Must-read: Barry Ritholtz: “Hedge Funds Scramble to Reassure Investors”

Must-Read: Barry Ritholtz: Hedge Funds Scramble to Reassure Investors: “Why is it that in the face of underperformance…

…investors still seem to love hedge funds?… This rather astonishing figure:

The 20 most profitable hedge funds for investors earned $15 billion last year while the rest of the industry collectively lost $99 billion. Those top managers have made 48 percent of the $835 billion in profits that the hedge fund industry has generated since its inception….

I suspect that… a large part of the reason for [the] inflows[is] an ill-advised pursuit of market-beating alpha by investors who seem to be desperate to find the next James Simons…. There are no signs of it slowing down. That isn’t to say a rotation within the hedge fund firmament is not taking place… the disappointed limited partners in hedge funds also seem to be a fickle group. Like speed daters looking for Mr. or Ms. Right, they table hop in pursuit of the one manager who has the secret sauce to make the wealthy accredited investor even wealthier.

Must-read: Roger Farmer: “Please: Lets Agree to Speak the Same Language”

Must-Read: I want to plump for “self-fulfilling prophecies” or “multiple near-rational equilibria” myself:

Roger Farmer: Please: Lets Agree to Speak the Same Language: “Animal spirits, confidence, sunspots, self-fulfilling prophecies and sentiments…

…have all been used to mean shifts in markets caused by factors that are non-fundamental. Now Olivier adds herding as one more term…. The idea that non fundamental factors can have real effects was developed at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1980s at about the same time that the Real Business Cycle model took off…. The RBC agenda pulled ahead and stayed ahead for thirty years. That is now changing. Why this divergence?…

There were three major reasons why the RBC program pulled ahead. 1) there was no single strong individual to promote the sunspot agenda and the three initial leaders, Costas Azariadis, Dave Cass and Karl Shell could not even agree among themselves…. 2) The literature on sunspots was technically demanding…. 3) Cass, Shell and Azariadis were not interested in empiricism and they did not make an effort to promote their agenda at central banks or at applied groups such as the National Bureau of Economic Research…. If you are a graduate student or a researcher who is working, or planning to work, in this area, I have a plea. Can we at least agree to add no more words to refer to the same idea? Please: Lets agree to speak the same language and, in so doing, give credit to those who laid the foundations for this agenda.

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard: “The Price of Oil, China, and Stock Market Herding”

Must-Read: Olivier Blanchard: The Price of Oil, China, and Stock Market Herding: “The main effect of a slowdown in China would be, through lower commodity prices…

…help rather than hurt the United States…. The oil price explanation… is even more puzzling…. It was taken for granted that a decrease in the price of oil was good news for oil-importing countries…. We learned in the last year that, in the short run, the adverse effect on investment on energy producing firms could come quickly and temporarily slow down the effect, but this surely does not undo the general conclusion. Yet the headlines are now about low oil prices leading to low stock prices…. [Not] convincing… [is] that very low prices lead to such serious problems for oil producers that this will end up… dominating the scene… [or] that the low prices reflect a yet unmeasured decrease in world growth…. Maybe we should not believe the market commentaries. Maybe it was neither oil nor China….

I believe that to a large extent, herding is at play. If other investors sell, it must be because they know something you do not know. Thus, you should sell…. So how much should we worry? This is where economics… gives the dreaded two-handed answer. If it becomes clear… that fundamentals are in fact not so bad, stock prices will recover…. [But] the stock market slump… can become self-fulfilling…. Hope for the first… worry about the second.

Must-read: Gavyn Davies: “China devaluation – a necessary evil?”

Must-Read: Gavyn Davies: China devaluation – a necessary evil?: “The 9 percent drop in global equity prices in the first two weeks of 2016…

…is certainly alarming, even for those of us who believe that the outlook for the world activity has not deteriorated much recently. The fundamental cause is the same as it was last August – a clash between a severe loss of credibility in Chinese economic policy and a Federal Reserve that still seems determined to continue tightening US monetary policy without much regard to international risks and a slowing domestic economy (see the hawkish Bill Dudley speech on Friday)…

Must-read: Olivier Blanchard: “Ten Take Aways from the ‘Rethinking Macro Policy: Progress or Confusion?'”

Must-Read: I think the extremely-sharp Olivier Blanchard misses an important part of my argument here. If g the rate of growth of a government’s taxing capacity > r its cost of funds via borrowing and if the government is risk-neutral then obviously the government should issue more debt: the economy is then dynamically inefficient with respect to the investments taxpayers have made in their “ownership” of the government and its assets. Any argument that such a government should not be frantically running up its debt must hinge on aversion to interest-rate risk caused by fear of the consequences in the event of an interest-rate spike. But in the case of a reserve currency-issuing sovereign, what are those consequences? The consequences are merely that one must then balance the government’s budget constraint, via some combination of higher taxes, inflation, and financial repression. And there is no reason to think that, for reserve currency-issuing sovereigns, the costs of such a balancing are unduly large.

Other policies to get rid of the distortions that produce g > r for government debt may well be better than running up the debt. But in the absence of those other policies, running up the debt is certainly better than the status quo unless the government is near the edge of its financial repression and taxing capacities and the costs of inflation are very large. And for reserve currency-issuing sovereigns those are none of them the case.

Olivier Blanchard: Ten Take Aways from the “Rethinking Macro Policy: Progress or Confusion?: “On the latter, perhaps the most provocative conclusion of the conference…

…was offered by Brad DeLong:  If the rate at which the government can borrow (r) is less than the growth rate (g), then, he argued, governments should increase, not decrease, current debt levels. If people value safety so much (and thus the safe rate is so low), then it makes sense for the state to issue safe debt, and possibly use it for productive investment.  And if the interest rate is less than the growth rate, debt is safe: the debt- to-GDP ratio will decrease, even if the government never repays the debt.
One senses that the argument has strong limits, from the likelihood that r remains less than g (the two letters appear to have become part of the general vocabulary), to the issue of what determines the demand for safe assets, to whether r less than g is an indication of dynamic inefficiency or some distortion, to whether, even if this world, high levels of debt increase the probability of multiple equilibria, rollover crises and sudden stops.

Must-read: Paul Krugman (2014): “Why Weren’t Alarm Bells Ringing?”

Paul Krugman (2014): Why Weren’t Alarm Bells Ringing?: “Almost nobody predicted the immense economic crisis…

…If someone claims that he did, ask how many other crises he predicted that didn’t end up happening. Stopped clocks are right twice a day, and chronic doomsayers sometimes find themselves living through doomsday. But while prediction is hard, especially about the future, this doesn’t let our economic policy elite off the hook. On the eve of crisis in 2007 the officials, analysts, and pundits who shape economic policy were deeply, wrongly complacent. They didn’t see 2008 coming; but what is more important is the fact that they even didn’t believe in the possibility of such a catastrophe. As Martin Wolf says in The Shifts and the Shocks, academics and policymakers displayed ‘ignorance and arrogance’ in the runup to crisis, and ‘the crisis became so severe largely because so many people thought it impossible.’…

Focusing, as Martin Wolf does, on the measurable factors—the ‘shifts’—that increased our vulnerability to crisis is incomplete…. Intellectual shifts—the way economists and policymakers unlearned the hard-won lessons of the Great Depression, the return to pre-Keynesian fallacies and prejudices—arguably played an equally large part in the tragedy of the past six years. Say’s Law… liquidationism… conventional economic analysis fell short…. But when policymakers rejected orthodox economics, what they did by and large was to reject it in favor of doctrines like ‘expansionary austerity’—the unsupported claim that slashing government spending actually creates jobs—that made the situation worse rather than better. And this makes me a bit skeptical about Wolf’s proposals to avert ‘the fire next time.’ The Shifts and the Shocks… Wolf’s substantive proposals… are all worthy and laudable. But the gods themselves contend in vain against stupidity. What are the odds that financial reformers can do better?

Must-read: Lorcan Roche Kelly: “Today”

Must-Read: It is likely to be an exciting day at the dog track!

Lorcan Roche Kelly: Today: “Chinese stocks close just 29 minutes after open…

…after the CSI 300 Index fell more than 7 percent. The selloff was sparked after the central bank cuts its yuan reference rate by the most since August…. The Stoxx Europe 600 Index slid as much as 3.6 percent, the most since August, before trading 3.2 percent lower at 10:40 a.m. in London. Germany’s DAX Index is trading below 10,000 for the first time since October…. Contracts on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index slid 2.2 percent to 1,938 as of 10:50 a.m. in London. U.S. markets closed lower yesterday following the release of the Fed minutes from the December meeting which provided little clarity…. U.S. oil futures in New York slid to the lowest in 12 years with West Texas Intermediate dropping as much as 5.5 percent before trading down 2.5 percent at $33.12 a barrel at 11:13 a.m….

When and why might a “confidence” shock be contractionary? Karl Smith’s approach can bring insights

When and why does the Confidence Fairy appear? The very sharp-witted Karl Smith has long had a genuinely-different way of looking at the national income identity. I think his approach can shed much light on this question. And it can also shed light on the closely related question of when and whether governments seeking full employment should greatly concern themselves with “confidence”.

Start with the household side of the circular flow of national income: national income Y is received by households, which use it to fund consumption spending C, savings S, and to pay taxes T:

(1) Y = C + S + T

Continue with the expenditure side: Aggregate spending Y–the same as national income–is divided into spending on consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports:

(2) Y = C + I + G + NX

Substitute the right-hand side of the first for the left-hand side of the second, and subtract taxes T from both sides:

(3) S = I + (G-T) + NX

Now what do investment spending I, the government deficit G-T, and net exports NX have in common? They all require financing. Banks and shareholders must be willing to lend money to and allow firms to retain earnings to fund investment. The government must borrow to cover its deficit. Exporters must find financiers willing to lend their foreign customers dollars in order for them to buy net exports. Add all these three up and call them the amount of lending BL, “BL” for “bank lending”:

(4) BL = I + (G-T) + NX

So we then have:

(5) S = BL(i,π,ρ)

Here i is the nominal cost of funds to the banking sector–the thing the Federal Reserve controls. Here π is the expected inflation rate. And here ρ is an index of the effext of risk on bank lending, and is determined by the balance between the perceived riskiness of the loans made and the risk tolerance of the financial-intermediating banking sector.

Now equation (5) must be true: it is an identity. The level of national product and national income Y will rise to make it true. If something raises BL–either lower i, higher π, or lower ρ–for a given Y, then Y will rise so that S can rise to match BL. If something lowers S for a given BL, then Y will rise so that S can recover and continue to match BL.

This framework hides things that are obvious in the usual presentation, and brings to the forefront things that are usually hidden. As Karl writes:

[If] the government is… a good credit risk… a rise in government borrowing suddenly makes overall lending safer, and so the BL curve moves out.

Thus fiscal policy is indeed expansionary. But in Karl Smith’s framework fiscal policy is expansionary because lenders have more confidence in the government’s debts than in private-sector debts, and so funding government debt does not use up any scarce risk-bearing capacity. And, if we move into an open-economy framework, capital flight–a loss of confidence that diminishes net exports–is expansionary as long as banks have more confidence in the loans to foreigners they are making to fund net exports than in their average loan.

We can then see how fiscal policy might not be expansionary:

Governments which may directly default (rather than inflate) lose traction…. It is not at all clear that Greece can move the BL curve…

because it is not the case that additional debt borrowed by the government of Greece will raise the average quality of liabilities owed to the banking system.

And we can see how capital outflows–a loss of confidence–might not be expansionary: it is not that loans to foreigners will reduce the quality of liabilities owed to the banking system, for the exchange rage will move to make the loans to foreigners high-quality, it is the capital outflow carries with it a reduction in financial-intermediary risk-bearing capacity.

And we can see where the result of Blanchard et al. that capital inflows can be expansionary comes from: when they bring additional risk-bearing capacity into the economy and so raise financial-intermediary risk tolerance, they lower ρ, even with a constant quality of liabilities owed to the banking system.

Karl Smith’s approach requires that all factors affecting national income determination work through their effects on:

  • the desired savings rate,
  • the nominal opportunity cost of funds to the banking sector,
  • expected inflation,
  • the risk-tolerance of financial intermediaries, and, last,
  • the perceived quality of the liabilities owed to the banking sector.

This is a valid framework. And it is one in which concerns about “confidence” are brought to the forefront and highlighted in ways that they are not in the standard modes of presentation.

Brad DeLong and Jan Hatzius on the macroeconomic situation

An interview I did last fall with Jan Hatzius:

Brad DeLong is a professor of economics at UC Berkeley, where his research focuses on financial crises and 20th century macroeconomics, as well as the political economy of monetary and fiscal policy. He has taught at Harvard University and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy under the Clinton Administration. Below, he and Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jan Hatzius discuss risks around liftoff and the structural downshift in rates.

The views stated by Brad DeLong herein are those of the interviewee, and do not necessarily reflect those of Goldman Sachs:

Allison Nathan: Has the US economy recovered from the Great Recession?

Brad DeLong: Yes and no.

It has not recovered from the large loss in productivity and potential output. The Great Recession knocked down our level of output by 8% compared to where we thought it would be now in 2007. We will probably never recover that loss. That is very unusual for the United States, which had a substantial recovery in lost output even after the Great Depression.

But as far as the labor market, we have mostly recovered–but not fully recovered.

Jan Hatzius: I believe that the labor market is mostly recovered and that the overall economy has come a long way toward recovery. To Brad’s point about disappointing output, the question is how much of that is exogenous weakness versus some form of hysteresis, with the effects of the Great Recession weighing progressively on economic activity. It’s difficult to know the answer, but I’ve become more sympathetic to the idea that we underestimated the extent of the exogenous slowdown. We’ve substantially revised our views on potential growth, and I don’t think it is all or even mostly due to the aftereffects of the Great Recession.

Allison Nathan: Has the time come to raise rates?

Jan Hatzius: Given how far the funds rate is below normal, how close the economy is to full employment, and my expectation of gradual increases in wage and price inflation, now seems like an appropriate time to move. But I would say there is still a good case for waiting on risk-management grounds because the future of the economy is uncertain. It seems more dangerous to lift off too early and find that the economy can’t tolerate tighter policy than to end up a bit high on inflation for a while. That said, I feel less strongly about the risk-management case than I did three or six months ago.

Brad DeLong: There are four reasons why it is not yet time to begin normalizing monetary policy.

First, we are only 300bp away from the equilibrium funds rate. Given how close we are, why not just wait until we get to full employment?

Second, there is an unknown amount of slack left, and it might be substantial.

Third, to Jan’s point on risk management, I think there’s a 50% chance that the Federal Reserve will be really sorry that it raised rates when it did. And there is no upside for proceeding with rate hikes now. The Fed could delay hikes another six months and then just raise them faster and still get to the same place. But if it raises rates now, it will have no way to catch up because rates would presumably still be very low.

Finally, we are likely to find ourselves at the zero lower bound sometime in the future again—and when we do, we want market participants to feel very certain that there will be overshooting coming out of it—more inflation and lower real interest rates over the medium term that will boost growth. We need a reputation of coming off of the zero lower bound with a roaring economy, and I believe we need to stay at zero longer for that to happen.

Allison Nathan: Why isn’t the Fed more concerned about the lack of inflation, and should it be?

Brad DeLong: Janet Yellen and Stanley Fischer really believe in their models, which predict that inflation will rise to and above 2% a year in 2017 and 2018. They see this inflation path as a tangible reality, but it is in fact only a shadow cast by their assumptions. The Fed should be much more concerned about model uncertainty and, in turn, the lack of inflation right now.

Jan Hatzius: I have a slightly more positive view on inflation. My approach is “trust but verify,” which Ronald Reagan used to say on arms control negotiations. I trust the inflation models more than Brad does, but I’d like to see more verification in terms of the numbers picking up. A recent pick-up in wage growth is somewhat encouraging; our broad measurement of wage growth has risen to 2.6% yoy—still low but the highest rate we’ve seen in the recovery. We’re only at 1.3% for core PCE, but that is roughly what we expected at the start of the year, not a downside surprise, which would be more worrying.

Allison Nathan: Do you worry about financial imbalances?

Jan Hatzius: Not really. Asset markets don’t look particularly frothy to me today, debt growth is reasonably muted, and the private sector is still running a decent financial surplus of a little over 2% of GDP. So I just don’t see sources of worries over financial imbalances in the United States. But there are certainly other places around the world that show greater cause for concern, China being among them.

Brad DeLong: I generally agree. The aggregate numbers don’t seem to suggest anything like the troubling financial imbalances we have seen in the past. People worried about imbalances today tend to say that their concern centers on who is bearing risk in the economy or the markets, especially given that risk-bearing capacity on Wall Street has declined and that low interest rates have continued to generate a “search for yield.” But we don’t have the data to know how many people are unprepared to bear the risks associated with their positions.

Allison Nathan: Given current excess liquidity, will the Fed be successful in actually lifting the fed funds rate?

Brad DeLong: Yes. It will be very interesting to see what it has to do to be successful. But if the Fed wants the rate to get somewhere, it will get it there.

Jan Hatzius: Agreed.

Allison Nathan: Where will the Fed’s communication from the December meeting leave market expectations for future rate hikes?

Jan Hatzius: Markets will think that January is firmly off the table, and that March will be on the table if the data cooperates. The probability for March now priced into the market is roughly 50%, and my guess is that this will rise, but probably not above 60-70%. How exactly the Fed gets the market there is a bit of a dance. They will emphasize data-dependence, but the idea of March being a real possibility could cause a tightening of financial conditions and set expectations for hiking at every meeting, which the Fed wants to avoid. But I think they’ll find a way to manage this.

Brad DeLong: I agree they will emphasize data dependence and the need to assess the effects of the first hike, which is likely to push expectations to March at the earliest.

Allison Nathan: In the last few rate-hike cycles, the fed funds rate rose faster and ended up higher than the Fed initially projected. Will this time be different?

Brad DeLong: This time will be different, because in all recent hiking cycles, the Fed started out well behind the curve.

In the mid-2000s, the Fed was unhappy that its short-term rate increases were having so little traction on the long end of the bond curve, which led them to hike more rapidly than they initially intended.

In 1994, the tightening cycle began after Alan Greenspan had cut Bill Clinton slack for an entire year to get deficit reduction accomplished, so Greenspan was very eager to start raising interest rates once the Fed actually began to hike.

In 1989, Greenspan had delayed hikes out of fear that stock market crash in October 1987 would cause a recession. It didn’t, so the Fed ended up needing to catch up to where it thought it should be.

And before then, Paul Volcker definitely believed that the Fed was far behind the curve at the end of the 1970s when he became Fed Chair.

Given this pattern of the past four major tightening cycles, this time really is different.

Jan Hatzius: This time should be different, but the market is priced for something too different. If the recent trends continue, we will be at full employment by the end next year and inflation and wage growth will also likely be higher. In that environment, I don’t see the Fed taking a six-month break. I see them hiking a quarter-point every quarter, which is twice as much as what the market currently expects.

Allison Nathan: What’s the risk that the Fed will need to return to more accommodative policy?

Jan Hatzius: I’d give it a roughly 15% probability, which is not insignificant and still a good reason to delay, or at least to go more slowly and be very responsive to new information about the economy, especially in the early days of the normalization process. You could call that a second-best approach to delaying liftoff, but I do think that is where they are now. I see the odds of a shallower path than projected by the dots, but not an outright reversal, as higher, roughly in the 30% range.

Brad DeLong: I think there’s a greater than 50% chance that the rate path will be shallower than the current dots. I see a roughly 50% chance the Fed will end up wishing that they had stuck at zero or at least hiked even more gradually than what the market is currently expecting, but I am not sure they would actually dare reverse course. I could see them staying at 1% for a while, wishing they hadn’t hiked but not daring to go back.

Allison Nathan: Will the ECB and BOJ be less likely to ease further once the Fed lifts off?

Jan Hatzius: The extent to which the Fed, ECB, and BOJ are driven by each other gets very overplayed in the market. These are all economies with flexible exchange rates, and foreign monetary policy decisions almost always have offsetting effects on their own desires to move in one direction or another. For example, if the Fed tightens and that leads to a stronger dollar and a weaker US economy, the implications for the ECB are pretty ambiguous. So I don’t see a big spillover, and it is very hard to prove any such spillover empirically.

Brad DeLong: I agree that internal monetary politics are overwhelmingly primary in both the Euro area and Japan. What the Fed does is only very small noise compared to their focus on their own political-economic configuration. The only places in the developed world where monetary policy is tightly linked to the Fed are Britain and Canada.

Allison Nathan: Where will rates end up in this cycle?

Brad DeLong: There has been a structural downshift in rates. A decade ago, we wondered if rates would end up at 6%; a decade before that, it was 8%. Now, virtually everyone would be surprised if they ended above 4%. I’m more pessimistic than most in that I see them most likely to end at 3% or below, with a fairly small chance they’ll end up higher and a one-in-three chance that in retrospect we won’t really see this as a tightening cycle at all because rates will be in the 0-1% range three or four years down the road.

The primary factor behind my relatively pessimistic view is people’s loss of confidence in the capacity to bear and understand risk, and in the idea that large downward movements in asset prices are once-in-a-generation episodes like the Great Depression. In the 2000s, we suddenly had three episodes: the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the US real estate collapse, and the 2008-2009 equity and risky debt market crash, with the most sophisticated players blindsided by one or two if not all three of those events. This eroded confidence, widening the risk spreads between safe and risky assets.

Jan Hatzius: I forecast the terminal rate at 1-2% in real terms and 3-4% in nominal terms, which puts me on the slightly more optimistic side of this debate. In my view, the labor market is a much better indicator of cyclical progress than real GDP, especially in an environment where potential growth has slowed. And I am struck by the amount of labor market improvement we’ve seen. So I do think rates will end substantially higher from here.

Must-read: Stan Fischer: “Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound I”

Must-Read: Very disappointing to me that both nominal GDP targeting and price path level targeting appear to be completely off of Stan Fischer’s radar:

Stan Fischer: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, and the Zero Lower Bound I: “Are We Moving Toward a World With a Permanently Lower Long-Run Equilibrium Real Interest Rate?…

…Research that was motivated in part by attempts that began some time ago to specify the constant term in standard versions of the Taylor rule has shown a declining trend in estimates of r*. That finding has become more firmly established since the start of the Great Recession and the global financial crisis…. A lower level of the long-run equilibrium real rate suggests that the frequency and duration of future episodes in which monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB will be higher than in the past. Prior to the crisis, some research suggested that such episodes were likely to be relatively infrequent and generally short lived. The past several years certainly require us to reconsider that basic assumption….Conducting monetary policy effectively at the ZLB is challenging, to say the least….

The answer to the question ‘Will r* remain at today’s low levels permanently?’ is that we do not know….

Raising the Inflation Target…. The welfare costs of high and variable inflation could be substantial. For example, more variable inflation would make long-run planning more difficult for households and businesses….

Negative Interest Rates: Another possible step would be to reduce short-term interest rates below zero if needed to provide additional accommodation. Our colleagues in Europe are busy rewriting economics textbooks on this topic as we speak…. It is unclear how low policy rates can go before cash holdings rise or other problems intensify, but the European experience has certainly shown that zero is not the effective lower bound in those countries….

Raising the Equilibrium Real Rate: An even more ambitious approach to ease the constraints posed by the zero lower bound would be to take steps aimed at raising the equilibrium real rate. For example, expansionary fiscal policy would boost the equilibrium real rate…. The Federal Reserve’s asset purchases… have reduced the level of the term premium….

Eliminating the ZLB Associated with Physical Currency….

None of these options for dealing with the difficulties of the ZLB suggest that it will be easy either to raise the equilibrium real rate or to mitigate the constraints associated with the ZLB…