Must-Read: Cardiff Garcia: Alan Taylor on financialisation, business cycles, and crises

Must-Read: Cardiff Garcia: Alphachat: Alan Taylor on financialisation, business cycles, and crises: “With collaborators Oscar Jorda and Moritz Schularick, the authors summarise their decades-long work on financialisation, which we discussed with Alan…

…From the paper:

Our previous research uncovered a key stylized fact of modern macroeconomic history: the “financial hockey stick.” The ratio of aggregate private credit to income in advanced economies has surged to unprecedented levels over the second half of the 20th century. The goal of this paper is to show that with this “great leveraging” key business cycle moments have become increasingly correlated with financial variables. Our long-run data show that business cycles in high-debt economies may not be especially volatile, but are more negatively skewed. Higher debt goes hand in hand with worse tail events.

A great deal of modern macroeconomic thought has relied on the small sample of US post-WW2 experience to formulate, calibrate, and test models of the business cycle, to calculate the welfare costs of fluctuations, and to analyze the benefits of stabilization policies. Yet the historical macroeconomic cross country experience is richer. An important contribution of this paper is to introduce a new comprehensive macro-financial historical database covering 17 advanced economies over the last 150 years. This considerable data collection effort that has occupied the better part of a decade, and involved a small army of research assistants.

Monetary Policy 201

This from Paul Volcker strikes me as substantially wrong:

Paul Volcker and Cardiff Garcia: AlphaChatterbox Long Chat:

[My] first economics course… at Harvard… Arthur Smithies…. Session after session he would drill into our head that a little inflation was a good thing. And I could never figure out why. But I know he kept saying it, so already at the time I for some reason had an allergy to what he was saying. But it’s interesting, his lectures, it’s the same thing that central banks are saying today….

I would never interpret it as you have to have [inflation] exactly zero. Prices tend to go up or down a little bit depending upon whether the economy’s booming or not booming. And I can’t understand making a fetish of a particular number, frankly. What you do want to create is a situation where people don’t worry about prices going up and they don’t make judgments based upon fears of inflation instead of straightforward analysis of what the real economy is doing.

And I must confess, I think it’s something of a moral issue…. You shouldn’t be kind of fooling people all the time by having inflation they didn’t expect. Now, they answer, well, if they expect it, it’s okay. But if they expect it, it’s not doing you any good anyway. Those arguments you set forward don’t hold water if you’re expecting it…

There are three major considerations:

  1. In any economy with debt contracts that fix principal in nominal terms, it is easier to fall into a destructive Fisherian debt-deflation chain of bankruptcies when you have a zero rate of inflation than when you have positive inflation and so some normal-time upward drift in the price level.
  2. Sometimes the Wicksellian “neutral” or “natural” short-term safe real interest rate will be less than zero. That’s the rate consistent with full employment and no price-level surprises. That’s the rate at which the economy wants to be, and the rate that a central bank properly performing its stabilization policy mission will aim for. But whenever the Wicksellian “neutral” rate is, say, -x%, no central bank can get the economy there unless the inflation rate is +x%.
  3. People really, really hate having their nominal wages cut. Firms would thus rather reduce costs by firing people than reduce costs by cutting nominal wages: in the first case, at least the people who hate you are no longer around to cause trouble and disrupt operations. Getting your nominal wages cut is a psychological diss with substantial sociological consequences. In an environment of moderate inflation firms thus have an extra degree of effective freedom at their disposal in reacting to changing circumstances: they can raise their prices by the amount of ongoing inflation, but not give the the corresponding inflation-compensating nominal wage increases. That extra degree of freedom is worth a considerable amount to employers. And it is worth a considerable amount to workers as well–for workers hate getting fired, especially in a slack economy, much, much more than they hate having their real wages eroded by inflation.

Paul Volcker, although he would not put it this way, seems to be working with a Lucas aggregate supply curve: that the unemployment rate is equal to the natural rate of unemployment minus or plus a slope parameter times how much people have been positively or negatively surprised by inflation, and that workers’ utility is highest when unemployment is at its natural rate, and lower when unemployment is either more or less than the natural rate.

Volcker, however, would not call it a Lucas aggregate supply curve. He would call it a Smithies aggregate supply curve, or a Viner (1936) aggregate supply curve:

In a world organized in accordance with Keynes’ specifications, there would be a constant race between the printing press and the business agents of the trade unions, with the problem of unemployment largely solved if the printing press could maintain a constant lead…

It has never been clear to me why this Viner aggregate supply function has such a hold on the economics profession as a benchmark model from which you start–and, in this case, stop–thinking.

I do not think it is clear to Cardiff Garcia either. In his conversation with Volcker, he raised these points:

Cardiff Garcia: If you have zero percent inflation, then you’re closer to having a [destructive] deflationary spiral…. If you have a little bit of positive inflation, then interest rates will be correspondingly a bit higher, so if there’s a downturn, you have room to lower them. And… if you have a little bit of inflation, then it’s easier for companies to give real wage cuts to their employees without laying them off, if they just freeze their wages and then they go down because of inflation…

But Volcker does not pick up on any of these–sea-room to avoid deflationary spirals, more freedom to move the Wicksellian “neutral” rate to where it wants to be, more labor-market flexibility. He simply takes immediate refuge in the Viner aggregate supply function, according to which it’s only unexpected inflation that ever matters for anything…

Must-Read: Paul Volcker: Cardiff Garcia’s Long Chat with Paul Volcker

Must-Read: This from Paul Volcker strikes me as really substantially wrong:

Paul Volcker: Cardiff Garcia’s Long Chat with Paul Volcker: “I would never interpret it as you have to have [inflation] exactly zero…

Prices tend to go up or down a little bit depending upon whether the economy’s booming or not booming. And I can’t understand making a fetish of a particular number, frankly. What you do want to create is a situation where people don’t worry about prices going up and they don’t make judgments based upon fears of inflation instead of straightforward analysis of what the real economy is doing. And I must confess, I think it’s something of a moral issue…. You shouldn’t be kind of fooling people all the time by having inflation they didn’t expect. Now, they answer, well, if they expect it, it’s okay. But if they expect it, it’s not doing you any good anyway. Those arguments you set forward don’t hold water if you’re expecting it…

Must-read: Cardiff Garcia: “China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough”

Cardiff Garcia: China and Traditional Industrialisation-Led Development: The World Was Not Enough: “[My] reaction was to be startled by [Justin Yifu Lin’s] comparison of China’s current position…

…to that of Japan in 1951 and South Korea in 1977…. Japan and Korea started rebalancing and liberalising their economies much later in the process than China did. Distortions… continued to linger for a long time after the rebalancing… the eventual opening is also challenging both in terms of timing and execution…. Japan and Korea are nonetheless held up as success stories of fast catchup growth in living standards. The best account… is Joe Studwell’s How Asia Works — check out Diane Coyle’s summary. Why were Japan and Korea able to pursue this model until per capita living standards were closer to those of rich countries, while China is undergoing this wrenching process so much sooner?…

A note by Credit Suisse economists offers a convincing explanation….

[A]fter growing at a steady pace of around 11% over the decade up until 2001, the pace of real Chinese export growth more than doubled in the period up to the Great Recession…. The problem with an increase in market share is that the adjustment is likely to be a one-off…. For China, this ‘adjustment’ back to a more normal growth model has been made much more difficult by external events and by the sheer size of the Chinese economy…. Despite GDP per capita only increasing to a still-modest 25% of that seen in the US, China now accounts for fully a third of global industrial production (up from only 5% as recently as the 1990s)….When you are that big, it becomes increasingly difficult to grow exports and production at a pace materially faster than growth in final global demand….

Finally… the Great Recession was a tremendous setback to the ultimate objective of more balanced growth…. The main policy mechanism for fighting the slowdown in 2008 and 2009 was a massive increase in investment, which we now know occurred at just the time that the export-driven growth model was breaking down….

The issue is complicated…. Automation… raises the prospect that premature de-industrialisation will be forced on countries who try this strategy anew…. Demographic changes surely also matter…. Still, what I take from the note is that China was just too big (or the world ex-China too small, if you prefer) for the model to ever work as well as it did in Japan and Korea…. That’s not to suggest that China was either right or wrong to follow this particular approach to catchup growth. Given this development strategy’s record in the case of Japan and Korea, maybe it made sense to try. Who can say what a counterfactual approach would have yielded?…

Must-Must-Must-Watch: FT Alphaville: Alphachatterbox

Must-Must-Must-Watch: Or, preferably I think, read–because they now have transcripts, so you can much more quickly absorb what are, I think, the best extended interview-format pieces I have seen:

FT Alphaville: Alphachatterbox: “Our podcast chat with Reihan Salam…

…Our chat with Esther Duflo — now with transcript…. Our podcast chat with Angus Deaton (updated with transcript)…. A chat with Greg Ip about ‘Foolproof’ (and the transcript)…. A wonky chat with Martin Wolf (plus the transcript)…. Our first Alphachatterbox episode is a talk with Anne-Marie Slaughter, whose new book Unfinished Business has just been published…