Must-Read: Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Emil Verner: Household Debt and Business Cycles Worldwide

Must-Read: Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Emil Verner: Household Debt and Business Cycles Worldwide: “An increase in the household debt to GDP ratio in the medium run…

…predicts lower subsequent GDP growth, higher unemployment, and negative growth forecasting errors in a panel of 30 countries from 1960 to 2012…. Low mortgage spreads predict an increase in the household debt to GDP ratio and a decline in subsequent GDP growth when used as an instrument. The negative relation between the change in household debt to GDP and subsequent output growth is stronger for countries that face stricter monetary policy constraints as measured by a less flexible exchange rate regime, proximity to the zero lower bound, or more external borrowing. A rise in the household debt to GDP ratio is contemporaneously associated with a consumption boom followed by a reversal in the trade deficit as imports collapse. We also uncover a global household debt cycle that partly predicts the severity of the global growth slowdown after 2007. Countries with a household debt cycle more correlated with the global household debt cycle experience a sharper decline in growth after an increase in domestic household debt.

Must-Read: Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer (2013): Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive

Must-Read: Very good. Mind you, I am not sure that it is right–while the risk premium ought to be linear in units of fundamental operating risk, and while requiring banks to maintain larger capital reserves ought to be irrelevant (save for the small financial-repression taxes involved) to costs of financing for Modigliani-Miller reasons, it is not clear to me that that is how things actually work in reality:

Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer (2013): Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive: “We examine the pervasive view that ‘equity is expensive’…

…which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly for society and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are fallacious, irrelevant to the policy debate by confusing private and social costs, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. And while debt’s informational insensitivity may provide valuable liquidity, increased capital (and reduced leverage) can enhance this benefit. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support.

We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage at the levels allowed, for example, by the Basel III agreement is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions and likely makes banking inefficient. Better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal. Except for government subsidies and viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks.

Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy.

Must-read: Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor: “Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts”

Must-Read: Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor: Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts: “In the era of modern finance…

…a century-long near-stable ratio of credit to GDP gave way to increasing financialization and surging leverage in advanced economies in the last forty years. This “financial hockey stick” coincides with shifts in foundational macroeconomic relationships beyond the widely-noted return of macroeconomic fragility and crisis risk. Leverage is correlated with central business cycle moments. We document an extensive set of such moments based on a decade-long international and historical data collection effort. More financialized economies exhibit somewhat less real volatility but lower growth, more tail risk, and tighter real-real and real- financial correlations. International real and financial cycles also cohere more strongly. The new stylized facts we document should prove fertile ground for the development of a newer generation of macroeconomic models with a prominent role for financial factors.

Must-Read: Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Emil Verner: Household Debt and Business Cycles Worldwide

Must-Read: Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Emil Verner: Household Debt and Business Cycles Worldwide: “A rise in the household debt to GDP ratio predicts lower output growth…

…and higher unemployment over the medium-run, contrary to standard macroeconomic models. GDP forecasts by the IMF and OECD underestimate the importance of a rise in household debt to GDP, giving the change in household debt to GDP ratio of a count… A rise in household debt to GDP is associated contemporaneously with a rising consumption share of output, a worsening of the current account balance, and a rise in the share of consumption goods within imports. This is followed by strong external adjustment when the economy slows as the current account reverses…. The pre-2000 predicted relationship between global household debt changes and subsequent global growth matches closely the actual decline in global growth after 2007 given the large increase in household debt during the early to mid-2000s.