.925	0.944	-3.834	2.424	0.114	0.336
L on W regression, id	3.280	2.641	0.214	0.156	0.970	2.047	0.636	0.640
Structural & other, id.	-8.536	5.263	0.105	0.158	-8.687	4.658	0.062	0.273
Structural & other, not id.	1.973	1.772	0.265	0.461	-3.605	2.956	0.223	0.299

Continued on next page

²¹This weighting technique was also employed as a robustness check in other meta-analyses, particularly in cases when researchers were concerned about sharp differences in numbers of estimates reported by primary studies, see e.g. Havranek and Irsova (2017) and Gunby et al. (2017).

Table 3: Testing for publication bias: robustness to treatment of outliers, all estimates (continued)

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	104.482	.	0.000	.	40.324	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>								
Hazard	-0.936	1.890	0.620	0.742	-1.400	1.622	0.388	0.508
Probit, logit, other	-1.283	1.661	0.440	0.625	1.310	1.262	0.299	0.375
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.601	.	0.741	.	3.292	.	0.193	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>								
Top journal	3.551	1.617	0.028	0.058	1.309	1.072	0.222	0.271
Citations	2.357	1.690	0.163	0.329	1.557	1.274	0.222	0.418
Pub. year (google)	0.147	0.128	0.252	0.354	0.068	0.085	0.424	0.525
NBER or IZA	-1.841	2.099	0.380	0.538	1.189	2.510	0.636	0.735
WP other	-0.199	2.735	0.942	0.955	-0.121	2.728	0.965	0.973
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	13.802	.	0.017	.	5.822	.	0.324	.
Constant	-5.132	3.835	0.181	0.302	-1.711	2.721	0.529	0.651
N	1254	.	.	.	1254	.	.	.

Notes: Here we investigate how the features of study design affect the estimates of supply elasticity. We present the results of the OLS estimation (left panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (right panel). We report regular p -values and p -values from wild bootstrap clustering; ‘id’ denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. As in Table 2, we only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 5% of outliers from the full sample) which left us with 1254 data points. We report results obtained under alternative outlier treatments in Online Appendix E.

Second, estimates converted from inverse elasticities tend to be higher than those obtained using separations. We chose unidentified separations-based estimates as our reference group; estimates converted from inverse elasticities, both identified and unidentified, appear larger by at least 11.27. The difference between identified and unidentified estimates based on separation elasticities in general is not statistically significant, and neither is the difference between inverse elasticities obtained with and without an identification strategy. However, comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients we note that the gap between estimates constructed using separations and those converted from inverse elasticities seems to become smaller once an identification strategy is in place.

This result is in line with Manning (2003), who argues that estimates converted from inverse elasticities may overstate the ‘true effect’ because this stock-based estimation method does not account for unobserved supply shocks. Our results show that implementing an identification strategy seems to diminish the gap between estimates converted from inverse elasticities and those obtained using separations; however, the gap does not disappear entirely. This result echoes findings presented by Tucker (2017), who applies the two methods to the same dataset and argues that the endogeneity bias suggested by Manning (2003) alone does not explain the gap between these two estimated elasticities. Indeed, there may be fundamental differences in what these methods measure. The inverse elasticity may measure how much market power firms have when hiring new workers. In contrast, the separation based approach is more informative about the market power that firms possess over incumbent workers. Tucker (2017) theorizes

that market power may increase after hiring, as workers develop firm-specific human capital and as job-specific amenities are revealed. Our results here seem to support this notion.

For studies that use structural models with production, estimates depend on whether the study employed an identification strategy: identified estimates obtained with this method are markedly lower compared to separations-based estimates, while the unidentified estimates show no systematic difference. The recruitment-based identified estimates appear to be relatively close in value to the separation-based identified estimates in the unweighted specification. However, this result disappears once we weight data by the inverse number of estimates reported per study, suggesting that the observed similarity could be due to results coming from a few big studies reporting large numbers of estimates (as opposed to many studies reporting several estimates per study). Finally, we do not detect a statistically significant difference between unidentified separations and estimates coming from studies that directly regress labor supply on wage.

We do not find statistically significant evidence of the female share affecting the estimates; this, however, could be due to the fact that many studies do not report precise demographic data, and the indicator we constructed is only an approximation (see subsection 4.1 for details). Nevertheless, the coefficient estimate for the female share has a consistent negative sign which can be interpreted as some (weak) evidence of gender gaps and warrants further investigation.

The results related to the effects of geographical and occupation factors are inconclusive as the F-test rejects the joint significance of factors pertaining to country and industry. Similarly, the use of non-linear estimation techniques (hazard, probit and logit models) does not seem to result in elasticity estimates that would be systematically different when compared with linear regression models. There is also no clear evidence of a trend in the evolution of the elasticity estimates over time: on the one hand, studies published more recently report higher estimates (other things equal); on the other hand, studies that use newer data sets typically report lower elasticity estimates, consistent with monopsony power having increased over time—though neither effect is statistically significant.

As discussed in subsection 4.1, having an identification strategy is of crucial importance for pinning down the underlying ‘true’ elasticity of labor supply to the firm. The results of Table 3 further illustrate this point, as there seem to be differences across estimates of elasticity obtained with and without an identification strategy in place. We will now investigate the effects that different elements of study design have on the elasticity parameter conditional on the study implementing an identification strategy.

We repeat the exercise of Table 3 using a subset of 549 identified elasticity estimates. We report the results in Table 4. For this exercise we add an extra specification in which we weight data by the precision of the respective estimates, thereby giving relatively more weight to results that are more precise. It is likely that estimates obtained using instrumental variables would appear statistically less precise compared to their unidentified counterparts. We chose not to apply this strategy to the mixed sample investigated in Table 3 out of concern that it would assign relatively lower weight to identified estimates, which, given the widely recognized

importance of having an identification strategy, would not be desirable. Focusing on the identified sample exclusively alleviates this problem, and we report results for the specification that employs precision weights in the right panel of Table 4.

Table 4: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Identified estimates only.

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights				OLS, precision weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>												
SE non-inverse	0.969	0.259	0.000	0.095	1.008	0.464	0.030	0.256	1.688	0.148	0.000	0.011
No obs (log)	0.749	0.598	0.211	0.376	0.399	0.692	0.564	0.719	0.195	0.184	0.289	0.516
Midyear of data	-1.391	0.323	0.000	0.033	-0.755	0.357	0.035	0.277	-0.532	0.201	0.008	0.001
Female share	-18.668	11.684	0.110	0.444	-9.913	7.198	0.168	0.324	-6.399	4.196	0.127	0.264
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	92.177	.	0.000	.	11.337	.	0.023	.	591.887	.	0.000	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>												
Developing	4.234	7.276	0.561	0.728	8.179	7.178	0.255	0.560	-0.561	0.937	0.549	0.808
Europe	-7.884	4.828	0.102	0.238	-7.138	4.869	0.143	0.381	-7.701	2.542	0.002	0.028
Nurses	-15.155	6.736	0.024	0.089	-14.692	9.894	0.138	0.367	-10.360	4.252	0.015	0.069
Teachers	-7.523	2.486	0.002	0.015	-3.121	2.559	0.223	0.301	-2.632	1.322	0.047	0.096
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	57.719	.	0.000	.	4.229	.	0.376	.	9.944	.	0.041	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>												
Inverse	8.967	5.470	0.101	0.133	6.804	6.363	0.285	0.409	8.250	1.433	0.000	0.000
Recruitment	6.344	2.979	0.033	0.048	-0.567	3.923	0.885	0.923	5.125	1.891	0.007	0.026
L on W regression	13.636	5.777	0.018	0.108	10.932	8.213	0.183	0.454	10.403	3.551	0.003	0.012
Structural & other	-10.326	3.200	0.001	0.031	-11.185	5.159	0.030	0.305	-1.387	1.234	0.261	0.532
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	34.819	.	0.000	.	15.793	.	0.003	.	34.603	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>												
Probit, logit, other	-4.375	4.856	0.368	0.424	-6.217	7.568	0.411	0.663	-1.842	1.753	0.293	0.390
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.811	.	0.368	.	0.675	.	0.411	.	1.104	.	0.293	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>												
Top journal	-3.366	5.198	0.517	0.611	-7.926	5.633	0.159	0.459	-4.230	1.616	0.009	0.066
Citations	6.038	1.419	0.000	0.027	5.011	2.532	0.048	0.390	1.628	1.082	0.132	0.241
Pub. year (google)	1.004	0.418	0.016	0.068	0.450	0.498	0.366	0.480	0.476	0.168	0.005	0.025
NBER or IZA	3.594	6.806	0.597	0.677	0.674	5.600	0.904	0.926	-4.979	1.149	0.000	0.004
WP other	-0.866	6.832	0.899	0.912	-4.368	6.816	0.522	0.661	-8.573	1.909	0.000	0.007
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	26.334	.	0.000	.	6.774	.	0.238	.	45.722	.	0.000	.
Constant	86.515	24.470	0.000	0.074	56.081	29.471	0.057	0.412	33.330	14.888	0.025	0.071
N	549	.	.	.	549	.	.	.	549	.	.	.

Notes: Here we investigate how the features of study design affect the estimates of supply elasticity. Unlike in Table 3, here we restrict the analysis to a subset of identified estimates. The panel on the left presents the results of the OLS estimation; the middle panel reports results from a weighted specification that uses inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights; the panel on the right reports results from a specification that uses precision weights. We report regular p -values and p -values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. As in Table 2 and Table 3, we only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail). Further restricting the sample to only the identified estimates left us with 549 data points. We report results obtained under alternative outlier treatments in Online Appendix E.

We find strong support for our previous conjectures about selective reporting: in line with evidence from both Table 2 and Table 3, we observe a positive correlation between the identified ‘direct’ estimates and their standard errors. This, again, points toward publication bias in the monopsony literature. As before, we also document a relatively large discrepancy between estimates based on separation and those converted from inverse elasticities, although the difference appears less statistically significant. Compared to the results from the full sample this gap is smaller in magnitude (somewhere between 6.8 and 8.97 as opposed to 11.27-17.54), which could mean that identification helps reconcile estimates obtained via these two approaches.

The same cannot be said about estimates obtained using other techniques. First, we see some results suggesting that estimates based on recruitment elasticities are larger compared to those based on separations, although this result does not hold for the specification in which we weight by the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study. As discussed in Section 1, researchers that estimate supply elasticity based on separations or recruitments have to assume steady-state equivalence between the two rates. Taken at face value, these results imply that this steady-state assumption may not always hold.

Second, the results of Table 4 indicate that studies that directly regress employment on wage tend to come up with higher estimates, while studies that employ structural models with production usually produce estimates that are lower—compared to those obtained from separation elasticities and conditional on having an identification strategy. Even though these effects did not appear as strong in Table 3, the signs of coefficients are consistent, suggesting that there may be structural differences across these methods, too.

Similar to Table 3, in the identified subsample we find weak evidence linking higher female shares to higher estimated monopsony power. The signs on the associated coefficients are consistent and negative across all specifications, even though the results lack statistical power. When looking at differences across occupations, we note that for this subsample it appears that studies that focus exclusively on the markets for nurses or teachers seem to produce lower estimates of the supply elasticity, potentially indicating that these markets tend to be more monopsonistic.

4.3 Heterogeneity and the treatment of outliers

So far we followed the strategy discussed in Section 2 and used a data set in which we cut 2.5% of outliers from each tail. We now check the robustness of our treatment of outliers. We repeat the exercises of Table 3 and Table 4 under alternative outlier treatments, i.e. no outlier treatment (see Table E1 for the mixed sample and Table E5 for the subsample of identified estimates), outliers winsorized at 1% in each tail (see Table E2 and Table E6), outliers winsorized at 2.5% in each tail (see Table E3 and Table E7) and outliers cut at 1% from each tail (see Table E4 and Table E8).

On the one hand, inclusion of additional outliers introduces extra noise which then makes the overall results less precise. We see increases in magnitudes of some of the estimated coefficients (especially the coefficients for unidentified estimates converted from inverse elasticities, e.g.

see Table E1); other effects can no longer be estimated precisely: for example, occupation effects disappear when we consider the full untreated sample of both identified and unidentified estimates. On the other hand, comparing point estimates we still see some of the same patterns even in the untreated sample, namely some differences across method and identification choices, as well as the positive correlation between estimates and their standard errors consistent with selective reporting. For the subsample of identified estimates, we see strong negative effects for nurses and teachers in the untreated sample. We also observe a negative effect associated with the female share that becomes somewhat more pronounced in some specifications, albeit not always significant. Finally, comparing our baseline results in which we cut the outliers with those obtained on a sample where the previously cut outliers are winsorized (see Table E3 and Table E7), we do not observe much of a difference aside from changes in magnitudes of some of the point estimates. We therefore conclude that the results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 are broadly consistent with those obtained under alternative outlier treatments.

4.4 Heterogeneity and model uncertainty

The results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 were obtained under an assumption that all of the 23 explanatory variables we came up with likely belong to the ‘true’ data generating process. However, it seems unlikely that each of the 23 explanatory variables contributes to the observed variation in supply elasticity estimates in a meaningful way. Therefore, model (9) that contains all of these variables could be misspecified. At the same time, as discussed in subsection 4.1 we have some intuition for why each of the 23 variables might contribute to determining the magnitude of elasticity estimates. We are therefore concerned about potentially inducing omitted variable bias by excluding any one variable *ex ante*. Although sequential *t*-testing is a popular choice in this context, we find it unsatisfactory: sequential elimination of insignificant regressors may lead us to accidentally exclude some of the variables that belong to the data generating process. We will now attempt to address this problem in a more systematic way, employing two methods designed to mitigate model uncertainty: Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and LASSO.²²

The BMA methodology tackles model uncertainty by explicitly modeling and estimating probabilities that different combinations of explanatory variables represent the ‘true’ model. Using the 23 variables we singled out as the potentially important controls we could come up with 2^{23} distinct variable combinations (or models). So far we have only estimated a tiny fraction of this model space. The BMA approach is radically different compared to what we have done in previous sections: instead of picking one specific model, BMA approximates the entire model space, assigning each of the 2^{23} possible models a metric—Posterior Model Probability—that reflects the likelihood of it being the ‘true’ model. It then averages parameter estimates across

²²This type of model uncertainty is a prominent problem for meta studies: as many factors can potentially explain variation in estimates, researchers often end up with large sets of potential explanatory variables. See Havranek et al. 2017 and Havranek and Sokolova 2019 for discussions of the model uncertainty problem with respect to meta-analyses in consumption theory; see Steel (2017) for a recent discussion of model uncertainty in economics in general.

all models, using posterior model probabilities as weights (see subsection Appendix C.1 for more details about BMA).

LASSO provides a very different solution to the model uncertainty problem. Assuming that the ‘true’ model is sparse (i.e. there is only a handful of explanatory variables that have a non-zero effect on the dependent variable), LASSO amends the OLS minimization problem by introducing an extra constraint on the sum of absolute values of regression coefficients. This amended minimization problem typically yields corner solutions that assign exact zeros to coefficients on some of the less relevant explanatory variables. In consequence, the less relevant variables get automatically excluded achieving sparsity (see subsection Appendix C.2 for more details about LASSO).

The results of BMA and LASSO estimations are presented in Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2, along with detailed discussions. In line with the OLS results reported earlier, both of these approaches detect positive and significant correlation between ‘direct’ estimates and their standard errors indicative of publication bias. The effect of having estimates converted from inverse elasticities remains positive and significant in all specifications. As before, point estimates associated with ‘identified’ inverse elasticities are smaller than those corresponding to ‘not identified’, underscoring the importance of having an identification strategy. Furthermore, both methods evaluate the effect of structural identified estimates to be negative—when compared to estimates from the separations-based approach.

Once again, we observe weak evidence suggesting that studies that consider data with higher shares of female workers come up with more evidence of monopsony power. The results regarding effects of occupation are mixed: BMA provides some evidence linking the market of nurses to higher degrees of monopsony power—but not the market of teachers; LASSO results suggest stronger negative effects for both—especially in the subset of the ‘identified’ estimates. The two methods also generate conflicting results with regard to recruitment-based estimates: according to BMA, results obtained using recruitments are not different from those obtained using separations, as the probability of the control for recruitment-based estimates belonging to the ‘true’ model is estimated to be below 7%. At the same time, LASSO reports a positive significant effect associated with using recruitment elasticities.

4.5 Heterogeneity and variation in country-specific variables

So far our analysis did not uncover any stable relationship between estimates and the geographical origin of the data. Taken at face value, this result could imply that there are no notable systematic differences in monopsony power across the regions that we studied. Alternatively, this could imply that our method of splitting data into country groups failed to reflect some key cross-country dimensions that govern the size of the elasticity parameter.

Here we take an alternative approach to studying cross-country differences in monopsony power. Instead of using region dummies, we collect country-specific information on factors that, we believe, could affect the wage-setting power of firms: country-specific labor and product market conditions, as well as the general level of economic development. To capture labor market

conditions, we use data on collective bargaining coverage, strictness of employee protection and active labor market program expenditures. We capture product market conditions with data on product market regulation. Finally, we proxy for the level of economic development using GDP per capita. A detailed description of variables and data sources is available in Table C5. Our strategy here is very similar to that of Foged et al. (2019), who conduct a meta-analysis of the effect of immigration on natives' labor market outcomes.²³

Having collected this data, we attempt to match our observations of supply elasticities with country-year information on our five chosen controls. We are able to match each of our estimates with the exact corresponding GDP per capita. Unfortunately, data on the rest of the country variables is more scarce, and for some of the elasticity estimates we do not have the corresponding country-years of the labor or product market controls. When we had any data on these variables for a given country, we imputed using the `ipolate` command in `Stata`.²⁴

We repeat the exercise of Table 3, substituting the region dummies with the new set of country-specific variables. We report results obtained on a larger sample that uses imputed data, as well as a smaller subsample that only includes estimates for which we were able to find the exact matches of cross-country variables. We do not repeat this exercise for the subsample of identified estimates, as for this smaller subsample we do not have enough variation to estimate the effects of the controls. Table C6 presents estimation results. For brevity, we only report the effects associated with the cross-country variables, and the F-tests for cross-country variable groups.

Overall, we are not able to capture strong effects associated with labor market conditions. This, however, does not necessarily imply that labor market conditions are unimportant: the two samples we study are characterized by high degrees of multicollinearity which could be inflating the associated standard errors. At the same time, we do observe a relatively stable effect associated with product market regulations: this variable is significant in some of the specifications, and in most of them the respective coefficient is positive. This may indicate that restrictive product market regulations have the effect of decreasing firm size, thus increasing the number of firms and reducing the risk of a labor market becoming oligopsonistic.

4.6 Heterogeneity and best practice estimates

To understand what different estimation strategies and features of the data imply about firm wage-setting power, we now compare fitted values of supply elasticity estimates conditioning on specific technique and data choices. For the final estimates to be useful to the reader, we construct what we believe are estimates associated with 'best practices' in the literature, rather

²³We use all institutional factors employed by Foged et al. (2019), with the exception of their measure of job tenure, which may be endogenous to the estimation of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, as many of the estimates are obtained using the separation approach which is based upon duration at a given job spell.

²⁴Our dataset includes estimates from 16 countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia, the UAE, UK and US. Our measure of employment protection was missing in all years for the UAE. The product market regulation variable was missing in all years for China, Colombia, Russia and the UAE. The active labor market program and collective bargaining variables were missing for these countries and Brazil.

than just focusing on sample means. This is done by substituting high parameter values for variables that, we believe, reflect best practice; low parameter values for those that do not; and putting sample means for cases where we are indifferent. For example, we correct for publication bias by substituting zero instead of the mean for the standard error on non-inverse estimates; we also believe that results from studies that use large data sets are probably more reliable—we therefore put the value of the 90th percentile for the *number of observations*; we also think that our readers are probably more interested in estimates that are more current (both recently published and using modern data)—we put 90th percentile values for *publication year* and *midyear of data*. We would like to rely on estimates that other economists trust as well, we therefore set the value of *top journal* to one and use the value of 90th percentile for the *number of citations*.

In the top panel of Table 5, we present best practice estimates obtained from a separation elasticity based strategy, by far the most common strategy employed in studies that we examine. We use three different models to obtain these results: the linear model of Table 3 (our baseline), the frequentist check from BMA estimation reported in Table C1 and the post-LASSO results of Table C3.

We observe relatively small estimates, which are much more consistent with a monopsonistic labor market than they are with a perfectly competitive labor market (which requires the elasticity of labor supply to be infinite). Under perfect competition the last worker hired would be paid the full amount of their marginal revenue product. Here, the point estimates imply that firms are able to pay the last worker hired between 12 and 15 percent less than his or her marginal revenue product. Even the largest estimate contained in one of our 95% confidence intervals, 15.07, implies firm markdown power of around 6%.

Table 5: Best Practice Estimates

Group	Point Estimate	95% interval	95% interval (wild)	Implied Markdown
Separations: Model				
Linear model	7.133	[1.75; 12.51]	[-0.88; 15.07]	12.3
BMA	5.738	[2.46; 9.02]	[1.03; 10.52]	14.8
LASSO	7.177	[2.37; 11.99]	[0.41; 13.78]	12.2
Separations: Gender				
Women	5.971	[1.09; 10.86]	[-0.90; 13.13]	14.3
Men	8.336	[1.98; 14.70]	[-1.19; 17.52]	10.7
Separations vs. Inverse				
Separations - Not identified	6.429	[1.00; 11.85]	[-1.39; 14.29]	13.5
Separations - Identified	9.910	[2.08; 17.74]	[-0.89; 19.17]	9.2
Inverse - Not identified	24.674	[19.33; 30.02]	[14.61; 31.24]	3.9
Inverse - Identified	22.810	[8.29; 37.33]	[1.58; 50.09]	4.2

Notes: The table presents fitted ‘best practice’ estimates using alternative models and data. Estimates in rows 1-3 are obtained using models reported in Table 3, frequentist check in Table C1 and the post-LASSO results of Table C3. The rest of the results are obtained using the linear model. We report both the standard 95% confidence interval calculated for errors clustered at the study level, and the 95% confidence interval calculated with wild bootstrap clusters. The estimates of the markdown are obtained using equation (2).

The middle panel in Table 5 reveals another important dimension of heterogeneity that we

have discussed above: there seems to be a difference in the markdowns across genders. While the estimated markdown for males is at 10.7%, for females it is up to 14.3% (as implied by a linear model and estimates obtained using separation elasticities).

The bottom part of the table compares the best practice estimates obtained using separation and inverse elasticities, with and without an identification strategy in place. The inverse-based estimates appear larger than separations-based estimates. However, they also depend on whether a study implements an identification strategy, suggesting that endogeneity is a significant concern for this literature. Overall, these estimates again do provide strong evidence of firms possessing some monopsony power; the largest estimate in our 95% confidence interval here, 50.09, suggests that firms have the power to pay workers about 2% less than they are worth.

To explore further the effect of identification on elasticity estimates we repeat the exercise of Table 5 using a subset of identified estimates only—we report the results in Table C7. Overall, the point estimates appear to be lower compared to those reported in Table 5, providing further evidence of firm monopsony power. However, these results are obtained using a smaller sample (576 instead of 1254 observations), and are associated with wide confidence intervals—especially when using the wild bootstrap cluster. Furthermore, we find that these results are much more sensitive to the precise definition of best practice. We therefore prefer to rely on evidence from Table 5.

The evidence of firm monopsony power we found can be used to reconcile some empirical puzzles arising in the labor literature. For example, in two meta-analysis, Card and Krueger (1995b) and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) show that increases in the minimum wage do not depress employment, and in fact sometimes have a positive effect. This finding goes against the logic of the competitive labor market framework; it can, however, be explained through presence of monopsony. Manning (2003, pp. 345-347) uses a general equilibrium version of the monopsony model to generate responses in employment to changes in minimum wages. In his example, positive or negligibly small responses are generated under elasticities of 3.3 and 5, not too far from the results we report in Table 5.

Dube et al. (2018a) argue that firm wage-setting power may explain bunching in wages at round numbers: the lower the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, the less costly the ‘wrong’ wage is in terms of turnover costs. For example, elasticities of labor supply to the firm of 1 and 5 would be associated with firms forsaking 1% or 10% of profits due to bunching, respectively. Our results are broadly consistent with these numbers.

Card et al. (2018a) provide micro-foundations for the static monopsony model, assuming heterogeneity in worker preferences across different work environments. This leads to workers distinguishing between different employers on the basis of things other than wage, and gives wage-setting power to the firms. The authors show that, under the assumption of a supply elasticity of 4 (and markdown of 20%) this model can be used to explain observed dispersion of wages, and their link to firm productivity.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Imperfect competition among employers can lead to workers being payed less than their worth to the firm. Recently, academic research on such labor market structures has made its way into policy debate. At the end of the Obama administration, the Council of Economic Advisers issued a policy brief on monopsonistic labor markets and potential policy remedies (Council of Economic Advisors 2016). The arguments of Krueger and Posner (2018) were put forward to a wider audience in a *New York Times* op-ed (Posner and Krueger 2018). In late 2017, Senators Cory Booker and Elizabeth Warren wrote an open letter to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions, urging enforcement of recent Department of Justice guidance that no-poach agreements are likely illegal (Warren and Booker 2017; Booker 2017). In October of 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives held a subcommittee hearing on competition in labor markets.²⁵ This new found interest from policy makers calls for a detailed investigation of the existing quantitative evidence for monopsonistic labor markets.

Here, we attempt to synthesize empirical evidence on the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, a parameter that captures the extent of firms' wage-setting power. We show that features pertaining to study design, data, publication quality and researcher's implicit preference combine to explain the observed variation in estimates. We also provide quantitative predictions of what supply elasticity estimates should be for different estimation techniques, conditional on employing best research practices. Our results suggest that, overall, the literature provides strong evidence for monopsonistic competition and implies sizable markdowns in wages. That being said, several caveats are in order.

First, we do not claim to explain the systematic variation in the 'true' supply elasticity parameter. Instead, our empirical exercise approximates the data generating process for supply elasticity *estimates*, conditional on the existing literature. Some of the variation that we report is likely driven by differences in the underlying parameter value (e.g. estimates for different countries), whereas other variation may arise purely due to choices made by researchers (e.g. estimation technique or selective reporting).

Second, our results provide evidence on the elasticity of labor supply to the firm and the implied degree of firms' wage-setting power, but not necessarily whether the firms are able to exercise this power. Given this concern, our results regarding implied salary markdowns from separations can be viewed as a prediction of what these markdowns would be assuming that firms fully exploit the power they have over workers. On the other hand, our results showing less wage setting power from inverse estimates could indicate that employers are not able to exploit the full extent of the monopsony power implied by a simple wage setting model. This is consistent with labor market institutions partially reigning in employers' wage-setting power.

²⁵See docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20191029/110152/HHRG-116-JU05-20191029-SD001.pdf.

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Appendix A: Description of Variables

Table A1: Definitions and summary statistics of explanatory variables

Variable	Description	Mean (all)	SD (all)	N (all)	Mean (95%)	SD (95%)	N (95%)
<i>Data characteristics</i>							
SE non-inverse	An interaction between standard error and a dummy for whether the estimate is obtained through 'direct' (not inverse) estimation.	1.90	3.96	1320	1.95	3.95	1254
No obs (log)	The logarithm of the number of observations.	10.23	3.21	1320	10.16	3.17	1254
Midyear of data	The average year of the data used minus 1919 (the earliest midyear in the sample).	75.50	17.39	1320	75.62	17.01	1254
Female share	The share of female workers in the study's data set; 0.5 if sample stats not reported.	0.51	0.28	1320	0.52	0.28	1254
<i>Country & industry*</i>							
Developing	=1 for data coming from countries classified as 'Emerging and Developing economies' by IMF classification in 2018.	0.10	0.30	1320	0.08	0.27	1254
Europe	=1 for data coming from countries in Europe.	0.26	0.44	1320	0.27	0.44	1254
Nurses	=1 for data that exclusively covers the market of medical workers.	0.06	0.24	1320	0.06	0.24	1254
Teachers	=1 for data that exclusively covers the market of teachers.	0.08	0.27	1320	0.08	0.27	1254
* [Reference category for COUNTRY: other advanced economies.] [Reference category for INDUSTRY: estimates that do not exclusively relate to either market of nurses or teachers]							
<i>Method & identification**</i>							
Separations, id.	=1 if estimate is based on separation rate AND is obtained through either IV or randomized identification strategy.	0.20	0.40	1320	0.21	0.41	1254
Inverse, id.	=1 if estimate converted from inverse elasticity AND is obtained through IV identification strategy.	0.10	0.30	1320	0.08	0.28	1254
Inverse, not id.	=1 if estimate converted from inverse elasticity AND the authors do not use IV.	0.04	0.19	1320	0.02	0.15	1254
Recruitment, id.	=1 if estimate is based on recruitment rate. AND is obtained through IV or other identification strategy	0.06	0.25	1320	0.07	0.25	1254
Recruitment, not id.	if estimate based on recruitment rate AND the authors do not use IV.	0.01	0.07	1320	0.00	0.07	1254
L on W regression, id.	=1 if estimate is obtained via stock-based estimation through regressing labor on wage AND is obtained through either IV or randomized identification strategy.	0.05	0.22	1320	0.05	0.22	1254
Structural & other, id.	=1 if estimated obtained from structural model with production, or any other method not based on separations and not covered by specification controls above AND is obtained through either IV or randomized identification strategy.	0.02	0.15	1320	0.02	0.15	1254
Structural & other, not id.	=1 if estimated obtained from structural model with production, or any other method not based on separations and not covered by specification controls above AND the authors do not use IV or randomize.	0.06	0.24	1320	0.07	0.25	1254
** [Reference category: estimates based on separations AND not identified (no IV or randomized identification)]							

Continued on next page

Table A1: Definitions and summary statistics of explanatory variables

Variable	Description	Mean (all)	SD (all)	N (all)	Mean (95%)	SD (95%)	N (95%)
<i>Estimation technique</i> ***							
Hazard	=1 if study uses hazard model (reference category: linear techniques).	0.23	0.42	1320	0.24	0.42	1254
Probit, other	logit, =1 if study uses probit, logit or any other non-linear technique not previously classified (reference category: linear techniques).	0.16	0.36	1320	0.16	0.37	1254
***[Reference category: estimates based on linear techniques]							
<i>Publication characteristics</i> ****							
Top journal	=1 if the study was published in one of the top five general interest journals in economics or the top field journal in labor.	0.26	0.44	1320	0.27	0.44	1254
Citations	The logarithm of the number of per-year citations of the study in Google Scholar (data for May 2019).	0.48	0.40	1320	0.48	0.41	1254
Pub. (google)	year The year the paper first appeared on Google Scholar minus 1977, the year when the first study in our sample was published.	33.98	7.08	1320	33.88	7.05	1254
NBER or IZA	=1 if estimate comes from an unpublished NBER or IZA working paper.	0.06	0.24	1320	0.06	0.24	1254
Working Other	=1 if estimate comes from other unpublished working paper.	0.09	0.29	1320	0.07	0.26	1254
****[Reference category for PUBLICATION STATUS: estimates that are published]							

Notes: Data was collected from published studies estimating the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. When indicator variables form groups, we state the reference category. We report means and standard deviations for the full sample of 1320 observations, as well as for the truncated subsample of 1254 estimates.

Appendix B Publication bias. Additional results

Publication bias using Andrews and Kasy (2019)

In this section we will explicitly model selectivity under publication bias using techniques developed by Andrews and Kasy (2019) ('AK 2019', for brevity). We will then estimate relative publication probabilities of different results and the unbiased means of the population of latent studies (i.e. the mean 'true' effect). In the next paragraphs we will briefly explain the method following closely the discussion presented in *Sections IIB and IIIC* of Andrews and Kasy (2019); we will also estimate the model featured in their *Section IIIC* on our data.²⁶

Consider studies estimating the supply elasticity parameter. In the AK 2019 setup, each study's underlying 'true' elasticity is drawn from some distribution. The authors make specific assumptions about this distribution's shape (e.g. normal, t -distribution) and later estimate the associated parameters (e.g. the mean of the distribution). A latent study then produces estimates of elasticity that are drawn from a normal distribution with the study's 'true' underlying elasticity as a mean, and with a standard error that is independent of the 'true' elasticity. Out of the estimates produced, some will be reported, while others will be discarded. The probability of reporting, $p(Z)$, may depend on the value of the estimate normalized by its standard error, Z .²⁷ The probability function $p(Z)$ may depend on the statistical significance (captured by $|Z|$) and the sign of the results (captured by the sign of Z). Absent selectivity, the observed distribution of reported results with high standard errors should reflect the distribution of results with low standard errors—plus noise. AK 2019 identify $p(Z)$ by comparing distributions of results with different standard errors.

Following AK 2019, we start with a visual diagnostic test for our data (Figure B1). Adopting the notation of AK 2019, we denote our elasticity estimates with X and their standard errors with Σ . The panel on the left presents a histogram of estimates of elasticity normalized by their standard errors. In the absence of selectivity, we would expect to see a smooth distribution. For our data, we notice that the density seems to be jumping around the cutoff of 0, and also roughly around 2. This suggests that the sign and significance of the latent estimates may affect their likelihood of being reported. The right panel plots estimates against their standard errors. If there was no selectivity at play here, the mean of the observed elasticity estimates X would not depend on the level of precision. Visually, this implies that if one was to draw two horizontal lines at different levels of Σ , then the mean values of X points plotted along those lines should be approximately equal. For our data, standard errors around 10 seem to be associated with higher mean reported estimates of the elasticity compared to standard errors close to 1, for which the estimates seem to cluster relatively close to zero. This, too, points

²⁶Andrews and Kasy (2019) discuss two major applications of their method: an application that utilizes estimates from replication studies and the one designed for the meta-study context, that only employs the results reported in original studies. Due to the nature of our data we will only use the latter approach; this is also the approach we will refer to throughout the text when using the 'AK 2019' notation.

²⁷Throughout the paper, AK 2019 refer to $p(Z)$ as the 'publication probability', but also note that selectivity may not necessarily occur as a result of the publication process; it may be driven by researcher's decisions not to report certain results. We will refer to $p(Z)$ as a probability of the result being reported, as our application features data from both published and unpublished work.

towards selectivity in the data, as there seem to be substantial structural differences between the distributions of observed estimates with high and low standard errors.

Figure B1: **Figure B1 About Here**

We will now estimate the version of the AK 2019 model discussed in *Section IIIC* of the body of their paper, in which the authors use data from the Wolfson and Belman (2019) meta-analysis of the elasticity of employment to changes in the minimum wage. The authors assume the distribution of the ‘true’ underlying elasticity to be a t -distribution with degrees of freedom $\tilde{\nu}$, scale parameter $\tilde{\tau}$ and the location parameter $\bar{\theta}$ —the mean ‘true’ elasticity. The relative probability of results being reported is then modeled using a step function:

$$p(Z) \propto \begin{cases} \beta_{p,1} & \text{if } Z < -1.96 \\ \beta_{p,2} & \text{if } -1.96 \leq Z < 0 \\ \beta_{p,3} & \text{if } 0 \leq Z < 1.96 \\ 1 & \text{if } Z \geq 1.96 \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

where the probability of reporting a positive result significant at 5% is normalized to 1, while the relative reporting probabilities of significant negative ($\beta_{p,1}$), insignificant negative ($\beta_{p,2}$) and insignificant positive ($\beta_{p,3}$) results are estimated via maximum likelihood.

Table B1: Testing for publication bias using Andrews and Kasy (2019)

<i>Panel A: All estimates</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
0.157 (0.001)	0.648 (0.006)	1.570 (0.028)	0.005 (0.003)	0.036 (0.048)	0.111 (0.074)
<i>Panel B: Published Estimates Only</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.269 (0.295)	0.548 (0.717)	1.435 (0.600)	0.002 (0.002)	0.020 (0.024)	0.073 (0.063)

Notes: This table presents results of estimating the model discussed in *Section IIIC* of AK 2019, using our sample of ‘direct’ estimates (*Panel A*) and the sub-sample of ‘direct’ estimates that were published (*Panel B*). The model estimated assumes that the ‘true’ underlying elasticity Ω^* is distributed according to $\Omega^* \sim \bar{\theta} + t(\tilde{\nu}) \cdot \tilde{\tau}$, and that the reporting probability is proportional to those featured by a step function in (10). See p.2784 of AK 2019 for more details. We produce our results using the `Matlab` code accompanying AK 2019 that replicates their *Table 3*. Similar to our *Table 2*, *Panel A* reports results for the sample of 1118 ‘direct’ estimates, both published and unpublished. We repeat this exercise under different outlier treatments and report the results in *Table D3* of *Online Appendix D*; the results are similar. *Panel B* restricts the sample to the 995 ‘direct’ estimates that are published; these results are also not very sensitive to outlier treatments (see *Table D4* of *Online Appendix D*).

The results of estimating this model on our data are reported in *Table B1*. *Panel A* reports results for the full data set of ‘direct’ estimates in which we include results reported in both published and unpublished work. The methodology featured here is identical to that employed to obtain *Table 3* in AK 2019. For our data, there is evidence that the reporting probability

function does indeed depend on Z . The reporting probability for a negative estimate is dramatically lower compared to an estimate that is positive and significant on a 5% level. Specifically, a negative insignificant result is about 28 times less likely to be reported, and a negative significant result would be reported even less often. A positive result with a Z lower than 1.96 is about nine times less likely to be reported compared to a result with Z over 1.96. The point estimate of $\beta_{p,3}$ is somewhat larger than $\beta_{p,1}$ and $\beta_{p,2}$, suggesting that positive insignificant results may be relatively more likely to be reported compared to the negative results (although this result is not precise enough for a statistical rejection of parameters being equal). The estimate of $\bar{\theta}$ —the mean of the distribution of the ‘true’ underlying elasticity across studies—is at 0.157 which is much smaller compared to the mean elasticity we observe in the truncated sample of reported estimates. We follow AK 2019 and repeat this exercise using the sub-sample of published studies; *Panel B* of Table B1 reports the results. Compared to the full sample, the point estimates of relative probabilities are somewhat smaller. The point estimate of the unbiased mean of the ‘true’ effect is also smaller, but much less precise. We therefore conclude that the results are roughly similar across the two samples, with the sub-sample of published studies being associated with a somewhat stronger selectivity. All these pieces of evidence suggest that selectivity is indeed very prominent in the monopsony literature.

Appendix C Heterogeneity. Additional results

Appendix C.1 Addressing model uncertainty: Bayesian Model Averaging

The model with all 23 controls included that we have studied in Table 3 is only one out of 2^{23} possible combinations of our chosen explanatory variables. Here we attempt to take into account the remaining $2^{23} - 1$ possible combinations of controls and address model uncertainty using Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). Sequential t -testing would discard the information coming from controls that appear insignificant in the broad specification of Table 3 and Table 4; BMA offers an alternative approach: instead of selecting and estimating one model, it traverses through the space of all possible regression models and assigns each a metric called Posterior Model Probability (PMP) that reflects how well the model performs compared to all the others.

Inference in BMA is obtained by taking a weighted average of the results from all possible models, using the Posterior Model Probability (PMP) as a weight. It is worth noting that we do not estimate each of the 2^{23} regressions; instead, we employ a Model Composition Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that visits models with the highest PMP and approximates the rest (see Madigan and York 1995). We implement this using the BMS package in R written by Zeugner and Feldkircher (2015). Our base specification uses a combination of uniform model prior and unit information prior for model parameters, following Eicher et al. (2011), but we also report results obtained under alternative priors. Detailed discussions of applications of BMA to economics can be found in Moral-Benito (2015) and Steel (2017); Koop (2003) provides an excellent technical description of the method. Another example of BMA application can be found in Fernández et al. (2001), who use it to combat model uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions. Havranek et al. (2017) use BMA in a context similar to ours, tackling model uncertainty in a meta-analysis of habit formation in consumption.

BMA estimation results for the full sample of 1254 estimates are reported in Figure C1. The explanatory variables shown on the left are sorted by Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP). Each explanatory variable is present in $2^{23} - 2^{22}$ models; PIP gives the sum of posterior model probabilities of all models in which a regressor is included, assessing how likely it is that each explanatory variable belongs in the data generating process for elasticity estimates. The vertical axis of Figure C1 lists explanatory variables with the highest to lowest PIP. The horizontal axis depicts different models with highest to lowest Posterior Model Probability and plots cumulative PMP values. White color in Figure C1 indicates that the explanatory variable is not included in the selected model, blue (darker in greyscale) means that the variable is included with a positive coefficient, and red (lighter in greyscale) means that the variable is included and has a negative sign.

We observe that the signs of most explanatory variables are quite stable across models in which the variables are included; they are also broadly consistent with evidence reported in Table 3. We present numerical results of BMA estimation in the left panel of Table C1, reporting the mean values of corresponding coefficients averaged across all models, their standard deviation and the values of posterior inclusion probabilities. Variables with PIP that exceeds 0.5

belong to the data generating process with probability of more than 50%—this can be thought of as the analogue of significance in frequentist econometrics. The right panel of Table C1 reports a frequentist robustness check in which we run an OLS with variables that have PIP higher than 50%. We cluster standard errors at the study level and additionally compute p -values using wild bootstrap clustering.

Figure C1: **Figure C1 About Here**

Table C1: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?
Bayesian Model Averaging

Response variable:	BMA			OLS with selected variables			
	Post. Mean	Post. SD	PIP	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>							
SE non-inverse	0.977	0.073	1.000	0.983	0.298	0.001	0.002
No obs (log)	0.044	0.086	0.260				
Midyear of data	-0.003	0.008	0.124				
Female share	-2.167	1.056	0.880	-2.499	1.840	0.174	0.383
<i>Country & Industry</i>							
Developing	1.358	1.320	0.580	2.384	2.959	0.420	0.503
Europe	0.024	0.156	0.048				
Nurses	-6.366	1.247	1.000	-6.346	4.875	0.193	0.301
Teachers	-0.193	0.679	0.111				
<i>Method & Identification</i>							
Separations, id.	2.970	1.540	0.866	3.469	3.672	0.345	0.499
Inverse, id.	15.836	1.043	1.000	15.436	7.376	0.036	0.109
Inverse, not id.	19.528	1.337	1.000	19.513	2.088	0.000	0.006
Recruitment, id.	0.110	0.543	0.068				
Recruitment, not id.	-0.087	0.698	0.039				
L on W regression, id	0.055	0.468	0.048				
Structural & other, id.	-8.596	1.745	1.000	-8.901	4.848	0.066	0.047
Structural & other, not id.	0.055	0.314	0.054				
<i>Estimation Technique</i>							
Hazard	-0.052	0.294	0.061				
Probit, logit, other	-0.028	0.193	0.047				
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>							
Top journal	3.656	1.048	0.989	3.305	1.733	0.057	0.026
Citations	2.073	0.944	0.896	2.408	1.440	0.094	0.255
Pub. year (google)	0.229	0.060	0.990	0.202	0.102	0.047	0.112
NBER or IZA	-0.634	1.164	0.276				
WP other	0.013	0.202	0.030				
Constant	-6.883		1.000	-5.842	3.653	0.110	0.173
N	1254			1254			

Notes: Here we present results of Bayesian Model Averaging estimation. PIP denotes posterior inclusion probability; SD is the standard deviation; ‘id’ denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. The left panel of the table presents unconditional moments for the BMA. The right panel reports the result of the frequentist check in which we include only explanatory variables with $PIP > 0.5$. The standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. ‘p-value (wild)’ are wild bootstrap clustered p-values. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. Here we only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail).

As before, we see strong support for our conjecture about publication bias: the posterior inclusion probability corresponding to the standard error of ‘direct’ estimates is at 100%, and its correlation with the reported estimates is high and statistically significant in the OLS robustness check. Similarly, we observe that estimates converted from inverse elasticities are markedly higher compared to those obtained using separations, while estimates obtained using structural models with an identification strategy are lower.

Compared to the results reported in Table 3, we see somewhat stronger support for the negative relationship between the elasticity estimates and the female shares in the associated data sets: BMA estimates the posterior inclusion probability for this variable to be around 88%. At the same time, the OLS robustness check in the right panel still does not have enough power to establish statistical significance, even though the magnitude and sign of the coefficient is consistent with both BMA estimation and results reported in Table 3. We observe a similar

pattern looking at the estimated coefficient for nurses: the BMA suggests that this variable is likely part of the ‘true’ model with a negative associated effect; at the same time, the OLS robustness check does not show strong statistical significance for this variable, albeit it does report a similar parameter estimate. In a similar vein, we see weak evidence of differences in monopsony power across advanced non-European and developing countries, as well as between separations-based estimates obtained with and without an identification strategy.

Figure C2 compares coefficients and posterior inclusion probabilities estimated by BMA under alternative prior settings; the results discussed above appear resilient to assumptions about priors, as the posterior inclusion probabilities and the associated coefficient estimates are similar under different prior assumptions. At the same time, for some of the variables that our baseline BMA did not find to be likely belonging to the ‘true’ model, the results obtained under HyperBRIC and Random priors suggest higher likelihood of inclusion (while at the same time reporting roughly similar coefficient estimates).

Finally, Table C2 reports the quantitative results of applying BMA to a sub-sample of the 549 identified estimates. Many of the results are similar to those discussed before. In addition, the table shows somewhat stronger evidence for high monopsony power being associated with larger shares of female workers. Unlike in Table 4 reporting OLS results for identified estimates, here we do not document a meaningful discrepancy between separation- and recruitment-based estimates. On the other hand, both BMA and OLS robustness check results suggest a sizeable differences between estimates obtained using separations and those converted from inverse elasticities, obtained with a stock-base regression of labor on wage or derived using structural models. We additionally evaluate the sensitivity of BMA estimation to the outlier treatment and report the results in Online Appendix E and particularly Appendix E.3. The results are broadly consistent.

Figure C2: **Figure C2 About Here**

Table C2: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?
BMA, identified estimates only.

Response variable:	BMA			OLS with selected variables			
	Post. Mean	Post. SD	PIP	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>							
SE non-inverse	0.863	0.107	1.000	0.904	0.211	0.000	0.067
No obs (log)	0.532	0.425	0.685	0.825	0.542	0.128	0.259
Midyear of data	-1.302	0.149	1.000	-1.383	0.248	0.000	0.008
Female share	-20.909	2.981	1.000	-20.652	10.601	0.051	0.224
<i>Country & Industry</i>							
Developing	0.538	1.778	0.127				
Europe	-4.911	3.001	0.801	-5.858	1.121	0.000	0.025
Nurses	-0.792	2.827	0.124				
Teachers	-1.721	2.708	0.350				
<i>Method & Identification</i>							
Inverse	11.263	3.413	0.993	10.893	5.898	0.065	0.201
Recruitment	0.665	2.475	0.156				
L on W regression	5.547	3.600	0.800	6.551	3.417	0.055	0.183
Structural & other, id.	-9.336	4.403	0.893	-9.091	4.069	0.025	0.119
<i>Estimation Technique</i>							
Probit, logit, other	0.114	1.064	0.068				
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>							
Top journal	-0.039	0.819	0.079				
Citations	4.187	1.260	0.982	4.163	1.365	0.002	0.022
Pub. year (google)	1.571	0.211	1.000	1.600	0.312	0.000	0.031
NBER or IZA	5.281	4.665	0.631	8.818	4.448	0.047	0.252
WP other	-1.373	3.398	0.212				
Constant	60.989		1.000	62.748	16.420	0.000	0.014
N	549			549			

Notes: Here we present results of Bayesian Model Averaging estimation using a sub-sample of identified estimates. PIP denotes posterior inclusion probability; SD is the standard deviation; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. The left panel of the table presents unconditional moments for the BMA. The right panel reports the result of the frequentist check in which we include only explanatory variables with $PIP > 0.5$. The standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. 'p-value (wild)' are wild bootstrap clustered p-values. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. Here we only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail).

Appendix C.2 Addressing model uncertainty: LASSO

In this subsection we try to tackle model uncertainty by implementing LASSO. The intuition behind the LASSO approach can be summarized as follows. We think that a good model explaining variation in supply elasticity estimates should be sparse, i.e. the key variation in the elasticity parameter could be captured by a smaller subset of the 23 control variables that we introduced. However, we experience difficulties selecting the subset of variables that should be included. The OLS procedure performed on all 23 variables does not assign exact zeros to any of the coefficient estimates—by construction, as OLS solves an unconstrained minimization problem. LASSO introduced by Tibshirani (1996) amends the OLS approach by adding to the minimization problem a constraint that demands the sum of absolute values of the variable coefficients to be smaller or equal to an upper bound, t (that is smaller than the sum of absolute values of coefficients in an unconstrained OLS). Unlike OLS, the LASSO procedure would often yield corner solutions that assign exact zeros to coefficients corresponding to the weaker predictors, achieving sparsity. The specific value of the upper bound t is typically chosen through cross-validation, which is the approach we will also follow here. Further details on LASSO implementation can be found in Hastie et al. (2015).

We implement LASSO with cross-validation using the `cvlasso` command in STATA. We employ 10-fold cross-validation and choose t that minimizes the mean-squared prediction error. The left panel of Table C3 reports coefficient estimates obtained with LASSO. The fact that LASSO forces the sum of absolute values of regression coefficients to lie within a specific upper limit causes individual coefficients to shrink towards zero, which results in a bias (see Belloni et al. 2012). To correct for this shrinkage bias, we follow a post-LASSO estimation procedure discussed in Belloni et al. 2012 which discards variables not selected by the LASSO with cross-validation and runs an OLS on variables that remain. We report the post-LASSO estimation results in the right panel of Table C3.

The two variables discarded by the LASSO procedure are the control for working papers that came out in outlets other than IZA or NBER, and a control for non-identified recruitment-based estimates. This is consistent with the results discussed so far, as neither of these variables showed statistical significance in any of the specifications we studied. The coefficients on the variables that remain in the post-LASSO estimation are very similar to those reported in Table 3, showing significant effects associated with some method and identification choices (e.g. converting estimates from inverse elasticities, using identified recruitment elasticities or structural models with an identification strategy). We also see some weak evidence suggesting that certain occupations (i.e. nurses and teachers) and demographic features (i.e. high shares of female employees) could be associated with higher monopsony power. Finally, we observe a significant positive correlation between estimates and their standard errors which, once again, we interpret as strong evidence of selective reporting in the monopsony literature.

Focusing on a subset of identified estimates yields results that echo those obtained using the full sample (see Table C4). We observe relatively strong effects associated with method and identification choices, as well as evidence pointing to the importance of publication bias.

The contribution of occupation and demographics appears slightly more prominent, as the negative coefficients on nurses and teachers become statistically significant, and the negative effect associated with female shares increases in magnitude. As before, we present the estimation results obtained under an alternative outlier treatment in Online Appendix E (see specifically Appendix E.4), noting that the results are broadly consistent.

Table C3: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? LASSO.

Response variable:	LASSO	OLS using selected variables			
	Coef.	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>					
SE non-inverse	0.979	0.983	0.307	0.001	0.001
No obs (log)	0.321	0.333	0.250	0.183	0.352
Midyear of data	-0.025	-0.027	0.018	0.129	0.312
Female share	-2.315	-2.361	1.800	0.190	0.458
<i>Country & Industry</i>					
Developing	2.388	2.429	3.089	0.432	0.586
Europe	0.581	0.618	1.040	0.552	0.632
Nurses	-7.943	-8.170	6.052	0.177	0.392
Teachers	-3.379	-3.619	2.259	0.109	0.179
<i>Method & Identification</i>					
Separations, id.	3.465	3.465	3.321	0.297	0.459
Inverse, id.	15.394	15.533	7.121	0.029	0.116
Inverse, not id.	17.458	17.466	3.117	0.000	0.000
Recruitment, id.	2.973	3.220	1.765	0.068	0.101
Recruitment, not id.	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
L on W regression, id	2.886	3.156	3.045	0.300	0.488
Structural & other, id.	-8.525	-8.663	4.562	0.058	0.053
Structural & other, not id.	1.827	1.952	1.790	0.276	0.474
<i>Estimation Technique</i>					
Hazard	-0.929	-0.957	1.762	0.587	0.704
Probit, logit, other	-1.226	-1.291	1.542	0.402	0.569
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>					
Top journal	3.550	3.577	1.410	0.011	0.024
Citations	2.281	2.361	1.657	0.154	0.318
Pub. year (google)	0.148	0.144	0.121	0.234	0.312
NBER or IZA	-1.747	-1.780	1.805	0.324	0.443
WP other	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
Constant	-5.137	-5.053	3.885	0.193	0.310
N	1254	1254	.	.	.

Notes: The left panel presents estimates obtained using LASSO with the penalty value selected to minimize mean-squared prediction error through cross-validation. We implement this in STATA using the `cvlasso` routine. Variables with zero coefficient values are excluded under the optimal penalty parameter value. The right panel shows results of estimating the OLS using the subset of variables selected by LASSO. We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. Here we only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail).

Table C4: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? LASSO
Identified estimates only

Response variable:	LASSO	OLS using selected variables			
	Coef.	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>					
SE non-inverse	0.928	0.948	0.227	0.000	0.093
No obs (log)	0.804	0.750	0.576	0.193	0.343
Midyear of data	-1.221	-1.409	0.284	0.000	0.040
Female share	-17.559	-18.935	11.778	0.108	0.457
<i>Country & Industry</i>					
Developing	4.914	4.924	7.059	0.485	0.667
Europe	-3.631	-5.292	2.549	0.038	0.178
Nurses	-7.572	-11.516	5.399	0.033	0.139
Teachers	-5.261	-7.338	1.543	0.000	0.006
<i>Method & Identification</i>					
Inverse	7.755	9.274	5.038	0.066	0.081
Recruitment	1.969	5.912	2.740	0.031	0.030
L on W regression	6.984	10.550	3.990	0.008	0.117
Structural & other	-11.584	-10.848	3.652	0.003	0.014
<i>Estimation Technique</i>					
Probit, logit, other	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>					
Top journal	-0.246	-0.619	2.430	0.799	0.776
Citations	4.494	5.358	1.084	0.000	0.003
Pub. year (google)	1.051	1.086	0.418	0.009	0.059
NBER or IZA	6.566	5.983	4.313	0.165	0.269
WP other	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
Constant	68.364	82.987	20.631	0.000	0.060
N	549	549	.	.	.

Notes: Here we employ the sub-sample of the identified estimates. The left panel presents estimates obtained using LASSO with the penalty value selected to minimize mean-squared prediction error through cross-validation. We implement this in STATA using the `cvlasso` routine. Variables with zero coefficient values are excluded under the optimal penalty parameter value. The right panel shows results of estimating the OLS using the subset of variables selected by LASSO. We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1. We only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail).

Appendix C.3 Heterogeneity and country-specific variables

Table C5: Definitions and summary statistics: country-specific variables

Variable	Description	Imputed country data			Raw country data		
		Mean (95%)	SD (95%)	N (all)	Mean (95%)	SD (95%)	N (95%)
Col. bargaining coverage	Collective bargaining coverage, measures percentage of employees with the right to bargain.	36.07	28.41	1154	29.24	23.20	817
Strictness of emp. protect.	Strictness of employment protection – individual dismissals (regular contracts) indicator.	1.01	0.96	1251	1.12	1.00	980
ALMP expenditure	Public expenditure on active labor market programs as a percentage of GDP	1.76	1.65	1154	0.75	0.56	473
Product market reg.	Product market regulation indicator	2.13	0.75	1227	1.72	0.30	809
GDP p. c.	Real GDP Per-Capita	44966.2	18772.2	1254	44966.2	18772.2	1254

Notes: Data on labor market institutions is taken from ‘Labour’ section of stats.oecd.org; product market regulation data is from ‘Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation’ section of stats.oecd.org. Pre-war U.S. GDP data is from Williamson (2014). All other GDP data is taken from World Bank: databank.worldbank.org/source/gender-statistics. GDP was deflated by USD using data from: www.multpl.com/gdp-deflator/table/by-year.

Table C6: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Country-specific variables

OLS, unweighted								
<i>Response variable:</i>	Imputed country data				Raw country data			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')
Col. bargaining coverage	-0.022 (0.252) [0.503]	.	.	-0.006 (0.893) [0.910]	0.054 (0.044) [0.087]	.	.	-0.061 (0.233) [0.622]
Strictness of emp. protect.	.	0.346 (0.721) [0.815]	.	-0.158 (0.904) [0.927]	.	-2.501 (0.028) [0.398]	.	5.722 (0.105) [0.561]
ALMP expenditure	.	.	-0.349 (0.189) [0.409]	-0.196 (0.609) [0.631]	.	.	0.440 (0.505) [0.601]	-6.703 (0.175) [0.605]
Product market reg.	2.185 (0.069) [0.202]	0.600 (0.759) [0.813]	1.817 (0.039) [0.222]	2.094 (0.110) [0.185]	-27.628 (0.021) [0.180]	1.292 (0.907) [0.942]	28.540 (0.008) [0.267]	40.935 (0.042) [0.425]
GDP p. c.	0.046 (0.157) [0.345]	-0.050 (0.510) [0.692]	0.036 (0.210) [0.363]	0.043 (0.198) [0.385]	-0.214 (0.480) [0.629]	-0.779 (0.026) [0.237]	1.025 (0.002) [0.121]	0.932 (0.001) [0.365]
<i>F-test (labor):</i>	1.313 (0.252)	0.128 (0.721)	1.725 (0.189)	1.945 (0.584)	4.051 (0.044)	4.854 (0.028)	0.444 (0.505)	3.179 (0.365)
<i>F-test (all country vars):</i>	3.794 (0.285)	1.618 (0.655)	5.180 (0.159)	5.441 (0.364)	8.418 (0.038)	16.043 (0.001)	10.891 (0.012)	19.774 (0.001)
N	1154	1227	1154	1154	698	809	406	406

OLS, study weights								
<i>Response variable:</i>	Imputed country data				Raw country data			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')
Col. bargaining coverage	0.000 (0.990) [0.992]	.	.	0.018 (0.478) [0.603]	0.019 (0.653) [0.739]	.	.	-0.034 (0.551) [0.806]
Strictness of emp. protect.	.	0.291 (0.705) [0.751]	.	-1.077 (0.203) [0.366]	.	-2.541 (0.032) [0.230]	.	6.996 (0.000) [0.167]
ALMP expenditure	.	.	0.054 (0.864) [0.921]	0.326 (0.514) [0.706]	.	.	0.482 (0.634) [0.805]	-10.538 (0.004) [0.213]
Product market reg.	3.097 (0.059) [0.097]	2.753 (0.094) [0.098]	3.034 (0.032) [0.216]	3.654 (0.026) [0.060]	-7.365 (0.400) [0.578]	7.783 (0.439) [0.624]	40.504 (0.000) [0.343]	54.022 (0.000) [0.393]
GDP p. c.	0.015 (0.651) [0.724]	-0.080 (0.386) [0.691]	0.013 (0.675) [0.739]	0.014 (0.663) [0.729]	0.043 (0.892) [0.935]	-0.749 (0.001) [0.191]	1.476 (0.000) [0.246]	1.026 (0.000) [0.380]
<i>F-test (labor):</i>	0.000 (0.990)	0.143 (0.705)	0.029 (0.864)	2.040 (0.564)	0.203 (0.653)	4.603 (0.032)	0.227 (0.634)	14.307 (0.003)
<i>F-test (all country vars):</i>	6.202 (0.102)	8.112 (0.044)	7.149 (0.067)	7.545 (0.183)	1.104 (0.776)	92.987 (0.000)	25.775 (0.000)	22.846 (0.000)
N	1154	1227	1154	1154	698	809	406	406

Notes: We investigate the effects of country-specific variables on elasticity estimates. We employ the set of all explanatory variables used to obtain Table 3 in which we replace the variables *Developing* and *Europe* with the country-specific variables reflecting labor market conditions, product market regulations and the level of economic development. We use the resulting set of control variables to run an OLS estimation (top panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (bottom panel). We use imputed values of the country variables (left panel), as well as the raw country-level data with no imputations done (right panel). For brevity, we only present coefficient estimates for the country-specific variables. We report regular p-values and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F-tests for joint significance of the subset of labor market variables, and for the set of all country variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table C5. We only use estimates that remain after we apply the outlier treatment strategy discussed in Section 2 (i.e. cutting 2.5% of outliers from each tail).

Appendix C.4 Best practice

Table C7: Best Practice Estimates
Identified estimates only.

Group	Point Estimate	95% interval	95% interval (wild)	Implied Markdown
Separations: Model				
Linear model	-1.487	[-6.49; 3.51]	[-5.44 ; 11.75]	-
BMA	-0.825	[-5.26; 3.61]	[-6.24; 10.61]	-
LASSO	-1.359	[-6.36; 3.64]	[-5.12; 12.34]	-
Separations: Gender				
Women	-10.654	[-23.02; 1.71]	[-36.06; 17.65]	-
Men	8.014	[-4.61; 20.64]	[-22.34; 38.23]	11.1
Inverse				
Inverse	7.480	[-3.21; 18.17]	[-3.85; 20.51]	11.8

Notes: The table presents fitted ‘best practice’ estimates using alternative models and data. Estimates in rows 1-3 are obtained using models reported in Table 4, frequentist check in Table C2 and the post-LASSO results of Table C4. The rest of the results are obtained using the linear model. We report both the standard 95% confidence interval calculated for errors clustered at the study level, and the 95% confidence interval calculated with wild bootstrap clusters. The estimates of the markdown are obtained using equation (2).

**Appendix D Publication Bias Robustness Checks
(For Online Publication)**

Table D1: Testing for publication bias: robustness to treatment of outliers, all estimates

	OLS	FE	BE	Precision	Study	IV
<i>Full sample</i>						
SE	1.366 (0.000) [0.000]	0.225 (0.000) [0.06]	1.960 (0.000) [0.000]	1.930 (0.000) [0.000]	0.555 (0.068) [0.000]	2.003 (0.000) [0.143]
Constant	1.761 (0.006) [0.000]	4.278 (0.000) .	1.213 (0.306) [0.337]	0.516 (0.002) [0.021]	1.821 (0.000) [0.000]	0.355 (0.000) [0.073]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1140	1140	46	1140	1140	1140
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 2%</i>						
SE	1.367 (0.000) [0.000]	0.228 (0.000) [0.060]	1.960 (0.000) [0.000]	1.928 (0.000) [0.000]	0.555 (0.068) [0.000]	2.004 (0.000) [0.144]
Constant	1.760 (0.006) [0.000]	4.271 (0.000) .	1.212 (0.306) [0.337]	0.513 (0.003) [0.021]	1.821 (0.000) [0.000]	0.355 (0.000) [0.073]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1140	1140	46	1140	1140	1140
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 5%</i>						
SE	1.499 (0.000) [0.000]	0.258 (0.000) [0.061]	1.889 (0.000) [0.000]	1.965 (0.000) [0.000]	0.768 (0.039) [0.000]	2.038 (0.000) [0.133]
Constant	1.517 (0.004) [0.000]	4.220 (0.000) .	1.256 (0.268) [0.302]	0.509 (0.003) [0.020]	1.613 (0.000) [0.000]	0.343 (0.000) [0.078]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1140	1140	46	1140	1140	1140
<i>Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped</i>						
SE	1.410 (0.000) [0.000]	0.321 (0.000) [0.001]	1.640 (0.000) [0.000]	1.955 (0.000) [0.000]	0.558 (0.070) [0.000]	2.033 (0.000) [0.156]
Constant	1.708 (0.005) [0.000]	4.088 (0.000) .	1.772 (0.159) [0.080]	0.515 (0.002) [0.021]	1.822 (0.000) [0.000]	0.344 (0.000) [0.073]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1137	1137	46	1137	1137	1137
<i>Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped</i>						
SE	1.443 (0.000) [0.000]	0.400 (0.001) [0.000]	1.258 (0.000) [0.000]	1.986 (0.000) [0.000]	0.562 (0.072) [0.000]	2.089 (0.000) [0.179]
Constant	1.733 (0.004) [0.000]	4.009 (0.000) .	2.175 (0.055) [0.000]	0.550 (0.003) [0.013]	1.837 (0.000) [0.000]	0.325 (0.000) [0.072]
Studies	46	46	46	46	46	46
Observations	1118	1118	46	1118	1118	1118

Notes: This table checks the robustness of the results presented in *Panel A* of Table 2 against the treatment of outliers. We report results obtained for untreated full sample (*'Full sample'*); for full sample where observations are winsorized at 1% at each tail of the distribution (*'Full sample, winsorized at 2%'*) and at 2.5% at each tail (*'Full sample, winsorized at 5%'*); for the sample where 1% of outliers is dropped from each tail (*'Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped'*); for the sample where 2.5% of outliers are dropped from each tail (*'Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped'*) — our preferred treatment reported in *Panel A* of Table 2. We repeat this exercise for our five specifications (*'OLS'*, *'FE'*, *'BE'*, *'Precision'* and *'Study'*) and report regular p-values in parenthesis and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering in square brackets, see notes for Table 2 for detailed description. In addition, we report results for the specification in which we use the number of observations to instrument for the standard error (*'IV'*). We do not report this in the main text as the first-stage results are insignificant.

Table D2: Testing for publication bias: robustness to treatment of outliers, published estimates

	OLS	FE	BE	Precision	Study	IV
<i>Full sample</i>						
SE	1.677 (0.000) [0.000]	0.220 (0.000) [0.125]	2.101 (0.000) [0.000]	2.070 (0.000) [0.011]	1.772 (0.000) [0.000]	2.176 (0.000) [0.288]
Constant	1.423 (0.012) [0.000]	4.698 (0.000) .	1.264 (0.017) [0.000]	0.540 (0.005) [0.043]	1.101 (0.000) [0.000]	0.302 (0.000) [0.254]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	1016	1016	38	1016	1016	1016
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 2%</i>						
SE	1.679 (0.000) [0.000]	0.226 (0.000) [0.125]	2.101 (0.000) [0.000]	2.067 (0.000) [0.010]	1.772 (0.000) [0.000]	2.177 (0.000) [0.289]
Constant	1.421 (0.012) [0.000]	4.687 (0.000) .	1.263 (0.017) [0.000]	0.536 (0.006) [0.041]	1.101 (0.000) [0.000]	0.301 (0.000) [0.255]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	1016	1016	38	1016	1016	1016
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 5%</i>						
SE	1.681 (0.000) [0.000]	0.235 (0.000) [0.127]	2.101 (0.000) [0.000]	2.067 (0.000) [0.010]	1.774 (0.000) [0.000]	2.181 (0.000) [0.294]
Constant	1.425 (0.011) [0.000]	4.677 (0.000) .	1.264 (0.017) [0.000]	0.535 (0.007) [0.039]	1.103 (0.000) [0.000]	0.300 (0.000) [0.256]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	1016	1016	38	1016	1016	1016
<i>Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped</i>						
SE	1.746 (0.000) [0.000]	0.367 (0.000) [0.003]	2.109 (0.000) [0.000]	2.099 (0.000) [0.010]	1.807 (0.000) [0.000]	2.212 (0.000) [0.313]
Constant	1.326 (0.007) [0.000]	4.397 (0.000) .	1.262 (0.017) [0.000]	0.538 (0.005) [0.043]	1.080 (0.000) [0.000]	0.288 (0.000) [0.253]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	1013	1013	38	1013	1013	1013
<i>Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped</i>						
SE	1.800 (0.000) [0.000]	0.491 (0.000) [0.000]	2.125 (0.000) [0.000]	2.135 (0.000) [0.015]	1.832 (0.000) [0.000]	2.276 (0.000) [0.370]
Constant	1.322 (0.004) [0.000]	4.231 (0.000) .	1.272 (0.016) [0.000]	0.578 (0.007) [0.039]	1.083 (0.000) [0.000]	0.266 (0.002) [0.258]
Studies	38	38	38	38	38	38
Observations	995	995	38	995	995	995

Notes: This table checks the robustness of the results presented in *Panel B* of Table 2 against the treatment of outliers. We report results obtained on a subset of published studies with estimates coming from an untreated full sample (*‘Full sample’*); from the full sample where observations are winsorized at 1% at each tail of the distribution (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 2%’*) and at 2.5% at each tail (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 5%’*); from the sample where 1% of outliers is dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped’*); from the sample where 2.5% of outliers are dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped’*) — our preferred treatment reported in *Panel B* of Table 2. We repeat this exercise for our five specifications (*‘OLS’*, *‘FE’*, *‘BE’*, *‘Precision’* and *‘Study’*) and report regular p-values in parenthesis and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering in square brackets, see notes for Table 2 for detailed description. In addition, we report results for the specification in which we use the number of observations to instrument for the standard error (*‘IV’*). We do not report this in the main text as the first-stage results are insignificant.

Table D3: Testing for publication bias using Andrews and Kasy (2019): robustness to treatment of outliers, all estimates.

<i>Full sample</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\bar{\tau}$	$\bar{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
0.166	1.026	1.645	0.011	0.066	0.161
(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.068)	(0.006)	(0.086)	(0.127)
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 2%</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\bar{\tau}$	$\bar{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.120	0.698	1.456	0.007	0.040	0.110
(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.004)	(0.044)	(0.068)
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 5%</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\bar{\tau}$	$\bar{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.114	0.698	1.460	0.005	0.042	0.110
(0.051)	(0.116)	(0.204)	(0.003)	(0.047)	(0.070)
<i>Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\bar{\tau}$	$\bar{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
0.158	1.098	1.572	0.011	0.068	0.174
(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.093)	(0.140)
<i>Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\bar{\tau}$	$\bar{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
0.157	0.648	1.570	0.005	0.036	0.111
(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.003)	(0.048)	(0.074)

Notes: This table checks the robustness of the results presented in *Panel A* of Table B1 against the treatment of outliers. We report results obtained from an untreated full sample of ‘direct’ estimates (*‘Full sample’*); from the full sample where observations are winsorized at 1% at each tail of the distribution (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 2%’*) and at 2.5% at each tail (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 5%’*); from the sample where 1% of outliers is dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped’*); from the sample where 2.5% of outliers are dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped’*) — our preferred treatment reported in *Panel A* of Table B1. See notes of Table B1 for details regarding the estimated specification.

Table D4: Testing for publication bias using Andrews and Kasy (2019): robustness to treatment of outliers, published estimates

<i>Full sample</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.314	0.488	1.411	0.004	0.023	0.067
(0.302)	(0.819)	(0.657)	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.069)
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 2%</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.314	0.486	1.410	0.004	0.023	0.067
(0.313)	(0.815)	(0.632)	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.070)
<i>Full sample, winsorized at 5%</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.300	0.481	1.391	0.003	0.024	0.068
(0.341)	(0.855)	(0.651)	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.074)
<i>Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.314	0.482	1.404	0.004	0.022	0.067
(0.335)	(0.868)	(0.673)	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.073)
<i>Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped</i>					
$\bar{\theta}$	$\tilde{\tau}$	$\tilde{\nu}$	$\beta_{p,1}$	$\beta_{p,2}$	$\beta_{p,3}$
-0.269	0.548	1.435	0.002	0.020	0.073
(0.295)	(0.717)	(0.600)	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.063)

Notes: This table checks the robustness of the results presented in *Panel B* of Table B1 against the treatment of outliers. We report results obtained from an untreated full sample of published ‘direct’ estimates (*‘Full sample’*); from the full sample where observations are winsorized at 1% at each tail of the distribution (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 2%’*) and at 2.5% at each tail (*‘Full sample, winsorized at 5%’*); from the sample where 1% of outliers is dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 2% of outliers dropped’*); from the sample where 2.5% of outliers are dropped from each tail (*‘Cut sample, 5% of outliers dropped’*) — our preferred treatment reported in *Panel B* of Table B1. See notes of Table B1 for details regarding the estimated specification.

Appendix E Heterogeneity Robustness Checks (For Online Publication)

Appendix E.1 Heterogeneity: model with all controls, full sample

Table E1: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? No outlier treatment.

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>								
SE non-inverse	0.800	0.463	0.084	0.175	1.020	0.461	0.027	0.052
No obs (log)	0.331	1.006	0.742	0.798	1.125	0.835	0.178	0.237
Midyear of data	-0.056	0.048	0.244	0.243	-0.081	0.068	0.230	0.223
Female share	-14.297	7.239	0.048	0.033	-7.182	5.430	0.186	0.390
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	5.692	.	0.223	.	6.186	.	0.186	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>								
Developing	11.679	11.784	0.322	0.502	17.638	11.586	0.128	0.298
Europe	2.859	6.563	0.663	0.732	12.018	9.312	0.197	0.506
Nurses	6.632	36.175	0.855	0.892	-9.231	20.058	0.645	0.746
Teachers	1.645	15.357	0.915	0.918	-6.139	15.083	0.684	0.800
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	4.099	.	0.393	.	4.093	.	0.394	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>								
Separations, id.	-2.328	8.012	0.771	0.820	1.604	7.312	0.826	0.866
Inverse, id.	8.801	39.047	0.822	0.886	18.832	26.282	0.474	0.815
Inverse, not id.	88.368	53.018	0.096	0.168	38.791	31.608	0.220	0.310
Recruitment, id.	-1.494	7.664	0.845	0.880	-7.776	8.513	0.361	0.435
Recruitment, not id.	-1.970	7.407	0.790	0.816	-14.157	7.777	0.069	0.236
L on W regression, id	-11.833	25.710	0.645	0.717	6.108	17.741	0.731	0.804
Structural & other, id.	-27.833	19.224	0.148	0.110	-26.100	16.122	0.105	0.377
Structural & other, not id.	6.858	7.528	0.362	0.527	-12.875	8.733	0.140	0.178
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	23.484	.	0.003	.	9.455	.	0.305	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>								
Hazard	-4.284	5.797	0.460	0.480	-10.635	7.038	0.131	0.177
Probit, logit, other	-6.179	5.317	0.245	0.360	1.267	4.581	0.782	0.801
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	4.088	.	0.130	.	2.304	.	0.316	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>								
Top journal	11.365	7.718	0.141	0.217	3.084	6.215	0.620	0.688
Citations	5.848	5.994	0.329	0.359	4.025	3.186	0.206	0.384
Pub. year (google)	0.569	0.843	0.500	0.687	0.037	0.374	0.920	0.930
NBER or IZA	2.007	6.444	0.755	0.771	9.706	7.205	0.178	0.242
WP other	22.827	30.125	0.449	0.684	3.895	19.483	0.842	0.851
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	7.361	.	0.195	.	2.388	.	0.793	.
Constant	-13.674	28.052	0.626	0.794	-4.148	12.919	0.748	0.804
N	1320	.	.	.	1320	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 3 using the full sample without implementing any outlier treatment. We present the results of the OLS estimation (left panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (right panel). We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E2: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Outliers winsorized at 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>								
SE non-inverse	0.833	0.397	0.036	0.128	0.884	0.394	0.025	0.080
No obs (log)	0.448	0.534	0.402	0.483	0.640	0.481	0.183	0.259
Midyear of data	-0.038	0.034	0.255	0.339	-0.055	0.049	0.254	0.313
Female share	-10.579	5.562	0.057	0.063	-5.451	3.971	0.170	0.377
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	6.440	.	0.169	.	5.944	.	0.203	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>								
Developing	11.453	8.521	0.179	0.331	14.920	9.822	0.129	0.300
Europe	1.530	3.271	0.640	0.709	6.092	4.455	0.172	0.393
Nurses	0.295	13.827	0.983	0.988	-0.978	9.252	0.916	0.942
Teachers	0.121	6.181	0.984	0.987	-0.528	6.890	0.939	0.951
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	3.270	.	0.514	.	3.790	.	0.435	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>								
Separations, id.	-1.163	6.071	0.848	0.884	1.593	4.261	0.708	0.769
Inverse, id.	11.584	15.953	0.468	0.724	11.818	11.728	0.314	0.668
Inverse, not id.	51.880	23.920	0.030	0.015	28.800	15.176	0.058	0.066
Recruitment, id.	0.049	3.622	0.989	0.989	-6.877	5.826	0.238	0.344
Recruitment, not id.	-0.984	5.893	0.867	0.898	-9.607	5.624	0.088	0.303
L on W regression, id	-7.940	10.913	0.467	0.612	-0.158	8.210	0.985	0.989
Structural & other, id.	-24.591	14.662	0.093	0.112	-21.919	12.227	0.073	0.348
Structural & other, not id.	7.372	5.055	0.145	0.397	-9.719	7.055	0.168	0.224
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	21.347	.	0.006	.	10.768	.	0.215	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>								
Hazard	-3.974	3.336	0.233	0.237	-5.718	3.938	0.146	0.226
Probit, logit, other	-6.566	3.978	0.099	0.265	0.552	3.104	0.859	0.882
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	6.128	.	0.047	.	2.337	.	0.311	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>								
Top journal	9.413	4.998	0.060	0.141	2.980	3.281	0.364	0.465
Citations	5.022	4.782	0.294	0.397	3.127	2.347	0.183	0.382
Pub. year (google)	0.338	0.453	0.455	0.618	0.087	0.186	0.641	0.669
NBER or IZA	1.141	4.454	0.798	0.822	6.883	5.785	0.234	0.343
WP other	20.580	15.035	0.171	0.499	7.117	11.434	0.534	0.667
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	6.675	.	0.246	.	2.640	.	0.755	.
Constant	-9.124	15.079	0.545	0.740	-3.624	7.331	0.621	0.750
N	1320	.	.	.	1320	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 3 using the full sample of elasticity estimates in which we winsorize the outliers in each tale at 1%. We present the results of the OLS estimation (left panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (right panel). We report regular p-values and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E3: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Outliers winsorized at 2.5% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>								
SE non-inverse	0.873	0.321	0.007	0.016	0.753	0.304	0.013	0.088
No obs (log)	0.435	0.273	0.112	0.201	0.479	0.290	0.098	0.192
Midyear of data	-0.030	0.021	0.159	0.314	-0.035	0.030	0.245	0.358
Female share	-4.944	2.815	0.079	0.166	-2.602	1.944	0.181	0.353
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	11.241	.	0.024	.	7.536	.	0.110	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>								
Developing	5.107	4.387	0.244	0.400	7.436	5.259	0.157	0.347
Europe	1.250	1.580	0.429	0.526	3.663	2.256	0.104	0.256
Nurses	-6.891	5.787	0.234	0.398	-2.329	4.572	0.610	0.745
Teachers	-3.149	2.406	0.191	0.289	-0.982	3.250	0.762	0.856
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	3.558	.	0.469	.	3.834	.	0.429	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>								
Separations, id.	2.002	3.940	0.611	0.709	3.155	2.725	0.247	0.366
Inverse, id.	15.544	7.018	0.027	0.225	10.067	5.650	0.075	0.296
Inverse, not id.	26.712	6.373	0.000	0.006	16.539	5.714	0.004	0.040
Recruitment, id.	2.465	2.021	0.223	0.239	-2.893	2.861	0.312	0.407
Recruitment, not id.	-0.432	3.211	0.893	0.922	-5.681	3.210	0.077	0.306
L on W regression, id	0.266	4.026	0.947	0.960	1.171	4.054	0.773	0.844
Structural & other, id.	-13.208	7.498	0.078	0.091	-12.290	6.419	0.056	0.287
Structural & other, not id.	3.545	2.563	0.167	0.409	-5.591	3.826	0.144	0.204
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	35.843	.	0.000	.	19.475	.	0.013	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>								
Hazard	-2.263	2.049	0.269	0.381	-3.345	2.359	0.156	0.260
Probit, logit, other	-2.988	2.133	0.161	0.350	0.879	1.763	0.618	0.678
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	2.882	.	0.237	.	3.024	.	0.221	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>								
Top journal	5.663	2.547	0.026	0.082	1.861	1.650	0.259	0.362
Citations	3.126	2.475	0.207	0.336	1.786	1.468	0.224	0.448
Pub. year (google)	0.201	0.202	0.320	0.490	0.041	0.107	0.704	0.761
NBER or IZA	-0.992	2.679	0.711	0.777	2.858	3.229	0.376	0.490
WP other	6.146	5.852	0.294	0.565	2.053	5.318	0.700	0.779
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	9.564	.	0.089	.	3.154	.	0.676	.
Constant	-6.785	6.647	0.307	0.532	-2.221	3.770	0.556	0.708
N	1320	.	.	.	1320	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 3 using the full sample of elasticity estimates in which we winsorize the outliers in each tale at 2.5%. We present the results of the OLS estimation (left panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (right panel). We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E4: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>								
SE non-inverse	0.865	0.357	0.015	0.086	0.775	0.347	0.025	0.092
No obs (log)	0.241	0.274	0.378	0.359	0.227	0.353	0.519	0.588
Midyear of data	-0.022	0.024	0.346	0.449	-0.036	0.036	0.317	0.407
Female share	-6.483	3.641	0.075	0.185	-4.024	2.889	0.164	0.354
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	8.566	.	0.073	.	5.962	.	0.202	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>								
Developing	8.530	6.411	0.183	0.347	11.670	7.585	0.124	0.283
Europe	0.269	1.996	0.893	0.912	3.325	2.613	0.203	0.371
Nurses	1.606	8.106	0.843	0.887	3.578	5.164	0.488	0.597
Teachers	0.678	3.674	0.854	0.873	1.765	4.020	0.661	0.733
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	2.201	.	0.699	.	3.422	.	0.490	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>								
Separations, id.	-0.001	4.889	1.000	1.000	1.558	3.233	0.630	0.694
Inverse, id.	9.097	10.067	0.366	0.472	10.232	7.518	0.174	0.452
Inverse, not id.	39.779	14.833	0.007	0.002	27.216	10.761	0.011	0.011
Recruitment, id.	0.294	2.642	0.911	0.913	-5.893	4.422	0.183	0.324
Recruitment, not id.	0.206	3.996	0.959	0.969	-6.503	4.412	0.140	0.370
L on W regression, id	-7.123	6.094	0.242	0.364	-3.307	4.480	0.461	0.555
Structural & other, id.	-19.069	11.722	0.104	0.197	-17.115	9.096	0.060	0.299
Structural & other, not id.	5.965	3.751	0.112	0.392	-7.256	5.661	0.200	0.283
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	23.370	.	0.003	.	17.593	.	0.024	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>								
Hazard	-2.049	2.161	0.343	0.381	-2.282	2.727	0.403	0.511
Probit, logit, other	-4.872	3.064	0.112	0.332	0.973	2.361	0.680	0.755
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	3.348	.	0.188	.	1.203	.	0.548	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>								
Top journal	7.739	3.514	0.028	0.072	3.161	2.372	0.183	0.284
Citations	3.398	3.519	0.334	0.461	2.349	1.831	0.200	0.380
Pub. year (google)	0.305	0.315	0.333	0.467	0.198	0.170	0.244	0.302
NBER or IZA	-0.287	3.272	0.930	0.942	4.357	4.484	0.331	0.465
WP other	15.751	9.230	0.088	0.418	6.020	7.653	0.431	0.645
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	6.928	.	0.226	.	4.301	.	0.507	.
Constant	-8.466	10.535	0.422	0.614	-5.358	6.111	0.381	0.562
N	1294	.	.	.	1294	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 3 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. We present the results of the OLS estimation (left panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (right panel). We report regular p-values and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Appendix E.2 Heterogeneity: model with all controls, subsample of ‘identified’ estimates

Table E5: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Identified estimates only. No outlier treatment.

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights				OLS, precision weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>												
SE non-inverse	0.583	0.370	0.115	0.262	1.515	0.782	0.053	0.169	1.706	0.166	0.000	0.002
No obs (log)	-0.127	0.964	0.895	0.920	1.289	1.193	0.280	0.497	0.226	0.215	0.292	0.488
Midyear of data	-1.961	0.522	0.000	0.059	-0.603	0.701	0.389	0.595	-0.463	0.220	0.035	0.057
Female share	-27.943	14.195	0.049	0.210	-8.841	7.375	0.231	0.317	-6.909	4.845	0.154	0.278
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	52.325	.	0.000	.	7.784	.	0.100	.	376.247	.	0.000	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>												
Developing	-7.945	12.109	0.512	0.663	5.824	8.467	0.492	0.640	-0.967	0.803	0.229	0.314
Europe	22.784	17.433	0.191	0.404	18.731	15.762	0.235	0.512	-4.901	3.073	0.111	0.210
Nurses	-45.706	19.252	0.018	0.209	-43.830	20.521	0.033	0.303	-8.190	4.672	0.080	0.167
Teachers	-47.265	19.626	0.016	0.150	-27.899	14.452	0.054	0.350	-3.237	1.854	0.081	0.111
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	8.337	.	0.080	.	6.752	.	0.150	.	6.216	.	0.184	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>												
Inverse	48.419	19.813	0.015	0.114	38.545	22.920	0.093	0.512	8.333	1.651	0.000	0.001
Recruitment	30.282	18.634	0.104	0.358	3.815	8.360	0.648	0.756	5.359	2.127	0.012	0.046
L on W regression	24.944	18.935	0.188	0.372	31.610	22.955	0.169	0.466	8.481	3.998	0.034	0.078
Structural & other	-15.662	16.578	0.345	0.637	-18.361	12.219	0.133	0.395	-1.450	1.385	0.295	0.576
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	9.892	.	0.042	.	7.371	.	0.118	.	27.226	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>												
Probit, logit, other	13.718	16.316	0.400	0.546	7.714	17.181	0.653	0.789	-0.701	1.799	0.697	0.752
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.707	.	0.400	.	0.202	.	0.653	.	0.152	.	0.697	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>												
Top journal	11.516	14.103	0.414	0.546	-3.364	11.631	0.772	0.866	-2.079	2.317	0.369	0.551
Citations	10.984	4.539	0.016	0.204	8.902	4.713	0.059	0.378	1.189	1.060	0.262	0.343
Pub. year (google)	1.142	0.732	0.119	0.240	-0.210	1.086	0.846	0.901	0.422	0.174	0.015	0.028
NBER or IZA	0.447	18.949	0.981	0.987	7.819	13.420	0.560	0.701	-3.792	1.677	0.024	0.115
WP other	-10.269	16.798	0.541	0.687	-25.635	21.537	0.234	0.606	-6.335	2.961	0.032	0.129
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	17.465	.	0.004	.	4.309	.	0.506	.	10.762	.	0.056	.
Constant	126.702	44.051	0.004	0.160	49.280	42.181	0.243	0.444	27.438	16.345	0.093	0.202
N	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 4 under an alternative outlier treatment. As in Table 4, we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 'identified' estimates. Unlike in Table 4, here we use all available 'identified' estimates without implementing any outlier treatment. The panel on the left presents the results of the OLS estimation; the middle panel reports results from a weighted specification that uses inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights; the panel on the right reports results from a specification that uses precision weights. We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E6: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Identified estimates only. Outliers winsorized at 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights				OLS, precision weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>												
SE non-inverse	0.733	0.285	0.010	0.103	1.184	0.544	0.030	0.124	1.697	0.165	0.000	0.002
No obs (log)	0.612	0.801	0.444	0.523	0.754	0.639	0.238	0.357	0.211	0.218	0.333	0.558
Midyear of data	-2.230	0.489	0.000	0.036	-1.026	0.618	0.097	0.354	-0.465	0.222	0.036	0.057
Female share	-39.049	21.094	0.064	0.359	-15.341	11.863	0.196	0.340	-7.081	4.994	0.156	0.284
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	56.094	.	0.000	.	7.761	.	0.101	.	375.903	.	0.000	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>												
Developing	3.938	13.642	0.773	0.862	13.757	11.304	0.224	0.525	-1.078	0.787	0.170	0.249
Europe	5.205	9.479	0.583	0.680	7.974	8.751	0.362	0.634	-4.775	3.050	0.117	0.216
Nurses	-19.128	8.483	0.024	0.098	-15.148	9.830	0.123	0.367	-7.628	4.610	0.098	0.199
Teachers	-21.517	6.224	0.001	0.031	-11.131	5.640	0.048	0.241	-3.139	1.845	0.089	0.120
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	14.031	.	0.007	.	7.770	.	0.100	.	6.718	.	0.152	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>												
Inverse	24.113	8.758	0.006	0.064	20.666	9.494	0.029	0.190	8.590	1.602	0.000	0.000
Recruitment	16.342	8.220	0.047	0.090	0.423	6.159	0.945	0.962	5.199	2.114	0.014	0.053
L on W regression	15.396	10.479	0.142	0.270	15.735	12.683	0.215	0.490	8.283	3.953	0.036	0.080
Structural & other	-17.368	6.562	0.008	0.124	-17.999	7.590	0.018	0.206	-1.392	1.447	0.336	0.633
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	33.842	.	0.000	.	14.256	.	0.007	.	31.676	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>												
Probit, logit, other	3.737	10.617	0.725	0.802	3.063	10.599	0.773	0.862	-0.420	1.750	0.810	0.837
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.124	.	0.725	.	0.084	.	0.773	.	0.058	.	0.810	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>												
Top journal	6.470	9.348	0.489	0.567	-1.113	7.863	0.887	0.934	-2.000	2.287	0.382	0.559
Citations	9.317	2.630	0.000	0.067	7.314	3.465	0.035	0.313	1.133	1.074	0.291	0.376
Pub. year (google)	1.735	0.448	0.000	0.054	0.643	0.605	0.288	0.463	0.459	0.169	0.006	0.012
NBER or IZA	10.939	11.667	0.348	0.405	13.387	11.426	0.241	0.525	-3.852	1.689	0.023	0.117
WP other	4.653	8.851	0.599	0.685	-5.404	11.696	0.644	0.791	-6.647	2.894	0.022	0.105
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	30.955	.	0.000	.	6.309	.	0.277	.	13.063	.	0.023	.
Constant	131.463	34.032	0.000	0.064	60.460	35.830	0.092	0.352	26.496	16.539	0.109	0.236
N	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 4 under an alternative outlier treatment. As in Table 4, we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 'identified' estimates. Unlike in Table 4, here we winsorize the outliers in each tale at 1% (prior to sub-sampling). The panel on the left presents the results of the OLS estimation; the middle panel reports results from a weighted specification that uses inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights; the panel on the right reports results from a specification that uses precision weights. We report regular p -values and p -values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F -test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E7: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Identified estimates only. Outliers winsorized at 2.5% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights				OLS, precision weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>												
SE non-inverse	0.777	0.269	0.004	0.086	0.976	0.432	0.024	0.161	1.696	0.165	0.000	0.002
No obs (log)	0.792	0.596	0.184	0.334	0.614	0.454	0.177	0.308	0.196	0.208	0.346	0.573
Midyear of data	-1.622	0.342	0.000	0.010	-0.632	0.433	0.145	0.409	-0.449	0.211	0.033	0.055
Female share	-23.499	13.620	0.084	0.498	-9.697	7.849	0.217	0.416	-6.688	4.718	0.156	0.294
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	79.018	.	0.000	.	7.397	.	0.116	.	365.783	.	0.000	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>												
Developing	3.177	9.305	0.733	0.836	9.308	7.782	0.232	0.528	-1.057	0.755	0.161	0.264
Europe	0.216	6.328	0.973	0.978	3.852	5.829	0.509	0.738	-4.720	2.920	0.106	0.208
Nurses	-12.150	5.710	0.033	0.112	-9.502	6.381	0.136	0.368	-7.242	4.379	0.098	0.203
Teachers	-12.489	2.948	0.000	0.019	-5.678	3.114	0.068	0.232	-2.886	1.698	0.089	0.116
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	25.074	.	0.000	.	8.966	.	0.062	.	7.149	.	0.128	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>												
Inverse	15.469	4.861	0.001	0.031	11.924	5.268	0.024	0.147	8.425	1.518	0.000	0.000
Recruitment	9.475	4.049	0.019	0.037	-1.131	4.352	0.795	0.855	4.977	1.986	0.012	0.051
L on W regression	11.073	6.987	0.113	0.234	8.200	8.299	0.323	0.568	7.971	3.757	0.034	0.082
Structural & other	-12.149	3.806	0.001	0.029	-13.667	5.387	0.011	0.161	-1.232	1.399	0.379	0.656
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	49.266	.	0.000	.	16.178	.	0.003	.	34.844	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>												
Probit, logit, other	1.945	7.318	0.790	0.846	1.544	7.193	0.830	0.901	-0.372	1.673	0.824	0.847
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.071	.	0.790	.	0.046	.	0.830	.	0.049	.	0.824	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>												
Top journal	3.921	6.896	0.570	0.642	-0.203	5.665	0.971	0.985	-1.953	2.184	0.371	0.551
Citations	6.224	1.620	0.000	0.044	4.569	2.350	0.052	0.337	1.076	1.017	0.290	0.370
Pub. year (google)	1.309	0.290	0.000	0.036	0.358	0.393	0.362	0.526	0.455	0.162	0.005	0.009
NBER or IZA	8.499	8.351	0.309	0.387	8.460	8.010	0.291	0.557	-3.806	1.613	0.018	0.111
WP other	2.503	6.620	0.705	0.753	-2.354	7.631	0.758	0.850	-6.539	2.784	0.019	0.104
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	40.862	.	0.000	.	6.246	.	0.283	.	14.490	.	0.013	.
Constant	90.365	21.001	0.000	0.036	38.945	24.163	0.107	0.372	25.283	15.649	0.106	0.233
N	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.	576	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 4 under an alternative outlier treatment. As in Table 4, we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 'identified' estimates. Unlike in Table 4, here we winsorize the outliers in each tale at 2.5% (prior to sub-sampling). The panel on the left presents the results of the OLS estimation; the middle panel reports results from a weighted specification that uses inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights; the panel on the right reports results from a specification that uses precision weights. We report regular p -values and p -values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F -test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E8: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? Identified estimates only. Outliers are dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	OLS, unweighted				OLS, study weights				OLS, precision weights			
	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>												
SE non-inverse	0.858	0.268	0.001	0.123	0.980	0.453	0.031	0.169	1.723	0.169	0.000	0.004
No obs (log)	0.920	0.774	0.235	0.373	0.114	0.881	0.897	0.937	0.196	0.225	0.382	0.629
Midyear of data	-1.940	0.480	0.000	0.063	-0.973	0.507	0.055	0.286	-0.456	0.218	0.037	0.060
Female share	-30.278	17.301	0.080	0.381	-13.910	10.244	0.174	0.313	-7.119	4.941	0.150	0.285
<i>F-test (group 1):</i>	73.320	.	0.000	.	11.169	.	0.025	.	335.331	.	0.000	.
<i>Country & Industry</i>												
Developing	5.427	10.506	0.605	0.774	12.083	10.355	0.243	0.575	-1.141	0.779	0.143	0.227
Europe	-1.215	6.960	0.861	0.889	4.361	5.675	0.442	0.698	-4.629	3.027	0.126	0.225
Nurses	-14.012	9.181	0.127	0.180	0.992	10.312	0.923	0.951	-7.187	4.792	0.134	0.260
Teachers	-12.976	4.118	0.002	0.020	-3.324	3.325	0.317	0.393	-3.030	1.859	0.103	0.141
<i>F-test (group 2):</i>	20.170	.	0.000	.	3.583	.	0.465	.	7.463	.	0.113	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>												
Inverse	13.777	8.185	0.092	0.155	19.267	9.005	0.032	0.172	8.688	1.552	0.000	0.000
Recruitment	11.191	5.610	0.046	0.067	-0.715	5.066	0.888	0.932	5.029	2.140	0.019	0.068
L on W regression	12.763	8.003	0.111	0.219	6.474	9.034	0.474	0.654	8.041	3.950	0.042	0.089
Structural & other	-14.703	4.778	0.002	0.032	-12.101	7.366	0.100	0.457	-1.310	1.501	0.383	0.692
<i>F-test (group 3):</i>	43.844	.	0.000	.	20.084	.	0.000	.	33.428	.	0.000	.
<i>Estimation Technique</i>												
Probit, logit, other	0.462	7.329	0.950	0.959	7.664	8.844	0.386	0.584	-0.251	1.817	0.890	0.894
<i>F-test (group 4):</i>	0.004	.	0.950	.	0.751	.	0.386	.	0.019	.	0.890	.
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>												
Top journal	3.586	7.667	0.640	0.700	1.487	5.892	0.801	0.880	-1.922	2.254	0.394	0.552
Citations	7.365	1.887	0.000	0.068	4.866	2.967	0.101	0.426	1.035	1.070	0.333	0.423
Pub. year (google)	1.401	0.621	0.024	0.064	1.237	0.654	0.059	0.157	0.473	0.167	0.005	0.010
NBER or IZA	11.604	9.816	0.237	0.332	9.991	9.835	0.310	0.595	-3.903	1.677	0.020	0.110
WP other	6.620	9.403	0.481	0.556	-5.971	10.319	0.563	0.723	-6.790	2.840	0.017	0.099
<i>F-test (group 5):</i>	26.288	.	0.000	.	8.657	.	0.124	.	12.846	.	0.025	.
Constant	114.787	37.074	0.002	0.149	39.983	37.349	0.284	0.648	25.373	16.814	0.131	0.309
N	562	.	.	.	562	.	.	.	562	.	.	.

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 4 under an alternative outlier treatment. As in Table 4, we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 'identified' estimates. Unlike in Table 4, here we drop 1% of outliers from each tale (prior to sub-sampling). The panel on the left presents the results of the OLS estimation; the middle panel reports results from a weighted specification that uses inverse of the number of estimates per study as weights; the panel on the right reports results from a specification that uses precision weights. We report regular p -values and p -values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F-test for joint significance for each group of explanatory variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Appendix E.3 Heterogeneity and model uncertainty: outlier treatments in BMA

Table E9: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?
 Bayesian Model Averaging, outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	BMA			OLS with selected variables			
	Post. Mean	Post. SD	PIP	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>							
SE non-inverse	0.883	0.127	1.000	0.888	0.301	0.003	0.041
No obs (log)	0.002	0.034	0.032				
Midyear of data	-0.003	0.011	0.076				
Female share	-6.153	1.467	0.997	-6.272	3.614	0.083	0.227
<i>Country & Industry</i>							
Developing	7.918	1.868	0.999	7.587	6.900	0.272	0.395
Europe	0.027	0.238	0.039				
Nurses	0.045	0.589	0.035				
Teachers	0.065	0.429	0.045				
<i>Method & Identification</i>							
Separations, id.	0.056	0.566	0.036				
Inverse, id.	11.292	2.295	0.998	12.115	7.159	0.091	0.189
Inverse, not id.	41.837	2.500	1.000	42.660	15.486	0.006	0.045
Recruitment, id.	0.054	0.416	0.040				
Recruitment, not id.	-0.022	0.837	0.028				
L on W regression, id	-7.614	2.897	0.942	-7.781	4.383	0.076	0.179
Structural & other, id.	-17.188	3.321	1.000	-18.492	10.220	0.070	0.143
Structural & other, not id.	1.830	2.812	0.347				
<i>Estimation Technique</i>							
Hazard	-0.081	0.430	0.059				
Probit, logit, other	-1.760	2.310	0.433				
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>							
Top journal	8.548	1.590	0.998	8.444	3.183	0.008	0.053
Citations	1.992	1.977	0.573	2.983	2.908	0.305	0.428
Pub. year (google)	0.327	0.095	0.982	0.331	0.220	0.133	0.204
NBER or IZA	-0.084	0.560	0.049				
WP other	14.672	2.378	1.000	14.149	9.006	0.116	0.391
Constant	-8.646		1.000	-9.468	7.536	0.209	0.293
N	1294						

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C1 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. PIP denotes posterior inclusion probability; SD is the standard deviation; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. The left panel of the table presents unconditional moments for the BMA. The right panel reports the result of the frequentist check in which we include only explanatory variables with $PIP > 0.5$. The standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. 'p-value (wild)' are wild bootstrap clustered p-values. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E10: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?
 BMA, identified estimates only, outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	BMA			OLS with selected variables			
	Post. Mean	Post. SD	PIP	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>							
SE non-inverse	0.794	0.147	1.000	0.822	0.224	0.000	0.082
No obs (log)	0.674	0.564	0.660	1.038	0.649	0.109	0.202
Midyear of data	-1.762	0.189	1.000	-1.804	0.336	0.000	0.011
Female share	-32.718	3.911	1.000	-31.704	14.916	0.034	0.093
<i>Country & Industry</i>							
Developing	0.599	2.031	0.119				
Europe	-0.930	2.331	0.186				
Nurses	-0.732	3.111	0.106				
Teachers	-5.873	3.214	0.874	-6.249	1.190	0.000	0.017
<i>Method & Identification</i>							
Inverse	16.419	3.486	0.998	16.447	8.450	0.052	0.180
Recruitment	1.191	3.920	0.163				
L on W regression	8.025	4.198	0.870	9.610	4.512	0.033	0.107
Structural & other, id.	-13.911	4.072	0.972	-14.417	5.054	0.004	0.145
<i>Estimation Technique</i>							
Probit, logit, other	0.242	1.600	0.068				
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>							
Top journal	0.376	1.596	0.100				
Citations	6.345	1.478	0.994	6.471	1.910	0.001	0.049
Pub. year (google)	2.100	0.226	1.000	2.124	0.417	0.000	0.029
NBER or IZA	10.004	6.125	0.798	13.265	6.020	0.028	0.231
WP other	-0.063	1.789	0.070				
Constant	83.257		1.000	81.287	24.511	0.001	0.031
N	562			562			

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C2 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. PIP denotes posterior inclusion probability; SD is the standard deviation; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. The left panel of the table presents unconditional moments for the BMA. The right panel reports the result of the frequentist check in which we include only explanatory variables with $PIP > 0.5$. The standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. 'p-value (wild)' are wild bootstrap clustered p-values. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Appendix E.4 Heterogeneity and model uncertainty: outlier treatments in LASSO

Table E11: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? LASSO, outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	LASSO	OLS using selected variables			
	Coef.	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>					
SE non-inverse	0.825	0.876	0.352	0.013	0.075
No obs (log)	0.140	0.258	0.268	0.336	0.354
Midyear of data	-0.004	-0.018	0.019	0.355	0.410
Female share	-5.462	-6.392	3.443	0.063	0.132
<i>Country & Industry</i>					
Developing	8.801	8.557	6.123	0.162	0.306
Europe	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
Nurses	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
Teachers	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
<i>Method & Identification</i>					
Separations, id.	1.071	-0.256	4.851	0.958	0.967
Inverse, id.	8.753	9.480	8.182	0.247	0.324
Inverse, not id.	38.976	39.588	15.101	0.009	0.000
Recruitment, id.	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
Recruitment, not id.	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
L on W regression, id	-5.680	-6.316	4.096	0.123	0.247
Structural & other, id.	-16.623	-19.049	11.335	0.093	0.152
Structural & other, not id.	4.069	6.199	3.254	0.057	0.447
<i>Estimation Technique</i>					
Hazard	-1.540	-2.373	1.765	0.179	0.249
Probit, logit, other	-4.344	-5.244	3.060	0.087	0.303
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>					
Top journal	6.441	7.595	3.301	0.021	0.070
Citations	2.786	3.521	2.887	0.223	0.366
Pub. year (google)	0.234	0.275	0.276	0.320	0.374
NBER or IZA	0.000	0.000	.	.	.
WP other	14.936	15.315	8.766	0.081	0.384
Constant	-6.342	-7.673	8.687	0.377	0.456
N	1294

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C3 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. The left panel presents estimates obtained using LASSO with the penalty value selected to minimize mean-squared prediction error through cross-validation. We implement this in STATA using the `cvlasso` routine. Variables with zero coefficient values are excluded under the optimal penalty parameter value. The right panel shows results of estimating the OLS using the subset of variables selected by LASSO. We report regular p-values and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering; 'id' denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Table E12: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary? LASSO
 Identified estimates only, outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Response variable:	LASSO	OLS using selected variables			
	Coef.	Coef.	SE	P-value	P-value (wild)
<i>Data Characteristics</i>					
SE non-inverse	0.886	0.858	0.268	0.001	0.123
No obs (log)	1.029	0.920	0.774	0.235	0.373
Midyear of data	-1.643	-1.940	0.480	0.000	0.063
Female share	-28.483	-30.278	17.301	0.080	0.381
<i>Country & Industry</i>					
Developing	6.623	5.427	10.506	0.605	0.774
Europe	-0.633	-1.215	6.960	0.861	0.889
Nurses	-8.928	-14.012	9.181	0.127	0.180
Teachers	-8.360	-12.976	4.118	0.002	0.020
<i>Method & Identification</i>					
Inverse	10.794	13.777	8.185	0.092	0.155
Recruitment	2.269	11.191	5.610	0.046	0.067
L on W regression	8.602	12.763	8.003	0.111	0.219
Structural & other	-16.008	-14.703	4.778	0.002	0.032
<i>Estimation Technique</i>					
Probit, logit, other	0.456	0.462	7.329	0.950	0.959
<i>Publication Characteristics</i>					
Top journal	0.212	3.586	7.667	0.640	0.700
Citations	6.163	7.365	1.887	0.000	0.068
Pub. year (google)	1.402	1.401	0.621	0.024	0.064
NBER or IZA	11.656	11.604	9.816	0.237	0.332
WP other	2.444	6.620	9.403	0.481	0.556
Constant	92.891	114.787	37.074	0.002	0.149
N	562

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C4 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. The left panel presents estimates obtained using LASSO with the penalty value selected to minimize mean-squared prediction error through cross-validation. We implement this in STATA using the `cvlasso` routine. Variables with zero coefficient values are excluded under the optimal penalty parameter value. The right panel shows results of estimating the OLS using the subset of variables selected by LASSO. We report regular p-values and *p*-values from wild bootstrap clustering; ‘id’ denotes estimates obtained with an identification strategy in place. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table A1.

Appendix E.5 Heterogeneity and country-specific variables: outlier treatments

Table E13: Why do estimates of supply elasticity vary?
Country-specific variables, outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

	OLS, unweighted							
	Imputed country data				Raw country data			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')
<i>Response variable:</i>								
Col. bargaining coverage	-0.010 (0.697) [0.804]	.	.	0.052 (0.455) [0.602]	0.053 (0.056) [0.106]	.	.	-0.061 (0.231) [0.620]
Strictness of emp. protect.	.	0.220 (0.871) [0.892]	.	-1.629 (0.416) [0.600]	.	-3.081 (0.014) [0.404]	.	5.683 (0.109) [0.564]
ALMP expenditure	.	.	-0.209 (0.557) [0.699]	-0.066 (0.898) [0.910]	.	.	0.454 (0.492) [0.591]	-6.606 (0.182) [0.607]
Product market reg.	2.471 (0.077) [0.183]	0.993 (0.785) [0.828]	2.386 (0.020) [0.188]	2.617 (0.117) [0.207]	-28.098 (0.027) [0.182]	-2.344 (0.860) [0.912]	28.415 (0.008) [0.268]	40.683 (0.044) [0.422]
GDP p. c.	0.025 (0.589) [0.696]	-0.123 (0.326) [0.443]	0.022 (0.581) [0.661]	0.029 (0.516) [0.644]	-0.229 (0.465) [0.618]	-1.081 (0.022) [0.236]	1.023 (0.002) [0.123]	0.931 (0.001) [0.366]
<i>F-test (labor):</i>	0.152	0.026	0.344	1.561	3.639	6.080	0.472	3.129
<i>F-test (all country vars):</i>	0.697	0.871	0.557	0.668	0.056	0.014	0.492	0.372
	4.007	1.927	5.614	6.835	7.261	13.046	10.945	19.396
N	0.261	0.588	0.132	0.233	0.064	0.005	0.012	0.002
	1174	1264	1174	1174	706	833	412	412

	OLS, study weights							
	Imputed country data				Raw country data			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')
<i>Response variable:</i>								
Col. bargaining coverage	0.022 (0.521) [0.701]	.	.	0.044 (0.246) [0.449]	0.019 (0.653) [0.739]	.	.	-0.033 (0.553) [0.805]
Strictness of emp. protect.	.	0.114 (0.921) [0.927]	.	-2.053 (0.130) [0.313]	.	-3.548 (0.012) [0.192]	.	7.013 (0.000) [0.167]
ALMP expenditure	.	.	0.417 (0.419) [0.682]	0.839 (0.280) [0.552]	.	.	0.480 (0.636) [0.805]	-10.578 (0.004) [0.216]
Product market reg.	3.512 (0.116) [0.181]	4.984 (0.060) [0.062]	3.791 (0.034) [0.193]	4.711 (0.032) [0.072]	-7.027 (0.414) [0.584]	9.269 (0.440) [0.633]	40.549 (0.000) [0.343]	54.145 (0.000) [0.392]
GDP p. c.	0.003 (0.951) [0.961]	-0.176 (0.263) [0.593]	0.002 (0.970) [0.974]	-0.000 (0.998) [0.998]	0.047 (0.882) [0.928]	-1.024 (0.000) [0.132]	1.477 (0.000) [0.247]	1.027 (0.000) [0.379]
<i>F-test (labor):</i>	0.413	0.010	0.653	2.507	0.203	6.250	0.224	14.399
<i>F-test (all country vars):</i>	(0.521)	(0.921)	(0.419)	(0.474)	(0.653)	(0.012)	(0.636)	(0.002)
	5.453	5.512	6.526	6.961	1.066	108.827	25.712	22.884
N	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.089)	(0.224)	(0.785)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	1174	1264	1174	1174	706	833	412	412

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C6 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. We investigate the effects of country-specific variables on elasticity estimates. We employ the set of all explanatory variables used to obtain Table 3 in which we replace the variables *Developing* and *Europe* with the country-specific variables reflecting labor market conditions, product market regulations and the level of economic development. We use the resulting set of control variables to run an OLS estimation (top panel) and the specification in which we use weights based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported in each study (bottom panel). We use imputed values of the country variables (left panel), as well as the raw country-level data with no imputations done (right panel). For brevity, we only present coefficient estimates for the country-specific variables. We report regular p-values and p-values from wild bootstrap clustering. We also report results of the F-tests for joint significance of the subset of labor market variables, and for the set of all country variables. A detailed description of all variables is available in Table C5.

Appendix E.6 Heterogeneity and best practice: outlier treatments

Table E14: Best Practice Estimates
outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Group	Point Estimate	95% interval	95% interval (wild)	Implied Markdown
Separations: Model				
Linear model	11.995	[4.37; 19.62]	[0.90; 22.18]	7.7
BMA	10.020	[4.21; 15.83]	[1.59; 17.27]	9.1
LASSO	11.825	[4.58; 19.07]	[1.26; 21.65]	7.8
Separations: Gender				
Women	8.811	[2.01; 15.61]	[-0.23; 17.49]	10.2
Men	15.294	[5.48; 25.11]	[0.52; 28.28]	6.1
Separations vs. Inverse				
Separations - Not identified	11.995	[3.48; 20.51]	[-0.21; 23.43]	7.7
Separations - Identified	11.994	[3.36; 20.63]	[0.87; 22.01]	7.7
Inverse - Not identified	51.774	[19.62; 83.93]	[20.59; 109.68]	1.9
Inverse - Identified	21.091	[0.23; 41.96]	[-18.68; 46.80]	4.5

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table 5 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. Estimates in rows 1-3 are obtained using models reported in Table E4, frequentist check in Table E9 and the post-LASSO results of Table E11. The rest of the results are obtained using the linear model. We report both the standard 95% confidence interval calculated for errors clustered at the study level, and the 95% confidence interval calculated with wild bootstrap clusters. The estimates of the markdown are obtained using equation (2).

Table E15: Best Practice Estimates
Identified estimates only; outliers dropped, 1% (each tail).

Group	Point Estimate	95% interval	95% interval (wild)	Implied Markdown
Separations: Model				
Linear model	-1.780	[-8.57; 5.02]	[-11.29; 6.83]	-
BMA	-0.957	[-5.99; 4.07]	[-10.41; 6.21]	-
LASSO	0.615	[-4.89; 6.12]	[-9.66; 10.95]	61.9
Separations: Gender				
Women	-16.647	[-36.20; 2.91]	[-59.50; 19.09]	-
Men	13.630	[-3.19; 30.45]	[-33.09; 49.21]	6.8
Inverse				
Inverse	11.997	[-2.42; 26.41]	[-5.88; 34.13]	7.7

Notes: Here we repeat the exercise presented in Table C7 using the sample of elasticity estimates in which we drop 1% of outliers from each tail. Estimates in rows 1-3 are obtained using models reported in Table E8, frequentist check in Table E10 and the post-LASSO results of Table E12. The rest of the results are obtained using the linear model. We report both the standard 95% confidence interval calculated for errors clustered at the study level, and the 95% confidence interval calculated with wild bootstrap clusters. The estimates of the markdown are obtained using equation (2).

Appendix F Studies Used in Meta-analysis

We used the following search query to find the relevant studies:

Our search query is: (“monopsony” OR “monopsonistic” OR “elasticity of labor supply to the firm” OR “separation elasticity” OR “recruitment elasticity”) AND (“estimate” “elasticity”)

Papers in Study

- Bachmann, Ronald and Hanna Frings**, “Monopsonistic competition, low-wage labour markets, and minimum wages—An empirical analysis,” *Applied Economics*, 2017, 49 (51), 5268–5286.
- Barth, Erling and Harald Dale-Olsen**, “Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover, and the gender wage gap,” *Labour Economics*, 2009, 16 (5), 589–597.
- Blau, Francine D and Lawrence M Kahn**, “Race and sex differences in quits by young workers,” *ILR Review*, 1981, 34 (4), 563–577.
- Bó, Ernesto Dal, Frederico Finan, and Martín A Rossi**, “Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2013, 128 (3), 1169–1218.
- Bodah, Matthew, John Burkett, and Leonard Lardaro**, “IX. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE WORKERS,” in “Proceedings of the Annual Meeting—Industrial Relations Research Association” IRRA 2003, p. 199.
- Booth, Alison L and Pamela Katic**, “Estimating the wage elasticity of labour supply to a firm: What evidence is there for monopsony?,” *Economic Record*, 2011, 87 (278), 359–369.
- Brochu, Pierre and David A Green**, “The impact of minimum wages on labour market transitions,” *The Economic Journal*, 2013, 123 (573), 1203–1235.
- Caldwell, Sydnee and Emily Oehlsen**, “Monopsony and the Gender Wage Gap: Experimental Evidence from the Gig Economy,” *Working Paper*, 2018, MIT.
- Cho, David**, “The Labor Market Effects of Demand Shocks: Firm-Level Evidence from the Recovery Act,” *Working Paper*, 2018, Princeton University.
- Currie, Janet**, “Employment determination in a unionized public-sector labor market: the case of Ontario’s school teachers,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 1991, 9 (1), 45–66.
- den Berg, Gerard J Van and Geert Ridder**, “An empirical equilibrium search model of the labor market,” *Econometrica*, 1998, 66 (5), 1183–1221.
- Depew, Briggs and Todd A Sørensen**, “The elasticity of labor supply to the firm over the business cycle,” *Labour Economics*, 2013, 24, 196–204.
- , **Peter Norlander, and Todd A Sørensen**, “Inter-firm mobility and return migration patterns of skilled guest workers,” *Journal of Population Economics*, 2017, 30 (2), 681–721.
- Dobbelaere, Sabien and Jacques Mairesse**, “Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections,” *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 2013, 28 (1), 1–46.
- Dobelaere, Sabien and Mark Vancauteran**, “Market imperfections and total factor productivity,” *Working Paper*, 2017, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
- Dube, Arindrajit, Alan Manning, and Suresh Naidu**, “Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers,” *Working Paper* 24991, National Bureau of Economic Research September 2018.
- , **Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri**, “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets,” *American Economic Review: Insights*, 2018, (forthcoming).
- , **Laura Giuliano, and Jonathan Leonard**, “Fairness and frictions: The impact of unequal raises on quit behavior,” *American Economic Review*, 2019, 109 (2), 620–63.
- , **T William Lester, and Michael Reich**, “Minimum wage shocks, employment flows, and labor market frictions,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 2016, 34 (3), 663–704.
- Fakhfakh, Fathi and Felix FitzRoy**, “Dynamic monopsony: Evidence from a French establishment panel,” *Economica*, 2006, 73 (291), 533–545.
- Falch, Torberg**, “The elasticity of labor supply at the establishment level,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 2010, 28 (2), 237–266.

- , “Teacher mobility responses to wage changes: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment,” *American Economic Review*, 2011, 101 (3), 460–65.
- , “Wages and recruitment: evidence from external wage changes,” *ILR Review*, 2017, 70 (2), 483–518.
- Fleisher, Belton M and Xiaojun Wang**, “Skill differentials, return to schooling, and market segmentation in a transition economy: the case of Mainland China,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2004, 73 (1), 315–328.
- Galizzi, Monica**, “Gender and Labor Attachment: Do Within-Firms’ Relative Wages Matter?,” *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, 2001, 40 (4), 591–619.
- Gittings, R Kaj and Ian M Schmutte**, “Getting handcuffs on an octopus: Minimum wages, employment, and turnover,” *ILR Review*, 2016, 69 (5), 1133–1170.
- Hirsch, Boris and Elke J Jahn**, “Is there monopsonistic discrimination against immigrants?,” *ILR Review*, 2015, 68 (3), 501–528.
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